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Abstract 
This thesis makes two contributions to environmental criminology. The first 
contribution is a rational choice event model for mobile phone thieves. This is 
based on interviews with 40 mobile phone thieves. In addition, the deterrent 
effects of 23 designs of phone are assessed. Comparisons are made 
between the responses of offenders and non-offenders; and between 
experienced offenders and less experienced offenders. The results show that 
mobile phone thieves make discerning choices about which model of phone 
to steal at the point of theft. The factors affecting handset choice reflect 
Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED characteristics. Mobile phone thieves are 
differentially deterred by a variety of design solutions, the most effective of 
which reduce the resale value of stolen handsets. In contrast with offenders, 
non-offenders are more easily deterred, and statistically significantly more 
deterred for five of the 23 designs presented in this thesis; do not appreciate 
the importance of resale value; and are not so aware of the possibilities for 
circumventing or neutralising security technology. The differences between 
offender and non-offender responses mean that offenders are arguably best 
placed to assess product use and misuse in the process of designing-out 
crime. 
The second contribution of this thesis is a Mobile Phone Theft Index which 
controls for phone availability in the absence of handset sales data. Mobile 
phone theft is arguably a form of pollution (Roman and Farrell, 2002) and 
can, therefore, be controlled using traditional pollution control instruments 
(Farrell and Roman, 2006). Informing the public of their risk of victimisation 
according to handset ownership would make security a marketable aspect of 
handset design, incentivising industry to decrease theft rates. Industry action 
to date shows evidence of obstructionism and pre-regulatory initiatives 
(Newman, 2004) meaning that a novel instrument such as the Index is 
necessary to alter the current status quo where industry costs UK society an 
estimated £1.2 billion per year (Mailley and Farrell, 2006). 
 
Key words: crime prevention; design against crime; crime as pollution; 
mobile phone theft; offender interviews; rational choice perspective; routine 
activity theory.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the thesis 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the context of the research reported in this thesis, by 
defining the discipline to which the thesis contributes, and key topics within 
that discipline. A summary is presented of the crime problem under scrutiny, 
and of the research project within which much of the research reported was 
undertaken. The role of the present author within the research team is 
clarified in order to identify which aspects of the thesis are original works, 
and which were completed as part of a research team. The chapter gives an 
overview of each chapter, before concluding with a synopsis of the main 
conclusions and recommendations.  
 
Definitions 
The discipline of environmental criminology 
This thesis contributes to the discipline of environmental criminology. 
Environmental criminology is founded on a family of theories that share a 
common focus on criminal events and on the immediate circumstances in 
which these occur (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008). The main premise is that 
the immediate environment plays a key role in determining human behaviour 
(Bottoms and Wiles, 2002; Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008). Each crime is 
viewed as the result of interactions between people and the situation they 
are in, or a ‘person-situation interaction’ (Wortley and Mazorelle, 2008:1).  
Two applications of environmental criminology 
Situational crime prevention (SCP) is one application of environmental 
criminology. It aims to decrease crime by increasing both the effort and the 
risk of crime commission, decreasing the rewards, and removing the 
provocations and excuses which increase the frequency of crime 
commission (Clarke, 1980; Cornish and Clarke, 2003). SCP requires a focus 
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on specific forms of crime rather than on offender dispositions, and seeks to 
alter the nature and prevalence of crime opportunities (Clarke, 1980).  
Design against crime (DAC) is a further application of environmental 
criminology. It aims to decrease the criminogenic potential of products and 
services. The process of designing out crime from products and systems has 
been described by ‘the five Is’ which are to gather Intelligence; identify an 
Intervention; ensure that Implementation is complete and sustained; explore 
how to stimulate Involvement from all necessary stakeholders, and assess 
the final Impact in order to hone the previous steps (Ekblom, 2008a).  
Although a reasonably new field of application, there is a growing body of 
evidence that designing out crime from products is possible: a classic 
example is how an increase in security features of cars has decreased the 
prevalence of car theft (see for example Brown and Thomas, 2003; Farrell et 
al., 2011). Clarke and Newman (2005) review other examples of DAC 
including the use of toughened glass in British pubs to decrease violence 
related injuries, and the evolution of tamper-proof packaging for 
pharmaceutical products in the USA. Several authors have proposed that the 
level of security designed into new products should be commensurate with 
predicted risk, and this requires an assessment of theft risk (i.e. vulnerability) 
against the efficacy of any security features of the product (i.e. security) 
(Ekblom; 1995; Clarke and Newman, 2005; Armitage and Pease, 2008b) 
Crime as pollution 
Roman and Farrell (2002) propose that crime can be viewed as a form of 
pollution, since industry profits while the costs of crime are borne by society. 
Crime is an orthogonal (unrecognised) externality, and so the market can 
never define an acceptable level of pollution (Roman and Farrell, 2002; 
Farrell and Roman, 2006). Traditional forms of pollution are controlled 
successfully by a variety of control instruments and Farrell and Roman 
(2006) argue that these can be used to internalise crime pollution. The 
instrument that has been successful in decreasing UK car thefts is the UK 
Car Theft Index (Laycock, 2004). Publishing the relative risk of theft for 
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different car models created consumer and insurance industry demands for 
increased vehicle security, leading to the innovation of features such as 
immobilisers and better quality door locks (Laycock, 2004). In the USA, 
similar calls for increased vehicle security and safety were eventually 
successful, but led to industry obstructionism (denying the need for 
internalisation of costs, and blaming drivers) and pre-regulation initiatives 
(industry did the minimum necessary to prevent government regulation) 
(Karmen, 1981; Newman; 2004). 
The crime problem 
Mobile phone theft is a chronic crime problem in the UK (POST, 1995; 
Harrington and Mayhew, 2001; Hoare, 2007). The Home Office estimated 
that 80 000 phone thefts occurred in 2004/05 (Hoare, 2007). Phone theft is 
estimated to cost the UK economy at least £1.2 billion each year (Mailley and 
Farrell, 2006). Phone theft was partly responsible for an increase in street 
robbery and theft in 2000 (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001), leading to public 
and media pressure for the government to respond to the problem (Tilley et 
al., 2004).  
The research project 
In 2005 Professor Graham Farrell of Loughborough University secured 
funding from the EPSRC, under grant EP/C52036X/1. The key outcomes 
from the research project including publications are described below. 
Professor Farrell undertook the bulk of drafting of the publications. 
1) A systematic review of the literature describing the nature and extent of 
mobile phone theft in the UK, and industry and government efforts to 
decrease theft rates. A summary of this work was published in the 
practitioner journal Justice of the Peace as Mailley et al. (2006a) 
2) Interviews with 40 mobile phone thieves, which allowed an assessment of 
the choice-structuring properties of phone models and the wider theft 
situation, and the deterrent value of 23 designs of phone.  
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3) A Mobile Phone Theft Index which uses police recorded data to rank 
models of phone according to their risk of theft. Risk of theft is calculated by 
comparing what is taken with what is available for theft. The methodology is 
based on that of the UK Car Theft Index, but specific methodological 
adaptations allow for the absence of industry cooperation in supplying data 
describing the UK phone pool (what is available for theft). The original count-
based Index was published in Mailley et al. (2006b) and the final risk-based 
results in Mailley et al. (2008). 
4) An estimation of the cost of mobile phone theft to the UK. The cost was 
estimated to be at least £1.2 billion per year. This estimation uses figures 
based on Home Office research of 80 000 theft per year (Hoare, 2007) and 
was published in the newsletter of the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit 
(Mailley and Farrell, 2006). 
5) A novel assessment of the characteristics which make mobiles secure 
against theft, which can be summarised in the acronym IN SAFE HANDS. 
This work was mainly carried out by Shaun Whitehead, a member of the 
EPSRC project team, and published as Whitehead et al. (2008). 
6) An assessment of the prevalence of phones which have altered identities 
(IMEIs) in the UK phone pool. This research was undertaken by Whitehead, 
Mailley and a criminology student at Loughborough University, Ms Toulay 
Kaplankarin. The results were published as Kaplankarin et al. (2008). 
 
Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis makes two key contributions to the discipline of environmental 
criminology. Firstly, a rational choice event model is proposed for mobile 
phone thieves. This describes the choice-structuring properties of phones, 
victims and the wider theft situation which phone thieves consider when 
assessing a potential theft opportunity. The model adds a new case study to 
the body of knowledge about decision-making during crime events, and 
removes an excuse which was used by the mobile industry to minimise crime 
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prevention efforts. The claim that phone thieves will take anything available, 
and do not make choices at the point of theft, has been used by the mobile 
industry to argue that little can be done to prevent theft.  
Previous work on product proofing electronic products (Armitage and Pease, 
2008b) also highlighted the need to determine whether or not offenders 
consider security at the point of theft. The results reported in Chapters 5 and 
6 of this thesis show that security is a factor considered by offenders, 
because different design solutions resulted in a variation in deterrence. 
Offenders also consider the likely financial value of the handset, its 
functionality, how modern it is and whether they are already familiar with the 
model. The wider situational factors considered include the likelihood of 
victim retaliation; whether any watching public might intervene in the theft 
event or act as eye witnesses later; the seriousness of the offence and the 
likelihood of apprehension and conviction.  
The second contribution of this thesis is the production of a Mobile Phone 
Theft Index. The Index provides a novel means to incentivise the mobile 
phone industry to internalise the costs of phone theft pollution. The Index 
would inform consumers and insurance companies of the relative risk of theft 
for different models of phone, therefore incentivising the incorporation of 
improved security technology. The development of the Index resulted in a 
new methodology for controlling for product availability in the absence of a 
suitable denominator (what is available for theft), when calculating crime 
risk. The methodology has been refined in order to minimise the resources 
necessary for routine production of an Index. 
 
More minor contributions have evolved from the process of producing the 
two key outcomes. These are: 
 A thorough assessment of the nature and extent of mobile phone theft 
in the UK, and discussion of the methodological issues involved in 
collecting data on an underreported crime type (Allen et al., 2005 
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report that approximately half of phone theft incidents are not reported 
to the police);  
 Evidence to support the hypothesis that the mobile phone industry 
has, to date, not fully engaged with government driven efforts to 
reduce phone theft. Progress made to date can be seen as ‘pre-
regulation initiatives’, which aim to minimise investment in more 
responsible behaviours whilst still avoiding government regulation 
(Newman, 2004);  
 Identification of the supercontrollers (Sampson et al., 2010) who have 
the potential to affect phone theft prevention efforts in the UK.  
 A comparison of the decision-making processes of offenders and non-
offenders, and the implications of this for efforts to predict the crime 
risk of products; 
 A comparison of the decision-making processes of experienced 
mobile phone thieves with novices, and the implications of this for 
crime prevention policy; 
 Quantitative evidence that different handsets are at varying risk of 
theft, and that theft risk varies over time. Theft risk varies during ‘theft 
careers’ or illicit product life cycles (Felson and Clarke, 1998) during 
the crime harvest stage of the change-crime cycle (Pease, 1997). 
 
Clarifying roles 
The author was employed as research associate on the EPSRC funded 
project and carried out the literature review on the crime problem, and 
identified and approached key stakeholders such as mobile industry security 
experts (reported in Chapter 4 of this thesis). The synopsis of the history of 
phone theft prevention, and comparisons with Newman’s (2004) history of 
vehicle safety and security are the author’s own work.  
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The author devised the offender interview schedules with guidance from 
Professor Farrell; and conducted the majority of the offender interviews and 
carried out all of the results analysis. The design of the interview schedule 
and the results of the offender interviews are reported in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively. The mobile phone theft event model presented in Chapter 6; 
the comparisons with previous research into offender target selection; and 
conclusions regarding the implications for using non-offenders to ‘think thief’ 
in crime-proofing phones, are the author’s own work.  
The argument that mobile phone theft can be seen as a form of pollution is 
based on original arguments made by Roman and Farrell (2002) and Farrell 
and Roman (2006). The author analysed thousands of crime records and 
developed SPSS™ syntax with the help of Professor Farrell, to produce the 
count-based and risk-based Mobile Phone Theft Indices (reported in 
Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis). The conclusions regarding the most suitable 
methodology for the Index resulted from team discussions. Considerations of 
the alignment of routine activity theory (Sampson et al., 2010) with the notion 
of crime as pollution are the author’s own. This thesis has been written solely 
by the author. 
 
Summary of chapters 
Chapter 2 describes the constituent theories and applications of 
environmental criminology. Particular emphasis is given to the theories and 
applications which underpin the work presented in this thesis. These are the 
rational choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) and routine activity 
theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Sampson et al., 2010); and the applications 
of situational crime prevention and design against crime. Evidence is 
presented of the effectiveness of situational crime prevention and design 
against crime in decreasing crime rates, and the issue of predicting theft risk 
is discussed. The chapter concludes with a rebuttal of criticisms of situational 
crime prevention.  
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Chapter 3 introduces the notion of crime as pollution, and uses the example 
of the UK Car Theft Index to illustrate how public information mechanisms 
can stimulate consumer demand for aspects of design such as safety, or 
crime-proofing. In the UK, the regular production of a Car Theft Index 
stimulated industry to ‘design out crime’ by increasing the security features 
fitted as standard on new cars (Laycock, 2004). Hence immobilisers and 
central locking account for the majority of the two thirds decrease in UK car 
theft since the mid 1990s (Farrell et al., 2011). 
Crime is seen as a form of pollution when the crime is caused by the 
production of a product or by a system when crime was not an intended 
outcome. Unintended outcomes are termed externalities, and externalities 
which are not recognised are called orthogonal (Portney and Stavins, 2000). 
Being unrecognised, there is no demand for the externalities to be 
internalised, unless a market for the internalised outcome (safer products, for 
example), is created. In the absence of this market for internalisation, 
pollution will continue unabated.  
Indices can create new markets for less polluting products, by increasing 
consumer demand for, for example, increased safety. Some common uses of 
indices and of product marking are described. Consideration of crime as 
pollution naturally leads to consideration of responsibility for crime 
prevention, and the comments of other authors are summarised at the start 
of the chapter to set the context. The responsibility of offenders for their 
actions is assumed throughout the thesis, but is not the focus of the 
research. Policies which aim to alter offender motivation are less achievable 
and effective than policies which decrease the opportunities for crime 
(Clarke, 1980). 
 
Chapter 4 describes the chronic problem of mobile phone theft in the UK and 
introduces the key actors in the mobile phone industry who each have a role 
to play in decreasing phone theft opportunities. The chapter gives a flavour 
of the scale of profit available for investment in preventive actions, and the 
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domination of the industry by a small number of corporations who have, 
historically, acted together to resist calls from government to internalise 
crime costs. Comparisons are made between the actions of the UK mobile 
phone industry, and those of the vehicle manufacturing industry to calls for 
increased car safety and security (Karmen, 1981; Newman, 2004). It is 
argued that the UK mobile industry has not fully engaged with internalising 
the costs of phone theft. Furthermore, an industry-led assessment of how 
efficiently stolen phones are cut off (blacklisted) is methodologically unsound. 
It is therefore likely that the UK government believes that industry reaction 
has been effective, when in reality, further efficiency gains in blacklisting are 
the least that should be demanded from industry. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 respectively describe the methodology and the results of 
interviewing incarcerated mobile phone thieves and a control sample of non-
offenders (students at Loughborough University). The interviews asked 
participants about their offending behaviour, and elucidated the factors they 
consider when making phone theft choices. These factors were determined 
by asking participants to describe why they preferred one model of phone 
over another, for six matched pairs of phones, and by asking them to 
express how much they would be deterred from theft by 23 different design 
solutions. Chapter 5 describes the development of the interview 
questionnaire and the practicalities of gaining access to a suitable sample of 
offenders and controls. Chapter 6 presents the results of the interviews. The 
choices of offenders in response to the six pairs of phones and the 23 
deterrent designs are contrasted to the responses of non-offenders. In 
addition, the implications for predicting the theft risk of new products are 
discussed. The offenders’ responses are further broken down in to those of 
phone theft experts and novices, in order to assess whether any differences 
in preferences have implications for phone design and crime prevention 
policy. 
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Chapters 7 and 8 describe both the methodology and results for a count-
based Mobile Phone Theft Index and a risk-based Theft Index respectively. 
Chapter 7 describes the process of obtaining and cleaning the police records 
of the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit, based in London. The results of the 
count-based index are presented, and the methodological limitations noted. 
Chapter 8 then builds on the count based methodology to assess risk of theft 
for different models of phone. The methodology borrows heavily from the UK 
Car Theft Index, but a novel assessment of risk is necessary for phones 
since there exists no central and accessible record of which phones are 
available for theft. This methodology uses data already available to the 
National Mobile Phone Crime Unit and therefore requires no interaction with 
industry. The Index methodology is made minimal by demonstrating that the 
risk-based Index produced by recoded (cleaned) police records is 
significantly similar to that produced using original (raw) police records. 
Chapter 9 summarises the conclusions of the research and identifies areas 
for further research; and the implications for policy and for preventive action. 
It is proposed that the routine production of a Mobile Phone Theft Index 
would incentivise innovation in novel secure phone designs. The information 
available from the interviews with mobile phone thieves can be usefully 
employed to inform practitioners about many of the aspects to consider when 
designing-out crime from phones.  
 
Conclusions and recommendations of the thesis 
The general aims of this thesis were to assess the nature and extent of 
mobile phone theft, in part from the perspective of thieves, and to use this 
information to explore methods of decreasing the risk of victimisation to 
mobile phone owners. 
The conclusions and recommendations of this thesis are summarised below 
and are repeated in Chapter 9. The synopsis presented here is expanded on 
in Chapter 9, by clarifying the evidence which supports each statement.  
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A MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF MOBILE PHONE THEFT: ROUTINE 
ACTIVITY THEORY AND CRIME AS POLLUTION 
1. Mobile phones are the crime target in mobile phone theft. The role of 
guardian (of the phone) can be filled by the phone owner, members of the 
public, and by technological or physical security features of the phone. 
Manufacturers are the supercontrollers (Sampson et al., 2010) who define 
the supply of suitable technological or physical security features, and 
therefore the supply of suitable targets.  
2. The government, the police, insurers, and the public can be seen as 
supercontrollers who interact with phone manufacturers to create demand for 
increased security.  
3. One means of aligning the incentives of all supercontrollers is to create 
public demand for increased security.  
4. One method of creating a market for phone security is to inform 
consumers of the variance in theft risk across handsets.  
 
 
A MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF MOBILE PHONE THEFT: THE 
RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE  
Mobile phone thieves display rationality in their choice of victim and their 
choice of phone target. A rational mobile phone event model is presented 
below, and is reproduced from Figure 5.6 of this thesis. 
1. Mobile phone thieves prefer to take some models of phone over others. 
Thieves are not on aggregate opportunists who take any phone available.  
2. Different handsets are at varying risk of theft, and theft risk varies over 
time. 
3. The main factor which increases risk of theft is resale value, which is 
assessed using the properties of handset moderness and functionality. 
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4. Increased experience of mobile phone theft leads to faster decision-
making, because elements of the decision-making process are automatic.  
5. Experienced thieves are less easily deterred than are novices, and are 
more resourceful in finding methods to overcome security measures. 
Figure 5.6: A rational choice event model for mobile phone theft 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY 
1. A Mobile Phone Theft Index should be produced using NMPCU (National 
Mobile Phone Crime Unit) data on a quarterly basis.  
a) The routine production of a risk-based Mobile Phone Theft Index 
which assesses risk of theft for different models of phones is feasible 
and methodologically justifiable using data which already exist within 
the crime records held by the UK’s NMPCU.  
b) The equation for assessing theft risk for each phone model is: 
Risk Ratio =   Proportion taken in targeted crimes (phone-only) 
Proportion taken in acquisitive crimes (not phone-only). 
 
c) The Index can use non-cleaned NMPCU data, saving on the 
resources necessary for routine production.  
d) The Index should include all types of mobile phone theft (for 
example burglary; theft from the person), apart from bulk thefts.  
e) The Index should only include models of phone where at least 100 
handsets have been taken, but further analysis should reassess this 
threshold over time.  
f) The Index should initially be produced on a three-monthly (quarterly) 
basis, but this time period should be reassessed depending on the 
theft trajectories or ‘theft careers’ of the most stolen phones. 
 
2. The effectiveness of the Index should be assessed by NMPCU. 
3. It is imperative that an independent review assesses the efficiency of 
blacklisting (cutting off phones by network operators). 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNING-OUT CRIME FROM MOBILE PHONES 
1. IMEI Blacklisting should not be the sole focus of future crime prevention 
efforts.  
2. Future designs which aim to deter thieves should greatly reduce the resale 
value of handsets, perhaps by using advanced technology. It is imperative 
that technological solutions cannot be easily bypassed; and that tracking 
devices result in a swift and negative consequence. 
3. Non-offenders are not suitable substitutes for offenders when predicting 
the crime consequences of new products.  
4. The deterrent effects of the 23 designs which were assessed in the 
offender interviews reported here should be used to refine the weighting of 
Clarke and Newman’s (2005) checklist of product security when considering 
mobile phones.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. The efficiency of blacklisting phones needs to be assessed, via an 
independent and blind test. The results should be compared to those 
reported by System Concepts who carried out previous tests of blacklisting 
efficiency (see Pimm et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2007). 
2. Further assessments of the different responses given by offenders and 
non-offenders to questions concerning deterrence are warranted. The 
majority of the non-offender population used in this research were design 
students, and a wider variety of non-offenders should be assessed to 
develop a more representative model of non-offender responses.  
3. Further assessments of a wider variety and greater number of mobile 
phone thieves are needed, in order to verify the validity of the initial rational 
choice event model proposed here.  
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4. Future research should consider whether the questions asked in the 
interview schedules used here could be randomised in order to minimise any 
order effects created by the interview design. 
5. The research presented here has focused on stated preferences between 
phone models, and used police crime data to explore ‘real world’ 
preferences. Future research should utilise mock-up theft scenes, and 
technology such as eye-scanning tools, to assess offender and non-offender 
responses to potential theft targets in the context of more complex and non-
interview environments. Observing the eye movements of offenders and non-
offenders, as well as novice and more experienced thieves, would be an 
ideal way to assess how accurate are hypotheses that aspects of target 
recognition become more swiftly recognised with increased theft experience.  
6. Since the empirical work for this thesis was undertaken, a key 
development is that the UK Home Office is considering regular production of 
the Mobile Phone Theft Index. Future independent research should measure 
theft rates, theft MO, and geographic patterns of thefts before and after Index 
publication, to test for preventive and possible displacement effects of the 
Index on phone thefts. There remains the question of how swiftly any 
decrease in theft rates would translate from Index, through to manufacturers, 
and onto the ground where consumers experience decreased risk of theft. 
This will in part depend upon manufacturer responses to the Index. It will 
also depend in part on whether the publicity alone from the Index has a 
positive effect and prevents some phone thefts before any newly designed 
models are released. Further desk-based research is needed to assess the 
probable timescales of the initial and longer term effects of the Index.  
7. If an Index is to be produced regularly, the methodology used to produce it 
should be refined according to the recommendations made under the section 
‘Implications for government policy’. 
8. Further research should explore the nature of the phones which were 
discarded in the lost property sections of Loughborough Police and 
University, and could be expanded to a wider variety of lost property depots. 
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Industry data describing the profile (market share) of handsets sold around 
the dates that the lost handsets were handed in, should be compared to the 
profile of the handsets handed to lost property departments. This would allow 
an assessment of whether or not the discarded phones were the older and 
less valuable models of their day, which is the result predicted by the 
research presented in this thesis.  
9. Data held by the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit should be mined 
further in order to assess the nature of several aspects of the ‘theft careers’ 
of different handsets. It appears from the initial analyses presented here that 
different models display theft careers of varying length and scale; and 
quantification of these factors would help to predict future theft patterns if 
those factors could be linked to some measurable aspect of the handset. It is 
likely that those measurable aspects will reflect the characteristics of 
CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) but operationalising (quantifying) these 
characteristics requires further research.  
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Chapter 2: Environmental criminology, situational crime prevention and 
design against crime. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the three key theories upon which environmental 
criminology is built. Particular focus is given to the rational choice perspective 
(Cornish and Clarke, 1986) and routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979 
and Sampson et al., 2010) because these form the two lenses through which 
the problem of mobile phone theft is examined in this thesis. The chapter 
discusses and provides examples of two applications of the founding theories of 
environmental criminology. These are design against crime (Ekblom, 1997; 
2008) and situational crime prevention (Clarke, 2008). Both aim to decrease 
crime rates and are relevant respectively to micro and macro discussions about 
mobile phone design. The change-crime cycle (Pease, 1997) describes the 
process whereby new products or services are created without any thought 
being given to their crime consequences. Felson and Clarke (1998) propose 
that risk of theft varies during the crime consequence stage, mirroring the 
product life-cycle of legitimate products. The attributes which make products 
attractive targets for theft can be summarised in the acronym CRAVED (Clarke, 
1999. Examples are given of successful situational crime prevention 
interventions and design against crime products. The case is made that 
incentivising crime-proofing of commonly stolen products remains problematic 
since there is no legal responsibility nor liability for business or central 
government to do so (Moss and Pease, 1999). The chapter concludes by 
presenting some common criticisms of situational crime prevention and 
environmental criminology, and their rebuttals.  
 
Environmental criminology and Crime science 
Environmental criminology is founded on a family of theories that share a 
common focus on criminal events and the immediate circumstances in which 
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they occur (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008). The main premise of environmental 
criminology is that the immediate environment plays a key role in determining 
human behaviour (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008). Each crime is viewed as the 
result of interactions between people and the situation they are in, i.e. a ‘person-
situation interaction’ (Wortley and Mazorelle, 2008:1).  
 
In contrast to traditional criminology, little weight is given to the role of people’s 
disposition to offend. Clarke (1997) argues that traditional criminology has made 
the error of assuming that explaining criminals is the same as explaining crime. 
Criminological focus on the dispositions of offenders naturally results in any 
attempts to describe, explain and affect crime being limited to describing, 
explaining or affecting only those dispositions. Furthermore, since the factors 
which affect dispositions are extremely varied, interact in a complex manner and 
are spread throughout an individual’s lifetime, policy which tries to influence 
these factors is bound to be ineffective (Clarke, 1997). The theoretical 
foundation of environmental criminology is comprised of three related 
perspectives. The basic elements of each are described below and expanded 
upon in what follows. 
 
The phrase Crime Scientist is used to communicate the role of the outcome 
driven, environmental criminologist as crime expert, working across disciplinary 
boundaries to exploit fully a wide range of analytical tools and solution options 
(Laycock, 2003; Clarke, 2004; Pease, 2008). The Jill Dando Institute of Crime 
Science was established in 2001 at University College London and was the first 
criminological unit in the UK dedicated solely to the study of crime and its 
prevention. Crime scientists deliberately seek to forge links with disciplines 
outside the social sciences, and will for example consult technological experts 
or evolutionary biologists when appropriate. Crime science is based firmly upon 
the founding theories of environmental criminology, which are introduced below. 
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Firstly routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) originally described the 
three basic elements necessary for a direct-contact predatory crime to occur. 
Crime events occur when (1) a motivated offender comes in to contact with (2) a 
suitable target, at a specific time and place, in (3) the absence of a capable 
guardian. Only one of the three elements needs to be removed to prevent a 
crime from occurring (Cohen and Felson, 1979).  
 
Secondly, the rational choice perspective (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish 
and Clarke, 1986) describes the decisions made by offenders to be involved in 
criminality at all (involvement decisions), and the specific decisions made during 
crime commission (event decisions). The central premise of the rational choice 
perspective is that offenders seek to benefit themselves from their behaviour. 
Therefore offenders are viewed as rational beings who make judgements about 
which behaviour will and will not be beneficial (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). 
 
Finally, crime pattern theory recognises that crimes cluster in time and space 
rather than being uniformly distributed (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). 
Crimes tend to cluster in specific places according to what typically happens in 
those places: for example mobile phone thefts are common outside the exits of 
underground train stations because people reappearing from tube stations tend 
to check their mobiles, thereby making them excellent targets for theft (Hoare, 
2007). 
 
Rational Choice Perspective 
In 1980 the basic elements of a rational choice perspective of offending were 
proposed by Ronald Clarke (1980). Citing evidence that people interviewed by 
social scientists were usually aware of consciously choosing to commit 
offences, Clarke (1980) proposed that criminological emphasis should be placed 
on offenders’ decisions and choices rather than on offenders’ dispositions. Such 
emphasis would, he argued: 
24 
 
 
(1) Focus criminological examination on criminal events, as opposed to 
offenders, 
(2) Make explicit the need for separate explanations of different 
categories of crime, as opposed to any attempts to develop a general 
theory of crime, and 
(3) Give more significance to the immediate setting of the crime and the 
offender’s current circumstances, as opposed to the traditional focus on 
offender psychology or biology (Clarke, 1980). 
 
By 1985 the rational choice perspective had been developed further by Clarke 
and Cornish (1985). After synthesising evidence from a variety of disciplines 
including criminology, psychology and economics, Clarke and Cornish (1985) 
proposed a series of offender decision models which were designed to inform 
research and policy development. A key development was to consider 
separately the decisions to be involved in crime at all (involvement, continuance 
and desistance decisions) and decisions made during the commission of an 
offence (event decisions). Together, the different decision models comfortably 
encompassed consideration of the influence of social, psychological and 
environmental factors on human decisions (Cornish and Clarke, 1986). The 
need for crime-specific analyses continued to be stressed as it had been by 
Clarke (1980), especially in event models, because specific forms of crime 
event require specific remedies (Clarke and Cornish, 1985).  
 
The models detailing the decision to be involved in crime, and the decisions 
made during the crime event are reproduced and discussed below. The event 
model is pertinent to Chapter 8 of this thesis, which describes the event choices 
made by the mobile phone thieves who were interviewed for this research. In 
the schematics of the involvement and event models presented below, 
residential burglary is used because there was available to Clarke and Cornish 
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(1985) a mixture of recent empirical research and anecdotal or theorised 
knowledge about this specific offence type. 
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Figure 2.1: Initial involvement model (example: burglary in a middle-class 
suburb) 
 
 
Source: Clarke and Cornish (1985) 
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Box 7 in Figure 2.1 represents an offender’s ‘readiness’ to commit the offence 
under consideration. Readiness implies that the offender has considered what 
he/she might do if faced with a suitable opportunity to offend and has decided, 
on some level at least, that offending is a viable option. Readiness to offend is 
affected by a variety of factors, but mainly whether the offence is perceived as a 
satisfactory means of meeting needs. In turn the inclusion of an illegal act in box 
5 (perceived solution) is influenced by the offender’s generalised needs (box 3) 
and previous learning and experience (box 2), which are both in turn reliant on 
‘background factors’ (box 1) (Clarke and Cornish, 1985).  
 
Figure 2.2: Event model (example: burglary in a middle-class suburb) 
 
Source: Clarke and Cornish (1985). 
 
The event model depicts the decisions made by a ready burglar to target one 
particular house in favour of others. Clarke and Cornish (1985) predicted that 
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other types of crime might have longer sequences, and that it was highly likely 
that broader categories of offence would have longer sequences. The rational 
choice perspective acknowledges that the information available to offenders 
may be incomplete; that planning might be rudimentary; and that offender 
information processes might not be perfect. These acknowledgements set the 
criminological rational choice perspective apart from purely economic models of 
decision making, and provide an explanation for decisions which may appear 
irrational to another person (Clarke and Cornish, 1985).  
 
The continuance model defined three categories of variable which Clarke and 
Cornish (1985) argued act to increase the readiness of an offender to commit a 
specific offence type. These can be summarised as: 
 
1) An increase in professionalism: increased skills and knowledge reduce the 
risk of apprehension and failed offence attempts, while the acquisition of fencing 
contacts maximises the financial gain of offence commission. 
2) Life style changes influencing readiness: increased reliance on offences to 
satisfy relevant needs, coupled with alterations in legitimate behaviour to 
increase the frequency with which suitable opportunities are encountered, may 
lead to overall devaluation of legitimate ends to meet needs and the rehearsal of 
excuses and justifications for criminal behaviour. 
3) Changes in peer networks: increased positive encounters with criminal peers 
will skew the offenders’ ‘routine relationships’ towards others who commit 
similar acts. Ironically, criminal peer networks might be strengthened the most 
during incarceration (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). 
 
The role of crime precipitators 
Wortley (1997) argued that situational variables were not only responsible for 
allowing criminal behaviour to occur, but that in some circumstances they would 
precipitate or induce criminal behaviour. Therefore efforts to reduce criminality 
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by altering only the perceived costs and benefits of crime commission were 
ignoring the role of situations in inducing criminal behaviour. Wortley (1997) 
classified precipitating factors as situations that prompt illicit behaviour; 
situations that exert social pressure; situations that permit illicit behaviour and 
situations that provoke such behaviour.  
 
In response to Wortley’s arguments, Cornish and Clarke (2003) agreed that 
precipitators have a role to play in offender decision making, but argued that this 
role is not equal to the role played by opportunity. They saw the role of 
precipitators as mainly acting on offender motivation and therefore on 
involvement decisions, and then only in some types of crime. Therefore, while 
acknowledging that in some types of crime the precipitator might cause the urge 
to offend, or give cues that it was permissible to offend, this still only created the 
‘ready offender’ who still needed a suitable opportunity within which to commit 
his/her offence. When precipitators were seen as initiating illicit behaviour, this 
could only occur once for each offender because after an initial precipitation 
event, the offender would be seen in rational choice terms as ready to offend 
again. However, the expansion of focus to include the motivational element of 
decision making was welcomed as an important contribution to widening the 
scope of crimes which crime prevention specialists might tackle (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003). In response to the arguments made by Wortley (1997), the 
variety of techniques available to practitioners wishing to decrease crime was 
expanded, and is discussed in the section on Situational Crime Prevention later 
in this chapter.   
 
Offence specialisation 
The ability of the rational choice perspective to predict and explain offence 
specialisation (where offenders commit crimes within a ‘cluster’ of similarly 
motivated and enacted events) was questioned by Kempf (1986). She argued 
that the continuance model implied the repetition of specific types of crime, and 
30 
 
that the rational choice perspective therefore predicted increased specialisation 
along an offending career. As Guerette (2005) highlights, this conclusion may 
result from a confusion of the original demand for crime specificity when 
considering a crime event, with an assumption of crime specificity by the 
offender. That is, although analytical focus has to be narrowly focused and 
differentiate, for example, between theft of cars for joy riding and theft of cars for 
resale abroad (Clarke and Harris, 1992), the crime-specific focus makes no 
assumption of the variety of offence types committed by the offender (Cornish 
and Clarke, 1985). The results of interviews with 40 mobile phone thieves 
reported in Chapter 6 of this thesis provide evidence of a mixture of offence 
specialisation and versatility among the sample. Some evidence of increasing 
specialisation with experience is presented and discussed in that chapter.  
 
Routine activity theory 
The central premise of routine activity theory is that a crime event occurs when 
a motivated offender makes contact at a given time and place with a suitable 
target, while a capable guardian is not present (Cohen and Felson, 1979). The 
latest version of routine activity theory is depicted in Figure 2.3 below and is 
taken from Sampson et al. (2010) which was published during the preparation of 
this thesis. The inner triangle represents the three elements deemed necessary 
for an offence to occur. These three elements are offender, target and place. 
Working outwards, the next layer depicts the people who might have 
supervisory roles (Felson, 2002) which influence the offender, target and place. 
Finally, Sampson et al.’s (2010) contribution of the supercontroller is depicted by 
the outermost triangle. Routine activity theory is immensely influential in 
environmental criminology, and so acknowledgement of the innovative thinking 
which led to its inception, and recognition of the micro and macro level 
implications of it, are warranted. A brief history of the various iterations of 
routine activity theory is described below, to afford these aspects their due 
attention.  
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The origins of routine activity theory 
Cohen and Felson (1979) were the first criminologists to explain effectively why 
post-World War II crime rates rose in the USA at the same time as a decrease 
occurred in the social conditions which had traditionally been thought to cause 
crime. Dispositional theories of crime predicted that improvement in social 
conditions should lead to decreases in crime. However as unemployment fell 
and economic and educational disparities between white and ethnic minorities 
reduced, both acquisitive and violent crime levels rose significantly (Cohen and 
Felson, 1979). The assumed drivers of crime rates were proved false.   
 
Figure 2.3: Routine activity theory complete with super controllers. 
 
Source: Sampson, Eck and Dunham (2010) 
 
32 
 
Cohen and Felson (1979) proposed that at a micro level crime events resulted 
when a motivated offender met a suitable target, at a specific time and place, in 
the absence of a capable guardian. A guardian was not necessarily a formal 
figure such as a guard or policeman, but could be a teacher, parent, neighbour 
or passerby. They might deliberately or inadvertently decrease the likelihood 
that a criminal act took place in their presence (Cohen and Felson, 1979). The 
simplicity of this model risks masking its ingenuity and immense impact on 
criminology. Shifting analytical emphasis away from the offender and on to the 
components of a crime event instigated a paradigm shift in how crime events 
and crime rates were (and still are) understood by environmental criminologists 
(Cornish and Clarke, 2008).  
 
Increased numbers of targets (such as televisions) simply increased the 
probability of the convergence of an offender and target. Conversely social 
trends such as increased employment decreased the number of suitable 
guardians at home during the day, and increased the concentration of people 
and goods on business premises. Thus, changing crime rates were explained 
by changes in the ‘ebb and flow of everyday life’ (Felson, 1986; 2002) and did 
not necessarily imply a change in offender motivation or in the number of 
offenders. In the original version of routine activity theory, the supply of 
offenders was taken as constant (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 2002). In 
response to Wortley’s (1997) consideration of precipitators, this view was later 
revised and situations recognised as being capable, in some circumstances, of 
creating a ready offender who in a different situation, might not be described as 
ready to offend (Felson, 2002). 
 
Cohen and Felson (1979) demonstrated the empirical fit between their theory 
and increases in USA crime rates. One example was that, according to the US 
census, daytime burglary rates rose by 15 percent between 1960 and 1970. At 
the same time, the number of females entering employment and the number of 
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single resident households increased. They argued that increased burglary 
rates could be explained by decreased daytime guardianship of residential 
housing. The suitability of certain targets for theft also increased: the lightest 
television listed for sale in the popular USA retail catalogue Sears was 38lbs in 
1960, compared to 15lbs in 1970. Cohen and Felson (1979) also noted similar 
trends in miniaturisation and weight decrease for products such as radios, 
record players and tape recorders. This trend continues today and the issue of 
target suitability, including portability, is discussed in more detail below.  
 
Since the original version Felson and Clarke (1998) and Felson (2002) have 
shown that seemingly senseless or emotional crimes can be understood in 
terms of routine activity theory once (1) the details and sequence leading up to 
the offence are known, and crucially (2) crimes are seen from the viewpoint of 
the offender. Examples of how opportunity influences crime rates include the 
observations that the likelihood of a male’s aggressive response to a verbal 
insult decreases when the proportion of ‘observers’ who are either middle-aged 
or female is increased; bigger or taller people tend to attack those shorter or 
smaller than themselves; and gangs of offenders are more likely to attack 
groups with fewer numbers than their own (Felson and Clarke, 1998). Similarly, 
child abuse is most frequently carried out by people known to the child and who 
therefore have access and the ability to spend time with the child and not be 
interrupted by guardians (Wortley and Smallbone, 2006). Comparing the murder 
rate of the USA with the UK demonstrates most clearly that access to lethal 
weapons increases the incidence of deaths caused by the concurrence of a gun 
being too close and a hospital being too far away (Felson and Clarke, 1998; 
Felson 2002).  
 
The addition of offender handlers and place managers 
In 1986 Marcus Felson expanded routine activity theory to include a fourth 
element: the intimate handler. The handler is someone able to affect the 
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behaviour of the (potential) offender. A handler, whether parent, teacher, friend 
or colleague, was someone whose social bond or ‘handle’ on the offender might 
be grasped in order to influence behaviour. The handler could prevent a crime 
event if they were present or exerted influence over the offender, even if the 
offender came into contact with a suitable target which was not sufficiently 
guarded (Felson, 1986).  
John Eck (1994, in Felson, 1995) added the final person depicted in routine 
activity theory: the place manager. Managers are individuals who control or 
monitor places, thereby influencing access to, and the behaviour tolerated in, 
those places. Managers include home owners, janitors, receptionists, formally 
employed managers, and bus drivers (Eck, 1994 in Felson, 1995). Felson 
(1995: 55) summarised the implication for crime control as the fact that in order 
for a crime to occur, ‘an offender has to get loose from his handlers, then find a 
target unprotected by guardians in a place free from intrusive managers’.  
 
The addition of crime facilitators 
In 1992 Ronald Clarke (Clarke,1992) further developed the routine activity 
approach by proposing the inclusion of crime facilitators. Crime facilitators fall 
into three categories. Physical facilitators either help in crime commission, 
and/or help to overcome preventive interventions. They include items such as 
vehicles which can be used as transport to and from offense sites; telephones 
which can be used to make obscene phone calls or to organise drug deals, and 
tools such as weapons which can be used to threaten or injure victims. Social 
facilitators such as peer pressure stimulate offending, often by providing 
excuses for offending behaviour. Chemical facilitators comprise drugs including 
alcohol, which reduce inhibitions and alter offenders’ perceptions of the 
likelihood and impact of the consequences of crime (Clarke, 1992). The supply 
of facilitators is determined by the physical environment, and the convergence 
of offenders with facilitators depends on offenders’ routine activities. Controlling 
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or altering the supply or usefulness of facilitators is therefore an important factor 
in altering crime opportunities (Clarke, 1992; 1997).   
 
The addition of super controllers 
Super controllers are those who regulate the conduct of controllers. They 
thereby affect whether or not controllers fulfil their role as potential preventers of 
crime, and have an indirect influence on crime occurrence (Sampson et al., 
2010). The typology of super controllers proposed by Sampson et al., (2010) is 
reproduced below in Table 2.1. Three broad categories of super controller are 
further broken down into ten more closely defined types. Formal super 
controllers tend to be institutions, while diffuse super controllers rarely consist of 
a single entity and are described instead as collections. Personal super 
controllers are networks of individuals or individuals who directly influence a 
controller. The typology is not mutually exclusive - super controllers can act in 
multiple roles and on each other (Sampson et al., 2010). However, the typology 
offers a starting point for thinking about super controllers and defines a research 
agenda which requires empirical evidence of the mechanisms by which super 
controllers work, and documentation of their effectiveness. According to 
Sampson et al. (2010) super controllers influence controllers in accordance with 
the rational choice perspective, since the controllers they influence make 
decisions about when and how to intervene in crime prevention according to 
considerations of the risk, reward, effort, excuses and provocations involved. 
Thus when a controller’s effort is minimal, and reward maximised, super 
controllers will exert their full influence over controllers. When the opposite is 
true, crime prevention is rarely implemented. Similarly, if the leverage used by a 
super controller (for example reducing risk of negative publicity) is not aligned 
with the concerns of the controller (they are for example most sensitive to cost), 
then crime prevention is not likely to result (Sampson et al., 2010). 
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Chapter 3 of this thesis describes key literature which explores how market 
demand can be stimulated in order to provide incentives for crime control. In the 
case study of mobile phone theft, the government, the public and the police can 
be described as super controllers who influence the mobile manufacturers, 
another super controller. 
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Table 2.1: Typology of super controllers 
Category Type Example 
Formal Organisational Nightclub chain replaces glass beer mugs with 
polycarbonates; prison authorities train and set 
rules for their staff. 
Contractual Sports venue has contract with a security firm; 
landlord has contract with a property 
management firm. 
Financial Car insurer pressurises car rental agency to 
decrease car thefts, by threatening to increase 
premiums. 
Regulatory Private sector: malls require minors to be 
accompanied by adults. 
Public sector: government agencies set rules 
under which businesses operate. 
Courts Local government attorneys take property owners 
to (civil) court for inaction relating to continued 
nuisance behaviour on the property. 
Diffuse Political State legislation controlling pharmaceutical drug 
sales 
Markets University produces lists of certified housing 
suppliers for students; standard kite marks such 
as from the British Standards Institute (BSI). 
Media Positive publicity stimulates crime prevention; 
negative publicity similarly galvanises 
organisations into action. 
Personal Groups Neighbours influence the behaviour of other 
neighbours. 
Family Foster children’s organisations affect the 
behaviour of foster parents. 
Source: Adapted from Sampson et al., (2010).
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Felson and Clarke (1998) summarised the implications of combining the 
founding theories of environmental criminology in ten principles. These 
principles specify the various ways in which crime and opportunities are related, 
and are reproduced below in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2: Ten principles of opportunity and crime 
1. Opportunities play a role in causing all crime. 
2. Crime opportunities are highly specific. 
3. Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and space. 
4. Crime opportunities depend on everyday movements and activity. 
5. One crime produces opportunities for another. 
6. Some products offer more tempting crime opportunities. 
7. Social and technological changes produce new crime opportunities. 
8. Crime can be prevented by reducing opportunities. 
9. Reducing opportunities does not usually displace crime. 
10. Focused opportunity reduction can produce wider declines in crime. 
(Source: Felson and Clarke, 1998) 
 
Geographic dimensions of crime patterns and policing styles. 
Due to the specific focus of this thesis, some important concepts within 
environmental criminology are not discussed in detail: this is a reflection of the 
orientation of this thesis and not of the importance of these concepts. They can 
be divided into two groups: the geographic dimensions of crime and the 
application of this knowledge to analysing crime patterns, and styles of policing. 
Both are summarised here. Generally speaking, the geographic dimensions of 
crime describe how crime concentrates at specific times and places due to 
place-based factors; aggregate crime patterns can be identified and used to 
inform crime prevention practices and policing tactics. More specifically, 
geographic profiling (reviewed by Rossmo and Rombouts, 2008) studies the 
distances travelled by offenders from their abodes to the places where they 
search for and seize crime opportunities. Profiling aims to help police identify 
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the area in which an unknown suspect might live, based on a comparison of his/ 
her offending patterns with those of previous offenders. The technique can be 
successful (Rossmo and Rombouts, 2008) but in line with any predictive 
methodology also has limitations (Bouhana, 2004).  
Repeat victimisation (Farrell and Pease, 2008) describes how a disproportionate 
amount of crime is concentrated on specific people and places. The implications 
of repeat victimisation for crime prevention implementation and policing styles 
are immense: knowing where crime concentrates allows resources to be 
targeted as efficiently as possible to produce the greatest net social gain from 
limited resources (Farrell and Pease, 2008).  
Crime mapping and hotspot analysis (Anselin et al, 2008) are tools used by 
intelligence analysts to describe the geographic patterns of crime. ‘Hot’ 
geographic areas are the places where crime concentrates, and those areas 
requiring preventive interventions and police response.  
Two key styles of policing related to environmental criminology are 
differentiated. Problem-oriented-policing (Scott et al, 2008) uses the same 
problem-solving methodology as situational crime prevention (Clarke, 2008), 
and seeks to address issues which are traditionally seen as outside police 
remits. Partnerships are key to the success of problem-oriented policing since a 
variety of stakeholders are necessary to solve the broad range of issues 
contributing to the crime problem (Scott et al., 2008). Intelligence-led policing 
(Ratcliffe, 2008) is more oriented towards prolific criminals and gangs than 
problem-oriented policing, and uses an extended range of information sources 
to gather intelligence which inform police management (Ratcliffe, 2008).  
 
Target suitability and attractiveness 
Pease (1997) describes the ‘crime-change cycle’ observed in relation to many 
new products and services. The cycle consists of three stages: 
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‘(a) the change occurs with little or no reference to its crime 
consequences; (b) the crime consequences become evident; (c) the 
change is revoked or a partial solution retrofitted to the problem.’ (Pease 
1997: 235). 
 
Pease (1997) observed that the cycle occurs because crime consequences are 
rarely, if ever, predicted. Predicting crime trends is difficult, but worthy of attempt 
since partial solutions and those that are retro-fitted are consistently less 
effective and more expensive than designing-out the crime potential of 
innovations before their release (Pease, 1997).  
 
VIVA 
Felson and Clarke (1998) proposed that the suitability of crime targets is 
influenced by four elements. These were: Value, Inertia, Visibility, and Access. 
The VIVA acronym was an exploratory attempt to identify the separate qualities 
of products, which made crime commission more likely.  
 
Later, the term ‘hot products’ was coined to describe products commonly stolen, 
in parallel with the emerging discipline of geographic profiling which used the 
term ‘hot spots’ to describe areas with high crime concentrations (Felson and 
Clarke, 1998). However, the reasons why some products were hot and some 
less so were not fully understood: 
 
“Studies are also needed to elucidate the criminogenic properties of 
whole classes of products, such as cellular phones.” (Felson and Clarke, 
1998; 21). 
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CRAVED 
The first comprehensive review of the items most stolen in a variety of theft 
types was published by the UK Home Office’s Policing and Reducing Crime Unit 
in 1999 (Clarke, 1999). The review aimed to evidence which products were ‘hot’ 
and why. Specific items were consistently stolen by thieves, for each kind of 
theft studied, and clear patterns emerged. For example, residential burglars took 
jewellery, videos, cash, stereos and televisions, where as shoplifters varied their 
favourite targets depending on the store. Book stores lost more magazines and 
cassette tapes than books, while supermarkets suffered the loss of cigarettes, 
video tapes, beauty aids and non-prescription medicine. However, despite 
variation in risk of theft according to setting, some items were consistently at 
higher risk of theft and included cassettes, cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, and 
fashion items such as Nike training shoes (Clarke, 1999). 
 
Clarke (1999) proposed that the key attributes of these hot products could be 
summarised in the acronym CRAVED, which replaced VIVA. ‘Hot’ products 
were Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable. 
Value could be either financial or psychological, while the attribute disposability 
was predicted to have the greatest effect on how often an item was stolen 
(Clarke, 1999). More recently, empirical research has used CRAVED to explore 
the theft patterns of products which physically appear very different from 
cigarettes and cassettes but can be seen as fashionable items within certain 
circles. Pires and Clarke (2011) operationalised each of the CRAVED variables 
to assess the theft patterns of parrots in Mexico. They found that those species 
which nest closest to open markets (where the birds can be sold) are stolen 
more frequently than those species which are rarer and more valuable, but nest 
further away. This finding is important as it lends support to the hypothesis that 
parrot poaching in this context is opportunistic rather than organised. A more 
organised criminal network would be predicted to focus efforts on the more 
valuable species (Clarke and Pires, 2011). 
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Cornish and Clarke (1987) recognised that target suitability is only one element 
which predicts the likelihood of theft: The rational choice perspective results in a 
consideration of the broader ‘choice structuring properties’ of crime settings. 
The choice structuring properties of a potential offence are, they argued, a 
combination of motive and situational factors which predict the likelihood of 
offence commission, by different subgroups of offender, or by the same 
subgroup of offenders at different times. Choice structuring properties will be 
unique to each crime setting but in general include: 
  
 Target availability (the number of targets and their accessibility);  
 Offender awareness of the required methodology to obtain the targets;  
 The likely cash yield per crime;  
 Planning and physical resources required;  
 The time required for offence commission and the need for assistance of 
and coordination with other offenders;  
 The risk of apprehension and severity of punishment if caught;  
 The level of violence required;  
 The nature of any potential victims;  
 The means to get rid of any stolen goods (fencing contacts and 
accessories); and a moral evaluation (Cornish and Clarke, 1987).  
 
Product life cycles 
Building on Pease’s (1997) macro level crime-change cycle of product 
innovation, crime consequence and response, Felson and Clarke (1998) 
proposed a model to describe the four stages within Pease’s (1997) crime 
consequence stage. They described the vulnerability of a new product to theft 
as fluctuating during four typical stages of legitimate sales: innovation, growth, 
mass market and saturation (Felson and Clarke, 1998).  
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 In the early stages of product innovation, the product is new to the 
market, relatively expensive and perhaps large or heavy, and bought 
legitimately by only a few customers.  
 In the growth stage, sales increase rapidly because product prices are 
lowered, and the latest versions of the products are lighter, smaller, and 
desired by more people.  
 At the mass market stage, the product is well known, affordable and 
highly fashionable, perhaps even iconic.  
 At the saturation stage, sales numbers plateau before declining, because 
at this stage most people who want the product have one. Individual 
product sales decline as the next desirable product is mass marketed 
and replaces the older product (Felson and Clarke, 1998).  
 
One of the few empirical studies assessing price and product life cycles 
(Wellsmith and Burrell, 2005) found strong support for the four stage life cycle 
proposed by Felson and Clarke (1998). Between 1997 and 2003, DVD 
recorders essentially replaced video recorders as theft targets during burglaries. 
This coincided with a peak in legitimate ownership levels of video recorders, and 
decreased legitimate prices. This signified that video recorders had reached the 
saturation stage while DVD recorders were at the innovation stage (Wellsmith 
and Burrell, 2005). Some more complex patterns of theft were also observed: 
the frequency of TV thefts in burglaries had decreased, presumably because of 
the greater size and weight of flat screen televisions, giving further weight to the 
assertion that different products will follow different theft patterns according to 
their CRAVED characteristics (Wellsmith and Burrell, 2005).  
 
It is likely that some new products need to be analysed at the model level in 
order to understand fully the detailed theft patterns and therefore risks to 
consumers. One example is the iPod (Farrell, 2007). Whereas an 80GB iPod 
bought online in 2007 cost £229.99 (Farrell, 2007), in early 2011 the same 
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money bought either an iPod with double the memory (the 160GB Classic 
model) or an 80GB product with video capability. An analysis of model life 
cycles would reveal whether and when the 80GB product was replaced on the 
legal and black markets by the 160GB Classic and/or the 80GB video-playing 
upgrade. Similarly, in Chapter 7 of this thesis, the life cycles of specific models 
of phone are explored using police crime records. The results show that each 
new model follows a wave pattern of increased theft, plateau, and then decline 
consistent with Felson and Clarke’s (1998) life-cycle hypothesis.  
 
In contrast with entire products, the variance in theft levels of commodities 
seems more sensitive to the variables disposability and value. Sidebottom et al. 
(2010) observed a strong correlation between the price of copper and theft 
levels from UK railways. The implications of the different sensitivities of products 
and of commodities to theft according to value are important. When considering 
the potential consequences of any measures to decrease phone theft, theft for 
the sale of the entire phone would be sensitive to measures that theft driven by 
the value of recyclable metals in the phone (such as silicon) is not. This issue 
further highlights the need for the crime-specificity which should be applied in 
crime problem analysis (Clarke, 2008). Some tentative predictions about future 
phone-related crime types, including the issue of recycling fraud and recycling 
driven theft are discussed further in Chapter 9 of this thesis. 
 
Design against crime  
Design against crime (DAC) uses the tools, processes and products of design to 
work in partnership with agencies, companies, individuals and communities to 
prevent a variety of criminal events (Ekblom, 1997; Gamman and Hughes, 
2003; Ekblom,  2008a). The discipline aims to produce products which are ‘fit for 
purpose’, and involves the practice of anticipating the crime consequences of 
new products, or recognising the crime consequences of existing products, and 
decreasing that crime potential (Erol et al., 2002; Ekblom, 2008a). The process 
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of designing-out crime evolved during the 1990s (Erol et al., 1999; Press et al., 
2000; Lester, 2001) and can be summarised by the five I’s:  
 
Intelligence: The collection and analysis of information on the crime problem 
and its perpetrators, causes and consequences. 
Intervention: Applying generic principles, through practical methods. 
Implementation: Assuring genuine, practical solutions to crime prevention. 
Involvement: Mobilising individuals or organisations to act as responsible 
crime-proofers. 
Impact: Assessing whether the intervention has succeeded in reducing 
crime levels, or the severity of crimes committed, and whether this has 
been achieved in a cost-effective and acceptable manner. In an area new 
to crime-proofing, there is no point introducing anti-crime efforts without 
some indication of their efficacy (Ekblom, 2008a). 
 
A review of the capacity and motivation of the design community to design-out 
crime was carried out by Erol et al. (2002) as part of the UK’s Crime Reduction 
Programme. Interviews with a range of stakeholder (designers, clients and 
manufacturers) resulted in the following conclusions: 
 
1) Both decisions makers and designers display limited awareness of design 
against crime. 
2) DAC is not often on the agenda of clients, designers or manufacturers and so 
is rarely incorporated into design briefs. 
3) Security and crime-proofing are only addressed late in the development 
cycle, and often after a crime harvest. 
4) Incentives to design-out crime are rare and low, being perceived to have little 
return on investment for the client. 
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5) The design process already involves a wide range of competing demands 
including product functionality, aesthetics, production costs, and pressure to 
release a new product ahead of any competitors (Erol et al., 2002).  
 
Good anti-crime design should not conjure images of barbed wire nor prison 
bars, nor unnecessarily increase anxiety about crime. It should be elegant and 
effective and require minimum human input or effort (Ekblom, 2008a). Designing 
products against crime in the UK is arguably led by Central Saint Martin’s 
College of Art and Design, where the Design Against Crime Research Centre is 
based. The novel designs produced by Central Saint Martin’s include three 
ranges of products listed below.  
 
 A range of Karrysafe bags (Gamman and Hughes, 2003 in Ekblom, 
2008) incorporates anti-rip material to minimise bag slashing; a 
reinforced handle to help prevent bag grabbing (snatch theft) and a 
Velcro roll-top to help prevent ‘dipping’ (like pick pocketing but from a 
bag) (Ekblom, 2008a). 
 The Stop Thief cafe chair which has bespoke notches cut in to it in order 
to enable bags to be secured beneath the knees, and therefore locked 
into place once the user sits down. The bag is therefore positioned in a 
place where it is within the personal space of the user, making it more 
likely they would react to any theft attempts than if the bag were out of 
sight and out of their personal space (Ekblom, 2008a). 
 A range of Grippa clips which secure bags to tables and furniture in bars 
and public houses, again to decrease incidents of bag theft and dipping 
(Ekblom, 2008a).  
 
The detailed research leading to the production of such novel designs follows 
the principles of problem analysis described by Clarke (2008). A specific crime 
problem is analysed from a variety of angles (for example, offender viewpoint, 
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victim viewpoint) and a variety of solutions considered, while an action-research 
cycle assesses the impact of the intervention and informs any necessary honing 
of the intervention (Clarke, 2008).  
 
One example of the empirical research necessary to inform effective design 
solutions is that conducted by Sidebottom and Bowers (2010), which revealed 
the most risky places to leave bags in bars was on the floor, or on the backs of 
chairs. The study highlights the difficulties in locating suitable denominators for 
product availability when assessing crime risk, and how usage patterns affect 
theft risk. 
Sidebottom and Bowers (2010) used police crime records to assess the risk of 
bag theft in 26 London bars, and customer surveys to determine the modus 
operandi of bag theft and customers’ perceptions of risk and security in these 
establishments. An annual bag theft rate was calculated by using police crime 
data as numerator, and controlling for bag availability via the proxy measure of 
seating capacity in each bar. Bag theft rates were found to vary considerably 
between the bars in the study, with a small number accounting for a high 
proportion of thefts. This unequal distribution is common in studies of crime risk 
Sidebottom and Bowers (2010). The use of proxy denominators in the absence 
of a ‘true’ measure of bag availability mirrors the need, discussed in Chapters 7 
and 8 of this thesis, to control for phone availability when producing a risk based 
Mobile Phone Theft Index.  
 
An analysis of police records revealed that the majority of bag thefts occurred 
when bags were on the floor, on the backs of chairs or at customer’s feet and 
were often committed without the victim noticing (Sidebottom and Bowers, 
2010). Interestingly, the proportion of females who reported theft of mobile 
phones was 32 percent while the male equivalent proportion was just 18 percent 
(Sidebottom and Bowers, 2010). Home Office research based on the British 
Crime Survey has shown that mobile ownership is equal among males and 
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females, but females are victimised more than males (Harrington and Mayhew 
2001; Allen et al., 2005 and Chapter 4 of this thesis). The results obtained by 
Sidebottom and Bowers (2010) therefore imply that more females than males 
carry mobiles in bags. These observations exemplify that target attractiveness is 
not the only factor affecting theft risk. For example cars are also at variable risk 
of theft according to their age and usage (see Brown and Thomas, 2003; Clarke 
and Harris, 1992; Farrell et al., 2011). 
 
Ekblom (2008b) recommends that designers are informed about offenders’ 
modus operandi, so that they can ‘think thief’. He argues that differences in 
offender experience and skill will result in different problems that require 
different design solutions: 
 
“Know your offenders – differentiate between design problems imposed 
by calculating, skilled and highly adaptable criminals and those where 
only the impulsive and poorly-resourced have to be countered.” (Ekblom, 
2008b). 
 
The best way to gather knowledge about offenders’ motivations and skill sets is 
arguably to ask them (Walsh, 1986). Some examples of research into offender 
target choices are presented towards the end of Chapter 3.  
 
Project MARC 
In 2004 the European Union funded a two year research project which aimed to 
define and operationalise Mechanisms for Assessing the Risk of Crime (MARC) 
for electronic consumer products (Armitage and Pease, 2008a). Project MARC 
reviewed existing crime risk assessment mechanisms; consulted with key 
stakeholders to determine if risk assessment was worth pursuing, and 
considered what form risk assessment should take. The project highlighted the 
need for: 
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“exploration of consumer appetite for secure products; the development 
of a risk index of electronic products; further exploration of offender 
decision making at point of theft; [and] that criminologists and 
manufacturers become friends” (Armitage and Pease, 2008a: 7). 
 
Armitage and Pease (2008b) proposed that a product marking scheme should 
be introduced which informed consumers of both the riskiness of a product, and 
its security level. This two tiered traffic light system would allow consumers to 
assess whether security was commensurate with risk.  
 
The results from Project MARC were published in a 2008 special edition of the 
European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research. That edition included a 
paper by Whitehead et al. (2008), which was one of the outputs from the 
research described in this thesis. That paper describes a new acronym ‘IN 
SAFE HANDS’ which describes the characteristics of mobile phones security 
features. These characteristics are Identifiable, Neutral, Seen, Attached, 
Findable, Executable, Hidden, Automatic, Necessary, Detectable and Secure.  
The acronym is intended to help designers explore a variety of solutions to theft, 
as opposed to Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED and Cohen and Felson’s (1979) VIVA 
which both identify characteristics which promote theft risk (Armitage and 
Pease, 2008a; Whitehead et al., 2008).  
 
During the early stages of Project MARC, the European Union introduced 
Mandate M 355/EN. The mandate demanded that, by 2005, the European 
Standards Institutes developed methodologies to assess and minimise crime 
risk in electronic products. The haste in which the European Union implemented 
Mandate M/355 EN resulted in duplication of effort between the research groups 
at Loughborough, those working on Project MARC, and the European 
Standards Institutes (Armitage and Pease, 2008a). Charles Brookson of the 
UK’s Department of Trade and Industry and ETSI, the European 
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Telecommunications Standards Institute, contacted Loughborough University in 
2005 asking for help in responding to European Mandate M355/EN. The 
response was published as Brookson et al. (2007), but did not incorporate the 
results from Project MARC, nor the research described in this thesis, nor the 
acronym IN SAFE HANDS (Whitehead et al., 2008). An assessment of its 
usefulness has not been carried out, and nor has a revision in light of new 
information. Arguably, both are warranted.  
 
The Foresight Crime Prevention Panel 
The UK’s Foresight Crime Prevention Panel was established in 1999 under the 
broader Foresight Programme, funded by the Department for Trade and 
Industry (DTi, 2000).  The Panel consisted of members from academia, 
business, government and the voluntary and public sectors. After considering 
how a variety of factors, including technology, would impact on crime trends up 
until 2020, the panel concluded that:  
 
 A dedicated funding stream should be established to focus science and 
technology attention on to crime reduction. 
 A national e-crime strategy was needed for all levels of e-crime. 
 Thinking on crime reduction should be incorporated into central 
government and business decision-making processes. Future threats 
should be identified by continuous horizon scanning. 
 A programme should be developed to address crime at all stages of a 
product’s life cycle (Armitage and Pease, 2008a). 
 
By 2008, there was little evidence of routine consideration of crime risk and 
crime prevention by businesses or by government, meaning that incentivising 
crime-proofing remained problematic (Armitage and Pease, 2008a). Some 
options for creating incentives are considered in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a place-based 
application of environmental criminology, and arguably the predecessor to 
design against crime in products (Cozens, 2008). It is not a main focus of this 
thesis but warrants brief explanation. CPTED practitioners redesign the built 
environment to create ‘defensible space’, a term coined by Oscar Newman 
(1973). The notion of defensible space results in key principles of CPTED which 
include: control access to buildings; manage the space use and image of 
places; increase natural and formal surveillance; define territories and 
boundaries (Cozens, 2008).  
 
Situational Crime Prevention 
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) seeks to prevent crime by applying a set of 
25 techniques (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) to specific crime problems (Clarke, 
2008). It is one micro-level application of the theories of environmental 
criminology (Wortley and Mazorelle, 2008). SCP employs 25 opportunity-
reducing measures which are presented in Table 2.3 below. These measures 
are directed at highly specific forms of crime; involve the management, design 
or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent 
way as possible; and make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and 
excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders (Clarke, 1983).  
 
The aim of SCP is to reduce the ‘near’ situational causes of crime, and in doing 
so reduce aggregate crime levels (Clarke, 2008). Many examples exist which 
show that SCP can be effective in decreasing crime rates. The first of an 
annually produced book, Crime Prevention Studies, was published in 1993 and 
the series has now reached its 26th volume (Madensen and Knutsson (eds.), 
2011). The series includes volumes dedicated to specific topics and case 
studies within situational crime prevention. One web-based collection of full text 
evaluations is available from www.popcenter.org and this collection is now (in 
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2011) numerous enough to allow sorting of the case studies by problem type 
and by other factors such as the nature of the intervention used (for example 
CCTV or street lighting). 
 
Smith et al. (2002) reviewed 142 case studies of crime prevention initiatives and 
found that reductions had occurred in the majority of cases. The range of crimes 
examined spanned common property crimes such as burglary, car theft and 
vandalism, and also fraud, robbery, street prostitution, drug-dealing and violent 
assaults (Clarke, 2008). Furthermore, an assessment of the timing of the crime 
reductions revealed that approximately 40 percent of those case studies which 
were sufficiently detailed showed evidence of anticipatory benefits (Smith et al., 
2002). Anticipatory benefits are reductions in crime which occur before the start 
of a crime prevention initiative. They are one form of a variety of ways in which 
crime benefits can diffuse from a targeted crime initiative to a wider context 
(Clarke and Weisburd, 1994). Other forms of diffusion of benefits occur if crime 
types other than those tackled by the intervention also decrease, or decreases 
in crime continue long after the intervention is active (Clarke and Weisburd, 
1994). Diffusion of crime benefits is discussed further below under the section 
‘Criticisms of situational crime prevention: displacement’.  
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Table 2.3: The 25 techniques of situational crime prevention. 
Increase the Effort Increase the Risks Reduce the Rewards Reduce Provocations Remove Excuses 
1. Target harden 
� Steering column locks 
and immobilisers 
� Anti-robbery screens 
� Tamper-proof packaging 
6. Extend guardianship 
� Take routine precautions: 
go out in group at night, 
leave signs of occupancy, 
carry phone 
� “Cocoon” neighborhood 
watch 
11. Conceal targets 
� Off-street parking 
� Gender-neutral phone 
directories 
� Unmarked bullion trucks 
16. Reduce frustrations and 
stress 
� Efficient queues and polite 
service 
� Expanded seating 
� Soothing music/muted lights 
21. Set rules 
� Rental agreements 
� Harassment codes 
� Hotel registration 
2. Control access to 
facilities 
� Entry phones 
� Electronic card access 
� Baggage screening 
7. Assist natural surveillance 
� Improved street lighting 
� Defensible space design 
� Support whistleblowers 
12. Remove targets 
� Removable car radio 
� Women’s refuges 
� Pre-paid cards for pay 
phones 
17. Avoid disputes 
� Separate enclosures for rival 
soccer fans 
� Reduce crowding in pubs 
� Fixed cab fares 
22. Post instructions 
� “No Parking” 
� “Private Property” 
� “Extinguish camp fires” 
3. Screen exits 
� Ticket needed for exit 
� Export documents 
� Electronic merchandise 
tags 
8. Reduce anonymity 
� Taxi driver IDs 
� “How’s my driving?” 
decals 
� School uniforms 
13. Identify property 
� Property marking 
� Vehicle licensing and parts 
marking 
� Cattle branding 
18. Reduce emotional arousal 
� Controls on violent 
pornography 
� Enforce good behavior on 
soccer field 
� Prohibit racial slurs 
23. Alert conscience 
� Roadside speed display 
boards 
� Signatures for customs 
declarations 
� “Shoplifting is stealing” 
4. Deflect offenders 
� Street closures 
� Separate bathrooms for 
women 
� Disperse pubs 
9. Utilize place managers 
� CCTV for double-deck 
buses 
� Two clerks for convenience 
stores 
� Reward vigilance 
14. Disrupt markets 
� Monitor pawn shops 
� Controls on classified ads. 
� License street vendors 
19. Neutralize peer pressure 
� “Idiots drink and drive” 
� “It’s OK to say No” 
� Disperse troublemakers at 
school 
24. Assist compliance 
� Easy library checkout 
� Public lavatories 
� Litter bins 
5. Control tools/ weapons 
� “Smart” guns 
� Disabling stolen cell 
phones 
� Restrict spray paint sales 
to juveniles 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
� Red light cameras 
� Burglar alarms 
� Security guards 
15. Deny benefits 
� Ink merchandise tags 
� Graffiti cleaning 
� Speed humps 
20. Discourage imitation 
� Rapid repair of vandalism 
� V-chips in TVs 
� Censor details of modus 
operandi 
25. Control drugs and alcohol 
� Breathalyzers in pubs 
� Server intervention 
� Alcohol-free events 
Source: Cornish and Clarke, 2003. 
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Some examples of SCP 
Some examples of crime prevention evaluations taken from the Crime 
Prevention Studies series and from the literature available at 
www.popcenter.org are described below. A range of crime types have been 
included to demonstrate the wide applicability of SCP. The repertoire of 
crimes which have received focus from the crime prevention community has 
gradually expanded from the ‘usual suspects’ of volume crime such as car 
theft and burglary to include terrorism (Clarke and Newman, 2006, in Clarke, 
2008); child sexual abuse (Wortley and Smallbone, 2006) and the illegal 
trade in endangered species (Pires and Clarke, 2010).  
 
Guerette and Clarke (2003) reported that a decrease in robberies at ATM 
machines in Los Angeles and New York was significantly greater than overall 
city-wide robbery decreases. The mechanisms responsible for ATM robbery 
reductions were increased formal surveillance (the use of security cameras); 
increased natural surveillance (for example increasing lighting at ATM 
machines and providing mirrors so that users could watch their own backs), 
target hardening (placing ATMs inside security controlled vestibules), access 
control (altering the opening hours of ATM machines in response to crime 
patterns) and the publication of the crime preventive initiatives and advice to 
the public.  Publicity alone has been shown to decrease crime rates in some 
contexts (Bowers and Johnson, 2005).  
 
Ramsay (1990) reported a significant decrease in the occurrence of 
incivilities and of fear of crime in Coventry city centre after a local bye-law 
was passed making the consumption of alcohol in designated streets an 
offence. A large scale before and after survey was used to assess the 
effectiveness of the bye-law. The mechanisms at work were a combination of 
publicity about the new law, increased police attendance at licensed 
premises and several local initiatives such as the provision of alternative 
alcohol-free discos for youngsters by the local YMCA (Ramsay, 1990). 
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Sloan-Howitt and Kelling (1997) reported a significant decrease in instances 
of graffiti tagging on New York Subway cars, once a programme was 
introduced whereby sprayed cars were impounded and the graffiti removed 
as quickly as possible. This seminal study on preventing graffiti tagging used 
the information that offenders’ reward for the crime was seeing their work 
transported around the city subway. There was no need to increase security 
or surveillance, which might have inconvenienced the general public. 
 
Criticisms of situational crime prevention 
Clarke (2008) succinctly rebuts seven repeated criticisms of situational crime 
prevention. These criticisms and their rebuttals are reproduced in Table 2.4 
below.   
 
Table 2.4: Seven criticisms of situational crime prevention – and rebuttals. 
Criticism  Rebuttal  
1. It is simplistic and atheoretical 
 
 
 
 
2. It is ineffective; it displaces crime 
and often makes it worse 
3. It diverts government attention from 
the root causes of crime 
 
4. It is a conservative, managerial 
approach to the crime problem 
 
5. It promotes a selfish, exclusionary 
society 
 
6.It promotes Big Brother and restricts 
personal freedoms 
 
 
7. It blames the victim 
 It is based on three crime theories: routine 
activity theory, crime pattern theory and the 
rational choice perspective. It also draws on 
social psychology. 
 
Many dozens of case studies show that it can 
reduce crime, usually with little 
displacement. 
It achieves immediate results and allows time 
for finding longer-term solutions to crime 
problems. 
It promises no more than it can deliver. It 
requires that solutions be economically and 
socially acceptable. 
It provides as much protection to the poor as 
to the rich. Thus, one of the first applications 
of SCP principles was in public housing. 
The democratic process protects society from 
these dangers. People are willing to endure 
inconvenience and small infringements of 
liberty when these protect them from crime. 
It empowers victims by providing information 
about crime risks and how to avoid them. 
 
Source: Clarke (2008: 191) 
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Hayward (2007) adds to this list the accusation that situational crime 
prevention is only applicable to acquisitive crime, not to ‘expressive’ crimes. 
As Farrell (2010) argues, there is plenty of evidence that the opposite is true: 
the example of timely graffiti removal decreasing graffiti incidents has been 
discussed above (Sloan-Howitt and Kelling,1997). More recently, Wortley 
and Smallbone (2006) have shown that child sex offenders often offend 
because of the opportunity to do so. In contrast, there is no empirical 
evidence to back Hayward’s (2007) critique (Farrell, 2010).  
 
Displacement and diffusion of crime benefits 
Further evidence for the assertion that opportunity rather than disposition 
plays a key role in crime rates comes from the assessment of crime 
displacement. If offenders were so driven as to overcome or work round all 
preventive interventions, then aggregate crime patterns would always be 
displaced (simply moved) following any preventive interventions.  
 
Reppetto (1976) proposed an early categorisation of types of displacement. 
These were: temporal, where an offence was committed at a different time; 
spatial, where an offence was committed at a different place; tactical, where 
a different modus operandi was used to commit the same crime; target, 
where a different target or victim was chosen; and crime type, where an 
offender committed a different type of crime. These categories were not 
mutually exclusive (Reppetto, 1976). Perpetrator displacement was added in 
1990 and refers to a criminal opportunity that is so tempting that if one 
offender does not take it up, another may (Barr and Pease, 1990). Guerette 
and Bowers (2009) suggest a more accurate term for this phenomenon might 
be offender replacement.  
 
A key study emphasising the importance of choice structuring properties in 
affecting behaviour comes from the seminal description by Clarke and 
Mayhew (1988) of how suicide by gas in the UK decreased greatly in the 
1960s and 1970s after natural, non-toxic gas was introduced. The proportion 
of suicides committed using gas fell from approximately 50 percent in 1958 
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to only one percent by the mid 1970s. Furthermore, the suicide rate 
decreased by a third between 1968 and 1975, meaning that displacement to 
other forms of suicide was not observed. Not only did the ready availability of 
toxic gas and its simplicity to use increase the likelihood of suicide by gas, it 
increased the likelihood of suicide via any method. The absence of 
displacement was because no equivalent alternative was possible (Clarke 
and Mayhew, 1988; Clarke, 1997). 
 
Only three assessments of displacement had been published at the start of 
the preparation of this thesis (Barr and Pease, 1990; Eck, 1993; Hesseling, 
1994) (Guerette and Bowers, 2009). The general conclusions from these 
were that displacement is by no means inevitable; and is rarely absolute. 
More recently, Guerette and Bowers (2009) examined 102 evaluations of 
situationally-focused crime prevention projects for levels of spatial 
displacement and the frequency of the diffusion of benefits. Spatial 
displacement was observed in 26 percent of observations, and diffusion of 
benefits in 27 percent (Guerette and Bowers, 2009). 
 
The presence of displacement does not necessarily imply the failure of a 
crime reduction programme. If displacement acts by spreading the 
experience of crime victimisation more evenly among a population, or the 
tactical displacement is from a more serious to a less serious form of 
offence, then displacement can be termed as benign (Barr and Pease, 
1990). Benign displacement can also occur if more vulnerable victims are 
spared some of the burden of crime, or if crime is geographically moved to 
an area where the consequences for the local community are less acutely 
felt (Guerette and Bowers, 2009). Further research is needed to explore the 
interactions between malign and benign displacement (Barr and Pease, 
1990) and the mechanisms by which displacement and diffusion of benefits 
may co-exist as a result of a single preventive intervention (Guerette and 
Bowers, 2009) 
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Summary 
This chapter has described the founding principles of two applied research 
areas within the broader discipline of environmental criminology. The rational 
choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Clarke, 2008) provides 
models of how offenders, using the knowledge, skills and resources available 
to them, will make decisions about whether, and how, to commit criminal 
acts. Routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Sampson et al., 2010) 
has evolved to encompass the various factors of the person-situation 
interaction which together affect the likelihood of a crime event taking place. 
The notion of target attractiveness is captured in Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED 
acronym, and these characteristics can be argued to cause the macro-level 
change-crime cycle (Pease, 1997), which can in turn be further modelled as 
an illegal product life cycle mirroring that of licit cycles (Clarke and Felson, 
1998). Design against crime (Ekblom, 2008a) provides a methodology for 
altering the detailed design of products which are likely to follow a change-
crime cycle (Pease, 1997) while the 25 techniques of situational crime 
prevention (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) describe a broader set of 
mechanisms by which crime rates can be decreased. Designers rarely 
consider the crime consequences of new products (Pease, 1997; Erol et al., 
2002; Clarke and Newman, 2005) and this can to a large extent be attributed 
to the absence of crime considerations on design briefs, caused by the 
absence of both awareness of crime consequences and incentives to 
minimise them (Erol et al., 2002). 
 
Discussion 
The rational choice perspective predicts that decreasing phone theft will rely 
on the successful alteration of offenders’ perceptions of the risks, rewards, 
and efforts of phone theft. At the micro level these perceptions could be 
altered through redesigning phones to make them less attractive or more 
difficult to steal. The qualities which make phones attractive to thieves were 
elicited from offenders interviews, described in Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
thesis. This information aims to answer Paul Ekblom’s (2008b) request that 
designers are informed about various aspects of offenders’ thinking 
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processes, and Armitage and Pease’s (2008a) call for an assessment of 
whether security is considered by offenders at the point of theft.  
 
At a macro level, routine activity theory predicts that in order to coerce 
industry into redesigning phones, it is necessary to convince these super 
controllers (Sampson et al., 2010) of the need and utility of doing so. Chapter 
3 of this thesis presents key literature which considers in more detail the 
ideas of responsibility for crime-proofing products, and how crime prevention 
can be incentivised. Viewing crime as a form of pollution allows the 
misalignment of industry and crime prevention goals to be identified, while 
learning from those who already control ‘traditional’ forms of pollution allows 
those goals to be realigned (Roman and Farrell, 2002 and Farrell and 
Roman, 2006). 
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Chapter 3: Crime as pollution and mechanisms to control it. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes how viewing crime as a form of pollution impacts on 
crime prevention practice and complements the most recent version of 
routine activity theory (Sampson et al., 2010). At a macro level, the 
instruments used to decrease more traditional forms of pollution can be used 
to incentivise the internalisation of crime costs by polluters (those who 
increase the opportunities for crime) (Roman and Farrell, 2002). The chapter 
begins by describing previous consideration of responsibility for crime 
prevention, before expanding on the notion of crime as pollution and its 
application to crime prevention. The UK Car Theft Index is used as an 
example of a successful public information mechanism that stimulated the 
vehicle industry to innovate improved security technology which is now 
incorporated routinely into car design. The effectiveness of incremental and 
competition-led security improvements in decreasing crime rates is proved 
by examining the decline in car thefts due to increased immobiliser and door 
lock prevalence and security. Alternative public information indices are also 
described, and the possibilities of using legal sanctions and incorporating 
crime proofing in to the Corporate Social Responsibility policies of 
businesses are explored. 
The chapter concludes with a description of previous research into the 
decision-making processes of robbers and burglars, because this sets the 
scene for the interviews with mobile phone thieves presented in Chapters 5 
and 6 of this thesis. Methodological issues relevant to the interviews reported 
in this thesis are reviewed. 
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Responsibility for crime prevention 
A basic assumption throughout this thesis is that offenders are, ultimately, 
responsible for their actions. Policies which aim to alter offender motivation 
are less achievable and less effective than policies which decrease the 
opportunities for crime (Clarke, 1980). Therefore the focus of the research is 
on responsibility for crime prevention, not on crime commission. 
Crime is so closely linked to opportunities that it can be said ‘in a very real 
sense’ to be caused by opportunities (Felson and Clarke, 1998; Laycock, 
2004). Therefore, those who should assume responsibility for crime 
prevention include all those who have a role in affecting the prevalence and 
nature of suitable crime opportunities (Clarke and Newman, 2005). Felson 
and Clarke (1997) assert that responsibility for crime prevention relies on 
successful partnerships between governments, industry and the police. 
Responsibility is spread throughout society as follows:  
1) Each person and organisation has a civic duty to take routine 
precautions against crime to reduce temptations to crime. 
2) Each business and organisation has a moral and legal duty to 
protect the public from crime when using its goods and facilities.  
3) Each business and manufacturer has a civic duty to reduce the 
opportunities for crime provided by its goods and services (Felson and 
Clarke, 1998: 210) 
Laycock (2004) differentiates between the actions of those who are 
responsible for and those who are competent in preventing crime. Individuals 
can only exercise their responsibility if assisted by those with the 
competency to assist: 
“So, for example, if mobile phones are designed so that they can still 
be used once stolen, then there is little that the phone owners can do 
to protect themselves from theft of the phone.” (Laycock, 2004: 28).  
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Felson and Clarke (1997: 212) suggest a ranking of individual responsibilities 
in relation to crime commission and preventive responsibilities. Felson and 
Clarke’s (1997) ranked responsibilities are reproduced below in Table 3.1 
below and depict increasing responsibility for car theft and its prevention. 
Only the last five categories are criminal.  
Table 3.1: Degrees of responsibility for car theft and its prevention 
 1. Keep an eye on your parked car. 
2. Lock car up. 
3. Park in safer place. 
4. Park in worse place. 
5. Fail to lock up. 
6. Leave keys in car. 
7. Leave keys in car with motor running. 
8. Do same near group of young males. 
9. Notice someone who might be stealing car but do not look. 
10. Notice someone stealing car but say nothing. 
11. Keep lookout for friend stealing car. 
12. Steal car with keys in and motor running. 
13. Steal car with keys in. 
14. Steal unlocked car. 
15. Steal locked car after breaking in.  
Source: Felson and Clarke (1997: 212). 
Laycock (2004) expands on these ideas and suggests reasonable levels of 
responsibility for individuals, for the police and crime reduction partnerships, 
for government and for industry and commerce. Her suggestions regarding 
the responsibilities of industry and commerce are reproduced in Table 3.2 
below and agree with arguments made by other environmental criminologists 
(Felson and Clarke, 1997; Pease, 2005; Ekblom, 2005; Farrell and Roman, 
2006).  
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Table 3.2: The actions of socially responsible companies 
 1. Design goods, services and policies with ‘crime in mind’. 
2. Understand that goods fitting the acronym CRAVED will be stolen 
and need extra protection. 
3. Resist marketing their goods in ways which risk drawing young 
people in to crime. 
4. Take some responsibility for the threat of theft, attack and other 
offences being directed at customers. 
5. Take reasonable measures to protect staff from victimisation 
through thoughtful policies, practices and training programmes. 
Source: Laycock (2004:32). 
 
Businesses, like people, tend to take routine precautions to protect 
themselves from risk of victimisation. Businesses do not tend, in general, to 
protect their customers (Felson and Clarke, 1998; Laycock, 2004; Clarke and 
Newman, 2005). The majority of products which have had crime designed 
out of them are products which business relies on, such as vehicles (for 
example buses, train carriages, trucks) and service delivery devices (for 
example parking meters, SIM cards, ATMs and coin operated payment 
meters) (Clarke and Newman, 2005). Examples of consumer products which 
have had crime designed out include cars and car parts, food and drugs 
packaging and labels, and some electronic equipment (see Clarke and 
Newman, 2005:19 for a full list). The mobile industry was successful in 
decreasing the cloning of SIM cards in the USA because the losses incurred 
by industry incentivised them to do so: Clarke, Kemper and Wyckoff (2001) 
report that losses due to SIM fraud were estimated to exceed 800 million 
dollars in 1995, but were largely eliminated by 1998. The innovations which 
caused this decrease included profiling systems to detect changes in usage 
patterns; assigning unique PINs to SIM cards, and radio frequency 
fingerprinting of handsets (to assess whether geographic usage patterns 
implied a cloned SIM was in existence). No displacement to other types of 
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fraud was observed, and the investment of 240 million dollars resulted in an 
estimated saving twelve times as great (Clarke et al., 2001). 
Similarly, many seemingly ‘green’ initiatives are financially motivated. For 
example, British Sugar wash off and re-use the mud and stones from sugar 
beet, and recycle the CO2 produced from their Whittington factory in Norfolk 
to increase tomato crop yields. The mud is sold for use on football pitches; 
the stones recycled to make aggregate. These initiatives benefit the 
environment, but only came about after EU subsidies for sugar beet 
production were removed, meaning that sugar production had to become 
much more efficient to remain profitable (BBC 1, Country Tracks, July 2008).  
Ronald Clarke was arguably a pioneer of firmly apportioning responsibility for 
crime prevention to industry giants. Felson and Clarke (1998) described how 
US vehicle manufacturers had long resisted calls for improving vehicle 
security. Professor Clarke reported that he was particularly critical of vehicle 
manufacturers for not taking responsibility car thefts which he believed could 
be attributed to the provision of poor quality door locks (Felson and Clarke, 
1998). At the same time his co-author, Marcus Felson believed that using 
crime prevention ‘as a stick to beat the vehicle industry with’ was not 
necessarily the most effective solution. One solution he hoped for was that 
security could become a marketable property of vehicle design (Felson and 
Clarke, 1998).  
Professor Felson’s solution was eventually achieved in the UK, via 
government intervention which generated consumer demand for car security 
(Laycock, 2004). The development of the UK Car Theft Index demonstrates 
how crime prevention policy can be aligned with industry interests, and result 
in a successful outcome, while minimising government investment. The UK 
Car Theft Index is described in more detail following further elaboration of the 
idea of crime as pollution, and how those wishing to prevent crime should 
take lessons from those who already control more traditional forms of 
pollution.  
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Crime as pollution 
Roman and Farell (2002) and Farrell and Roman (2006) draw parallels 
between crime pollution and ‘traditional’ forms of pollution, such as noise and 
air pollution. Furthermore, the study of how traditional forms of pollution can 
be controlled can yield useful lessons for those who wish to control crime 
pollution (Farrell and Roman, 2006).  
Externalities are forced upon society, whether inadvertently or deliberately, 
and society bears the costs if they are negative, and reaps the benefits if 
they are positive. Crime is a negative externality (Roman and Farrell, 2002). 
An example is that while manufacturers and service providers profit from the 
sale and use of mobile phones respectively, society bears the cost of the 
victimisation which occurs because phones provide ideal theft targets. (For 
details of the nature, extent and estimated cost of phone theft in the UK, see 
Chapter 4 of this thesis).  
Externalities can cost more to society if they act as multipliers: if, for 
example, an opportunity to commit crime precipitates (Wortley, 1997; 2001) 
or extends a criminal career. In this case, one crime opportunity not only 
costs society the one immediate crime event, but also any related events 
which follow (Roman and Farrell, 2002). Some evidence that particularly 
attractive phone targets act as prompts for criminal acts is presented in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. Some examples of crime types which can be viewed 
as pollution are listed below in Table 3.3 along with the crime polluters 
responsible for them. The table is an abridged version of work presented in 
Farrell and Roman (2006).  
Car park owners and management companies regularly declare their 
immunity to responsibility by placing signs telling users that they ‘Leave 
vehicles at their own risk’. In truth, the design and management of the car 
park will greatly affect the risk of a vehicle becoming a crime target (or 
facilitator if it is used as a getaway vehicle). Car park owners, managers, and  
designers all have a responsibility to make themselves aware of how their 
practices can affect user risk, and to tailor their practices accordingly (Clarke 
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and Newman, 2005). Similarly, Internet Service Providers know that the 
internet is a facilitator of crime, and doing little to protect their customers from 
victimisation is negligent (Laycock, 2004; Clarke and Newman, 2005).  
Once ‘the penny drops’ (Farrell and Roman, 2006) it becomes easy to view 
other offences as pollution. A further addition to the crime types suggested 
by Farrell and Roman (2006) is increased illegal poaching of wild flora and 
fauna as a result of legal logging and deforestation in South East Asia (see 
Clements et al., 2010). Increased access to previously impenetrable habitat 
increases the opportunities for poaching by decreasing the effort necessary 
to access forests. 
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Table 3.3: Some sources of crime pollution by crime category (adapted from Farrell and Roman, 2006: Table 8.1)  
Crime type/ area Possible polluters Why is it pollution? Comments/ possible measures 
Theft of/ from vehicles Vehicle manufacturers Savings on production costs which 
avoid built-in anti-theft design and 
measures. 
Minimum crime safety standards 
and testing akin to those for crash 
safety. 
Theft of/from vehicles Car park designers, owners, 
managers 
Savings on barriers to reduce 
access, on CCTV, on staffing, on 
design. 
Safer Parking Scheme (new 
version of Secured Car Parks) 
extended to minimum crime-safety 
practices and standards. 
Theft of/from vehicles Car owners Failure to lock car door is negligent. System of fines for negligent 
owners (as used in Australia and 
elsewhere).  
Residential and commercial 
burglary 
Architects and builders Failure to design safe designs 
standards. 
Legislation to promote safer 
designs. 
Theft and robbery of hot 
products 
Product designers and 
manufacturers 
Production of lightweight, valuable, 
easily stolen products (DVDs, iPods) 
and omitting security features saves 
on design and production costs. 
Mobile phones cause mini-crime 
wave of robbery and theft in UK. 
Phone manufacturers and 
providers benefit but do not bear 
the cost of crime. 
 
 
 
68 
 
Crime type/ area Possible polluters Why is it pollution? Comments/ possible measures 
Internet fraud Internet service providers, 
internet retailers, e-commerce 
and auction sites 
Huge benefit to e-commerce but little 
(or belated) attention to crime risk. 
Increased accountability of ISPs, 
perhaps incentives for research 
and development of tracking and 
detection software. 
Shoplifting Shop designers, owners and 
managers 
Poor designs can encourage robbery. Mandatory crime-proof checks akin 
to fire safety standards. 
Child pornography Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) 
ISPs benefit from subscriptions, but 
also facilitate exchange of illegal 
pornography. Society pays the cost in 
terms of crime. 
Increased accountability of ISPs, 
perhaps incentives for research 
and development. 
Inner-city grime caused by 
chewing gum  
on streets 
Chewing gum manufacturers Manufacturers profit from sales while 
society incurs the costs of extensive 
(and predictable) gum littering. 
Manufacturers should pay for 
clean-up operations, encourage 
environmentally friendly disposal of 
gum (e.g. gum-tree boards or 
provide wrappers). 
Domestic violence Alcohol manufacturers and 
licensees? 
Alcohol often plays a role (but is not 
an excuse for) domestic and other 
violence. Manufacturers and 
licensees profit but do little to absorb 
costs to victims and wider society. 
Enforced responsibility of 
licensees. Perhaps taxes and fines 
used to fund domestic violence 
related services.  
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Roman and Farrell (2002) assert that developing effective crime prevention 
policies necessitates answering the question of how to maximise the net 
social benefit of crime prevention. They propose that cost-benefit analysis, 
extended to consider crime as an externality, promises to answer that 
question. The ideal scenario is for policy makers to have a menu of 
responses at their disposal, and to know the likely benefits and costs of each 
item on the menu (Roman and Farrell, 2002). The example of cell phone 
fraud elimination in the USA (Clarke et al., 2001) demonstrates how 
investment in security technologies can result in a considerable return on 
investment.  
 
Controlling environmental pollution 
Roman and Farrell (2002) and Farrell and Roman (2006) suggest that 
lessons learnt from environmental pollution control should be applied to 
crime prevention strategies. This section summarises some of the key 
mechanisms available for pollution control, and their individual properties. 
The summary is based on the discussion of environmental control within a 
book on the same, (Portney and Stavins, 2000).  
Environmental policies are traditionally made of two components: a goal 
which can be general or specific and a mechanism to achieve that goal 
(Stavins, 2000). Market failure is said to occur when there is no market value 
placed on externalities, meaning that the market can never determine a level 
of pollution which is acceptable (Portney, 2000). Such non-recognised 
externalities are called orthogonal, and differ from pecuniary externalities 
which are recognised, but not controlled and can result in a decreased price 
(Roman and Farrell, 2002). An example of a pecuniary externality would be if 
land were less expensive because of its proximity to a factory (Portney, 
2000).Crime risk in relation to electronic products remains an orthogonal 
externality: consumers are not generally aware of how their product choices 
affect their crime risks, apart from when choosing houses and cars 
(Learmount, 2005).  
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One set of mechanisms used with increasing frequency in US environmental 
pollution control is termed ‘market-based’ or ‘economic-incentive’ instruments 
(Stavins, 2000). These encourage behaviour through market signals, which 
define acceptable pollution levels. They avoid explicit directives which define 
a level of pollution, or sometimes the mechanism for decreasing pollution. 
Market forces are said to be ‘harnessed’, since the goals of the polluter (to 
maintain or increase profit) are aligned with those of the regulator (to 
decrease or control pollution) (Stavins, 2000). To use the terminology of 
Sampson et al.’s (2010) routine activity theory, an effective market-based 
crime pollution control policy would align the goals of the supercontroller(s) 
with those of the guardian, because both are motivated to decrease the 
number of suitable crime opportunities. This approach is closely aligned with 
UK government research published in 2006 which also advocated an 
incentive based approach to crime reduction where markets had failed 
(Home Office, 2006). 
Traditional ‘command and control’ regulatory mechanisms tend to define 
acceptable levels of pollution, and may even prescribe the mechanisms by 
which pollution control occurs (Stavins, 2000). This can go so far as to define 
the type of technology to be used in pollution control (for example, that car 
exhaust fumes are filtered by catalytic converters, rather than by any suitable 
technology). Thus command and control strategies can confer relatively high 
costs to the polluter, and perhaps worse still, they can stall the development 
of technologies which might further decrease pollution (Stavins, 2000). The 
phenomenon of ‘designing down’ to minimal standards is well recognised in 
the field of design against crime (see for example Ekblom, 2005) and occurs 
because of the absence of incentives to exceed control targets (Stavins, 
2000).  
In contrast, market-based mechanisms provide both the incentives and the 
freedom necessary for technological innovation (Stavins, 2000), with the 
result that pollution decreases will often exceed regulatory limits. Four major 
categories of market-based pollution control mechanisms are described by 
Stavins (2000) and these are reproduced in Table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.4: Mechanisms for market-based pollution control: 
1) Pollution charges: a fee or tax is applied by the polluter, 
commensurate with the level of pollution produced. 
2) Tradable permits: an allowable level of pollution is defined and 
permits are allocated amongst polluters, equalling the sum total level 
of pollution allowed. Firms are then incentivised to decrease pollution 
levels up to the point where further pollution decrease is more costly 
than the profit made on selling ‘spare’ permits.  
3) Market barrier reduction: explicit or implicit barriers to market 
activity are removed. Three subtypes of market barrier removal 
mechanisms exist: 
i) Market creation (government facilitates the creation of a new 
market) 
ii) Liability rules (firms are forced to weigh the potential 
consequences of their polluting activities and may, therefore, 
reduce them) 
iii) Information programs (the functionality of the free market is 
improved by increasing the quality of information provided to 
consumers, who can then ‘vote with their feet’ and purchase 
goods accordingly). 
4) Government subsidy removal (the removal of subsidies which often 
inadvertently lead to economically inefficient and environmentally 
unsound practices).  
Source: Stavins (2000). 
 
Legal sanctions  
Liability-based market barrier reduction could be achieved by adapting 
existing legislation. Moss and Pease (1999) argue that in the UK, Section 17 
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 should be amended to confer 
responsibility for crime prevention. The Act already obliges local authorities, 
primary care trusts, the police and the fire service to consider the crime 
consequences of their actions, and central government and businesses 
should be added to the list (Moss and Pease, 1999).  
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Similarly, Farrell and Roman (2006) propose that liability-based market 
barrier reduction could be achieved via an ‘enhanced crime doctrine’. They 
argue that crime events, like car crashes, are predictable at aggregate levels; 
that victim fault is irrelevant; and that manufacturers are therefore obliged to 
minimise the probabilities of crime events associated with their products. The 
doctrine would read: 
“The theft of certain types of products is clearly foreseeable. Hence, 
manufacturers should have a duty to design for foreseeable theft and 
resale which occurs with or without the fault of the victim. Therefore, 
frequently stolen consumer products must be reasonably difficult, or 
unattractive, or unrewarding propositions for theft and resale.” (Farrell 
and Roman, 2006: 148): 
A further legislative instrument which could be adapted is Article 12 on 
Corporate Liability of the European Treaty on Cybercrime. The Article makes 
companies legally accountable for crimes committed by their employees. 
Accountability is assumed ‘regardless of whether the employee was acting 
under instructions from [the firm] or was allowed to [commit the crime] due to 
a lack of adequate supervision or control by [the firm]’ (European Treaty, 
185). It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that, if liability-based market 
barrier removal mechanisms were desirable, the Article could be extended to 
include legal accountability on manufacturers for crimes committed: 
“‘regardless of whether any person was contravening product safety 
or usage advice, or due to a lack of adequate anti-security measures 
being available or designed in to the product.”  
In the UK, the Companies Act (2006) introduced a requirement that public 
companies report on social and environmental impacts (Economist, January 
19th 2008). If crime pollution were recognised as a social impact of business, 
this Act would automatically mandate that the crime consequences of 
business activities were considered and reported on.  
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Corporate social responsibility policies 
Another option for ensuring that crime risk was routinely considered by the 
private sector would be to include criminogenic considerations in Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) policies. However there would be much work to 
do for this option to be pursued. In the UK, CSR polices typically include 
‘green’ initiatives such as recycling schemes and minimising the use of 
plastic carrier bags, and can extend to investing in local community projects 
such as education or land regeneration (The Economist, January 19th 2008). 
However, crime consequences are not incorporated into CSR policies. In 
2007 the present author attended the Public Interest Environmental Law UK 
(PIEL) Conference. Delegates included academics, private consultants and 
NGO employees within the fields of Environmental Law, and CSR. When the 
audience was asked, during a session on the future of CSR, whether crime 
was ever considered in CSR polices, the question seemed to cause 
confusion even to this enlightened audience, and the conclusive answer was 
no. The Department of and Trade and Industry recognises that CSR can 
increase sales (DTi, 2003) and has developed a framework to help 
companies introduce CSR into their usual business practices (DTi, 2004). 
CSR activities are also used to attract, motivate and retain high quality staff 
(Economist, January 19th 2008). Crime pollution, crime risk, and criminogenic 
properties are not mentioned in the assessment of CSR benefits (DTi, 2003), 
the implementation framework (DTi, 2004) nor a more recent review of ‘good’ 
corporate governance (Filatotchev et al., 2007). Nor is it mentioned in a 
survey carried out by McKinsey on what topics are important within CSR, 
reported in a special feature by The Economist (The Economist, January 19th 
2008). Much more research is needed to identify how crime pollution might 
be incorporated into CSR, and whether the consequent self-regulatory 
practices would be as robust in controlling crime as those incentivised by 
instruments such as indices.  
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The UK Car Theft Index: an example of government leverage 
The orthogonal nature of criminogenic externalities means that market-based 
crime prevention instruments have yet to be widely applied (Farrell and 
Roman, 2006). One notable exception is the example of the UK government 
publishing the first UK Car Theft Index in 1992, which made car 
manufacturers incorporate better security technology. The Car Theft Index is 
essentially a market barrier reduction mechanism, and specifically an 
information programme. Its aim was to inform the public and interested 
parties (such as insurance agencies) of the differential risk of theft for 
different types of car (Laycock, 2004). The title of this section mirrors that of 
a seminal description of the development of the UK Car Theft Index written 
by Professor Gloria Laycock. This section relies heavily on her work. 
Laycock (2004) describes three deceptively simple stages of index 
production: 
 1) Agree on the need for an index 
 2) Gain access to denominator data (what is available for theft) 
 3) Gain access to numerator data (what is stolen) 
 
The UK motor industry was disinterested in vehicle security because security 
was not considered a marketable issue (Laycock, 2004). Even though Home 
Office research in the 1980s demonstrated that cheap and effective security 
could be incorporated, and designers had already predicted how cars might 
be made more secure (Southall and Ekblom, 1985), industry did not 
incorporate this security. This disinterest was little compared to the active 
resistance to government pressure that was to come (Laycock, 2004).  
The concept of a Car Theft Index is to compare what is stolen with what is 
available for theft. Vehicles are then ranked according to their risk of theft. 
The process of translating this simple notion in to a usable, accepted and 
useful index was not easy. Laycock (2004) describes the key stages involved 
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in producing the UK’s first Car Theft Index, and Houghton (1992) describes 
the methodological nuances in further detail.  
Agreeing on the need for an index 
By 1991, theft of and from vehicles had increased in the UK to account for 28 
percent of all UK recorded crime (Houghton, 1992). In 1988 the Home 
Office’s Car Crime Working Group called for research to identify which cars, 
if any, were at greater risk of theft. The results showed that theft risk varied 
between models, and in response to this information UK government 
Ministers agreed in 1990 that a Theft Index should be produced to inform 
both the public and manufacturers of these findings (Houghton, 1992). The 
idea was not unique to the UK since Indices were already produced in both 
the USA and in Australia. Houghton (1992) describes the advantages of Car 
Theft Index production as: 
- Providing information to existing car owners of the potential risk of 
theft. 
- Providing information to potential car owners so that those who 
wish to can factor theft risk into their decision-making process. 
- Providing manufacturers with the relative theft risks of their 
particular models and allowing monitoring of the success or 
otherwise of any newly introduced security features. 
- Potentially assisting with research into car theft if the right data are 
incorporated into the Index. 
 
Houghton (1992) describes the factors affecting the ranking of each car 
model within the Index as its level of security (i.e. vulnerability to thieves), its 
attractiveness to thieves (i.e. suitability for joyriding, or for chopping and 
resale), and the behaviour of drivers, in particular their parking habits. The 
Car Theft Index did not attempt to separate out these various factors.  
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Defining denominator and numerator 
Identifying a suitable denominator for the UK Car Theft Index was 
problematic. Over 70 makes of car (e.g. Ford) were in use on the UK’s roads, 
and consisted of over 290 different models (e.g. Ford Escort), which could be 
further broken down into ranges (e.g. Ford Escort Mark 1) and lines (e.g. 
1987 1392cc Ford Escort GL Plus Mk 3). Many of these cars had different 
security features (Laycock, 2004).  
Defining appropriate boundaries between categories of vehicle was central to 
the usefulness of the Car Theft Index: too narrow a classification would risk 
low numbers in each category, and produce too many categories for the 
Index to be informative to the public. Broad categories of vehicle type would 
risk aggregating together dissimilar vehicles and therefore masking 
underlying theft patterns (Houghton, 1992; Laycock, 2004). The ‘ever 
watchful eye’ of the motor industry scrutinised methodological decisions such 
as these (Laycock, 2004). Records held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Authority (DVLA) were not suitable because they resulted in over 10 000 
categories of vehicles (Houghton, 1992). The categories used in the final 
index were based on a system developed by the Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT). Devised for use by the motor industry, 
SMMT records detailed the make and model of vehicles registered in the UK. 
The database was derived from DVLA data but records were cleaned to 
remove coding errors and inconsistencies, and perhaps more importantly, to 
reclassify vehicles into a smaller number of meaningful sub-categories than 
in the DVLA records. Furthermore, SMMT records included the age (year of 
manufacture) of each vehicle (Houghton, 1992). 
The numerator for the Index was also difficult to identify. Several options 
were explored and none was ideal (Houghton, 1992; Laycock, 2004). For 
example, the data held on the Police National Computer (PNC) omitted 
cases where missing cars had been found before they were entered on the 
PNC. The final data set for the first UK Car Theft Index was obtained directly 
from 13 of England and Wales’ 43 police forces (Laycock, 2004). This was 
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labour intensive, because vehicles such as lorries, vans and motor cycles 
had to be removed, and free text fields corrected, but it yielded more 
complete information than the PNC (Houghton, 1992). The final numerator 
represented around one fifth (23%) of national thefts from November 1989 
thru October 1990 (Laycock, 2004). 
The number of vehicles stolen was divided by the number on the road 
according to SMMT records, resulting in a theft risk. Because only a 
proportion of national thefts was included, each risk calculation had a 
sampling error associated with it (Laycock, 2004). This reflected the 
uncertainty of how the ratio might have differed had a different sample been 
obtained (Houghton, 1992). The final index grouped cars in to high, medium 
and low risk groups according to theft risk, and that three category ‘traffic 
light’ grouping continued in all versions of the Index (for example Home 
Office, 2005a). 
A search of the UK Home Office website in 2011 reveals that the Car Theft 
Index was published annually only until 2006. A Freedom of Information Act 
submitted to the Home Office in November 2008 by a member of the public 
(FOI T23587/8) resulted in a reply from the Home Office that a 2007 Index 
had not been published, and that plans for a 2008 Index to be published in 
2009 were not confirmed. That reply is attached as Appendix 3.1 Further 
research should be carried out to assess whether the absence of an Index 
has slowed the progress of further innovation in vehicle security, and why the 
Home Office has decided to retract this tool.  
The effect of the UK Car Theft Index 
“The effect of publishing the UK Car Theft Index was dramatic” 
(Laycock, 2004:36)  
The UK Car Theft Index was originally published in 1992. A five year delay 
then followed, until the annual Index was produced from 1997(Laycock, 
2004) until 2006. The effectiveness of the Car Theft Index spurred the 
production of the Bike Theft Index, which ranks stolen mopeds, scooters and 
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motorcycles in order of risk, and is based on a similar methodology (Home 
Office 2002; 2005b).  
In 1992 the Home Office invited media and the major manufacturers to the 
Home Office in order to present the first edition of the Car Theft Index 
(Laycock, 2004). The publicity helped make security a marketable 
commodity, and therefore spurred innovation in the design, and the routine 
incorporation of, better vehicle security. The effect of the UK Car Theft Index 
on aggregate theft levels is clearly implied by Figure 3.1 below, reproduced 
from Laycock (2004). Although there is a possibility that alternative 
explanations exist for the decrease in car crime, a growing body of evidence 
suggests that incremental security increases have impacted on different 
types of car theft and resulted in the aggregate decline. Some recent 
evidence is presented in what follows. 
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Figure 3.1: Vehicle theft in the UK and the publication of the Car Theft Index 
Source:Laycock (2004) 
The impact of increased security 
Clarke and Harris (1992) advocated that different motivations for car theft 
existed, and that the motivation would impact on how theft levels would alter 
in response to different security innovations. They ranked models of cars 
stolen in the USA made between 1983 and 1985 according to theft risk for 
three sub types of car theft: stripping for parts; theft for temporary use, and 
permanent theft. The models topping each Index differed: German cars with 
good audio equipment were at higher risk of thefts for parts; sporty American 
models were at highest risk of temporary theft; and foreign sports cars were 
at highest risk of permanent theft for resale abroad and chopping (Clarke and 
Harris, 1992). The differences were explained by Clarke and Harris (1992) by 
three broad categories of choice-structuring properties, made up of a 
combination of motivational and situational factors:  
- Security: the quality of locks, alarms, immobilisers, and the 
presence or absence of soft roofs.  
80 
 
- Availability: how common the models were; where they were seen 
(used) and stored. 
- Attractiveness for theft: the profit potential or kudos value, related 
to image, engine power, and monetary value of parts including 
sound systems. 
They predicted that theft for joy riding (temporary theft) would be decreased 
by immobilisers more than permanent theft (for resale abroad), and 
suggested that different indices based on the three main motivations might 
help to identify differing theft trajectories according to security 
implementation. Several pieces of work have tracked the effect of a variety of 
security mechanisms on car theft in the UK and abroad. Some are described 
below. The key message is that different security measures have on 
aggregate decreased both permanent and temporary theft of vehicles, and 
theft from vehicles, and that Clarke and Harris’ predictions were accurate. 
The evidence in relation to the effectiveness of immobilisers and better door 
locks is presented here as a case study. Similarly, it would be expected that 
different security measures introduced in to mobile phones would impact 
differently on the various motivations for phone theft. The motivations for 
phone theft are described in Chapter 4 of this thesis, and some predictions 
about the differential impact of security measures on phone theft are made in 
Chapter 9. 
Brown and Thomas (2003) were the first researchers to account for vehicle 
age when assessing the impact of increased vehicle security. Increasing 
vehicle age had been shown to correlate with increased theft risk, for a 
variety of reasons, including decreased security on older cars and storage 
and usage patterns (Houghton, 1992; Brown, 1995). An assessment of 
immobiliser impact on the theft risk of UK cars stolen between 1997 and 
2000 and controlling for age revealed that immobilisers conferred some 
protection against theft, but that there was evidence of some displacement 
towards older (less secure) vehicles (Brown and Thomas, 2003). These 
findings were mirrorred in Australia when Kriven and Ziersch (2007) repeated 
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Brown and Thomas’ (2003) ‘age crime curve’ methodology and showed that 
immobilisers also decreased the risk of theft for Australian vehicles. More 
recent work building on these studies was conducted by Farrell et al. (2011). 
They hypothesised:  
“[ ] that immobilizers have greater impact on theft of than theft from 
cars (immobilizers do not make it harder to steal from cars), that 
alarms impact on theft from cars rather than theft of cars (alarms do 
not make it harder to drive cars away), and that central locking affects 
both but has a distinct impact on modus operandi (cars with central 
locking can still be entered in other ways).” (Farrell et al., 2011:153). 
 
A natural experiment was conducted when Western Australia subsidised and 
then made mandatory ‘quality’ immobilisers (meeting specified criteria), and 
the rest of Australia mandated the same immobilisers two years later in 
2001. Figure 3.2 below shows the relationship between car thefts and 
immobiliser subsidy and mandating in Western Australia, and mandating in 
the rest of Australia (Farrell et al., 2011). It is clear that immobiliser 
mandating in the rest of Australia was swiftly followed by a decrease in 
thefts. The story for Western Australia appears slightly more complex and it 
would be useful to unpick (1) why there is an initial increase in thefts after 
immobiliser subsidy; and (2) the relative contributions to the decrease made 
by immobiliser subsidies, and by a possible anticipatory benefit (Smith et al,. 
2002) of immobiliser mandating. 
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Figure 3.2: Vehicle theft in Australia 1997 to 2007 
 
Source: reproduced from Farrell et al. (2011). Data source of theft numbers=: 
CARS, the Australian Comprehensive Automotive Research System. 
 
A second piece of evidence to support Farrell et al.’s (2011) hypotheses 
came from analysing the changes in decline in temporary and permanent 
thefts in the UK and in Australia, against an increase in the prevalence of 
security features in the car pools of both countries. Figure 3.3A shows the 
falls in temporary and permanent theft of vehicles in England and Wales from 
1995 to 2006/7. Two thirds of the drop is accounted for by a fall in joyriding 
thefts (temporary theft where cars were recovered). Figure 3.3B displays 
similar information for Australia. The disproportionate decrease in temporary 
thefts in both countries supports the hypothesis that increased immobiliser 
prevalence and better door locks deterred the less motivated joyriding 
offenders more than it deterred thieves targeting cars for resale abroad.  
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Figure 3.3A: Temporary and permanent car theft in England and Wales, 
1995 to 2007 (Source: BCS).  
Figure 3.3B. Temporary and permanent car theft in Australia, 2000 to 2007 
(Source: CARS).  
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A third piece of evidence presented by Farrell et al. (2011) showed how the 
modus operandi of vehicle entry had also altered as the prevalence of 
security in vehicles had increased. In both the UK and Australia, the modus 
operandi which decreased the most was that of lock forcing. The decrease in 
lock forcing is consistent with increased central locking prevalence and 
quality resulting in increased effort being necessary to break the locks.  
 
Industry (in)action 
The story of the UK Car Theft Index described above shows how index 
production can be successful in stimulating innovation and competition 
regarding security. Two case studies are described below which highlight 
how industry denied the need for increased vehicle security and safety, by 
laying the blame for thefts and accidents on drivers. Some generalisations 
about typical industry reaction to pressure for internalising crime costs can 
be made. These generalisations are compared in Chapter 4 of this thesis to 
the reactions of the UK mobile industry to government and media pressure to 
internalise crime costs.  
Laying blame elsewhere 
One of the earliest calls for increased car security came from the 
Netherlands. Karmen (1981) wrote a paper aptly titled ‘Auto theft and 
corporate irresponsibility’, in which he accused industry of irresponsibility 
providing easily stolen cars. He hypothesised two reasons for this behaviour: 
 1) Cost cutting: the externalisation of cost maximises profit. 
2) Increasing sales: Karmen (1981) estimated that approximately five 
percent of vehicle sales were replacements for unrecovered stolen 
vehicles, or those recovered in poor condition.  
A typical response of industry to claims that they should take some 
responsibility for the prevalence of car thefts was to ‘damn the driver and 
spare the car’ (Karmen, 1981:65). Some examples of industry statements 
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are reproduced in Table 3.5 below. Some examples of mobile phone industry 
statements concerning responsibility for phone theft are presented in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Similarly, Newman (2004) observed that as the concentration of cars on the 
road and driving speeds increased, deaths due to vehicle accidents 
increased, but industry vehicle manufacturers blamed drivers and not their 
products for increased injury rates: 
“The history of auto safety is a story of two struggles: ideas and 
interests. The struggle of ideas pitted the idea of the bad driver as the 
cause of car accidents (promoted by car manufacturers) against the 
idea of the bad design (promoted by small elements of the medical 
community) that contributed to the severity and extent of auto-injury” 
(Newman, 2004:221) 
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Table 3.5: Damning the driver and sparing the car 
Source, Affiliation, 
Date 
Statement about responsibility 
Sherman, Manager,  
Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association, 1956 
...the industry has exerted great efforts to assist in 
the prevention of automobile theft and makes 
available all possible help to assist officials and 
insurance companies in the recovery and 
identification of stolen automobiles. 
It is obvious that the first principle in theft protection 
must be the cooperation of the motorist in locking 
his vehicle. 
 
Bogan, Vice President, 
 Engineering,  
Chrysler Corporation, 1967 
 
We (Chrysler) and the auto industry as a whole 
have cooperated with national agencies in auto 
theft prevention and recovery programs since our 
very beginning. And we are engaged in a continual 
process of improving the theft deterrence 
characteristics of our vehicles. 
Scott, Automotive Safety 
Director, Ford Motor Company, 
1967 
 
 
 
I think that the record of the industry has been very 
creditable in responding wholesomely to correcting 
and changing components of cars which were 
brought to our attention as a theft problem. 
We do view anti-theft actions as important even 
though we can find little evidence of customer 
appreciation or desire to pay higher car prices to 
obtain a more secure product. 
 
Wolfslayer, Assistant Chief 
Engineer, Chrysler Corporation, 
1975 
All the security you put in a car is not going to do a 
darned bit of good if people are careless. People 
have to learn to take better care of their autos. 
Source: Karmen (1981:66) 
Competing interests 
Newman (2004) describes the competing interests of a variety of actors 
involved in vehicle design and sales. These actors include manufacturers, 
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who seek advantages over competitors in order to maximise profits; industry 
suppliers, who have a keen interest in the inclusion of their goods in vehicle 
design; insurers, who remained in the background in the history of car 
security but generally assessed the changes in risk associated with differing 
manufacturing processes; plaintiff lawyers, who pursue their own financial 
interests in finding fault in car design and apportioning blame accordingly; 
consumer watchdogs, whose interests are in opposition to industries’ 
financial motives and who seek to minimise risk to consumers; individual 
consumers, whose preferences ultimately drive the market; the state 
government, who regulated car production from the beginning but were slow 
to regulate fully safety-related issues; and the federal government, 
concerned with federal regulation. Clarke and Newman, (2005) add to this 
list of actors the media, and design and academic professionals concerned 
with crime prevention.  
Corporate strategies in relation to car safety and security included 
obstructionism and pre-regulation initiatives. Obstructionism (Nader, 1966, in 
Newman, 2004) describes industry resistance to involvement by government 
in the design and marketing of vehicles, despite the fact that safety had been 
researched and prototype cars produced well before safety was mandated 
by government. Pre-regulation initiatives describe actions taken by 
manufacturers which are ‘enough’ to avoid mandatory action such as 
regulation or legislation, or which gain a market advantage (Newman, 2004).  
 
Government response 
Government activities were not always effective in increasing either safety or 
security in vehicles: an example of the tactic of technology-forcing is given by 
Newman (2004). President Nixon mandated that passive restraint systems, 
such as air bags linked to the car ignition, should be developed and included 
in vehicle design. This strategy fuelled competition among manufacturers 
and suppliers of passive restraints, but unfortunately also caused mistrust 
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between industry and government. Public outcry at (apparent) infringements 
of freedom and choice caused the mandate to be repealed.  
A further complication was government pluralism, where conflicts of interest 
between departments led to ineffective or unclear strategies (Laycock, 2004; 
Newman, 2004; Newman and Clarke, 2005). For example, a department 
concerned with security might mandate a security intervention which 
increased production costs, and departments concerned with trade and 
industry would oppose initiatives which decreased the competitiveness of the 
goods (Laycock, 2004). Farrell and Newman’s (2006) proposition of using 
market-based instruments reduces the risk of pluralism, by aligning the goals 
of many actors. There may still be a risk that security which is valued in one 
country is not valued as highly in another, meaning that national crime 
prevention goals and international trade interests might clash. However, 
routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) predicts that in the case of 
mobile phone theft, most countries where phone ownership has increased 
will be experiencing theft driven crime harvests, and so would benefit from 
more secure products and systems. Detailed cost-benefit analyses as 
recommended by Roman and Farrell (2002) and Farrell and Roman (2006) 
would inform policy makers whether the net benefits of national crime 
prevention strategies were greater than those from export.  
Newman’s (2004) conclusions about the differences between the 
development of car security and safety highlight that the idea of crime as 
pollution has yet to become a paradigm. There were, according to Newman 
(2004), no records of consumers complaining that cars had been stolen, nor 
of consumers suing a manufacturer for selling a car that was easy to steal. In 
contrast, there were plenty of complaints and consumer demands for 
increased safety. His conclusions about what was effective in increasing 
safety and security are useful lessons for those wishing to alter established 
industry practice. Legislation which interfered with manufacturing and 
suppliers was, he concluded, generally ineffective. Insurance groups could 
be powerful allies in lobbying for action, if they were incentivised to do so. 
Publicity was perhaps the most powerful tool, creating consumer demand 
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and therefore causing industry to react to that demand (Newman, 2004). The 
Mobile Phone Theft Index proposed in this thesis seeks to utilise consumer 
pressure in order to stimulate the internalisation of phone theft costs.  
 
Informing consumers 
Consumer information programmes, such as indices and standards labelling 
are highly varied. Those which aim to stimulate consumer conscience are 
often initiated by pressure groups within the NGO sector. Some systems for 
informing consumers are listed below in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6: Common rating systems and standards labelling  
- Secured by design (SBD) standard accreditation on housing, by 
local Architectural Liaison Officers.  
- Eco-friendly labels on cleaning products (for example if they are 
fully biodegradable) 
- RSPCA ‘Freedom food’ labels on food products (to show a 
minimum animal welfare standard has been met) 
- Organic labels on food products (such as the EU green starred leaf 
emblem which shows the product meets EU organic criteria) 
- ‘Traffic light’ labelling of supermarket produce to inform customers 
of the fat, calorie and salt content of foods. 
- Michelin Stars, and AA ratings to indicate the quality of food 
outlets. 
- ‘Fair Trade’ labels to indicate the nature of the profit trail of a 
product. 
- EU Energy Rating systems detailing energy efficiency of white 
goods, other electronic goods and cars, ranked from A to G.  
- Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) detailing the energy 
efficiency and carbon footprint of a property, given to UK home 
purchasers before purchasing a new property. 
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- Film classification to indicate for which age range a film is suitable, 
according to the British Board of Film Classification. 
- Feedback scores for individuals and companies on online trading 
websites, such as E-bay and Amazon. 
 
Standards labels and rating systems give consumers useful information, but 
consumers have to make between-product comparisons themselves. Indices 
allow these comparisons to be made at a glance. That is why they are ideal 
for stimulating between-manufacturer competition. Table 3.7 below describes 
some common examples of index usage. It is not exhaustive, but does show 
the range of topics for which indices are used. 
 
Table 3.7: Some uses of Indices 
- Indices of levels of corruption: for example, the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2010) 
- Indices of environmental pollution by geographic location: for 
example, Blacksmith Institute (2007) 
- Indices of school performance: in the UK, this is achieved via 
league tables published by Department for Education. Similar 
indices exist for Universities. 
- Indices of hospital and regional performance, on a variety of 
variables such as mortality rates, patient satisfaction and MRSA 
infection rates (published by the NHS)  
- Indices ranking places of work according to staff satisfaction. 
- Indices reflecting popularity through purchasing choices: for 
example music download charts. 
- Indices reflecting popularity according to votes, ranging from local 
and national government election results to programmes such as 
‘TV’s funniest moments’. 
- Indices ranking products by theft risk: UK Car Theft Index, UK Bike 
Theft Index.  
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- Indices reflecting financial performance: for example the FTSE 100 
Index and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
- Indices comparing countries on a range of variables including aid 
effectiveness; the nature of land use; education levels; malnutrition 
prevalence and mortality rates, all provided by the World Bank. 
- Football and other sporting league tables, ranking the relative 
performance of teams within a sport.  
- Indices produced by price comparison websites which rank 
suppliers of goods and services according to price.  
- Product value and efficiency ranking via established consumer 
organisations such as Which? and Good House Keeping. 
 
With so many sources of information already available to consumers, it is 
important to assess whether there is an appetite for product ranking based 
on security (Armitage and Pease, 2008b). Research carried out by Simon 
Learmount of Cambridge University (Learmount, 2005) indicated that 
consumers do not routinely consider crime risk when choosing electronic 
products, but that they inherently recognise that increased security can 
decrease opportunistic crime. It is arguable that consumers do not consider 
the theft risk of electronic products because they are unaware of the variance 
in risk according to purchase choice. Armitage and Pease (2008b) also raise 
the question of whether offenders consider security at the point of theft. This 
chapter concludes with a review of previous research into the choice 
structuring properties of crime targets. Much of the evidence was gathered 
by interviewing offenders. This review and the results from interviews with 40 
mobile phone thieves, presented in Chapters 6 of this thesis, aims to answer 
Armitage and Pease’s question and to inform designers about which factors 
thieves consider when selecting phone theft targets.  
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Previous research on target selection 
Many of the earlier empirical assessments of the rational choice perspective 
were published as a collection edited by Cornish and Clarke (1986). The 
methodological limitations of these earlier works have, to some extent, been 
overcome as more refined methods for researching rational choice have 
developed (Bouffard et al, 2007). For example, allowing offenders to 
spontaneously list the factors which they consider when faced with 
hypothetical or real-world scenarios is an improvement on asking offenders 
to choose from a researcher-defined list of alternatives.  
This section describes the main methodologies and their limitations, and 
summarises previous research on offender target selection. The literature 
reviewed is restricted to some of the crime types relevant to mobile phone 
theft (robbery, theft and burglary) and excludes interesting but less relevant 
explorations of rationality in offences such as child sexual abuse (Wortley 
and Smallbone, 2006) or aeroplane hijacking (Dugan et al., 2005). Studies 
which use only non-offender samples are omitted as a growing body of 
evidence suggests that non-offenders are poor replacements for offenders. 
Nee and Meenaghan (2006) summarise four studies on burglary which show 
how the responses of burglars to visual cues about target suitability cannot 
be accurately replicated by non-burgling offenders. They describe a sliding 
scale of sensitivity to visual cues concerning target suitability. Experienced 
offenders are at the top of this hierarchy, followed by novice offenders (with 
no experience of the crime type under study), then police officers, and with 
the general public at the bottom (Nee and Meenaghan, 2006). Put simply, it 
appears that non-offenders find it more difficult to ‘think thief’ than might be 
assumed.  
 
Previous research on the rational choice perspective can be grouped into 
three main categories (Bouffard et al., 2008). Ethnographic interviews ask 
offenders about their past decision-making processes. In general these 
studies have shown that reward is the key focus, while risks and costs are 
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sometimes ignored. Longitudinal studies have compared future offending 
behaviour with a snapshot of offenders’ perceptions of risk, effort and reward 
at the time of the research interview. These have found some evidence that 
opportunities and rewards influence crime rates, but little support that formal 
or informal sanctions act as deterrents (Bouffard et al., 2008). Hypothetical 
offending questions aim to elicit perceptions of various consequences of 
crime commission. Curiously, Bouffard et al. (2008) state that hypothetical 
scenarios have been used in a large number of studies, but that offenders 
are rarely included in the samples. They appear to have omitted the studies 
of offender decision-making included in the edited collection of Clarke and 
Cornish, 1986, and the work of Nee and colleagues described below.  
 
Methodological issues 
Analysis of aggregate crime statistics 
Information about offender choices can be inferred from victim statements 
and official crime records, but this method will always result in hypothetical 
explanations rather than offender stated evidence. For example, the Home 
Office used these sources to identify some of the salient features of street 
robbery events (Smith et al, 2003). Offender tactics followed repeated 
patterns, allowing the researchers to identify four commonly used event 
sequences, referred to as blitz, confrontation, con and snatch. Each tactic 
implied different decision-making processes: the con avoided physical 
violence or threat, whereas the blitz relied on sudden unannounced violence 
to overpower the victim. Tactics varied to some extent according to victim 
gender: confrontation and con robberies were more common among younger 
and male victims, and snatch robberies much more common among female 
victims. There is no way of assessing whether this variation was due to the 
unwillingness of some offenders to be more violent towards female victims, 
or because there was less need to be so frequently violent towards female 
victims. The best way to answer this question is, arguably, to ask offenders.  
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Hypothetical scenarios 
Carroll and Weaver (1986) acknowledge two limitations of the hypothetical 
situation methodology. They may omit some of the features crucial to 
decision-making, and offenders might respond in a more causal way than 
when faced with real consequences. However, they argued that verbal 
protocols (i.e. ‘thinking aloud’) reveal those elements of the thought process 
which are described. Verbal protocols will not however reveal any processes 
which are automatic or subconscious and therefore unrecognised by the 
participant. Using a variety of hypothetical scenarios and varying the 
components in a systematic fashion helps to eliminate the potential that 
offenders only verbalise what the researcher is looking for. As mentioned 
above, allowing spontaneous description of the factors under consideration 
also minimises the risk of omitting key choice-structuring properties from 
research models. 
 
Incarcerated offenders 
Walsh (1986) described several shortcomings of using incarcerated 
offenders as a research sample. In addition to the fact that the sample 
represented incompetent offenders (they had been caught), there remained 
the risk of potential unresponsiveness of the subjects. He suggested that it 
was difficult for offenders to summarise verbally the often complex mental 
processes, and the many factors which interplay during a crime event; and 
that recall problems impacted descriptions of past behaviour. Walsh (1986) 
also suggested that offenders might display reticence in unveiling aspects of 
behaviour which they perceived to be ‘trade secrets’, and might employ 
deliberate deceit in order to alter the interviewers’ perception of them (for 
better or worse). He did however conclude that offenders remained the best 
source of information on offending behaviour: 
95 
 
“Because offenders are the source of the crime it would seem absurd 
not to avail oneself of their versions of what they were doing and why” 
(Walsh, 1986:49)” 
Indermaur (1996) compared the self-reported behaviours of a sample of 
incarcerated robbers with prosecution records and concluded that on 
aggregate, there was little difference between self-reported levels of violence 
and prosecution files because those offenders who ‘minimised’ their reports 
of violence cancelled out those who ‘maximised’ their reports. In his sample 
at least the net effects of deceit suggested by Walsh (1986) were minimal. 
Robbery and ‘street theft’ 
Feeney (1986) retrospectively interviewed 113 Californian robbers in order to 
establish evidence of motive and planning relative to the involvement model 
of Clarke and Cornish (1985); to establish evidence of offence specialisation 
and the effects of learning and experience on event decisions, which were 
relevant to Clarke and Cornish’s continuance models; and to ascertain the 
robbers’ opinions about weapons and violence as part of the crime event. 
The findings revealed that although 80 percent of robbers reported using a 
weapon, 30 percent of those who used guns either did not have the gun 
loaded or used a fake. This was because of the desire to minimise the risk of 
hurting victims, and the risks posed by increased probability and severity of 
punishment (Feeney, 1986). A fifth of robbers (20%) chose personal robbery 
victims because of convenience, and 15 percent were victimised because 
they appeared to have money. A further 15 percent of victims were chosen 
because a fast getaway was possible, or the crime was perceived as low risk 
due to some other factor. Feeney (1986) reported variation in motivation for 
robbery with age, but not with race. For example, younger robbers were 
more likely to cite peer pressure as an influence in their decision to rob than 
were older offenders. On aggregate, over half of the robbers stated they 
employed no planning, but any planning that did occur was frequently 
performed a few hours before the robbery event. The more careful planners 
(15%) reported repeating previously successful patterns in victim selection 
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and event decisions, supporting the hypothesis of reinforced crime scripts 
(Cornish, 1994).  
Walsh (1986) employed retrospective interviewing and hypothetical victim 
and target selection to assess the rationality of 69 robbers and 45 
commercial burglars. Significant differences in the behaviour of the two 
groups were observed, underlining the need for crime-specificity in offender 
oriented research. Over half of the robbers (52%) stated that they planned 
their offences, usually a matter of days or weeks before the event. They 
chose their victims based on knowledge gained through work, through other 
people (a ‘knowledge economy’ existed where people exchanged drinks and 
money for tip offs), and personal observation and experience. The non-
planners (called opportunists) stated that they used intuition to select victims. 
Nearly half of robbers were drunk at the time of their last offence, and 
perhaps not surprisingly accidents and mistakes were accepted as a normal 
part of offence commission. Walsh speculated that descriptions of hunches, 
intuition and luck were in fact the result of prior experience leading to 
increased familiarity and automatic mental processes. The more rational 
robbers who planned their offences were described as ‘flaw hunters’ who 
acted purposively to identify the Achilles heel in any situation, whereas those 
exhibiting less planning were not so determined to identify these ‘windows of 
vulnerability’ (Walsh, 1986). 
 
Burglary 
Bennett and Wright (1984, in Nee and Meenaghan, (2006)) conducted 
interviews with over 300 convicted burglars, and incorporated videos and 
photographs of a variety of properties. Their research was among the first to 
show empirically the sequential nature of burglars’ decision-making (Nee and 
Meenaghan, 2006). Decisions to burgle were often formed away from the 
scene of the crime, and motivated by financial need. Purposeful searching of 
potentially suitable target areas followed. Burglars paid attention to cues 
signifying occupancy, accessibility, ease of surveillance, and levels of 
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security when identifying target dwellings. Similarly, Hearnden and Magill 
(2004) report that interviews with 82 convicted burglars in the UK revealed 
money, boredom and the influence of friends to be the key motivations for 
burglary, and that the majority of intentions to burgle were formed away from 
the burglary site. The key factor affecting target choice was the ‘likely yield’, 
which was inferred from cues about the occupants’ wealth. The effect of 
different structural aspects of buildings on decision-making varied between 
burglars: some were deterred from flats because of the absence of escape 
routes, while one offender preferred flats because once inside the main 
building, there were many possible targets (dwellings). Two-thirds of 
offenders reported repeat offending at the same property at least once; and 
half of these repeat offences were carried out within one month. Repeat 
burglaries were motivated by the knowledge that previously stolen goods had 
been replaced (some offenders looked out for cues such as packaging left 
out for recycling); the knowledge that valuable goods had been left during the 
first offence, and the perception that risk was minimised because the 
property was now familiar to the burglar. Over eighty percent of offenders 
who offered an opinion on deterrence stated that alarms, owner occupancy 
and the presence of CCTV acted as deterrents. Strong doors and window 
locks deterred just over half of offenders, while poster campaigns and 
property marking schemes deterred 18 and 25 percent respectively.  
Research in the Republic of Ireland also concluded that burglars were 
sensitive to cues relating to layout, wealth, occupancy and security (Nee and 
Meenaghan, 2006). The combination of factors taken into consideration 
varied according to the situation, and target selection in general was highly 
habit-driven. Logie, Wright and Decker (1992) were among the earliest 
researchers to ask US burglars, in a real-world crime setting, about their 
target selection strategies once inside the dwelling. Many offenders followed 
‘cognitive scripts’, reporting that they prioritised a search of the main 
bedroom and were looking for cash, guns and drugs and aimed to exit within 
20 minutes. Nee and Meenaghan’s (2006) more recent work in Ireland 
produced similar findings to those of Logie et al. (1992), showing again the 
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hierarchical and systematic decisions made during dwelling selection and 
during the search within dwellings.  
Variation between expert and novice offenders 
Carroll and Weaver (1986) asked 17 expert shoplifters and 17 novices to 
‘think aloud’ as they walked around shopping malls. The verbal protocols of 
experts and novices were recorded by the researchers and later coded into 
phrases to allow analysis of the protocols. Clear differences emerged 
between expert and novice shoplifters. Experts spoke about shoplifting 
explicitly in 51 percent of their phrases, while none of the novices 
spontaneously did so. Experts noticed the presence or absence of cues, 
such as security mirrors on the walls, more frequently than novices, and 
weighed these cues up as part of a hierarchical decision-making process. 
Experts considered the broader situation (for example shop layout, or the 
presence of people watching) before focusing their attention on cues relating 
to specific items. Novices described fewer attributes of the wider situation. 
Some experts were adept at neutralising the deterrent effect of risk factors by 
describing how they could circumvent them, or by offsetting them with a 
facilitating factor. Novices mentioned guilt and were deterred by it more often 
than experts (10% vs. 2% respectively). Experts also showed evidence that 
familiarity with certain objects was a key factor in deciding which items to 
take. Novices did not exhibit this prior knowledge.  
Experience also appears to increase the recognition of suitable cues when 
offenders work in groups. Hochstetler (2001) found that experienced robbers 
and burglars reported in interview that they could converge upon a suitable 
target with almost no conversation. Less motivated offenders were also 
‘pushed’ in to offending more often by group influence than if they had been 
acting alone. Hochstetler (2001) argues that the effects of interactions within 
co-offending groups on criminal behaviour are under-researched. 
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Summary 
This chapter has described key literature relating to responsibility for crime 
prevention, and how to incentivise the private sector to internalise crime 
costs. The example of the UK Car Theft Index (Laycock, 2004) provides 
evidence that security can be made a marketable commodity once the 
barrier to market production, i.e. public ignorance of crime risk, is removed. 
Some generalisations can be made about how the vehicle industry reacted to 
pressure to internalise the costs of vehicle accidents and vehicle thefts. Their 
responses included obstructionism and pre-regulatory activities, and a 
tendency to blame vehicle drivers rather than vehicle design (Karmen, 1981; 
Newman, 2004).  
The goal of internalising crime costs by increasing public demand for security 
is based on the premise that offenders will alter their behaviour in response 
to increased product security. Therefore, it is imperative to assess which 
cues offenders use to choose targets. Previous research describing the 
decision-making processes of burglars and robbers shows that offenders 
appear to follow the models proposed by Clarke and Cornish (1985), by 
exhibiting purposeful behaviour and taking note of a variety of cues to make 
initial and event decisions (Carroll and Weaver, 1986; Walsh, 1986; Logie et 
al., 1992; Indermaur, 1996; Nee and Meenaghan, 2006). Increased 
experience in offending leads to quicker and more automatic decisions 
(Carroll and Weaver, 1986; Hochstetler, 2001). The absence of offending 
experience is one reason why non-offenders appear to be poor substitutes 
for offenders in research which aims to identify the criminogenic potential 
and security features of new products (Nee and Meenaghan, 2006). 
 
Discussion 
The absence of the UK Car Theft Index 
The Car Theft Index has not been made publicly available by the Home 
Office since the 2006 iteration. It is important for criminologists and policy 
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makers to determine why this has occurred, and it is imperative to measure 
whether the rate of vehicle security innovation has altered in response to the 
removal of the Index. When security innovation stalls, the methods to 
overcome existing security improve and become more widely known among 
offenders, who then gain an advantage in the designer-offender arms race 
(Ekblom, 2005). If the Car Theft Index has made security an inherent aspect 
of vehicle design, it may be safe to stop Index production, because security 
innovation will continue. If Index production has stopped because of a lack of 
government or police resources, there is a risk that innovation will stall. 
Measuring what happens next, and unpicking the reasons why, will have 
important implications for vehicle security in the UK and more generally for 
lessons in how best to use indices as information programmes to incentivise 
innovation.  
 
Crime as pollution 
In economic terms, pollution which increases the prevalence of suitable 
victims can be seen as increasing the supply of crime opportunities (Farrell 
and Roman, 2006). The corollary is that pollution which increases the supply 
of offenders increases the demand for crime opportunities. It might be that in 
the future, as consideration of crime as pollution is developed further, it is 
necessary to differentiate between crime pollution causing increased supply 
and pollution causing increased demand. Differentiation would be necessary 
because these types of pollution will require different solutions.  
A tentative typology for crime pollution is presented below in Figure 3.4. It is 
tentative because there will doubtless exist goods and services whose by-
products overlap the three suggested categories. However the typology is 
presented here as a starting point for future consideration of the types of 
crime pollution which exist, the definition of which would enable future 
empirical assessment of whether any of the three types respond more 
favourably to certain types of control instrument than others. For example, 
the UK Car Theft Index shows that pollution caused by increased supply of 
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targets (cars) can be decreased by a public information market-barrier 
removal instrument. It is difficult to imagine how a similar instrument could 
affect pollution caused by alcohol sales, which falls under the category of 
facilitator pollution.  
As Felson and Clarke (2003) argue in their reply to Wortley (2001), 
opportunity is by far the most important factor affecting crime rates. It may be 
that the most useful role of the suggested typology or any subsequent 
typology of pollution will be to focus attention only on pollution which affects 
crime opportunities, since preventive mechanisms focused here will have the 
best chance of the greatest net decrease in social harm. 
Figure 3.4: A proposed typology of crime pollution: Pollution via 
opportunities, precipitators and facilitators 
1) Opportunity production: the production of a good or service results 
in an increase of suitable targets; incapable guardians; and/ or 
suitable times and places to commit crimes. Targets can be broken 
down into products and victims. 
2) Facilitator production: the production of a good or service results in 
an increase in crime facilitators, such as alcohol or guns (Clarke, 
1992).  
3) Precipitator production: the delivery of a good or service results in 
an increase in crime precipitators, such as when high temperatures in 
prison increase the frequency of violent incidents (Wortley, 2008). 
 
A new proposal: the three aspects necessary for a polluting situation to 
occur. 
It is possible to generalise about the conditions which give rise to crime as a 
form of pollution (Roman and Farrell, 2002 and Farrell and Roman, 2006). 
Routine activity theory defines the three elements necessary for a crime 
event to occur as being a motivated offender, a suitable target and the 
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absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979). The absence of 
any of the three prevents the crime event.  
Figure 3.5 below respectfully attempts to mirror the original crime triangle 
(Felson, 2002) to define the three elements necessary for a polluting 
situation to arise. This diagram visualises Roman and Farrell’s (2006) thesis, 
but draws parallels with Felson’s (2002) crime triangle and the language 
used to describe the three elements necessary for a crime event to occur. 
Crime pollution occurs when a polluter produces a criminogenic factor 
(opportunity, facilitator or precipitator) in the absence of an effective pollution 
control instrument. 
 
Figure 3.5: The three elements necessary to cause crime pollution 
 
The schematic presented in Figure 3.5 may be a tidy way of summarising the 
macro level situation, but it is of limited use other than to identify the key 
actors in the polluting opportunity. Farrell and Roman (2006) propose that 
polluters can be identified by asking ‘Who benefits?’. The schematic is not 
helpful for, nor is it intended to determine, how to affect the level of pollution. 
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Pollution control is only possible following identification of the polluter and the 
specific role of the polluting good or service in increasing crime rates.  
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Chapter 4. The UK mobile industry, theft levels and theft responses to 
2008 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the context within which interviews with mobile phone 
thieves were conducted, and the Mobile Phone Theft Index was developed. It 
is essentially a summary of background research. Firstly a description of the 
UK mobile phone industry, dominated by a small number of manufacturers 
and network operators, shows how the industry can easily act in concert to 
either enable or block crime reduction initiatives. Secondly, examining the 
nature, extent and cost of mobile phone theft in the UK provides evidence of 
the need for more effective crime prevention efforts than have been achieved 
to date. The chapter concludes with a section describing the progress made 
up to 2008 in the UK towards combating mobile phone theft. Some of the 
literature is now slightly out of date but to the author’s knowledge, there has 
been no significant progress in combating mobile phone theft since this initial 
research was carried out. Some of the research presented was published as 
Mailley et al. (2006a). Most government activity to date has aimed to 
increase law enforcement capability, and to prevent thefts by encouraging 
industry to block (blacklist) stolen phones. In parallel with the history of car 
safety and security, evidence is presented here of the competing interests 
between government and industry, and of Newman’s (2004) industry 
obstructionism and pre-regulation initiatives. For at least three years 
(between 2008 and 2011) it appears that industry has maintained the status 
quo where do they do the minimum to avoid regulation and resist any calls 
for them to take on responsibility for the criminogenic properties of their 
goods. Professor Graham Farrell was invited to talk to the Home Office in 
early 2011 about how to decrease phone theft and other crimes associated 
with electronic goods. It seems that the production of a Mobile Phone Theft 
Index, backed by the detailed research from offender interviews, is needed 
more than ever to bypass the current situation where industry continues to 
pollute and the government appear unable to break their resolve. 
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The UK mobile industry and market. 
The research presented in this thesis is UK specific. However, it is 
noteworthy that most mobile manufacturers and some network operators are 
global enterprises who will tend to resist manufacturing changes which may 
be demanded in one country but not another (Saraga, 2008). Their global 
dominance also brings power and influence. For example Nokia  
manufactured 40 percent of all handsets sold globally in 2008 (Tech.co.uk, 
2008). The UK is an established market, in that the majority of people 
already own a mobile phone and sales are therefore based on replacements 
or upgrades by existing customers, rather than attracting brand new 
customers (Mintel, 2007a). So called ‘emerging markets’ where a lower 
proportion of the population own a mobile handset include India, China and 
Africa (see Mintel, 2007b, and Tech.co.uk, 2008)   
 
Mobile connections in the UK. 
Data on the number of mobile connections in the UK were available from a 
variety of key sources. This section describes these sources and compares 
their estimates of trends in UK mobile phone ownership.  
 
The UK telecommunications regulator Ofcom publishes statistics describing 
key aspects of the UK mobile phone industry (for example see Ofcom, 
2007b). A search of the various reports revealed there was no single source 
which detailed the yearly estimated number of mobile connections in the UK. 
Therefore a Freedom of Information request, FOI 2664892, was emailed in 
April 2006 which resulted in the return of an unpublished Excel spreadsheet 
(Ofcom, 2006a) detailing the estimated number of UK mobile subscribers 
between 1994 and 2006. Figure 4.1 plots these data and shows a gradual 
increase in subscriptions between 1994 and 1998, followed by a more rapid 
increase beginning in early 1999 and continuing to 2005. 
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Figure 4.1: Ofcom Count of UK Mobile Subscriptions between 1994 and 
2005. 
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The methodology used by Ofcom was not specified in the FOI response, and 
so a complementary data source was sought. The GSMA (Groupe Speciale 
Mobile Association) host in the UK a database called the Shared Equipment 
Identity Register or SEIR, which records the unique identifier or IMEI of each 
handset active on UK networks. The functionality of IMEIs and their role in 
crime prevention are discussed below.  
 
The GSMA were approached in March 2006 via personal correspondence 
and subsequently provided SEIR-based data describing the number of 
individual phones connecting to the SEIR between 2001 and 2005. The 
number of GSMA counted mobile connections are shown below in Figure 
4.2. Data are indexed to Q3 in 2001, and reveal a steep rise in connections 
between 2001 and 2005. The SEIR cannot differentiate between the 
handsets of tourists and of UK residents meaning there will be an inflation of 
SEIR based numbers, accounted for by tourists’ handsets. However, the 
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steep rise in connections coincides with that evidenced in Figure 4.1 above 
based on Ofcom data. 
Figure 4.2: UK Mobile Phone Connections Between 2001 and 2005 (Indexed 
to Q3 of 2001) 
UK mobile Phone Connections (Indexed to 100 in 3rd Qtr 2001)
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Other sources of data on mobile ownership in the UK include surveys such 
as the British Crime Survey and the General Household Survey which both 
estimate levels of UK mobile ownership. The numbers suggested by the 
British Crime Survey, Ofcom and the General Household survey are similar 
(Hoare, 2007). Mintel are an established market research company who also 
regularly produce specialist reports on the telecommunications industry (see 
for example Mintel, 2007a and b). Mintel estimated the number of UK 
subscribers in 2007 to be 69.7 million (Mintel, 2007a). This estimate is not 
incompatible with Ofcom figures of 65 million in 2005, if the trend of 
increasing subscriptions continued to 2007. 
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Mobiles per person 
Between 2001 and 2005 UK mobile ownership rose from 77 percent market 
saturation to 108 percent, and saturation levels of 116 percent were reported 
for 2006 (Ofcom, 2007b) That is, since the mid ‘noughties’ there were more 
mobile phones than people in the UK. However this does not mean that 
every person in the UK owned a mobile phone: ownership was skewed 
towards younger people.  
 
Demographics of UK mobile phone owners 
According to the 2005/06 British Crime Survey mobile phone ownership was 
similar in both male and female UK occupants: 74 percent of males and 73 
percent of females of all ages owned a mobile phone (Hoare, 2007). Table 
4.1 below is reproduced from Hoare (2007) and demonstrates the young age 
bias of mobile phone ownership. Only 4 percent of sixteen to twenty four 
year olds did not own a mobile phone. In contrast, nearly forty percent of 
people aged over 65 did not own a mobile. The figures are in agreement with 
demographics of mobile owners published elsewhere. For example Mintel 
(2007b) reported that in 2006, forty two percent of over 65s did not own a 
mobile.  
 
Table 4.1: Mobile ownership in different age groups, 2005/06 BCS data. 
Age 
group 
Percent 
owning 
mobiles 
0 - 7 2 
8 – 11 39 
Dec-15 84 
16 – 24 96 
25 – 34 95 
35 – 44 94 
45 – 54 90 
55 – 64 81 
65 – 74 62 
75+ 35 
Average 74 
Source: Hoare (2007, Table 2.2). 
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Industry domination by key manufacturers and operators 
Manufacturers 
Within the UK market, handset manufacture is dominated by Nokia, Sony 
Ericsson, Samsung, Motorola, and more recently LG (Mintel, 2007a). Table 
4.2 below shows the percentage UK market share for each manufacturer in 
2002, 2004 and 2006. In no year does the percentage of the market share 
accounted for by the top five manufacturers combined fall below 73 percent. 
On one hand the domination of both the manufacturing markets and network 
operator markets by a small number of companies poses a challenge to 
crime prevention. Bonded together under the umbrellas of the GSMA and 
MICAF (the Mobile Industry Crime Action Forum) specifically, these 
companies effectively form a monopoly. The roles of MICAF and the GSMA 
in the history of preventing mobile phone theft in the UK are described later 
in this chapter. 
 
Table 4.2: Estimated share of UK handset sales by manufacturer in 2002, 
2004 and 2006. 
 
  Share of UK sales (%) 
Manufacturer 
2002 
(n=14.28m) 
2004 
(n=18.08m) 
2006 
(n=21.47m) 
Nokia 52 41 30 
Siemens 11 10 * 
Sony Ericsson 10 12 28 
Samsung 9 10 23 
Motorola 8 9 8 
LG * 4 5 
Others 10 14 6 
Total 100 100 100 
* see Other. 
Source: Mintel (2007a, Figure 22). 
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Network Operators 
The key UK network operators are O2, Orange, Vodafone, T-mobile, and to 
a lesser extent Virgin Mobile, Tesco and most recently 3 or Hutchinson 3G 
(Mintel, 2007b). Table 4.3 below shows the UK network operator market 
share for 2002, 2004 and 2006 and clearly demonstrates the continued UK 
market domination by O2, Orange, Vodafone and T-Mobile.  
 
Table 4.3: Network Operators’ Market Share for 2002, 2004 and 2006. 
 
 Market share of subscribers (%) 
Operator 
2002  
(n= 49.6m) 
2004  
(n= 59.7m) 
2006  
(n= 69.7m) 
O2 24 24 25 
Orange 27 24 22 
Vodafone 26 23 21 
T-Mobile 18 16 16 
Virgin 
Mobile 5 8 8 
3 - 4 5 
Tesco - 1 2 
Other - - 1 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Mintel (2007a, Figure 23). 
 
Value of the UK mobile industry 
Data supplied by the Department of Trade and Industry indicated that for the 
financial year 1998-99 the UK network operators had an estimated combined 
turnover of £5.8 billion (Conway and Morgan, 2001: 17). The total turnover 
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generated by UK operators in 2005 was estimated to be £12.1 billion1 
(Ofcom, 2006b).  
 
The total value of revenue generated during 2007 by UK mobile handset 
sales, subscriptions and call costs was predicted to exceed £14.5 billion 
(Mintel, 2007a). This represents a 67 percent increase in revenue compared 
to 2002 (Mintel, 2007a). These figures are in general agreement with figures 
published by Ofcom, where the UK’s total mobile retail revenue was valued 
in 2006 to be £13.9 billion (Ofcom, 2007b). Mintel estimated that over 23 
million handsets would be sold in the UK in 2007. Sales of mobile handsets 
alone during 2007, excluding accessories such as hands-free kits, holders 
and phone faces, and excluding call and text revenues, were estimated to be 
worth £1.38 billion (Mintel, 2007a). 
 
In 2007 Nokia reported global post-tax profits of nearly 7000 million Euros 
(6746 million Euros) (Nokia, 2007a). Assuming a conversion rate of 0.8 
Euros to one British pound, this equates to over 8400 million pounds sterling 
(£8432.5 million) profit. It is clear that there are considerable sums of money 
available every year for investment in crime-prevention measures if the will 
exists. 
 
Key personal contacts within the mobile phone industry 
During this research communication was established with key personnel 
from the mobile phone industry and associated organisations. This section 
describes these key contacts within the context of their company or 
organisation, since the personal correspondence from many of them form 
substantive sources. Furthermore, because of the monopolies formed by the 
largest manufacturers and operators, specific beliefs held by some key 
industry personnel can be pinpointed as crucial hurdles to effective crime 
prevention interventions.  
 
                                                          
1
 Figure based on multiplication by four of the mean turnover from Q1 thru Q3 2005. If turnover 
altered dramatically in Q4 2005 this estimate will be inaccurate. 
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GSM Association 
In 1982 the Group Speciale Mobile (GSM) was formed to design and 
standardise the technology used by the telecoms industry across Europe. 
The GSM Association evolved from GSM in 1987, and now functions as a 
global trade organisation. The GSMA represents over 700 GSM mobile 
phone operators, which account for over 82 percent of the world’s mobile 
phone customers (GSMA, 2007a and 2007b).  
 
Personal correspondence was exchanged with James Moran, Director of 
Fraud and Security at the GSMA. A meeting was initially held with James at 
GSMA’s headquarters in Dublin, where James outlined the history of using 
IMEIs to individually identify handsets, and the processes in place to 
increase the security and validity of IMEIs.  
 
ETSI 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI, is the official 
European Commission Standards Organisation for Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT). ICT includes fixed, mobile and radio 
telecommunications technologies as well as broadcasting and internet 
technologies (ETSI, 2008a). The Standards developed by ETSI include the 
globally used GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) standard, 
which defines the technologies upon which mobile phone networks operate 
(ETSI, 2008b). The contact made within ETSI was Charles Brookson, an ex 
BT engineer, active ETSI Board Member, and employee of the UK’s 
Department of Trade and Industry (now renamed as BERR, the Department 
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform).  
 
MICAF 
The UK’s Mobile Industry Crime Action Forum, MICAF, represents the 
mobile manufacturers, some network operators and main retail outlets on 
matters relating to criminality and mobile phones. In 2005 the MICAF website 
described MICAF’s mission to represent mobile phone manufacturers and 
some operators when addressing matters concerning phone security. It did 
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not specifically mention lowering criminality associated with phones as an 
aim. Following the publication of some of the results from this research, and 
conversations with the Home Office, MICAF’s web page in 2008 read: 
 
“An organisation set up by the UK telecommunications industry, 
including mobile handset manufacturers, to address the issues of 
mobile phone theft. The Forum meets regularly to exchange 
information and agree crime prevention strategies to reduce mobile 
phone theft  and associated activity in the United Kingdom.” (MICAF, 
2008). 
 
Clearly full credit for this change can not directly be associated with the 
research described here. However it is likely that the change was in part 
made in response to a growing call for more responsible actions, of which 
Loughborough’s publications formed a substantive part.  
 
The main contact made within MICAF was the chairman, Jack Wraith. He 
stated publicly that mobile phone thieves are non-discerning and that all 
phone models were at similar risk of theft (see Mailley and Farrell, 2007). 
This view is at odds with the rational choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 
1986) and is proved false by the research presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Some of the statements made by Mr Wraith in response to media and 
government calls to internalise some of the costs of phone theft pollution are 
described later in this chapter.  
 
The extent and nature of mobile phone theft 
The following section describes the nature and extent of mobile phone theft 
in the UK. The section describes in detail the most comprehensive 
assessment of phone theft, conducted by Harrington and Mayhew (2001) for 
the UK Home Office. Their research is then compared with data provided by 
the UK’s dedicated mobile phone theft police unit, the National Mobile Phone 
Crime Unit, and with more recent Home Office research. The section 
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concludes by presenting estimates of the cost of mobile phone theft to the 
UK economy. 
 
The extent of mobile phone theft in the UK.  
Mobile phones were causing a crime wave as far back as 1995. The 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST, 1995) summarises 
the main crimes associated with analogue mobile phones as being theft from 
both the person and from warehouses; cloning and re-chipping (copying and 
altering the phone’s unique identifying number, the IMEI); and subscription 
fraud, where a false personal identity is given by the subscriber to avoid 
payment of bills. At this time alterating the unique identifier on a phone, the 
IMEI, was not illegal. Theft levels were estimated at between 12 to 15 
thousand analogue phones a month, on top of a potential 1000 digital phone 
thefts a month (POST, 1995). This figure pales into insignificance when 
compared to what was to come.  
 
In 2001 Harrington and Mayhew published a seminal piece of work 
estimating national phone thefts to be in the order of 710 thousand, 
representing two percent of phone owners. Their research presented a 
thorough assessment of the nature and extent of phone theft, and warrants 
some detailed description.  
 
Data from police records, the British Crime Survey (BCS) and from two self-
report surveys were combined to estimate national theft levels. The BCS 
annually surveys a representative sample of adults over age 16 residing 
within England and Wales. Inclusion of results from the BCS helped adjust 
crime figures for under-reporting to police, by those over 16. The two self-
report surveys aimed to assess the extent of thefts within younger age 
groups whose victimisation would not usually be recorded by police 
(Harrington and Mayhew, 2001).  
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BCS results 
Results from the 2001 BCS suggested that on average phone thefts and 
attempts were suffered at a rate of 1.1 incidents per 100 adult UK residents 
or 2.1 incidents per 100 mobile owners (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001: 6).  
The 2001 BCS incident rates were extrapolated to the estimated adult 
population of England and Wales in 2000, resulting in an estimated annual 
theft number of 470 thousand. This is likely to be an underestimation 
because the BCS did not at the time of the 2001 sweep ask about 
victimisation of persons under 16, nor record commercial offences 
(Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). Furthermore, the BCS estimates were 
artificially restricted to allow only a maximum of five offences in a series to be 
recorded against each victim (Farrell and Pease, 2007). 
Incidence rates express the average number of crimes (incidents) per 100 
population. However, crime is concentrated on a small proportion of victims 
because a small proportion of victims are repeatedly victimised. Farrell 
(1992) showed that 70 percent of all incidents reported in the 1982 BCS 
were suffered by 14 percent of respondents. Such repeat victimisation is 
consistent across many crime types (Farrell and Pease, 2008).  
Prevalence rates describe the number of people victimised once or more in a 
population. Harrington and Mayhew reported that the prevalence rate from 
the 2001 BCS respondents was 1 percent if all BCS respondents were 
considered, or 2 percent if only mobile owners were considered. The 
incidence rate of 2.1 thefts per 100 owners compared to the slightly lower 
prevalence rate (of 2 victims per 100 owners) suggests an element of repeat 
victimisation. This figure would probably change again if the absolute number 
of offences were recorded by the BCS, instead of capping the number of 
offences in a series at five. Farrell and Pease (2007) calculated that in the 
2005-06 BCS, capping the number of repeat victimisations of robbery 
underestimated actual offence numbers by 7.2 percent, and underestimated 
mugging by 5.8 percent. 
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The ‘On Track’ survey 
During June and July 2001 fifteen thousand 11 to 15 yr olds in schools in 
England and Wales were interviewed as part of the Crime Reduction 
Programme. The schools selected were all in highly deprived areas, and so 
were likely to report higher victimisation rates than the national school 
average (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). The incident rate for all types of 
phone theft in the sampled schools was 16 per 100 respondents, with one 
quarter of victims being victimised more than once, giving a prevalence rate 
of all respondents of 11.9 percent (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001).  
 
The nature of theft circumstances was not recorded directly by the On Track 
survey. However proxy measures of theft and robbery were developed: 
Fourteen percent of school aged victims reported their handset was in use 
when it was taken. Harrington and Mayhew (2001) asserted that a theft of 
this sort would probably be recorded as a robbery in recorded police figures 
(for adults). It is interesting to note that such behaviour might be colloquially 
termed ‘bullying’ when observed in the context of a school setting, but 
robbery when considering adults. The Home Office guide to the police for 
crime recording defines robbery is:  
 
“The use or threat of force in a theft from the person should be 
recorded as a robbery. For example, if the victim or a third part offers 
any resistance, or if anyone is assaulted in any way, then this 
constitutes force. Similarly, if a victim is under any impression from the 
offender’s words or actions that the offender may use force, then this 
constitutes threat of force.” (Home Office, 2004a.) 
  
Harrington and Mayhew (2001) reported that twenty eight percent of On 
Track respondents’ phones were taken while in their possession (that is on 
the person, such as being in a pocket or bag). Offences where the phone 
was in a person’s possession but not in use might well represent the 
equivalent of the recordable offence ‘Theft from the person’. (Harrington and 
Mayhew, 2001).  
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The ‘proxy theft rate’ of six per 100 On Track respondents was much higher 
than the rate of 0.23 thefts or robbery incidents per 100 adults estimated by 
the BCS. Bearing in mind the potential inaccuracies from sample bias and 
from participant exaggeration, the total number of UK mobile phone thefts 
among children predicted by the On Track survey was 550 thousand 
(Harrington and Mayhew, 2001: 7).  
 
The MORI survey 
In 2001 the Youth Justice Board carried out a survey via MORI which asked 
about general phone theft victimisation of just over five thousand 11 to 16 yr 
olds. The sample was smaller but more representative than the On Track 
survey (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). The prevalence rate was five victims 
per 100 respondents. The equivalent prevalence rate for comparison from 
the On Track survey was 11.9 percent; for the BCS it was 1 percent. Clearly 
rates would be higher if only phone owners were considered but the MORI 
survey did not ask about ownership, and so these comparisons can not be 
made.  
 
The MORI survey did not ask about the nature of incidents and so 
comparisons can not be made between rates of offence types between the 
BCS and On Track survey. Combined, the MORI and On Track surveys 
strongly suggested that in 2000 children were more often targeted as phone 
theft victims than adults, and that repeat victimisation among children was 
higher than among adults (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001).  
 
Police records 
Harrington and Mayhew (2001) also examined the records of all incidents 
where a mobile phone was taken within six police forces. Using weights to 
account for force size and level of urbanisation, the estimated number of 
police records in England and Wales of a mobile phone theft or attempted 
theft was 330 000 (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). This will be an 
underestimate due to underreporting to police. Hoare (2007: 22) states that 
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in every BCS sweep since 2001/02, only approximately half of phone theft 
victims reported the incident to the police. 
 
Combining the results from BCS, On Track, MORI and Police data 
Harrington and Mayhew (2001) combined the survey results to estimate the 
number of UK phone thefts within victims aged 11 years and upwards to be 
710 000. Less weighting was given to the On Track survey compared to the 
more representative MORI survey. The police data were extrapolated to all of 
England and Wales, resulting in an estimate of 330 000 recorded phone 
thefts and attempted thefts within the adult population. This estimate was 
recognised as an underestimate due to the proportion of offences not 
reported to the police.  
The nature of phone thefts in the UK  
Phone unattended 
Approximately two thirds of phone thefts recorded in the 2000 and 2001 BCS 
combined occurred when the phone was left unattended. One third of stolen 
phones were taken in offences classified as ‘Other theft’, and one third in 
thefts from the vehicle. (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). The Home Office 
Counting Rules define Other Theft as a theft where the offence can not be 
categorised as robbery, theft of personal property, theft of or from a motor 
vehicle or pedal cycle (Home Office, 2004c). In reality this means offences 
where a phone is taken when the victim is not present. Similarly, theft from a 
vehicle tends to occur in the absence of the car owner. More recent evidence 
from the 2005/06 BCS reveals that this trend continued, with 69 percent of 
phone thefts reported to the BCS occurring while the phone was unattended 
(Hoare, 2007).  
 
Offence type 
BCS data suggested that in 2000 the more violent and headline grabbing 
offences of robbery and theft from the person accounted for only four and 15 
percent of phone losses respectively. Much more common were Other thefts, 
thefts from vehicles (accounting for 29 percent of thefts), and thefts occurring 
during burglaries of dwellings, accounting for 20 percent of phone losses 
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(Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). However, the number of victims within each 
offence category was small, and so extrapolation to the national level should 
be treated with caution (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). It is likely that trends 
were captured –that is, that the fewest phones were taken during robberies 
during 2000 and the most in Other thefts and thefts from vehicles- but 
possible that exact proportions were not.  
 
Phone thefts drove a rise in street crime 
Estimates of the number of thefts accounted for by crime type gave insight 
into how phones were being stolen. Harington and Mayhew (2001) presented 
evidence suggesting that in 20001 mobile phones were fuelling an observed 
rise in street crime, i.e. theft from the person and robbery. All figures were 
based on police recorded data.  
Firstly, the proportion of robberies involving mobiles had increased from eight 
percent in 1998/99 to 28 percent in 2000/01. Furthermore, the proportion of 
thefts from the person involving a mobile had risen from 15 percent to 33 
percent (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001).  
Secondly a comparison of the proportion of offence types involving phones 
across forces revealed that robbery in city centres was more likely to involve 
a phone than robbery throughout the force as a whole (Harrington and 
Mayhew, 2001). These results could have been due to a higher availability of 
phones as targets in city centres than across the force as a whole, or 
because offenders targeting phones congregated in city centres.  
Thirdly, police recorded data showed that the increase in robberies where a 
phone was taken was much greater than the increase in robbery of all types. 
Finally, considering offences where the phone was the only item taken, 
‘phone only’ robberies increased more than ‘phone and other item’ robberies 
(Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). Together the results imply that mobiles 
were responsible for a rise in the number of ‘acquisitive street crime’, and are 
not linearly correlated to the rising numbers of phones in circulation 
(Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). 
 
 
120 
 
Offenders and victims 
In 2000, mobile phone thieves tended to be young males working in groups. 
A third of those accused of phone thefts were between 15 and 16 yrs old, 
and more than two thirds of phone robberies involved more than one 
offender.  
Victims tended to be younger than for other types of robbery, with nearly half 
being under 18 yrs old, and ages 15 to 16 accounting for the largest 
proportion of any age group (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). These patterns 
remained roughly consistent over time (Allen et al., 2005). Owners from 
Black and Ethnic minorities, and living in poor areas with high levels of 
deprivation were also at higher risk than other ethnic groups, and than those 
in more affluent areas (Allen et al. 2005: 22). 
 
Comparison with more recent research 
More recent Home Office research sought to assess trends in the nature and 
extent of phone thefts over time using the BCS complemented by other 
sources. Allen et al. (2005) analysed answers to the 2002/03 BCS and from 
the 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey. The prevalence rate of 
mobile thefts rose from 2 percent in the 2000 BCS to 6.9 percent in the 
20002/03 survey. Women were significantly more likely to be victims of 
phone theft than men, and of theft from the person in general (Allen et al., 
2005). This may be due to usage patterns, and specifically storing phones 
more frequently in bags than males, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
In accordance with Harrington and Mayhew’s initial findings, the majority of 
phone thefts reported to the 2002/03 BCS occurred when the phone was not 
being carried, for example being left on a table or left in a bag. These 
unattended phones accounted for nearly three quarters (72 percent) of 
thefts. Sixteen percent of incidents occurred while the phone was on the 
person but not visible; while 6 percent occurred while the mobile was on the 
person and visible (Allen et al., 2005).  
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NMPCU data 
More recent evidence from NMPCU showed that by 2007 the numbers of 
mobile thefts were decreasing to levels similar to those of 2001 (Higgins, 
2007). Figure 4.3 below visualises this trend. However the issue of mobile 
phone theft still warrants attention from researchers and from policy makers. 
Even these decreasing figures still represent many thousands of thefts 
nationally. Furthermore, the reasons for the decrease in thefts are not 
understood, meaning that crime prevention lessons for other similar theft 
issues cannot be re-applied. Future research should seek to assess which 
proportions of the decline can be attributable to increased blacklisting of 
IMEIs. This would require data describing changes in blacklisting efficiency. 
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Figure 4.3 Total Metropolitan Police Recorded Mobile-Only Thefts Between 
Q1 2001 and Q3 2007. 
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(Source: Higgins, 2007)  
 
Motivations for phone theft 
Clarke and Harris (1992) showed how different motivations for car thefts 
resulted in differential targeting strategies. An equivalent definition of the 
various motivations for mobile phone theft is necessary in order to assess 
which crime prevention interventions are most likely to be effective. However, 
there exists very little empirical evidence describing the motivations for 
mobile thefts. Conversations with intelligence analysts from the NMPCU led 
to the following conclusions: 
 
1) That the majority of phone thefts are motivated by the profit of 
resale in the UK and the reward of personal use by the thieves, but 
the proportions of thefts driven by these motivations are not known 
2) That some thefts are motivated by sale of the phone abroad, and 
numbers of this offence type are thought to be growing but difficult to 
estimate. One difficulty is the need to cooperate with HM Revenue 
and Customs to quantify illegal export volumes at ports in sting 
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operations, which requires more resources than are available to the 
NMPCU. 
3) That offences where phones were taken as part of bullying 
behaviour in schools form a significant and under-reported aspect of 
phone theft, but that numbers or proportions are not known. 
 
False claims and under-reporting of mobile thefts. 
Conversations with industry experts and police early on in the research 
reported in this thesis revealed a common perception that many phone thefts 
reported to the police and to insurance companies were false. Some phones 
were allegedly lost but reported as stolen in order to be eligible for insurance 
claims; others were (allegedly) deliberately sold or passed on and a free 
upgrade obtained through the false claim process. Industry used the ‘false 
claim’ argument (that thefts were not as high as implied by police figures) to 
downplay the need for crime prevention interventions. It was surprising to 
hear experienced police officers assuming this view to be correct, while there 
appeared to be little empirical evidence to support the ‘paradigm’.  
 
Although it is difficult to assess the true nature of the extent of false claims, it 
is important to try to gauge their impact. Evidence is presented below which 
estimates that false claims account for only between 10 and 20 percent of 
police recorded thefts.  
 
Experienced officers at NMPCU estimated false claim levels to be in the 
order of five to 25 percent (Tilley et al., 2004). Forensic Pathways, a 
company analysing data provided by the UK’s insurance industry, estimated 
that as many as seventeen percent of all insurance claims might be false, 
although some of these seventeen percent may have been duplicate cases 
(Leary, 2005). Other sources imply a lower level of false claims: an analysis 
of NMPCU data from March 2003 to February 2004 revealed that only 0.4 
percent of offences reported to NMPCU were retrospectively labelled as 
‘wasting police time’, and that only 7 percent were retrospectively recorded 
as ‘no crimes’ (Tilley et al., 2004). A record is ‘no crimed’ if information 
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shedding significant doubt on the validity of the allegation is received after 
the offence is recorded.  
 
Even if the higher estimate of around twenty percent, based on Tilley et al. 
(2004) were considered, this is more than likely countered by under-reporting 
of offences to the police. According to the British Crime Survey 46 percent of 
mobile phone thefts suffered in the year prior to the 2002/03 BCS were not 
reported to the police (Allen et al. 2005: 24). Under-recording by the police 
would confound this effect. Therefore any claims made by industry that false 
claims distort police figures to any great extent are not supported by the 
empirical evidence.  
 
The cost of mobile phone theft 
The annual cost of mobile phone theft to the UK has been estimated 
conservatively at £1.2 billion (Mailley and Farrell, 2006). This estimate is 
described as conservative for two reasons: a likely underestimation of crime 
numbers, which has been described above, and a possible underestimation 
in the true cost of crime.  
The methodology for estimating theft cost utilised Harrington and Mayhew’s 
(2001) estimate of 710 000 annual thefts. The cost estimates used were 
sourced from Dubourg and Hamed (2005) who estimated a robbery cost 
£7281, theft £844, burglary £3268 and theft from motor vehicle £858. The 
proportions of offence types within the assumed 710 000 thefts was taken 
from 2005 theft data provided to the research team by Leicestershire police, 
because this was more up to date than Harrington and Mayhew’s estimates 
of offence proportions. Figure 4.4 below shows the proportions of offences 
and the associated estimated costs. 
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Figure 4.4: Estimated cost of mobile phone theft in the UK. 
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Source: Mailley and Farrell (2006) 
 
Dubourg and Hamed (2005) estimate the total costs of offences to victims 
and to society by summing direct costs such as the cost of policing, prisons 
and the criminal justice system, as well as ‘intangible’ costs such as the 
physical and emotional impact of crimes. Estimates of intangible costs 
involve QALYs- Quality Adjusted Life Years. which measure a victim’s 
mobility; ability to care for him or herself; ability to undertake usual activities; 
levels of pain and discomfort; and levels of anxiety and depression. QALYs 
can be translated into financial cost using established methodology (Dubourg 
and Hamed, 2005). A general term for this methodology of assessing crime 
costs is ‘victim-compensation’ (Roman and Farrell, 2000) 
 
An alternative methodology to measuring the cost of crime to victims and to 
society is ‘willingness–to-pay’. This American methodology increases the 
estimated costs of crimes by at least a factor of ten when compared to the 
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UK methodology. Cohen et al. (2004) adapted a methodology called 
‘contingent valuation’ (CV). CV has been widely used in environmental 
studies to place monetary value on otherwise intangible social benefits, such 
as increased air quality or protection of an endangered species (Cohen et al., 
2004). Essentially, CV involves asking respondents to define the level of 
money they are prepared to pay in order to experience various social 
benefits within their community.  
 
Cohen et al. (2004) asked respondents about their willingness to pay (WTP) 
for a ten percent reduction in pre-determined crime types. Table 4.4 below 
compares the resulting estimates of their methodology with UK estimates.  
US Dollars are converted into British pounds at a rate of 1.69 dollars to one 
British pound. Figures have been rounded for ease of reading, while factor 
difference was calculated using non-rounded data. 
 
Table 4.4: Comparison between cost of crime estimates 
Offence type Dubourg & Hamed 
(2005) USA estimate 
(£) 
Cohen et al. 
(2004) UK 
estimate (£) 
Factor 
difference 
Burglary 3.3 K 42.25 K 12.9 
Sexual assault 
including rape 
31.4 K 400.1 K 12.7 
Murder 1.5 M 16.4 M 11.2 
Source: Cohen et al. (2004) and Dubourg and Hamed (2005). 
 
Cohen et al (2004) estimated the costs of burglary, armed robbery, serious 
assault, rape and sexual assault and murder. Therefore cost estimates using 
Cohen et al.’s (2004) methodology are not available for many of the offence 
types where a mobile is taken, such as theft from vehicle, robbery and other 
theft. However it seems logical to assume that the cost estimates for the 
crime types relevant to Mailley and Farrell’s (2006) cost calculation would be 
inflated using the American methodology as were other offence types.  
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Responses to phone theft in the UK 
The final section of this chapter summarises the various responses to the 
problem of phone theft in the UK. It explains why the Mobile Phone Theft 
Index (Chapters 7 and 8) is proposed as a mechanism to stimulate a 
coherent industry response to the problem. Responses up to the end of the 
research period, 2008, were only partial. In general, the responses to the 
problem followed similar patterns to the responses to car security described 
in Chapter 3: initial efforts were heavily government-led but relied on the 
involvement of the mobile phone industry, who complied enough to avoid 
official regulation but did not, it can be argued, engage fully. Industry action 
was coordinated and overseen by both MICAF and the GSMA.  
 
The research which allowed the research team to understand the status quo 
involved over 20 face to face meetings with key personnel within 
organisations including the Home Office and Department of Trade and 
Industry; the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI); 
mobile manufacturers and service providers; specialist and local police; and 
independent forensic science providers. Appendix 4.1 lists the meetings 
held. There is a considerable amount of information to summarise and for the 
sake of brevity and clarity only the most salient findings are detailed below.  
 
The section begins with a description of the goal of most historical activity. 
The goal was that stolen phones are cut off (blacklisted) using the unique 
identifying number which each handset possesses, the IMEI. Once 
blacklisted, phones are not able to send or receive any information through 
the UK networks. Blacklisted phones are therefore of little to no value to 
thieves who wish to use stolen phones themselves, or to sell them on for use 
in the UK.  
 
The section then progresses logically through a description of the progress 
made in implementing blacklisting. The actions taken by government, police 
and industry are described before concluding with a description of the issues 
which appear to have slowed and halted progress. It is necessary to note 
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that the story told by the research presented here stops in 2008, and 
progress on some aspects may have been made since that time. However, 
evidence will be presented showing that MICAF claimed in 2007 that 
blacklisting was carried out more often than is probably true. While this claim 
by MICAF stands, government pressure will inevitably have decreased, since 
the government believe or cannot disprove that ‘enough’ has been done by 
the industry to protect customers. The proposed Mobile Phone Theft Index 
would incentivise industry to overcome any remaining hurdles to efficient 
blacklisting. More importantly, it would also incentivise industry to decrease 
theft types which would not be decreased by blacklisting. These types 
include theft for resale abroad and are discussed further below. 
 
Blacklisting 
Blacklisting removes the rewards for some motivations for phone theft. Since 
a blacklisted phone cannot be used on any UK network, phones stolen for 
personal use and for sale in the UK will be worthless. If blacklisting were 
efficiently carried out it would still be possible to make money by selling 
stolen phones for their parts, for recycling, and for resale abroad. Blacklisting 
would not remove the presumably psychological incentive for bullying thefts. 
 
The blacklisting process is summarised in Figure 4.5 below. Following the 
loss or theft of a mobile phone (stage A), the owner is responsible for stage 
B, informing their service provider (network operator) that the phone needs to 
be deactivated (blacklisted). In stage C the service provider then places the 
identity of the phone on their own local IMEI database or EIR, which includes 
a list of the IMEIs belonging to blacklisted phones. The IMEI databases from 
each service provider are networked to a central GSMA-hosted IMEI 
database covering all UK service providers, called the Shared EIR or SEIR. 
At stage D, information about all newly blacklisted phones is uploaded from 
local service providers’ EIRs to the SEIR once every 24 hours. The final 
stage E occurs when the SEIR updates all other service providers with the 
identities of newly blacklisted phones. Each service provider downloads the 
updated SEIR records once every 24 hours. 
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Successful blacklisting relies on three conditions being met. These are listed 
below and the history of each aspect is described in what follows. 
 1) That IMEIs are unique, so that duplicates do not exist on the SEIR. 
2) That IMEIs are secure against hacking. 
3) That information provided by customers to service providers is 
entered quickly and accurately on to their EIRs, and that all EIRs are 
updated efficiently by the SEIR.  
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How IMEIs are composed 
The unique identifier for a handset is a 15 digit number called the 
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). The IMEI of a handset can be 
revealed by entering *#06# on the keypad. The 15 numbers comprising an 
IMEI contain information relevant to manufacturers and to network operators. 
The first two digits indicate the country which the phone was manufactured 
for. The 9th to 14th digits indicate the manufacturer and model of the handset 
(GSMA, 1992). 
 
IMEI allocation 
In the UK, allocation of IMEIs is carried out by BABT (the British Approvals 
Board for Telecommunications), an agent appointed by the GSMA. BABT 
allocation is funded by the GSMA and so manufacturers incur no direct costs 
for using this accredited supplier (BABT, 2004). The process for IMEI 
allocation is that manufacturers request allocation of IMEIs from BABT, 
detailing in their request the make, model and number of units to be 
manufactured. BABT then allocates a block of sequential IMEI numbers to 
that manufacturer for the specified batch of handset model. BABT maintains 
a register of this allocation, and reports the allocation to the GSMA so that 
the IMEIs are listed as useable (whitelisted) on the GSMA’s shared IMEI 
database or SEIR (BABT, 2004).  
 
Unique IMIEs are central to the viability of the blacklisting process. If 
duplicate IMEIs exist then blacklisting one specific IMEI would cut off all 
identical IMEIs. The issue of duplicate IMEIs being allocated to some types 
of telecommunications device, and the possibility of unused IMEIs being 
hijacked by IMEI reprogrammers are discussed further below. 
 
The history of UK responses to mobile phone theft 
Figure 4.6 below visually summarises the various arms of the UK response 
to mobile phone theft. The responses by government, police and industry are 
interwoven and explained in the sections which follow. The UK government 
were instrumental in creating the conditions in which blacklisting could be 
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utilised, by passing legislation which made tampering with IMEIs illegal; by 
allocating police resources (the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit) to deal 
with transgressions of that law and to deal with phone theft in general; and 
by launching the Street Crime Initiative as an initial crackdown on street 
crimes including mobile phone theft. At the same time, government applied 
pressure to industry to increase the security of IMEIs; to work with the 
NMPCU in sharing intelligence data, and aiding the public to report stolen 
mobiles; to make sure that only unique IMEIs were allocated, and to agree to 
a Charter defining acceptable levels of blacklisting efficiency. The main 
stages of progress are summarised in Table 4.5 and discussed below. 
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Table 4.5: Key stages in the history of mobile phone theft prevention in the UK 
Date Activity and comments 
    
1985 Ernie Wise makes 1st ever call in the UK on a mobile 
phone. 
1992 GSMA guidelines state that IMEIs should be unique. 
1995 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology reports 
concerns over cloning of analogue phones and a rise in 
thefts. 
2001 Media pressure and publicity highlight the rise in street 
crime (Tilley et al., 2004) 
2001 Harrington and Mayhew (2001) publish seminal work on the 
nature and extent of mobile phone thefts. Phones are a 
cause of rising street crime. 
Mar 2002 Government launch the Street Crime Initiative, consisting 
mainly of targeted policing activities, aimed at decreasing 
many types of street crime including mobile phone theft. 
Other tactics include increased sentencing for ‘street 
crimes’. 
Feb 2002 Government and media push for the IMEIs of stolen 
phones to be blacklisted via a coordinated IMEI database 
(the SEIR). UK Vodafone and BT Cellnet refuse to do so. 
Duplicate IMEIs are their excuse. Other operators have 
local EIRs. 
Nov 2002 SEIR is officially launched and all UK network operators 
join. 
2002 Mobile Telephone (Reprogramming) Act (2002) makes an 
offence of altering or intending to alter an IMEI. Difficulties 
in proving intent make enforcing the law difficult for 
NMPCU. 
2003 National Mobile Phone Crime Unit (NMPCU) is launched. 
2004 GSMA’s Nine Principles are adopted, which state that 
IMEIs should be resistant to alteration (hacking).  
2004 Phonesec (2005) shows an increase in altered IMEIs 
between 2004 and 2005. 
2004 A Vodafone executive promises publicly to blacklist all 
stolen phones across Vodafone territories, and is made 
redundant shortly after (Mobile magazine, 23 June 2006) 
2005 England (2005) reports very low levels of duplicate IMEIs 
are present on the UK SEIR. Those that do exist are mainly 
IMEIs which are used in bulk on goods tracking devices, 
and are easily differentiated from hacked IMEIs 
2005 Mobile Telephones (Reprogramming) Act 2002 revised via 
the Violent Crime Reduction Charter (2005). This makes it 
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easier for NMPCU to carry out sting operations and arrest 
IMEI hackers: offering to alter an IMEI is now an offence.  
2005 MICAF commission the 1st test of blacklisting efficiency. 
Results (Pimm et al., 2005) showed that four of the six 
network operators failed to blacklist one third of reported 
IMEIs within five days of reporting, and  another (Vodafone) 
had twice this fail rate. The network 3 performed 
considerably better, only failing to blacklist two of 22 
handsets within five days. 
2006 Kaplankarin et al. (2008) show that up to 5% of IMEIs in a 
sample of UK lost property phones are altered or tampered 
with. 
2006 Home Office minister Hazel Blears calls a meeting with 
industry and the then Police commissioner Ian Blair. Media 
pressure increases for industry to take some responsibility 
for phone thefts and to minimize customer risks (Mobile 
magazine, 2006). 
2006 MICAF signs the Mobile Phone Industry Crime Reduction 
Charter (2006). This contains goals of blacklisting 80% of 
phones reported as stolen within 48 hours on the UK SEIR. 
2006 Loughborough University publish work which estimates the 
cost of mobile phone theft; assesses the progress made in 
phone theft prevention to date, and presents the first count-
based Mobile Phone Theft Index. 
2007 MICAF commission the 2nd test of blacklisting efficiency. 
The resulting report (Cooper et al. 2007) uses questionable 
methodology and results in erroneous conclusions. 
2008 Loughborough University (Mailley et al., 2008) publish the 
first iteration of the risk-based Mobile Phone Theft Index. 
MICAF react by arguing that the rational choice perspective 
is false. 
2011 UK Home Office calls a meeting with industry 
representatives, MICAF and crime experts. Professor 
Graham Farrell notes that MICAF are still opposing calls for 
industry to internalize the costs of phone theft. 
 
Government and police response 
The first coordinated policing response to mobile phone theft formed a part of 
the 2002 Street Crime Initiative (Tilley et al., 2004). Newspaper headlines such 
as “Are the police doing enough?” (The Evening Standard, 2 Jan 2002) and 
“Shot for her mobile phone” (The Evening Standard, 13 February 2002) fuelled 
the fire of public anxiety and pressure for a decisive government response 
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(Home Office Communications Directorate, 2003). The Street Crime Initiative 
included measures ranging from increasing police awareness of the severity 
and nature of mobile phone theft; increasing prison sentences for offences 
where a phone was taken; producing educational material for courts of law; and 
directing police forces to target high problem areas (Tilley et al., 2004).  
 
An early review of the Street Crime Initiative showed that these measures had a 
positive effect: the Home Office (2002) reported a ten percent decrease in all 
street robberies when compared to 2001, and an increase in conditional bails 
and remands. However, it was recognised that this ‘front end driven’ success 
was not sustainable in the long term because it relied on resource-intensive 
targeted operations and high visibility initiatives, both heavily reliant on overtime 
working (Tilley et al., 2004). The prevention of key drivers of street crime, 
including mobile phone theft, was crucial. The government therefore invited and 
pressurised the mobile phone industry to cooperate in developing more secure 
IMEIs, coordinated IMEI databases and more efficient blacklisting processes, 
and provided resources to launch a policing unit dedicated to mobile phone 
theft: the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit or NMPCU.  
 
On Wednesday 17 December 2003, the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit 
(NMPCU) based on Sirdar Road, Nottingdale, London W11 was launched by 
Hazel Blears MP and Lord Toby Harris. The primary aim of the NMPCU is to 
reduce street crime and the number of mobile phones stolen during street crime 
offences. The secondary aim is to identify and target the market for stolen 
mobile phones (NMPCU, 2004). 
 
The government introduced the Mobile Telephones (Re-programming) Act 
(2002) in order to criminalise the act of altering an IMEI. This Act came into 
force on October 4th 2002 (Home Office Crime Reduction, 2002). Under the Act 
it is an offence in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland to: 
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 Change an IMEI without the authorisation of the manufacturer; and 
 Possess, supply or offer to supply the necessary equipment with the 
intent to use it for re-programming mobile phones. 
The offences carry maximum penalties of five years' imprisonment or unlimited 
fines or both (Home Office UK Acts (undated)). However, NMPCU and security 
experts at Panasonic reported to the research team that proving intent to alter 
an IMEI, or proving that equipment was supplied for the purposes of altering 
IMEIs, was in practice a complex and costly exercise. This was because the 
equipment which resulted in IMEI alteration also had another use, of unlocking 
SIM cards from specific networks. The ‘dual use excuse’ hindered NMPCU sting 
operations which aimed to target suspected IMEI hackers, because intent was 
hard to prove beyond reasonable doubt unless IMEI alteration was observed 
first hand by police officers.  
 
This loophole had been anticipated by the House of Lords when the Bill was first 
read (Lords Hansard 2002, column 482). However it was not amended until 
2005 when a clause was included in the Violent Crime Reduction Bill (2005) 
which made an offence of offering to alter an IMEI (UK Parliament Internet 
Publications, 2005). NMPCU reported to the research team that this had 
improved the ease of bringing prosecutions, but that successful prosecutions 
under the Reprogramming Act (2002) were still few and far between. Prevention 
remained a priority. 
 
In 2006, Home Office Minister Hazel Blears called a meeting with key actors 
from the UK mobile industry including representatives from MICAF, the GSMA, 
and all major network operators and manufacturers (Mobile magazine, 23 June 
2006). The attendance of the then Police Commissioner Ian Blair suggests the 
importance placed on this meeting. The outcome of this meeting was an 
agreement by industry to sign a crime reduction charter (described below), while 
the time lag between this meeting and the initial set up of the NMPCU and the 
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alteration of legislation suggests that industry were not incentivised to act 
autonomously and increase mobile security in the absence of government 
pressure.  
 
Industry response 
The story of the industry response to the issue of mobile phone theft was told to 
the present author differently by MICAF and the GSMA compared to the story 
told by personnel involved in the government’s efforts to persuade industry to 
respond in a sufficiently robust manner. Mr Jack Wraith and James Moran from 
MICAF and the GSMA respectively claimed that industry action to make 
blacklisting an effective preventive mechanism was driven by or invested in 
wholeheartedly by their organisations. Personnel within the Home Office 
reported that a level of pressure was necessary in order to secure investment 
and action by the industry, at each stage of the process. This tale has striking 
parallels with that described by Laycock (2004) and Newman (2004) concerning 
the response of the vehicle manufacturing industry to issues of security, and the 
summary of generic industry responses to designing out crime made by Clarke 
(2005).  
 
The various aspects of the response which were reliant on industry are 
summarised below under headings which describe the conditions necessary for 
blacklisting to be achieved for all stolen phones. These conditions are 
summarised above in Figure 4.6. IMEIs need to be both unique and to be 
secure against alteration (hacking), and the EIRs of each service provider need 
to be coordinated and updated regularly via the Central EIR. Together these 
three conditions make blacklisting technically possible. However, the only 
assessments of whether the industry does in fact utilise this potential was 
arranged and funded by MICAF. The current section concludes the entire 
chapter by describing why the research team remain unconvinced that the latest 
assessment, by a company called Systems Concepts, was carried out with 
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sufficient scientific rigour to be used as a key indicator of mobile industry action. 
As mentioned above, this test is key to determining whether the government 
believes that ‘enough’ has been done by the industry to prevent mobile phone 
theft.  
 
IMEIs need to be unique 
The GSMA (1992) defined from the outset of IMEI use that they should be 
unique. The original role of the IMEI was defined by the GSMA as two-fold:
  
 
“the main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of 
stolen equipment, or against equipment of which the use in the GSM 
system can [ ] no longer be tolerated for technical reasons.” (GSMA, 
1992) 
 
Our MICAF contact explained that in the past, manufacturers would deliberately 
over-order the number of IMEIs needed for a particular ‘batch’, in order to keep 
sales figures of particular models secret. The problem with this was that this left 
many spare ‘genuine’ IMEIs for either hackers to guess, or to steal or coerce 
from malleable industry contacts. Panasonic stated that they had made 
considerable efforts to both reduce the numbers of spare IMEIs ordered from 
BABT, and that those used were chosen randomly from within the block of 
allocated numbers. Using randomly selected numbers meant that large sub-
blocks of numbers were no longer available for sale or for hackers to guess as 
easily.  
 
Are IMEIs unique? 
There is a complex history behind the evolution of unique IMEIs, and the 
reluctance of industry to engage fully with the research described here means 
that the picture remains fuzzy. Jack Wraith from MICAF stated to the research 
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team in 2005 that duplicate IMEIs were still in use, and that this meant 
blacklisting had to be judged on a case by case basis. Using duplicate IMEIs is 
clearly in contravention of GSMA (1992), a standard signed up to by all 
suppliers of mobile handsets to the UK. A cynical point of view is that ‘the 
duplicate excuse’ allowed the industry to put forward an apparently technical 
reason for not blacklisting every phone reported as lost or stolen. This excuse 
was probably used to resist government calls to sign a Charter which set 
quantitative targets for blacklisting efficiency. However, it could be that by 2005 
the GSMA’s principles were being adhered to more strictly, removing the 
prevalence of IMEI duplicates on the SEIR. When industry were challenged by 
government to assess the extent of IMEI duplicates and to do more to decrease 
them, a confidential report made available to the research team (England, 2005) 
claimed that very few duplicate IMEIs existed, apart from some easily 
recognisable IMEIs used on tracking devices, and concluded that: 
 
“the operators can see no further value in investing resources into this 
analysis” (England, 2005: 1). 
 
IMEIs need to be secure 
On 27 February 2004, the GSMA and the major handset manufacturers agreed 
to a set of Nine Principles (GSMA, 2004b) which protected the integrity of the 
IMEI. The Principles stated that security was not absolute, by requiring that 
IMEIs be resistant to change rather than change-proof (GSMA, undated a). The 
UK government had a significant role in persuading the six major manufacturers 
supplying the UK market to agree to the Nine Principles (Patel, 2003). By 
allowing the manufacturers to decide on how to technically implement the broad 
principles, security of the IMEI of different manufacturers should become a 
competitive factor taken into consideration when operators make purchasing 
decisions. However this will only occur if security is demanded by customers.   
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The methods of making the IMEI more secure which were reported to the 
research team were varied, and included: storing the IMEI in various parts of the 
phone so that it cannot physically be tampered with easily; protecting the 
location of the IMEI with a casing; writing the IMEI into memory which is only 
‘One Time Programmable’; and blowing tiny fuses between the IMEI and 
attached circuitry in order to leave fewer ‘backdoors’ for would-be hackers to 
use to access the IMEI.  
 
Are IMEIs secure? 
The question of whether IMEI security had improved as a result of the GSMA’s 
Nine Principles proved difficult to answer. Panasonic advised that their product 
security had increased greatly (David Rogers, personal correspondence, 
November 2005). MICAF claimed that the NMPCU had to use very old models 
to set up sting operations in which the IMEI was deliberately altered. 
Quantitative data describing IMEI hacks are collected by the GSMA, via their 
IMEI Weakness Reporting and Correction Process, but these data were not 
made available to the research team: the GSMA stated they were commercially 
sensitive.  
 
Therefore two alternative sources of empirical evidence were found, and they 
showed that IMEI security was not absolute. The first measure came from an 
independent monitor of IMEI security, the French company Phonesec. 
Phonesec describe themselves as a company specialising in mobile phone 
security and anti-piracy measures (Phonesec, 2005). They scan the internet and 
involve themselves within the hacking community to alert network operators of 
potential security breaches. They validate the alerts before passing the 
information to the GSMA, who collate and pass on this information to the 
relevant manufacturers (personal correspondence, Pascal Capauno of 
Phonesec, December 2005). Figure 4.7 below depicts the count of IMEI 
breaches detected and validated by Phonesec in 2004 and in 2005. There were 
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twice as many alerts between 1 January 2005 and 21 September 2005 as in the 
same period for 2004.Unless the number of phone subscriptions also doubled in 
that time, this seems to represent an increase in the proportion of IMEIs hacked. 
 143 
 
Figure 4.7: Monthly IMEI breaches reported by Phonesec, 2004 and 2005 
(Source: Phonesec, 2005). 
 
Phonesec reported that the security of IMEIs from different manufacturers 
varied greatly. Further research would reveal which methods of securing IMEIs 
were most effective, and where market forces were failing to incentivise 
manufacturers to further increase IMEI security. 
 
The second source of empirical evidence regarding IMEI security in the UK 
came from practical research carried out by the research team, published in 
Kaplankarin et al., (2008). Mobile phones stored in the lost property 
departments of Loughborough Police and Loughborough University were 
checked for signs of IMEI hacking and tampering. Hacking was simple to detect 
and relied on comparing the software version of a phone’s IMEI with the hard 
copy version. As mentioned previously the software version of an IMEI is 
revealed by typing *#06# on the phone’s keypad. The IMEI is also physically 
etched on to metallic labels, often located under a phone’s battery. 
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The observation of a removed or defaced label suggested the possibility of a 
hacked IMEI, since there are few reasons to alter the sticker other than to hide 
the true IMEI. A difference between the software and hard copy IMEIs of a 
phone proved that the IMEI had been altered from its original state. The checks 
of lost property samples were complemented by an on-street survey of mobile 
phone owners who agreed to their IMEIs being observed by the interviewer. The 
results together suggest that around 5 percent of the phones sampled had their 
IMEIs altered (Kaplankarin et al., 2008).  
 
EIRs need to be coordinated 
The purpose of an EIR (Equipment Identity Register) is to allow a network 
operator to control and monitor the equipment operating on its network. An EIR 
is essentially a database consisting of lists of the IMEIs of all mobile equipment 
operating on a network, composed of mainly mobile phones but also equipment 
such as ‘mobile modems’ used to track consignments of goods. Once each 
piece of equipment is turned on and ready for use (booted up), it will transmit to 
the network and the IMEI of the equipment is compared to three lists referred to 
as white, black, and grey.  
 
White lists do not contain individual IMEIs but consist of ranges of numbers 
allocated by BABT. Black lists consist of all individual IMEIs which are barred by 
the network which owns the list. Barring can be either due to being reported as 
lost or stolen, or for technical reasons, such as network non-compatibility. Grey 
lists contain the IMIEs of handsets which are monitored for technical reasons, or 
for financial reasons.  
 
In order that the status of each IMEI is consistent across networks the separate 
EIRs must connect and communicate. This is achieved via the GSMA hosted 
Central EIR, the SEIR, via the process described in Figure 4.5 above. 
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Evolution of the UK’s SEIR 
The government had to pressurise the network operators in to coordinating 
EIRs. The following newspaper extract demonstrates the public stance of both 
the government and some of the mobile network operators: 
 
“The government and industry experts are infuriated by Vodafone UK and 
BT Cellnet’s refusal to implement the systems [ ] that block stolen 
handsets when the other major networks- Orange, One2One and Virgin 
Mobile- have all done so. ‘We want to see all mobile phone operators 
using this technology’ said a Home Office spokesman.” (The Guardian, 2 
Feb, 2002 in Broadbridge, 2002). 
 
At the same time that they were arguing about the feasibility and usefulness of a 
SEIR, all five UK networks were cancelling the SIM cards of phones reported as 
lost or stolen. The situation parallels that reported by Clarke et al. (2001) when 
US cell phone SIM frauds were designed out, but cell phone thefts were not. In 
defence of their inactivity, one UK operator cited the issue of duplicate IMEIs: 
 
“BT Cellnet says it is a misconception that a blacklist would cut crime and 
argue that they would cut off innocent users because up to 10% of IMEI 
numbers are duplicated. 
The majority of handset manufacturers disagree. Nokia says it is 
extremely hard to change the IMEI numbers on its phones and any 
duplication is rare, and usually occurs on phones shipped to different 
parts of the world. Sony Ericsson claims it never issues duplicate IMEI 
numbers. 
The issue is complicated by thieves reprogramming or ‘chipping’ phones 
to change their IMEI numbers. The Home Office has asked the industry 
to discuss whether this should be outlawed.” (Guardian, 2 Feb 2002 in 
Broadbridge, 2002) 
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Following discussions with the industry via MICAF, the government announced 
on 8 February 2002 that it would outlaw the reprogramming of mobile phones as 
soon as parliamentary time allowed (Broadbridge, 2002). Eventually, the SEIR 
was publicly launched on 1 November 2002 by the mobile phone industry, 
Government and police, with all UK networks using it and communicating with 
each other (Patel, 2003). Unfortunately, according to our GSMA contacts, key 
documents recording when and why industry made the decision to cooperate 
with the government about the SEIR are not available under the GSMA Security 
Classification scheme.  
 
Blacklisting efficiency  
In 2005 MICAF commissioned an independent test of UK network operators’ 
blacklisting processes. The report, prepared by the company System Concepts 
(Pimm et al., 2005) showed that four of the six operators had not blacklisted one 
third of the phones in the test (n=22 per operator) even after five days had 
passed since the phones were reported as stolen. Vodafone had not blacklisted 
two thirds of its phones, while the operator 3 had blacklisted nearly all (n=20) of 
its handsets. 
 
In 2007 MICAF commissioned the second test of blacklisting efficiency in the 
UK. The five UK network operators tested were Orange, T-mobile, Vodafone, 
O2 and 3. The methodology of the test is described below in Figure 4.8 and is 
based entirely on the final report to MICAF by Cooper et al. (2007). The 
methodology is described before criticisms and comments are put forward.  
 
The network members of MICAF signed up to a Crime Reduction Charter in 
2006, which specified that a handset reported to them as stolen would be 
blacklisted on the handset’s usual (‘home’) network within 24 hours of the report 
being made. Blacklisting on all UK networks would then take place, via the 
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SEIR, within 48 hours of the report being made. MICAF set two targets for the 
2007 test of blacklisting efficiency: 
 
 Target A was to blacklist 80% of stolen handsets on the ‘home’ 
network and upload the handset details to the UK SEIR within 24 
hours of receipt of the report of the stolen handset. 
 Target B was to blacklist 80% of handsets reported as stolen to other 
networks within 48 hours of the theft report (Provided that the handset 
details had been successfully uploaded to the UK SEIR within 24 
hours). 
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Figure 4.8: Process for testing blacklisting efficiency in the UK 
Steps 1 – 7: Getting ready for testing.  
Purchase a handset, SIM and credit for each UK network participating in 
the test. Register the handset, home SIM and use the phone for 2 calls 
per day for 7 days. Furthermore, buy a ‘clean’ SIM for each UK network 
and check each works in the handset. The handset now has a registered 
SIM working on the home network, plus is able to use clean SIMs from 
each of the other UK networks. 
 
Step 8: Report as stolen.  
On the 8th or 9th day, switch off handset and report as stolen to the home 
network. 
 
Step 9: Test the registered SIM. 
24 hours after the report of theft, switch the handset back on and try to 
make a call using the registered SIM. Record pass or fail. 
 
Step 10: Differentiate between 24 hour SIM block and home network 
blacklisting. 
Also test the clean SIMs in the ‘stolen’ handset: replace the registered 
SIM with each of the clean SIMs and attempt a call. This checks whether 
a call blocked using the registered SIM was due to SIM block or 
blacklisting. 
 
10i: If it was not possible to make a call using a clean SIM, record 
this as a pass and move to step 11 for that SIM. 
 
10ii: If it was possible to make a call using a clean SIM, make a 
further 9 calls at a minimum of 30 minute intervals. Switch handset 
on and off between each call.  
 
10ii a: If it was possible to make a tenth call then inform 
MICAF and, record this on the test sheet, and wait for 
further instructions. 
 
10ii b: If it was not possible to complete the tenth call, 
record this as a pass and move to step 11. 
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Step 11: Test for 48 hour and 72 hour cross-network blacklisting 
(i.e. download of the blacklist by each operator). 
24 hours after establishing that the handset was blacklisted on the ‘home’ 
network, conduct cross-network blacklisting checks by placing a clean 
SIM from each network in the handset and attempt a call. 
 
11i: If it was not possible to make a call then this indicates the 
network of that SIM has blacklisted the handset. Record this as a 
pass for test B.  
 
11ii: If it was possible to complete a call, make a further 9 calls 
with that ‘clean’ SIM. (Note: timing between calls not specified) 
 
11ii a: If it was possible to complete a tenth call then the 
network of the clean SIM has failed the 48 hour blacklisting 
test. Repeat step 11 for other non home network SIMs.  
 
11ii b: If the network had failed the 48 hour test, wait a 
further 24 hours and attempt a call at 72 hours after the 
theft report. Record the success or failure. 
 
11ii c: If it was not possible to make the tenth call at stage 
11 ii then record this as a pass for that network and repeat 
step 11 for all other non-home network SIMs.  
Source: Cooper et al. (2007) 
 
Results 
Cooper et al. (2007) reported that all networks had blacklisted over 80 percent 
of handsets reported as stolen, on the home network, within 24 hours of the loss 
report. Therefore all networks were assumed to have exceeded Target A. 
Similarly, all networks were reported as having met Target B, by apparently 
downloading the identities of blacklisted handsets and blocking their use within 
48 hours of the theft report. However, detailed consideration of the methodology 
questions whether these claims are valid. 
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Criticisms of the System Concepts methodology 
A fundamental methodological design flaw was that the test was not carried out 
blind: all network operators knew about the test. It is therefore possible that 
knowledge of the testing process and timings affected the networks’ 
performance during the testing process. Internal controls, such as numbers of 
staff on duty and total man hours worked before, during and after the test would 
help ascertain whether the tests were carried out under ‘normal’ working 
conditions.  
A further diversion from good experimental design was the instruction at stage 
10iia, where MICAF were contacted and ‘instructions’ sought if a handset was 
failing the 24 hour home network blacklist test. There is no information 
concerning the content of the MICAF instructions, nor how often they were 
contacted by the test team. 
 
Time slippage is another key issue which is not disclosed or acknowledged by 
Cooper et al. (2007). If nine calls were allowed at a minimum of 30 minute 
intervals at stage 9, then it would be very easy for the later calls in this 
sequence to be made well over 24 hours after the handset was reported as 
stolen. This issue would be compounded if it was the case that one person was 
testing several handsets at once, but such details are not clear from Cooper et 
al.’s (2007) methodology. The most meaningful value to record would be the 
number of hours elapsed between the theft report and an unsuccessful call 
attempt. This is also the most simple measure to record and to report, which 
suggests that the methodology and results have been over complicated, 
perhaps to mask reality.  
 
The time intervals between the nine calls allowed at stage 11ii are not specified, 
but could quickly add up to a time period significantly longer than 48 hours 
between theft report and test call. Furthermore,  the results section does not 
specify whether the ‘passes’ recorded for Target B were those passes at stage 
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11ii, 48 hours after the theft report, or those recorded at stage 11iib, which is 
actually at least 72 hours after the theft report.  
 
Another key flaw was that each handset was tested for cross-network 
blacklisting using a sequential methodology. So if for example an Orange SIM 
had failed to make a call after 24 hours, only then was an O2 SIM tested in the 
same handset. This sequential methodology could contribute more significantly 
to time slippage than the issue of the 30 minute intervals between calls, and 
should be clarified. Again, reporting the simple statistic of total times between 
theft report, home network blacklisting and non-home network blacklisting would 
reveal the true picture.  
 
In conclusion, the methodology can be summarised as poor at best, biased at 
worst. Since the methodology was agreed with MICAF; contact with MICAF was 
written in to the testing procedure, and the results are unclear, it is difficult to 
assume anything other than the test and results amount to little more than a 
whitewash.  
 
Damning everyone else and sparing the phone industry? 
It is arguably harsh to claim that the System Concepts report was a whitewash, 
but this opinion has been formed because of a series of communications with 
industry which have demonstrated a tendency to argue for whatever will 
minimise the probability of industry investing in crime prevention efforts. Karmen 
(1981) gave examples of the motor industry ‘damning the driver and sparing the 
car’ and some of these are presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Similarly, Mr 
Jack Wraith of MICAF, one of the more influential persons involved in the 
industry’s response to phone theft, has displayed ignorance about criminological 
knowledge and a tendency to lay blame for phone thefts anywhere other than 
with the phone industry, as evidenced in the quote below. These are not meant 
in the spirit of a personal attack: it is important to identify the opinions of 
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influential persons who might be hindering the overall progress made in 
increasing prevention implementation in the UK. 
 
“Based on figures on the UK SEIR the numbers of phones black listed 
before and after the signing of the Charter has not increased in any 
significant way. Since 2003 we have always blacklisted phones as and 
when they have been reported to us!” Personal correspondence to the 
author in 2006, as a response to a draft version of Mailley and Farrell 
(2006). 
 
“Mobile phone theft will NEVER go away. This shows a lack of 
understanding of the underlying problems of mobile phone theft. The 
authorities including Government, Police and industry can only put in 
place measures to impact on the post theft environment – phones will 
always be the subject of theft – FACT” Personal correspondence to the 
author in 2006, as a response to Mailley and Farrell (2006). 
 
“There’s no way it is a practical scenario for a drug dealer [to use stolen 
phones]. What about the ancillary products like chargers? Drug dealers 
don’t want to handle stolen phones in the same way they go to extreme 
lengths not to handle drugs.” Comments published by Mobile magazine 
(23 June 2006) in response to NMPCU intelligence suggesting that 
phones were crime facilitators for drug dealers.  
 
“[Jack Wraith] would question ‘the usefulness and the viability’ of the 
phone theft index which he compared to a vehicle crime index, 
adding: ‘A thief, in the main, steals a phone because the opportunity is 
there or the phone is a by-product of a robbery. I do not believe a 
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thief stands on a street corner thinking: ‘I am going to steal that because 
it is a Samsung and not that one because it is a Nokia’.” Comments 
published in Farrell and Mailley (2007). 
 
In addition to these written comments, Mr Wraith proposed a variety of reasons 
for industry non-action when asked about the history of industry cooperation 
during the initial stages of this research. These included the ‘false claims’ 
explanation, which aimed to play down the extent of phone theft; the duplicate 
IMEI explanation, which was used to argue that routine blacklisting was not 
feasible, but was in contradiction to the evidence presented by England (2005); 
and the argument that people should record their phone details on a central 
database (immobilise.com) so that police could reunite owners with recovered 
property. The immobilise database has not been described in detail in this thesis 
because its use seems questionable: it is only useful to reunite owners if stolen 
or lost property is handed in to the police and they check the database, via the 
National Mobile Phone Register (NMPR). Further research is needed to assess 
how often immobilise is actually used by the police or whether it is simply a 
distraction from the central issue of industry pollution. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Research carried out by Harrington and Mayhew (2001) and backed by data 
from the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit provides evidence of the chronic 
issue of mobile theft in the UK. The cost of phone theft has been estimated to 
exceed £1.2 billion annually (Mailley and Farrell, 2006) 
 
The mobile phone industry is dominated by a small number of global 
manufacturers and network suppliers. While this may pose a challenge to crime 
prevention efforts, it also promises an opportunity for any changes made in 
manufacturing or network operator policies to become almost ubiquitous. 
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Data describing the turnover of the major corporations involved in mobile phone 
manufacture and network operating show the considerable sums available for 
implementing crime prevention efforts. This to some degree negates any 
argument which might be made that a company’s first priority has to be to its 
shareholders: while there are large amounts of profit being made, it is morally 
difficult to justify not spending a small proportion of these amounts on crime 
prevention efforts.  
 
The interventions to date which aim to decrease theft levels by blacklisting 
stolen mobile phones are not implemented fully. Some progress has been made 
through efforts to make IMEIs unique and more secure. However, it is also clear 
that the efficiency of the blacklisting process in the UK is not optimal. The 
‘monopoly’ presented by MICAF in previous interactions with the UK 
government has lead to the extraordinary situation where a test (Cooper et al., 
2007) presumably used to inform policy responses was not transparent, 
accurate or independent.  
 
The history of the UK response to mobile phone theft (summarised in Table 4.5) 
shows how long it has taken for action to be implemented by industry. It seems 
progress has twice followed a cycle of industry obstructionism, increasing 
pressure from government, and pre-regulation initiatives (Newman, 2004). The 
first cycle resulted in the SEIR being established. The second cycle resulted in 
blacklisting being assessed and the Mobile Industry Crime Reduction Charter 
being signed. It seems likely that it is now time in 2011 for government pressure 
to build again. 
 
While the UK government is being told that blacklisting is efficient, there is little 
room for leverage to persuade industry to take further crime preventive action. 
The effectiveness of blacklisting as a theft deterrent is explored further in 
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Chapters 5 and 6 which describe the methodology and results of semi-
structured interviews with 40 mobile phone thieves. 
 
The opinions of key industry figures are doubtless central to the stop/start and 
piecemeal nature of industry responses so far. Some evidence of those opinions 
has been presented here. There are many parallels between these opinions and 
the motor industry’s excuses for not increasing car security sooner (Karmen, 
1981). The next chapters describe the methodology and results from interviews 
with mobile phone thieves. The results prove that the assumptions of figures 
such as Mr Wraith are incorrect, because they show that while opportunity plays 
a large role in theft rates, mobile phone thieves also display rationality in their 
target selection and chose which phones to take and which to leave. The results 
therefore pave the way for considering how to incentivise greater industry 
investment in product proofing via the publication of the Mobile Phone Theft 
Index in Chapters 7 and 8.  
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Chapter 5: Interviewing Mobile Phone Thieves: Methodology. 
 
Introduction 
In October 2006, interviews were conducted with 40 individuals convicted of 
mobile phone theft. This chapter describes the methodology of designing and 
conducting those interviews. It begins with a description of the aims of the 
interviews, which sets the context for describing the interview design. A 
summary of relevant literature is presented which describes the need for careful 
planning of the order of the interview sections, question wording and delivery by 
the interviewers. The chapter describes the process of obtaining access to 
convicted offenders, and the practicalities of carrying out the interviews. This 
paves the way for the results of the interviews which are described in Chapter 6.  
 
A control group of 45 students from Loughborough University was used to allow 
comparison between offender responses and those from a population assumed 
to not be involved in mobile phone theft. The student were either enrolled on 
Loughborough University’s MSc in Criminology, BSc Product Design and 
Technology, or BA Industrial Design and Technology. The results of the 
comparisons are detailed in Chapter 6. Within the offender population, 
interviewees were assigned as either ‘novice’ or ‘expert’ thieves according to a 
range of factors, such as their stated experience of phone theft; their 
demonstrated knowledge of technical issues such as IMEI reprogramming; their 
contacts with fences and their level of knowledge about issues such as the 
value of different stolen models. This allowed a comparison of the results 
between less and more experienced offenders.  
 
Background to the interviews 
The belief that offenders make choices before and during offence commission is 
well established as a useful paradigm in environmental criminology. Since the 
initial proposal and development of a rational choice perspective in the 1980s 
 157 
 
(Cornish and Clarke, 1986) a growing body of literature has added weight to the 
assertion that offenders are on the whole ‘rational’. Key pieces from that 
literature have been described in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. The interviews 
described here aimed to add to the current knowledge about offenders’ rational 
choices by identifying the choice-structuring properties of different models of 
phones and the choice-structuring properties of different theft situations. Home 
Office research concerning mobile phone theft has described many attributes of 
victims and of offenders, such as gender, age, ethnicity and household status 
(see for example Hoare (2007) and Chapter 4 here). The research identifies 
only a few factors describing the circumstances of phone thefts. These are 
restricted to whether the phone was attended and in use at the time of the theft, 
and where the offence took place (see for example Hoare, 2007: 28). No 
research to date has quantified which phone models, if any, are at higher theft 
risk and why, leaving potential preventive measures unexploited. 
 
Knowledge about what does or does not make one model of phone more 
attractive as a theft target should be incorporated into theft solutions. Similarly, 
knowledge about what affects an offender’s choice to attempt a theft in a given 
situation should inform both phone design and public education about ways to 
protect people from victimisation.  
 
The absence of research into the choices made by phone thieves has led to the 
erroneous belief that phone thieves are purely opportunistic. This belief is held 
by key personnel within the mobile phone industry, as the following quotes 
demonstrate: 
 
 “I do not believe that phone thieves are discerning”  
(Fraud and Security Director, GSM Association, personal correspondence 
2007).  
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“I do not believe a thief stands on a street corner thinking ‘I am going to steal 
that because it is a Samsung and not that one because it is a Nokia’.”  
(Jack Wraith, Chairman of the UK’s Mobile Industry Crime Action Forum, within 
Farrell and Mailley (2007)). 
Jack Waith’s statement calls into question the validity of the rational choice 
perspective (Clarke and Cornish, 1985), and has serious practical implications. 
It hinders the identification of novel crime prevention interventions. If the choice-
structuring properties of theft targets (phones) are not sought out and defined, 
and if the choice-structuring properties of theft opportunities (the situational 
factors) are not identified, neither can be manipulated in order to lower theft 
rates.  
 
Aims of the interviews. 
The interviews had several inter related aims. These are framed below as 
research questions in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Interview research questions 
1) Are mobile phone thieves discerning or do they take any objects 
available for theft? 
2) Which phone-specific factors (if any) affect thieves’ choices? 
3) Specifically, does IMEI blacklisting deter thieves? 
4) Specifically, can iconography and semantics deter thieves? 
5) Which situational factors (if any) such as the nature of the victim, or 
the presence of witnesses, affect thieves’ choices? 
6) What level of knowledge do phone thieves have of fencing stolen 
phones, reprogramming IMEIs and making false insurance claims? 
7) Do the responses of more experienced thieves differ from those of 
less experienced thieves? 
8) Do the responses of offenders differ from those of a non-offending 
control population? 
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Identifying and accessing interview participants 
The ideal offender participants were people with experience of taking mobile 
phones, and with a range of expertise in this. Previous research had shown that 
the majority of phone thieves are young males under 18 (Harrington and 
Mayhew, 2001; Hoare, 2007). Therefore establishments dealing with those 
below prison age were most relevant for sampling. Furthermore, increasing the 
proportion of younger, less experienced offenders in the sample minimised the 
systematic bias potentially introduced by concentrating on incarcerated and 
older offenders in prisons, who would typically represent more experienced 
offenders (Cornish and Clarke 1986; Walsh 1986). To minimise the time and 
expense taken to travel to prisons, the ideal participant sample was of offenders 
located within the Midlands of England. 
 
Applying for access to offenders. 
Within the UK, Her Majesty’s Prison Service (HMPS) oversee two main types of 
institution for convicted offenders. Prisons typically house inmates aged over 21 
years, while Young Offenders’ Institutes (YOIs) house those aged between 15 
and 21 years (CJS online, 2008). Within each YOI, juvenile offenders aged 
between 15 and 17 years are separated from those aged 18 to 21 years. 
Prisons and YOIs in the UK are grouped by HMPS in geographical regions 
called Prison Service Areas. Applications for research which involves 
establishments in two or more Prison Service Areas require submission of 
application form PSO 7035 to the National Research Committee (HMPS 
Research, 2008). Since Loughborough is located reasonably close to HMP 
institutions in Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and the Birmingham area, it was 
very likely that the final participating prisons would be located within at least two 
PSAs. Appendix 5.1 displays the completed application form PSO 7035 which 
was submitted to HMPS Research in March 2006. 
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The application process for the research described in this thesis was 
complicated. A ‘catch-22’ situation arose where HMPS requested a definitive 
assessment of the number of establishments to be involved in the research, 
while it was not clear how many interview participants could reasonably be 
expected to be located in each establishment without some feedback from the 
establishment. However, HMPS maintained that contact with establishments 
should only be through them, and using the form described above. After some 
months of intermittent contact with HMPS, approval was given via email for 
research to be carried out within the West Midlands area. Management at both 
Birmingham’s main adult prison and YOI Brinsford in West Birmingham agreed 
to participate. 
 
At the same time, local Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) were approached on an 
individual basis. Each local authority in the UK has a Youth Offending Team. 
These teams consist of a variety of staff from the local police, probation service 
and social services as well as experts in health, education, drugs and alcohol 
misuse and housing. The role of YOTs is to assess the needs of young 
offenders who are either due to be sentenced to a custodial term or community 
order, or are on Final Warnings. YOTs also assess the risks to the public posed 
by these offenders to the public. A Final Warning can be administered where an 
offender admits to a first or second offence. The YOT is responsible for 
supervision and continual reassessment of young offenders while in the 
community, whereas HMPS are responsible for their supervision if they enter 
custody (YJB, 2008). 
 
In total, over 20 YOTs were contacted via over 100 emails many phone calls 
from Loughborough University. Keeping detailed records of the progress made 
with each institution was important due to the time delays between 
communications and the number of different staff involved. The YOTs who 
identified suitable and willing participants for the interviews were Leicester City 
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YOT, and Staffs ISSP (intensive supervision and surveillance project). The 
research team held face to face meetings with managers to explain the research 
process, and to establish commitment from the various establishments. 
Establishing rapport was key to engaging staff who were already busy and who 
personally stood to gain little from this research. 
 
Within the prison, YOI and YOT, staff carried out reviews of individual crime 
records, and spent time recruiting interview participants. They were provided 
with posters to inform inmates of the research initiative. This poster is presented 
below in figure 5.1. The poster was designed to stimulate awareness about the 
research and to give offenders a local contact, while reassuring them about 
confidentiality. The poster was assessed and passed as suitable by 
psychologists working at HMP Birmingham. It was particularly important that the 
poster specified that there was neither reward for taking part in the research, nor 
any negative implications for not taking part. 
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Figure 5.1: Poster for prisons and YOIs 
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Designing the interview instrument 
The interview questionnaire was a semi-structured instrument consisting of 6 
sections. It is attached as Appendix 5.2 of this thesis. A considerable amount of 
literature was available giving advice about interview design, question wording 
and interview conduct. Key sources used for the research presented here were: 
advice in social research methodology books about overall interview design and 
delivery (May, 1997; Greenfield, 2002; Salent and Dillman, 1994); advice 
specifically tailored to questioning offenders for criminological research or for 
problem-solving (Connell and Farrington, 1996; Decker, 2005; Hearnden and 
Magill, 2004); psychological research describing the factors which affect 
people’s ability to store information, to retrieve it and the effect of question 
wording and interviewer styles on the reliability of offenders’ responses (Milne 
and Bull, 1999); and specific advice on question wording and content from the 
academic community (Question Bank Factsheets 2,4 and 6; Rowlands, 2002). 
The section below summarises the relevant lessons from that literature.  
 
Overall interview design 
The sample used for retrieving information about phone preferences and 
offending behaviour was a convenience sample of males convicted of mobile 
phone theft. The methods of identifying and gaining access to participants are 
described above. Since research took place in prisons and Young Offender 
Institutions (YOIs), it was necessary to design and deliver face-to-face 
interviews. Face-to-face interviews can, when conducted properly, be described 
as the gold standard of interview survey methodology (de Vaus, 2002). They 
result in high response rates, and in depth and reliable responses, because 
interviewers have the opportunity to probe for detailed information when 
appropriate. The main logistical disadvantages of face-to-face interviews are 
high costs and the length of time taken to gather the information (Question Bank 
Factsheet 2). Face-to-face interviews pose several methodological issues, such 
as social desirability bias. This is where a participant might under-report 
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behaviour which is not socially desirable, such as offending behaviour or 
violence, unless they are reassured that no judgement is being made (Question 
Bank Factsheet 6; Milne and Bull, 1999; Greenfield, 2002).  
 
De Vaus (2002) lists five generic principles to consider when designing the 
order and grouping of questions. These are:  
- to ensure that the flow of the questionnaire makes sense;  
- to commence the interview with questions that respondents will enjoy 
answering- those which are easy, factual and concrete yet relevant;  
- to group related questions together;  
- to leave open-ended questions towards the latter stages of the 
interview to ensure that rapport is established (though remember that 
within a question sequence, open-ended questions result in the most 
accurate recall of memorised events (Milne and Bull, 1999)); and  
- to introduce a variety of question formats to make the interview 
interesting. However, a balance should be struck between including 
enough question formats to keep a participant interested, and 
including too many which might result in confusion or too much 
concentration being requested of the participant.  
 
Question type and question wording 
Questioning styles and wording can have a significant impact on the amount 
and accuracy of information provided by interview participants. Open-ended 
questions are ideal for gathering accurate information, because the participant is 
able to give an open and unrestricted answer. They are free to report any 
information which occurs to them, and are not likely to be adversely affected by 
the interviewer. The quality of information collected from open ended questions 
is high, but the information can be incomplete (Milne and Bull, 1999: 22).  
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Closed questions are best used to gain specific information or to probe after an 
open-ended question. The main advantage of closed questions is that they 
allow an interviewer to seek out specific information. The main disadvantages of 
closed questions are that they result in short and restricted answers; and they 
can increase the proportion of inaccurate information given by participants. The 
reasons that closed questions increase the amount of inaccurate information 
given is that they can suggest to the interview participant that they ‘should’ know 
the answer. Good interview practice therefore involves reassuring and 
reminding participants during an interview that not knowing, not remembering or 
not having an opinion are perfectly valid responses (Milne and Bull, 1999; de 
Vaus, 2002). Following this, it is logical that the answer categories presented in 
forced-choice questions must include the option of a neutral response or ‘Don’t 
know’ as appropriate.  
 
Question language should be carefully thought out at the design stage. It should 
be tailored according to the target audience, the aim of the question, and the 
question’s place in the overall flow of the interview. In general, well designed 
questions will avoid complex grammar; avoid negative phrasing; avoid jargon 
and technical terminology (these can alienate the participant as well as 
decrease their confidence); always incorporate a ‘Don’t know’ or neutral 
response if appropriate; avoid multiple questions combined into one; and avoid 
being leading (Milne and Bull, 1999; Question Bank Factsheet 4). 
 
Question language can affect both the quantity and quality of information given 
by interview participants. Loftus and Zanni (1975, in Milne and Bull, 1999) 
demonstrated that using the definite article (‘the’) in place of the indefinite article 
(‘a’) increased the rate at which non-present items were recollected by students. 
The definite article can result in what is essentially a leading question, because 
the presence of an item or person is assumed. In a separate study, Harris 
(1973, in Milne and Bull, 1999) demonstrated that asking participants ‘How tall’ 
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a person was resulted in an average estimate of height that was ten inches 
greater than when the wording ‘How short’ was used. The ideal wording is 
neutral, such as ‘What was the height of the individual?’ 
 
De Vaus (2002: 175) provides a checklist against which to assess proposed 
questions. That checklist is reproduced in Table 5.2 below. An answer of ‘yes’ to 
any of the checklist suggests that the question requires revision. 
 
Table 5.2: Question wording checklist 
1. Is the language complex? 
2. Is the question double-barralled? 
3. Is the question negative? 
4. Will the words have a different meaning for different people? 
5. Is the question ambiguous? 
6. Is the frame of reference for the question unclear? 
7. Does the question have dangling alternatives? 
8. Is the question a ‘dead giveaway’?  
9. Can the question be shortened? 
10. Is the question leading? 
11. Is the respondent unlikely to have the necessary knowledge? 
12. Is there a prestige bias? 
13. Is the question too precise? 
14. Does the question artificially create options? 
15. Is the question wording unnecessarily detailed or objectionable? 
16. Does the question contain gratuitous qualifiers? 
Source: de Vaus, (2002:175) 
 
Attention also has to be paid to the order of responses presented to any 
questions which are not open-ended, referred to as forced choice questions. 
Response order effects occur when the ordering of answer categories affects 
the likelihood of the categories being chosen. Primacy effects refer to the 
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tendency of respondents to choose the first option if presented with a list of 
options. Primacy effects are most commonly observed when information is 
presented visually. Recency effects refer to the tendency of participants to 
choose the last option from a list, and is most often seen when information is 
presented aurally (Question Bank Factsheet 6; May, 1997). Both effects can be 
minimised by presenting information visually via the use of showcards, while the 
interviewer also orally describes the response options. Showcards used in the 
interviews reported here are explained in further detail within the section ‘The 
interview questionnaire in detail’. 
 
Conduct during interviews 
Generic rules for increasing the quantity and quality of information collected 
during an interview include: begin the interview with a general topic and 
gradually bring the discussion round to more specific areas of interest; maintain 
a professional but friendly rapport where possible; be aware of the possibility 
that participants might be bored by, wary of, irritated by or even in awe of the 
interviewer depending on how they perceive them in relation to themselves- 
minimise these effects by clarifying their consent to be involved, using neutral 
verbal language, relaxed body language and maintaining eye contact but not 
over-staring; use more open-ended questions to start with if the information 
required relies on memory- only probe afterwards with closed questions to try 
and elicit omitted information; repeat words used by the participants in follow-up 
probes or repeated questions; try to re-word unanswered questions instead of 
simply repeating them; recognise if a line of questioning or topic is fruitless and 
move on to a different topic where possible (and perhaps return to the same 
topic but reword the question later); only ever check any doubts about the 
validity of answers in a non-threatening manner, and ideally towards the end of 
the interview; wait until a rapport has been established and towards the end of 
the interview before dealing with contentious issues such as offending 
 168 
 
behaviour, and personal information such as ethnicity and age (Hughes, 2002; 
Milne and Bull 1999; Question Bank Factsheet 4). 
 
The interviewer is also fallible in his/her recording of responses during interview. 
This is especially so if the interviewer has a mental predefined ‘script’ which the 
participant is expected to follow. In this case, selective attention can affect both 
the flow of the interview and which information is recorded by the interviewer. 
Selective attention refers to the phenomenon of focusing on information or 
actions which are expected, while disregarding those which do not fit the 
interviewer’s assumptions (Milne and Bull, 1999).  The gold standard of 
transcript recording is to tape each interview, but where this is not possible, 
taking notes contemporaneously will minimise the likelihood of the interviewer 
forgetting the detail of responses given. Note-taking does, however, interrupt 
eye contact and interview flow, and can lead to a more formal atmosphere 
(Hughes, 2002).  
 
An overview of the final questionnaire 
The final questionnaire followed a standard overall structure of interview 
schedules (see for example Milne and Bull, 1999; Decker, 2005). An overview of 
each section is given below and specific questions are expanded on later. The 
questionnaire was piloted within the research group in order to hone wording 
and question order, and to highlight where questions could be cut down, omitted 
or reworded. Furthermore, questionnaire development was carried out under the 
guidance of Professor Graham Farrell who is experienced in interview and 
survey design and conduct, and as such represents an ideal source of advice 
(Milne and Bull, 1999). 
 
Section I was an introductory stage. It allowed researchers to introduce 
themselves to participants, to explain the purposes of the research and the 
interview, to lay out likely time scales for the interview and to ask for consent to 
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continue. The opening questions were about mobile phone ownership, phone 
use and preferences. The section introduced the topic of mobile phones and 
their use, while avoiding intrusive questions about offending behaviour at this 
early stage. Some of the opening questions also provided background 
information on participants’ level of knowledge about SIM blocking and IMEI 
blacklisting. These processes were then explained to participants. In this way 
participant ‘expertise’ was assessed before new information was given to them, 
while the potential for confusion between SIM blocking and IMEI blacklisting 
was minimised.  
The core of the interview consisted of three sections. Section II asked 
participants to verbalise their preferences within six matched pairs of phones. 
The phone pairs were matched on some factors such as colour and overall 
shape, leaving a key difference unmatched. The section allowed the 
quantification of group and individual preferences, and verbalisation of the 
reasons for preferences expressed.  
Section III asked participants to report how much, if at all, they would be 
deterred from taking phones in 23 different scenarios and of different designs. 
This allowed both quantitative assessment of how much the designs deterred 
offenders, and capture of the spontaneously verbalised reasons why this was 
so.  
Section IV asked participants various questions about their offending behaviour 
and the last phone theft they could recall. This provided information about 
participants’ specialisation in phone theft; their reasons for choosing a specific 
target during their last offence; and an assessment of whether or not they 
expressed a standing decision to offend. These event-specific reports provided 
a valuable internal check about the more theoretical stated preferences and 
behaviours reported in Sections II and III.  
 
Section V was short and provided an opportunity to better gauge offenders’ 
levels of knowledge about fencing stolen phones, IMEI reprogramming and 
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making false insurance claims, all of which can be seen as measures of 
expertise in the stolen phone market. The interviews were concluded by 
collecting demographic data and asking participants if they wished to raise any 
questions; further ideas or issues. The sections below explain each section of 
the interview in more detail. Indented sections represent wording taken directly 
from the interview schedule.  
 
Conducting the offender interviews 
One printed interview schedule was used for each participant. Since recording 
instrumentation such as tape recorders or Dictaphones was not allowed in the 
institutions, contemporaneous hand written notes were taken by the 
researchers. Bearing this in mind, the schedules had been devised with 
adequate space left for the responses to open questions to be written down 
verbatim. The options for forced choice questions were printed for each forced 
choice question, allowing responses to be quickly circled without interrupting the 
flow of the interview. Two researchers carried out the interviews independently 
from each other. Therefore the general demeanour of the interviewer, and 
variation in follow-up question wording were agreed prior to interviews being 
conducted. 
 
The methodology adopted was to establish where possible a friendly and 
respectful rapport with participants. Initial interviews quickly revealed that 
respondents reacted well to being consulted as ‘experts in their field’. This 
approach worked well in all instances apart from one, which resulted in the 
termination of interviews at one prison. Interviews were conducted by the 
present author and one other member of the research team. While that member 
was interviewing in a West Midlands prison, one participant was particularly 
interested in discussing the 23 deterrent designs. Unfortunately, the offender 
took the researcher’s engagement in a conversation about these to mean that 
he was invited to collaborate in future employment. This erroneous assumption 
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spread quickly through the prison, and despite the researchers’ best efforts to 
reassure the prison psychologist, access to further participants was denied. 
Therefore that researcher only conducted nine of the total 40 offender 
interviews. The present author conducted the remainder. 
 
Conducting the student interviews 
Students studying Loughborough University’s MSc in Criminology; BSc Product 
Design and Technology and BA Industrial Design and Technology were briefed 
about the aims of the interviews in a lecture theatre setting and asked to 
complete Sections II and III of hard copies of the questionnaires, and the 
demographics section. They were led through the questions by the present 
author, with show cards replaced by Powerpoint™ slides. The context meant 
that guidance was available if needed, but conferring between students was 
minimised. 
 
The interview questionnaire in detail 
Section I: Introduction to the questionnaire  
After personal introduction, explaining the purpose of the interview and checking 
consent to particpate, one copy of the same semi-structured interview schedule 
was used for each participant. The full questionnaire is attached as Appendix 
5.2. Questions 1 to 6 of the Introduction asked participants about the last or 
current mobile phone they owned. These questions aimed to begin to establish 
a rapport with the participants, by putting them at their ease and turning their 
minds to the subject of mobile phones. Since incarcerated offenders were not 
allowed access to mobile phones during their sentence, they were asked about 
the last model they owned before their sentence began.  
 
Questions 7 to 11 asked participants to explain what they knew about mobile 
phone SIM blocking, IMEI reprogramming, and IMEI functionality. This section 
had several purposes. Firstly it allowed an assessment to be made of 
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participant’s true knowledge of mobile phone technology, before any further 
knowledge was introduced by the interview process. Since colloquial terms such 
as blocking were often used to mean both IMEI blacklisting and SIM card 
blocking, it was important to establish participants’ understanding of these two 
processes. Where confusion was apparent, the difference between the two 
processes and the relevant language were explained. Finally, since blacklisting 
is mostly a response to a phone being stolen, this section took participants a 
step closer to considering their own offending experience without asking 
contentious questions too early on in the interview process. By the end of 
question 11 the interview had been in progress for approximately ten to fifteen 
minutes, almost all of that time focused on the participants’ use of phones, their 
preferences for certain types, and their understanding of key technical issues.  
 
Section II: Comparing pairs of phones 
The aim of this section was to allow quantification of the phone-specific factors 
which affected thieves’ target choices. Six pairs of phones were chosen by the 
research team, and pictures of each pair shown one at a time to participants. 
The pairs were chosen by the research team to elucidate different factors of 
phone design: most pairs consisted of a newer and an older version of the same 
basic phone shape. Three basic phone shapes exist and these are: candy bar, 
where the phone is a simple block shape with no moving components; 
clamshell, where the phone flips open and shut like a clam; and slider, where 
the phone keyboard slides out from underneath the phone screen in order for 
the phone to be used.  
 
Participants were asked which, if either of the pair, they would prefer to take 
given a low risk theft opportunity. After they had stated their preference, they 
were prompted for the reasons for their choice. Figure 5.2 below displays the six 
matched pairs of phones. The order of the pairs of phones shown here matches 
that of the results in Chapter 6 and is not the same as the order of the pairs that 
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were shown to interview participants. In figure 5.2 below the phone chosen most 
often is on the left; during the interview the handedness of the predicted 
favourite was varied between left and right to minimise the risk of participants 
‘learning’ which side would display the preferred phone.  
The names of the pairs were used for identifying the pairs during analysis and 
were not disclosed to interview participants. They were prompted with non-
leading questions such as ‘Why do you say that?’ or for example: ‘You say the 
one on the left is better. In what way is it better?’ Care was taken to not express 
agreement or disagreement with participants’ choices. Similarly, during any 
conversations which arose from the probing questions, care was taken to avoid 
introducing or suggesting to participants which factors were predicted to be 
important in the decision making process.  
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Figure 5.2: The six matched pairs of phones. 
Pair: Old vs. New 
Nokia 6020 vs. Nokia 5110 
 
This pairing controlled for make (Nokia) and shape (candybar). The key 
differences between the models was age, although the models also differed in 
size, the presence of an aerial, and colour. It was predicted that this pairing 
would result in a strong preference for the newer rather than the older model.  
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Pair: Sliders Popularity 
Samsung D500 vs. Nokia 7650 
 
This pairing aimed to encourage participants to verbalise and compare their 
perceptions of value and familiarity. Shape and colour were controlled for. The 
popular D500 (left) ranked 4th in the 2006 Count Based Theft Index and was 
predicted to be most easily recognised as iconic, and easy to fence, by 
experienced thieves. However the larger screen and the icons on the Nokia 
7650 suggest more advanced functionality than the D500.  
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Pair: Clamshells Icon 
Motorola Razr vs. Motorola V300 
 
Make, colour and shape were controlled for, and the iconic Motorola Razr on the 
left compared to the well known but older and smaller V300. The research team 
predicted that a high proportion of participants would prefer the Razr due to its 
iconic status and long term high ranking in the Theft Indices.  
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Pair: Candy Bar Curves 
Nokia 7610 vs. Nokia 6020 
 
Controlling for make, colour and basic shape, this pairing tested preferences for 
newer models, displaying better functionality and design (the curves of the 
7610, left) against more basic design and functionality of the 6020. 
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Pair: New Concepts 
Sony E Concept phone vs. Loughborough’s Fortress 
 
Both handsets in this paring were novel phones not available for sale. The 
pairing compared reactions to the futuristic Sony Ericsson (top left below) which 
resembled a sleek candybar, with reactions to the totally unique and unfamiliar 
Fortress. The Fortress was designed by one of the students taking the MSc in 
Design at Loughborough University. Introducing novel designs encouraged 
participants to verbalise their decision-making process as they worked through 
their initial reactions and justified a decision.  
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Pair: Candy Bar Upgrade 
Sony E K700i : Sony E T630 
 
Controlling for colour, shape and make this pairing compared a slightly more 
modern upgrade with its predecessor. The styling and clearer screen icons of 
the K700i (left) suggest that it is slightly newer than the T630, but the 
functionality suggested on the screens is identical. These very similar handsets 
were predicted to be chosen by almost equal numbers of participants. 
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Section III: Design solutions 
The aim of this section was to quantify the deterrent effects of various design 
solutions. The design solutions chosen for presentation at interview consisted of 
a mixture of those already in use, such as blacklisting, and novel ideas. Some of 
the novel ideas were developed by setting students taking Loughborough 
University’s BSc Product Design and Technology and BA Industrial Design and 
Technology the task of designing a phone which would deter thieves. Firstly, 
students were briefed on the idea that deterrence might be achieved by the use 
of iconography and semantics, or by practical means such as making the phone 
useless or worthless after theft. The terms iconography and semantics refer to 
the overall appearance and symbolism of the phones. Examples include the 
biological hazard warnings seen on oil drums of chemicals, and the indicators of 
poison, danger or a bitter taste observed in the natural world such as black and 
yellow stripes (Felson, 2006). Students’ designs were shortlisted by the entire 
research team and then scored according to which of the 25 techniques of crime 
prevention (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) they employed to deter theft. Appendix 
5.3 displays this final list.  
 
The final selection of phone designs and scenarios presented to interview 
participants ensured that a mixture of novel and current deterrent designs were 
tested, which utilised a variety of the 25 techniques of situational crime 
prevention represented. In addition, some wider situational factors such as the 
presence of a watching public were included to assess their influence on 
participant decision-making. The 23 designs are described below. Each 
participant was asked whether, and how much, each design would deter them 
from an easy and low risk theft opportunity. Participants were presented with, 
and asked to score, the level of deterrence according to the Likert scale 
presented in Figure 5.3 below. The Likert scale allowed participants to quantify 
their responses, allowing quantitative ranking of aggregate results, while also 
neutralising the initial question.  
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The 23 deterrent designs 
The numbered indented sections below each reflect the original question 
wording as written on the researcher’s interview schedule. The first three design 
solutions were all based on an increasingly permanent method of simple 
product marking. Product marking is commonly promoted by the UK police to 
aid product identification following a theft, and ranges from stamping children’s 
bikes to writing postcodes on electronic equipment with invisible ink: 
 
1. The phone has someone's name written on it with a marker pen. 
2. The phone has someone's name stamped on the cover, but it is 
not one of those covers you can replace easily, so you can’t get rid 
of the name. 
3. The phone has someone's face stamped on the cover, and again 
its not one of those covers you can replace easily. 
 
The next two questions tested the idea of iconography as a deterrent. In the first 
instance the icon –the ancient eye of Horus- was allowed to speak for itself in 
that its meaning was not explained to participants. In the second instance its 
meaning was explained. The eye is pictured below in Figure 5.4. 
 
4. Now I’m going to show you a picture, and I’d like you to tell me 
what you’d think if you saw that on a phone- what’s your gut 
reaction? [SHOW PICTURE OF EYE] 
5. If I told you that the eye, this symbol, means the phone won’t work 
if it’s reported stolen.  
 
The next deterrent design aimed to assess whether offenders believed that the 
ability to check the validity of a mobile phone was important. 
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6. Now imagine that the phone’s serial number, the IMEI, is stamped 
on the outside of the phone so that people such as the police or a 
potential buyer can check to see if it’s been changed.  
 
The two following designs assessed the effectiveness of the phone being 
attached to the owner in some form. Theoretically, a different set of skills and 
motivation are needed to stop someone and force them to remove a worn item, 
compared to lifting an abandoned object from a location such as a chair or pub 
table. The Lanyard chain and the wrist band phone are depicted in Figures 5.5 
and 5.6 respectively. 
 
7. This phone is attached by a chain to someone's trousers [SHOW 
PICTURE OF LANYARD CHAIN]  
8. This picture shows a phone which is worn on the wrist like a 
bracelet [SHOW WRIST BAND PHONE].  
 
The next two questions assessed the effectiveness of alarms being activated on 
either the owner, or the stolen handset: 
 
9. Imagine a phone where the handset communicates with another 
part on the wristband of the owner. When the handset is taken 
more than a few feet away from the user, a loud alarm goes of on 
the handset.  
10. Imagine the same phone where the handset and wristwatch 
communicate. What if, when the handset is taken away, the alarm 
goes off on the wristwatch of the owner?  
 
The following design centred on an already available technology, tracking 
devices: 
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11. Imagine that the mobile phone is fitted with a tracking device - like 
a tracker on a car - so it can be located when it’s stolen.  
 
The next eight suggestions assessed the effectiveness of increasingly efficient 
blacklisting, or personalised use of the phone using biometrics: 
 
12. Imagine that the mobile phone handset will definitely be blocked in 
the UK within 48 hours of being reported stolen, so it cannot be 
used.  
13. What if it would be blocked even quicker, say within 24 hours?  
14. What if you knew that the phone would be blocked immediately in 
the UK?  
15. Imagine that the mobile phone will definitely be cut off when 
stolen, but it will still work as a camera and MP3 player.  
16. Imagine that the phone was likely to be cut off, but that your friend 
had the equipment to unblock it by changing its identity [if 
necessary: its serial number, the IMEI number], so that it worked 
again.  
17. What if the phone would be cut off and the only way to reactivate it 
was to get inside and change some of the chips inside it, which is 
quite difficult to do.  
18. Imagine that the mobile phone can only be activated with 
something unique to the owner, like a fingerprint, an eye scan, or 
face recognition.  
19. Imagine that the handset is locked by a PIN code, so you need to 
take it to someone who can unlock it before it works. 
 
The next two solutions ascertained participants’ reactions to the presence of 
members of the public watching; and the need to take a phone out of someone’s 
pocket: 
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20. Imagine you’re in a public place and you see an unguarded mobile 
phone but there’s other people watching.  
21. Imagine that you know somebody is carrying a mobile phone 
because you can see the headset they’re wearing, so you know 
the phone is in their pocket.  
 
The final two design solutions presented to participants assessed the effect of 
decreasing the cash resale value of stolen phones by means other than 
blacklisting: 
 
22. Imagine that people only carry very cheap ‘disposable’ mobile 
phones. They can only be used for voice calls and text. They don’t 
have a screen. They can’t be reprogrammed. They can have up to 
£5 worth of call credit on them.  
23. Let’s say that handsets in the future are free, and are just left lying 
around in bars, restaurants and so on. They don’t hold any 
personal information on them, they are just used to connect to, 
say, the internet, so there’s no money or personal details on them.  
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Figure 5.3 Likert Scale presented at interview 
How much would it put you off?
CompletelyQuite a lotA littleNot at all
4321
 
Figure 5.4 The eye of Horus shown to interview participants 
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Figure 5.5 Lanyard chain shown to interview participants 
 
 
 187 
 
Figure 5.6 Wrist band phone shown to interview 
participants
 
Thanks are due to Shaun Whitehead for providing Figures 5.4,5.5 and 5.6 and for the 
bulk of artistic input into Figure 5.1
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Section IV: Experience of taking phones 
The initial questions in this section asked offenders about whether they 
preferred to take mobile phones compared to other objects, or whether they also 
took other objects. This was to establish their degree of specialism in mobile 
phone theft. Participants were also asked whether they made active choices 
about which phones to take, and which to ignore. This provided further evidence 
of the choices they made before and during offence commission. 
 
The next questions were concerned with the details of the last offence they 
could remember. By focusing on the last offence, a more representative sample 
of offences was obtained than if participants had been asked about an offence 
within a given time frame, or a series of offences. It is possible that participants 
relayed the details of the last memorable offence, which might have been more 
dramatic than less eventful thefts, since dramatic events are more memorable 
(Milne and Bull, 1999). Furthermore, it is possible that participants wanted to 
either show off about their prowess as thieves, or to hide the worst details if they 
were embarrassed or ashamed of their behaviour (see the discussion of social 
desirability bias earlier). Nevertheless, the questions were designed to get a 
flavour of the offences committed by the offenders who were interviewed. 
Reactions such as shame and bravado were minimised by introducing the 
section to participants as follows: 
 
Now as you know, the reason we’re asking your opinion on these ideas is 
because you know a bit about taking phones. That’s fine. It’s actually very useful 
for us, because you’re the expert. Can you tell us, from your experience, do you 
prefer to steal phones rather than other things?   
 
Participants were asked, if they could remember and were happy to disclose the 
information, about the make and model of the last phone stolen, who it belonged 
to, and to give an account of what happened before and during the offence. 
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Asking offenders what happened to lead them to take the phone gave some 
insight into their standing decisions to offend, that is, their readiness to seize an 
opportunity. Asking them to verbalise the sequence of events during the incident 
gave further insights into the thought processes carried out and the choices 
made during offence commission. This questioning methodology followed the 
basic rules of the cognitive interview, which has been proven to increase the 
accuracy and completeness of accounts of remembered events during police 
investigations (Milne and Bull, 1999).  
 
Offenders were also asked about the total number of phones they had taken, 
and the length of time they had been stealing. These factors along with their 
knowledge of fencing and of technical issues such as blacklisting were used to 
assess whether participants were novice or more professional thieves. The 
responses of novices and professionals are compared in the results chapter 
which follows this one.  
 
Section V: False insurance claims 
Since the level of false claims was an unknown entity, it was logical to ask 
offenders if they themselves or anyone they knew had made false claims. It is 
not altogether clear whether offenders would be more or less likely than the 
general population to make false claims. Previous research into offending 
behaviour has shown that ‘those who do big bad things also usually do little bad 
things’ (Chenery et al., 1999; Roach, 2004; 2007). If phone thieves have no 
need to make false claims because it is easier to steal a new phone than deal 
with the process of making a false claim, they might underrepresent the true 
extent of false claims. If, however, phone thieves are happy to make false 
claims as part of a repertoire of dishonest behaviour, then false claims might be 
higher within the phone thief population than within the general population.  
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Section VI: Snowball contacts, demographics and closure 
In the final stage of the interview, participants were asked whether they knew of 
any other inmates who might like to take part in the interviews. This was 
intended to create a snowball effect, where one participant identified another 
knowledgeable participant and so on. However none of the participants 
identified anyone else, presumably because this would have been seen as 
‘grassing up’ their fellow inmates. 
 
The demographics of participants (age, gender, geographic region of abode and 
ethnicity) were obtained. Participants were presented with showcards of the 
various options. Numbers were assigned to the response options, such as age 
range or ethnic group, so that participants could avoid using descriptive 
language if they desired.  
 
At the very end of the interview, participants were asked if they had any 
questions or concerns, or any other issues they wished to raise. They were then 
thanked for their participation and told who to contact within their institution if 
they had any questions at a later stage. This was designed to leave participants 
feeling that their contribution had been valuable, and that they had control over 
the information they had given, even at a later stage. This had the benefits of 
creating happier participants, and minimising any risk of negative rumours 
spreading about the interviews through the institutions thereby potentially 
decreasing the number of willing participants. 
 
Criticisms of the methodology 
Some criticisms of previous research into decision-making have been described 
in Chapter 3. The methodological limitations of the interviews with mobile phone 
thieves can be summarised as: 
(1) Whether the results from a sample of 40 incarcerated thieves are 
generalisable to the wider offending population; 
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(2) Whether the hypothetical scenarios presented at interview allow conclusions 
to be drawn about real-world situations.  
(3) Whether the offenders’ accounts of previous behaviour or hypothetical 
behaviour are valid: some may exaggerate to impress the interviewers, while 
others might repress some details to avoid perceived judgement. 
(4) For this particular interview instrument, how much the focus on phone theft 
throughout the interview generated biased responses in both students and 
offenders.  
 
In reference to (1), whether the responses are applicable to the wider offending 
population, it seems unlikely that the thieves interviewed differ vastly from those 
in other geographical areas. However, it is not possible to assess how 
representative is the range of experience within the sample compared to the 
wider population. This could be assessed by interviewing larger samples, and 
samples from different geographic locations, complemented by scrutiny of the 
repeat-offender literature. Furthermore, the sample could be extended in future 
research to include phone thieves who have not been caught, in order to assess 
whether their choices vary considerably from those who are arguably less 
successful (Walsh, 1986). 
 
In reference to (2), the hypothetical scenarios presented were not intended to 
fully replicate real-world situations. The six matched pairs of phone aimed to 
identify those factors verbalised by offenders when they made between-phone 
choices, regardless of other situational factors. The 23 deterrent designs aimed 
to compare the deterrent effects relative to the other designs, and to elucidate 
the reasons why. Future research could ask offenders to verbalise their 
strategies when selecting people and phones in a real-world setting (see for 
example Logie et al., 1992). This would identify the wider situational factors and 
further victim-related factors considered by thieves, which may be missing from 
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the rational choice event model resulting from this research and presented in 
Chapter 6.  
 
There are few checks available on (3) the validity of the offenders’ accounts, 
although within-sample comparisons of responses should identify any severe 
outliers. One comparison was made between offenders’ claimed knowledge 
about SIM blocking and IMEI blacklisting against their knowledge demonstrated 
during the interview. Future research could replicate Indermaur’s (1996) 
methodology of comparing self-reports with prosecution or police files. For the 
present results, it is hoped that any minimisers (who hide the worst details) will 
on aggregate cancel out the effect of any maximisers (who exaggerate the 
negative aspects of their behaviour), if they exist at all. 
 
Finally, in reference to (4), the possibility that a focus on mobile phone theft and 
the possibility that the order of the questions might have generated demand 
characteristics, i.e. increased the probability of exaggeration, false reporting or 
its opposite. The initial sections of the questionnaire were deliberately kept 
general in order to allow exploration of the offenders’ genuine knowledge levels 
of phone theft. Therefore, a cross-check for likely exaggeration was possible, 
when analysing whether the responses of more and less experienced thieves 
differed. Furthermore, the aim of the sections asking about choices between 
matched pairs and the deterrence effect of the 23 designs were deliberately 
designed to ask about choices within these parameters presented, not to ask 
about choice rates in the real world per se. Again, a cross-check of reported 
preferences (preferences between model pairs) and data from NMPCU allowed 
some assessment of how accurate the offender responses were. The possibility 
of exaggerated between-model choices, is genuine, because participants were 
presented with only one pair of phones at a time. However, the aim of these 
questions was as much to identify any factors used to differentiate, and not the 
preference strength per se. Some exploration of how any preferences stated 
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were reflected in real world phone theft data was possible. These analyses are 
presented in Chapter 6. Further analysis of the types of phones discarded, such 
as those handed in to stolen property departments, would develop the work 
presented here further: An analysis of the models discarded and their 
characteristics would enable an assessment of whether discarded phones are 
the corollary of those most commonly stolen, i.e. the older and less valuable 
models. In effect, such an analysis would attempt falsification of the hypothesis 
proposed here and supported by the evidence so far, that more valuable and 
modern phones are preferred by thieves, even opportunistic ones who happen 
across a lost handset. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the stages of identifying a suitable sample of 
convicted mobile phone thieves and of designing an interview schedule to be 
used for the research. After defining the aims of the interviews, the interview 
schedule was designed following generic sociological and specific criminological 
research advice concerning questionnaire design and interview conduct. In 
parallel, much effort was spent contacting prisons and Young Offenders 
Institutions within the Midlands area in order to secure research participants. 
The interview design aimed to minimise the compounding effects of 
methodological issues including interviewer conduct; question wording and 
order; and the hypothetical nature of the scenarios presented. While every effort 
was made to minimise these effects, the interview was conducted in the context 
of an interview about mobile phone theft: therefore all biases can not have been 
avoided. There remains some risk that offending behaviour, and between model 
variability, were inflated due to the false scenarios presented. However, 
comparison of stated preferences with real world police data allows some 
assessment of the scale of any inflation. Future research should focus on the 
corollary: an analysis of ‘by catch’ or phones handed in to lost property 
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departments. The results of the interviews are presented in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Results of the interviews 
 
The final data set 
Offenders 
The final data set consisted of 40 male offenders aged 16 to 30 yrs old, who had 
been involved in mobile phone theft. The majority (77%) were aged between 16 
and 20yrs. In all 85% (n=34) of participants were sourced from local YOIs and a 
local prison, with the remainder (n=6) being identified by two local Youth 
Offending Services. Table 6.1 below displays the breakdown of both offender 
and student interview sources. Those from the YOIs and the prison were 
interviewed on the wings in which they were incarcerated. Those from Youth 
Offending Services were interviewed in a variety of locations ranging from a 
static caravan home, to a shed while they were taking part in rehabilitative Art 
Therapy.  
 
Students 
In all, 45 male students were asked the questions in sections II (matched pairs) 
and III (23 deterrent designs) of the interview schedules, and for demographic 
information. It made no sense to ask them about their offending behaviour. The 
majority of student responses came from the BSc Product Design and 
Technology and BA Industrial Design & Technology (82.2%; n=37). Six were 
enrolled on the MSc in Criminology; and a further two (4.4%) randomly selected 
students were stopped on campus and asked to take part in the questionnaire. 
The process of randomly selecting students on campus was not pursued 
because identify willing participants was time consuming. There were no 
females in the final offender data set, and so female student responses were 
omitted from the final analysis.  
 
The final sample is geographically convenient, and focused on samples from the 
East Midlands. It therefore risks not being generalisable to the whole of the UK. 
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Previous research has shown for example that robbery location varies with 
geographical area characteristics (Bernasco and Block, 2009). However, the 
main focus of the interviews was on choices made within the theft location, i.e. 
hypothetical choice of target (person and handset), and not the movements 
which resulted in the coincidence of offender and suitable opportunity. There is 
therefore a low risk that the opinions of this sample of offenders will vary 
considerably compared to others (see also Hochstetler, 2001). At worst, the 
sample represents a starting point for describing offender decision-making and 
comparing the responses of offenders with students. If future research reveals 
regional variation, then that will be the time to develop region-specific models.  
 
Table 6.1: Breakdown of interview sources 
 
Source  Frequency 
% of all 
interviews 
O
ff
e
n
d
e
rs
 
YOI Brinsford: Young Offender 18 21.2 
YOI Brinsford: Juvenile 10 11.8 
HMP Birmingham 6 7.1 
Leicestershire YOS 3 3.5 
Staffordshire ISSP 3 3.5 
Total 40 47.1 
S
tu
d
e
n
ts
 Student: BSc/BA Design 37 43.5 
Student: MSc Criminology 6 7.1 
Student: Random 2 2.4 
Total 45 52.9 
All Total 85 100 
 
Conducting the offender interviews 
Offenders were almost all interviewed one-to-one. Exceptions came from those 
identified by YOSs, where a parent or YOS representative was present. Each 
interview took approximately an hour, and had to fit in with establishment 
routines. This sometimes resulted in interviews being cut short if participants 
were needed for an educational session, for a solicitor’s meeting, or even in one 
case because the individual was being moved to another establishment.  
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Entry to prison wings was not possible before 9.30 am; between 12 noon and 
2pm, or after 4.30 pm. At these times offenders were either being moved to and 
from cells for eating purposes, or were locked in their cells as part of the 
everyday reality of incarceration. Mass movement of offenders by HMP staff 
was labour intensive and time consuming, because of the need to count each 
offender in and out at each stage. At other times, offenders were not available 
for interview because they were taking part in educational or physical activities. 
Interestingly some guards offered to go and interrupt educational and physical 
activity in order that interviews could be carried out. These offers were declined 
because it seemed unethical to interrupt any rehabilitative activities, and could 
have caused resentment from the participants therefore decreasing their 
cooperation during the interview.  
 
Queues at reception, security checks and waiting for staff who were free to act 
as escorts all meant that entry to the establishments was sometimes not 
achieved until after 10am. The only items allowed past the prison security 
function were the interview schedules, consent forms and a pen. Car keys and 
mobile phone were left in a secured locker at reception in compliance with 
establishment rules. 
 
The various daily routines and activities meant that at most, four interviews were 
possible in one working day. This maximum was rarely achieved because any  
delay, such as a wait while guards located and then escorted an offender to 
interview, would mean only one interview could be conducted in a morning or 
afternoon. Lunch was a solitary affair taken in the car park of the 
establishments, since all visitors were requested to leave during lunchtime lock 
up. However this did provide an opportunity to add extra notes to any interview 
schedules completed in the morning.  
 
 198 
 
When interviewing the incarcerated offenders, each participant was escorted 
from their cell to a room designated as the interview room. Researchers were 
always closest to the exit door and noted any panic or help call buttons situated 
on the walls. In the event none of the participants were in the least bit 
intimidating or threatening. Many were respectful, calling the present author 
‘Miss’, and seeming to welcome the break from their daily routine. 
 
Interviews conducted with younger participants from Staffordshire and 
Leicestershire City YOTs involved fewer security logistics than those conducted 
within HMP institutions, but were influenced in other ways. Three individuals 
from Staffordshire were interviewed during an art therapy class. They were 
finishing the production and decoration of wooden objects created during a 
series of workshops. One object in particular was an outstandingly well crafted 
rocking cot for one teenager’s unborn child. Unfortunately, time ran out during 
these interviews, meaning questions concerning their offending behaviour were 
not answered fully. However the three participants did answer questions 
concerning choices within six matched pairs of phones and the deterrent effects 
of the 23 design solutions.  
 
Another interesting interview location was on a mobile home site, where the 
family of the young offender lived. The majority of the interview was conducted 
out of earshot of the individual’s mother, who was clearly ashamed of her son’s 
behaviour, and might well have affected his responses had privacy not been 
sought.  
 
For convenience, Table 6.2 below is repeated from Chapter 5. It lists the 
research questions which the interviews aimed to answer. The results are then 
presented in the order of these research questions. The key findings and 
conclusions are summarised and discussed at the end of the relevant sections, 
before being pulled together in the chapter’s final section. Quotes are used 
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throughout and represent verbatim the responses of offenders, unless square 
brackets [ ] denote some filling in by the author to aid clarification. 
 
Table 6.2: Interview research questions 
9) Are mobile phone thieves discerning or do they take any objects 
available for theft? 
10) Which phone-specific factors (if any) affect thieves’ choices? 
11) Specifically, does IMEI blacklisting deter thieves? 
12) Specifically, can iconography and semantics deter thieves? 
13) Which situational factors (if any) such as the nature of the victim, or 
the presence of witnesses, affect thieves’ choices? 
14) What level of knowledge do phone thieves have of fencing stolen 
phones, reprogramming IMEIs and making false insurance claims? 
15) Do the responses of more experienced thieves differ from those of 
less experienced thieves? 
16) Do the responses of offenders differ from those of a non-offending 
control population? 
 
Results 
The results sections below are numbered and in bold to denote research 
questions. Sub-sections are denoted by headings in bold and italics.  
 
Research question 1. Are mobile phone thieves discerning or do they take 
any objects available for theft? 
Phone specialists and generalists 
Question 72 asked participants whether, in general, they preferred to take 
phones rather than other objects. Nearly half (46%) of the 26 valid respondents 
expressed a preference for phones, implying there exists a population of mobile 
phone theft specialists. The term ‘specialist’ refers to the choice of theft object 
within acquisitive crime types, and not to ‘stability in offending types’ as used in 
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some research into criminal careers (e.g. Francis et al., 2004). The reasons 
given for preferring phones focused mainly on the financial value and the 
‘enjoyability’ of phones. For example:  
 
“[phones are] straight cash, everyone wants a new one.” 
 
“You go by the value of the phones, depends how much money you get for it.” 
 
“Newer ones are better. I always wanted the best camera [and that] for myself, 
and obviously if you’re selling it you get more money for it don’t you?”  
 
The responses to this question also highlighted that the use of a stolen phone 
was flexible: 
 
“When we was kids they were the things to have. [You’d] use them for a bit, and 
sell ’em if you needed money.” 
 
A third (34%) of offenders were generalists, reporting their choice of theft object 
depended on the situation. Money, laptops, iPods and MP3 players were 
specifically mentioned as common alternatives to phones. Five individuals 
(19%) appeared to mainly commit offences other than mobile phone theft, in 
that they preferred to take other objects instead of phones. Of these five 
respondents, two were car thieves who took phones as part of the acquisitive 
trawl, and two did not give explanations. Only one offender (0.04%) expressed 
the opinion that phones were not worth enough money to warrant the risk and 
effort of theft. This in itself is a rational choice, according to the perceptions of 
that offender. The same individual hinted at being involved in his brother’s drug 
running business. He also stated that his brother sometimes accepted phones 
as part payment for drugs, and so had some knowledge about using and 
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disposing of stolen phones. Therefore his responses are included in the 
analysis. 
 
Stated preferences 
The most direct evidence of phone-specific selection came through asking 
offenders whether they preferred to take some models of phone over others, or 
if they routinely took any phone available (Q74). Table 6.3 below shows that 
three quarters (75%; n=21) of respondents stated they would choose which 
models to take. The minority (n=6) who stated that they took anything available 
appeared to do so because phones were not their primary focus.  
 
Table 6.3: Proportion of offenders who reported they made choices between 
models. 
 
Response to “Make a choice?” Frequency Valid % 
Yes made a choice 21 75.0 
No took anything available 6 21.4 
Depends 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
 
Four respondents offered the information that they had either left, or even given 
back, phones they did not want. The action of leaving an available phone 
involves a very clear decision driven by strong preferences; the act of giving a 
phone back to a victim even more so. They provide further evidence that the 
belief that phone thieves are purely opportunistic is incorrect. 
 
“If it’s an old heap of junk I can’t be bothered with it ’cause no one wants to buy 
it. [ ] I take newer flash ones.” 
 
“[I took the] latest ones on the market, ones you could get more money for and 
stuff like that. I did leave one because it was so crap, a Nokia 402.” 
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 “I tended to take the newest ones, with cameras and MP3s [etc]. Once I 
 stopped someone and gave it back ’cause it was so shit.” 
 
Research question 2. Which phone-specific factors (if any) affect thieves’ 
choices? 
Preferences within matched pairs 
Q13 thru 24 required participants to verbalise whether, and why, they would 
prefer to take one model rather than another. Participants were shown pictures 
of six pairs of matched phones as described in Chapter 5. Comparisons of the 
aggregate strength of preferences within and between pairs are made by 
calculating a ‘preference ratio’. This is the number of offenders who chose the 
more popular model within each pair divided by the number who chose the less 
popular one. Responses of ‘Don’t know’ or ‘I would take neither’ are omitted. 
 
Table 6.4 below displays the offenders’ preference ratio for each of the six pairs. 
The strongest preference ratio is ranked at the top, with the pair eliciting the 
most split opinion at the bottom. The first column, ‘viewing order’, shows the 
order in which the pairs were presented to offenders during interview. The 
second column shows the pair name and the valid n (offenders who expressed 
a preference) within each pair. In the third column the preferred phone model is 
named on the left for each pair.  
Table 6.4: Offender preferences within 6 matched pairs of phone 
Viewing 
order 
Pair Name (n) Phone models in pair Preference 
Ratio 
1  New vs. Old (39) Nokia 6020 vs. Nokia 5110 39/39 
4 Sliders (36*) Samsung D500 vs. Nokia 7650 33/36 
5 Clamshells (39) Motorola Razr vs. Motorola 
V300 
34/39 
3 Candybars (39) Nokia 7610 vs. Nokia 6020 28/39 
6 Concepts (40**) Sony E Concept vs. Fortress 28/40 
2 Candybar Upgrade 
(32***) 
Sony E K700i vs. Sony E T630 20/32 
*= One respondent could not decide between the phones; two would take neither. 
**= One participant only cooperated and chose between the pair Concepts. 
***= Five respondents could not decide between the phones; two would take neither.  
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Figure 6.1 below visualises the strength of preference within each pair, but the 
order of the bars reflects the order of the pairs and the models as they appeared 
on the interview showcards. The results suggest that the research team’s efforts 
to randomise the placement of the phones most likely to be preferred were 
mostly successful.  
 
Figure 6.1: Phones chosen within each pair as presented to participants 
 
Figure 6.2 below shows the same results between pictures of each phone pair. 
The order of results is the same as in Table 6.4, and the preferred phone is 
shown on the left for consistency. 
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Figure 6.2: Offender preferences within 6 matched pairs of phones. 
Pair: Old Vs New 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pair: Sliders Icon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nokia 6020 vs. Nokia 5110 
39/39 
Samsung D500 vs. Nokia 7650 
33/36 
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Pair: Clamshells Icon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pair: Candy Bar Curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motorola Razr vs. Motorola V300 
34/39 
Nokia 7610 vs. Nokia 6020 
28/39 
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Pair: New Concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sony E Concept phone vs. Loughborough’s Fortress 
28/40 
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Pair: Candy Bar Upgrade 
 
 
 
 
 
    Sony E K700i vs. Sony E T630 
       
      20/32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strength and speed of preference and model familiarity 
Easily recognised and iconic models elicited stronger aggregate preference 
ratios and faster preference decisions by individuals. Pairs containing unfamiliar 
phones and closely matched phones elicited a split aggregate response, more 
‘don’t know’ responses and slower individual decisions.  
 
The strongest preference was expressed in the first pair shown, named Old vs 
New. The Nokia 6020 is clearly a more recent model than the Nokia 5110, and 
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perhaps not surprisingly all offenders chose the newer. Even here however, the 
richness of information gained from face to face interviews is exemplified. One 
offender hesitated and commented that he believed the older Nokia was no 
longer available, but that he had known someone in the past who was looking 
for such a model to use in an old car. The offender would take the older Nokia if 
he knew that person was still interested, showing flexibility in target choice and 
that he was prepared to steal to order if the opportunity arose.  
 
The two pairs eliciting the second and third strongest preference ratios each 
contained an iconic (well recognised and market leading) model. Within the pair 
Sliders, this was the Samsung D500 and within the pair Clamshells, the 
Motorola Razr. Many offenders recognised and named the iconic models, and 
made their decisions particularly quickly having recognised the model. 
Preferences for these models were due to disposability and enjoyability.  
 
“The Razr- [they’re] popular phones so you know you’ll sell ’em quick and easy.” 
 
“Its more popular, [you’d] get forty to fifty quid for the V3.” (Referring to the Razr) 
 
“The D500. You’re guaranteed seventy pounds for that []” 
 
“The D600. It’s newer than the other one, everyone’s after them.” (Misnaming 
but referring to the D500). 
 
In contrast, when pair 6 (Concepts) was presented, offenders often paused for a 
long time, verbalised their thought processes and asked questions. They were 
asked to make their choice before the interviewer explained about the phones’ 
functionality.  
 
 “I would wonder how it's going to work” (talking about the Fortress) 
 
“[Fortress] looks like it’s got more technology. Can do more things, and worth 
more money.... I dunno though, it says stolen on it.” 
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“That one [right model] looks nice, unusual. That left one- I don't even know 
what it is man.” 
 
Offenders also paused and looked at the detail of pair 2 (Candybar upgrades) 
where the Sony Ericsson K700i was visually very similar to the T630. This pair 
elicited the greatest number (n=5) of ‘Don’t know’ responses, all of which were 
due to the models being too similar to chose between.  
 
Value, functionality and ‘moderness’ 
The reasons given for the choices made within the six matched pairs were 
coded into five data-driven categories: Moderness; Functions; Form and style; 
Financial value and Other. Each category is defined below: 
 
 Moderness- words such as age, new, or modern scored a mark in this 
category 
 Functions- any mention of functionality, such as internet or a colour 
screen scored a mark in this category. 
 Form and Style- any reference to how the phone looked, such as smaller, 
slimmer, cooler, less bulky, or comments such as ‘I prefer it it looks 
better’ scored a point in this category. 
 Financial value- any mention of monetary value scored a point in this 
category. 
 Other- this category included reasons such as personal experience of the 
phone, or not being able to make a choice, or other comments which did 
not fall into the other four categories. 
 
The responses were scored by hand within SPSS™ and a random sample was 
checked for scoring consistency within the research team. The categories are 
not mutually exclusive, meaning that a sentence such as ‘That one looks new 
because its shiny, and it’s got internet’ would score one in each of the three 
categories Moderness, Functions and Form and style. 
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Figure 6.3 below shows the number of times each factor was mentioned as a 
reason for the choice made. Form and style was explicitly mentioned almost 
twice as often as Financial value, Functionality, and Moderness. Care was taken 
to only score Form and style if it was specifically mentioned. So a response 
such as ‘It looks nicer- its newer and slimmer and I prefer slimmer phones’ 
would score in both Form and style because slimness was mentioned, but also 
in Moderness. The answer ‘It’s the more up to date model so I’d get more 
money for it’ would score in Moderness and Financial value, but not in Form and 
style because although it is implicit within the explanation, specific aspects of 
form and style were not verbalised.  
 
Value, Functionality and Moderness were mentioned with almost equal 
frequency by the offenders. These all relate to the CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) 
characteristics of Value, Enjoyability and Disposability.  
 
Figure 6.3: Count of factors mentioned by offenders when choosing within six 
matched pairs of phones 
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The following section groups research questions 3,4 and 5 together because 
these are all answered by analysis of the responses to the deterrent effects of 
23 design solutions. When participants had verbalised how much they were or 
were not deterred by each deign, they were asked why, and this allowed the 
factors that they considered to be identified. This allowed quantitative ranking of 
the relative deterrent effects of the 23 designs, and qualitative descriptions of 
the choice-structuring properties of phone designs and the wider theft situation. 
 
Research question 3. Specifically, does IMEI blacklisting deter thieves? 
Research question 4. Specifically, can iconography and semantics deter 
thieves? 
Research question 5. Which situational factors (if any) such as the nature 
of the victim, or the presence of witnesses, affect thieves’ choices? 
 
Q25 thru 70 of the interview schedule asked participants to express whether 
and how much they would be put off an easy theft opportunity by 23 deterrent 
designs. The results for both offenders and students (non-offenders) are 
presented in Figure 6.4 below. Statistical test to assess whether there were 
significant differences in the responses of offenders and non-offenders are 
presented later under Research Question 7.  
 
The section below Figure 6.4 describes the reasons given by offenders for the 
deterrent effect of each design in turn. The total n of valid offender responses is 
given in brackets after the title of the design. The following section organises 
responses into phone-specific factors and the wider situational factors which 
offenders spontaneously verbalised. 
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Figure 6.4: The deterrent effect of 23 design solutions 
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Biometric phone (n=38) 
The design which was most effective in deterring offenders was a biometric 
phone, where only the user could activate the phone via their fingerprint. The 
majority of deterred offenders (n=31) spoke about not being able to use the 
phone, or it not working without the biometrics of the owner. Several mentioned 
that although they were not aware of how to bypass the technology, someone 
would be or would develop methods in time. A few offenders considered 
increasing levels of threat and violence before rejecting these options: two 
considered but rejected forcing the victim to give their fingerprint, and one stated 
that he was not prepared to cut off someone’s finger and so would not take the 
phone. One offender thought that it might be possible to use the phone if it was 
on or activated when stolen, but still decided the probability of this occurring was 
low and stated he would not take the phone. Five of the seven offenders not 
deterred by the biometric phone believed that they or someone would find a 
means to bypass the technology. One of the five also mentioned the alternative 
option of selling for parts in the event the technology could not be bypassed. 
 
Tracker phone (n=38) 
This design deterred 30 offenders. The phone was described to them as having 
a tracking device installed, meaning that its location would be known to the 
owner and the authorities. The majority of deterred offenders believed that the 
phone would be traced, although some verbalised doubts as to whether the 
police would follow up a less serious offence such as a mobile phone theft. Of 
the eight who were not deterred, four believed they could take out or bypass the 
tracking device, and four stated they would quickly sell on the phone before they 
could be traced.  
 
Disposable (n=38) and ubiquitous (n=35) phones 
The disposable phone was described as a cheap, cardboard phone which was 
designed to be disposed after a small credit limit had been reached. The 
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ubiquitous phone was described as a phone which had better functionality than 
the disposable phone, but was free to everyone since payment was for the 
services accessed on it. The offenders deterred by the disposable (n=30) and 
ubiquitous phones (n=22) all stated that the reason was the lack of resale value. 
Of those who were not deterred by the ubiquitous phone, the majority said they 
would take it just in case there were some information on the phone or the 
possibility of selling parts. Those not deterred by the disposable phone were 
mainly hopeful that they could use any credit available. 
 
Alarm on handset (n=38) and alarm on owner (n=38) 
These designs utilised proximity alarms which were located on the phone user, 
such as in a piece of jewellery. The handset alarm design activated an alarm on 
the phone handset when the handset and proximity detector were removed a 
few feet away from each other. Conversely, the alarm on owner design was 
described as an alarm sounding on a wristband or necklace worn by the phone 
owner. The alarm on the handset put off a much larger proportion of offenders 
than the alarm on the owner (57.9% vs. 13.2%) The main reason was that those 
deterred by the handset alarm did not want attention brought to themselves. The 
risk posed by an alarm being on the owner was not perceived to be as high 
because it did not identify the thief.  
 
Wristband phone (n=38) 
The wristband phone is depicted in Figure 5.6 of this thesis. Twenty offenders 
were deterred by the design, many of whom stated that they were not prepared 
to commit a robbery instead of a theft. They feared the violence of the 
immediate struggle and the increased likelihood and severity of punishment for 
such crimes.  
“[You’re] going to get a lot of struggle plus [he’s] got a spare hand to punch 
you!” 
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Those who were not deterred by the wristband design all stated that the phone 
would be worth a large amount of money, and that there would be a high 
demand for them on the black market. 
  “..love it...[I’d] knock the guy to the floor for it.” 
 
“Would be a craze to steal them: [face] needs to be flexible, so would be 
expensive. How would you talk on it though?” 
 
IMEI blacklisting immediately (n=37), at 24 hours (n=38), and 48 hours 
(n=38). 
Offenders had already been informed of the blacklisting process towards the 
start of the interviews and were reminded of this during these questions. The 
deterrence value of blacklisting increased if it was immediate compared to at 24 
or 48 hours, but it still deterred only 40.5% of offenders. Only 18.4% of 
offenders were deterred by blacklisting at 24 hours and at 48 hours. Table 6.5 
below depicts the reasons for offenders not being deterred by blacklisting at 
different time periods. Although the sample size is small, this analysis shows 
that selling phones on quickly, and reprogramming the IMEIs were both key 
reasons for not being deterred by blacklisting that was not immediate. The belief 
that phones could be reprogrammed was the main reason for immediate 
blacklisting not being a deterrent. The analysis only includes responses where a 
reason was given for the non-deterrence. 
 216 
 
Table 6.5: Reasons why offenders were not deterred by blacklisting at 48hrs, 24 
hrs and immediately 
 
Blacklisting time period 
Reason not deterred 
48 hrs 
(n=27) 
24 hrs 
(n=24) 
Immediate 
(n=16) 
Sell quickly 55.6 54.2 0.0 
Reprogramme 18.5 16.7 50.0 
Mix of options 14.8 25.0 25.0 
Sell parts 7.4 0.0 18.8 
Sell abroad 3.7 4.2 6.3 
Total % of non deterred 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% of all offenders who were 
put off 18.42 18.42 40.54 
Reprogramming with ease (n=38), or with difficulty (n=34) 
Offenders were asked whether the fact that a phone would be blacklisted would 
deter them if they had a friend who could reprogramme it (‘unblocking easy’), 
and if the chips inside the phone needed changing, which made ‘unblocking’ 
difficult. Only four offenders were deterred at all if they knew someone who 
could circumvent the blacklisting, whereas 16 were deterred if the IMEI chip had 
to be replaced. Those not deterred by the more difficult reprogramming (n=18) 
almost all stated that they would sell the phone for parts, still get round the chip 
themselves, or in one case, try to sell on the blacklisted phone.  
 
Camera, MP3 (n=34) 
Offenders were asked about the deterrent effect of a securely blacklisted phone 
which would still work as a camera and/or MP3 player. Once this was 
suggested, it decreased the proportion deterred by immediate blacklisting from 
40.5% (n=15) to 29.4% (n=10). This suggests that not all of the offenders had 
spontaneously considered the use or resale value of the phone parts. Those 
who were deterred did not believe the effort and risk of crime commission was 
worth having a phone with only partial functionality.  
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People watching (n=32) 
The concept of people watching a phone theft only deterred eight offenders. 
Those who were deterred believed that the watching public might intervene, or 
act later as witnesses. Some offenders had been caught by being recognised, 
and would not risk it again. The main reasons for non-deterrence were that 
offenders believed they could carry out the offence quickly and deftly; that the 
public were unlikely to intervene; or in a few cases, that the need for money 
would override the risk posed by the public. 
 
“I've done it in the past- people are too scared to do anything.” 
 
“If they were proper looking at the phone it might [put me off].Not really if I could 
get away with it.” 
Headset (n=33) 
Offenders were asked whether the sight of a headset, implying the presence of 
a phone hidden on the owner, would deter them from theft. Eighteen of the 
offenders were not deterred by this design. Most of them stated they were 
prepared to force the victim to give up the phone, but that this depended on the 
value of the phone. Those who were deterred (n=15) were put off by the risk of 
escalation of the offence to a more violent and serious one, or they were 
unhappy with not being certain of the phone’s location on the victim. 
 
 “If I wanted it I'd get it, you get me. I'd get his bag or pockets or summat.” 
 
“You might get into a fight and that, and that's stupid (get longer sentence, get 
punched.) Not worth it for a £30 phone.” 
 
Symbol explained (n=39) and unexplained (n=39) 
The Eye of Horus was shown to offenders with no explanation of its meaning, 
and then again after explaining that it meant that the phone would not work once 
reported stolen. This symbol is presented in Figure 5.4 of this thesis. Almost ten 
percent of offenders (n=4) were deterred by the symbol in the absence of any 
explanation. The reasons they gave were that it looked odd and might make 
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them suspicious, or that it would decrease resale value. Once the meaning of 
the symbol was explained, the deterrent effect was roughly equal to that of 
immediate blacklisting, suggesting that well publicised symbolism can affect 
offenders’ choices.    
 
Chain (n=38) 
Offenders were shown a picture of a Lanyard chain (Figure 5.5 of this thesis). 
Only a third (n=13) were deterred by this. Of the 25 who were not deterred, eight 
believed that the chain would make a snatch and run robbery more easy: the 
chain identified the presence of a phone and would probably snap. Others 
stated they would be prepared to escalate the level of threat or violence, 
depending on the value of the phone. Those who were deterred believed that 
the chain would not snap, or they were not prepared to escalate the threat of 
violence necessary to obtain the phone.  
 
Face stamp (n=39), name stamp (n=39), IMEI stamp (n=38) and name 
written on (n=39) 
Each of these four designs aimed to individualise the handset and signify 
ownership. In general, stamps had a greater deterrent effect than the written 
name, but none of the designs deterred a high proportion of offenders. The 
offenders deterred by the face stamp (n=15) reported that the face would 
decrease how ‘cool’ the phone was, decreasing personal enjoyability and resale 
value. Several mentioned that it also implied a young owner, and therefore a 
childish phone. Those who were not deterred by the face stamp, IMEI stamp 
and name written on the phones all stated that they would be able to remove the 
stamp or name, and use or sell the phone anyway. Those not deterred by the 
IMEI stamp (n=33) believed the police would rarely if ever check the IMEI. Most 
offenders believed they could wash or scratch off a written name.  
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Keypad PIN (n=37) 
The keypad PIN, where the phone was protected by a 4 digit PIN code, was the 
least effective deterrent. Only one offender was deterred. Many offenders 
almost sneered at this idea. Most stated that it was commonly known that PINs 
could be reset and therefore there would be an easy and cheap way round this 
protection.  
 
Key factors emerging from the 23 deterrent designs 
This section highlights the key factors which offenders consider in relation to 
phone theft. It builds on the previous section by using further quotes from the 
offenders to demonstrate repeated themes from the interviews. The factors are 
represented in a rational choice event model for mobile phone thieves in Figure 
6.5 below. This is based on the event model for burglary of an urban middle 
class area depicted in Clarke and Cornish (1985), which is reproduced as 
Figure 2.2 of this thesis.  
 
Level of violence 
Some offenders were deterred by the possibility of increased violence. Common 
reasons for being deterred were an increased risk of injury from a defensive 
victim, or of an offence escalating to a more violent one and thus having greater 
potential repercussions:  
 
“Its like robbery- [you’re] risking physical damage”. 
 
 “Street robbery is serious. I’m not like that.” 
 
“How would you get it off them? It turns into a robbery not a theft.” 
 
Several offenders stated that they would make a judgement depending on the 
victim’s physicality. The presence of co-offenders was also sometimes 
considered.  
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“Depends- if I thought I could have ’em” 
 
One offender’s verbal protocol revealed his immediate thoughts of how to 
remove the wristband phone- either by sliding the phone off or taking the 
person’s wrist off. He then decided that it was probably not worth the risk 
because in a struggle ‘people see you and that, you get me?’ The Lanyard chain 
resulted in similar considerations of increased risk of harm and prosecution: 
 
“It makes a scene, like when the D500 first came out I pushed a guy and it led to 
a fight, and I got done for common assault.” 
 
“[That’s] the same as the necklace idea- I don’t want a struggle.” 
 
 
Typical statements from those who considered violence and decided it worth 
their while are below. These relate to the Lanyard chain. 
 
“If I was going to rob someone I’d bang them to the floor and rip it off. [Done this 
before] ..If you punch someone to the floor you’ve got all the time to get it.” 
 
“[The chain] can just be ripped off” 
 
“I’d still go for them- [it’s] easy to grab the chain, pull it and run off.” 
 
It is difficult to assess the accuracy of any claims made by offenders that they 
would escalate violence levels. On one hand, an element of bravado may be 
involved, with interview participants wishing to ‘impress’ the interviewer (Walsh, 
1994). However, participants might also not have wished to appear to be violent 
to the interviewer if they believed the interviewer would not see this as normal 
behaviour (Milne and Bull, 1999). This may have resulted in the effects of 
‘maximisers’ and ‘minimisers’ cancelling each other out (Indermaur, 1996). 
Either way what is clear is that the need to use force and the associated risks of 
physical harm and of more serious judicial repercussions are key factors 
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considered by mobile phone thieves when assessing potential theft 
opportunities.  
 
Figure 6.5: Rational choice event model for mobile phone theft 
 
 
(Adapted from Cornish and Clarke, 1985)  
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Monetary value 
Financial value was mentioned in many offenders’ responses to the deterrence 
designs. The following answers were given when considering the wristband 
phone, which looked modern and technologically advanced: 
 
“As soon as they came out they’d be a target them would.” 
 
“...would be worth loads of money....You’d get loads for it.” 
 
“If a phone like that was worth a lot, [it’d] put me off a little but on the other hand 
it’d cause a scene. Not worth it, causing attention.” 
 
 
Counter moves in the arms race 
Many of the offenders who were not deterred by technological issues such as 
IMEI blacklisting, PIN codes, alarms and tracking devices believed that they 
would find a way round the problem. Others said that if they did not already 
know someone who had the solution, they were confident that they soon would. 
This exemplifies the presence of ‘flaw hunters’ (Walsh, 1986) and the cause of 
the ongoing arms race between offenders and designers (Ekblom, 2008). It 
demonstrates why stagnation in innovation will result in increased theft levels.  
 
“There's a way round everything. There's always someone out there who knows 
a way around it.” 
 
Others were already familiar with the design suggested and a possible counter 
move. When asked why he was not deterred by the tracking phone, one 
offender responded: 
 
“Cos like cars you’d leave ‘em parked up and see if they're really tracked” (see if 
someone comes along to retrieve it). “But if you sell it quicktime it doesn't really 
matter.” 
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Another immediately considered how feasible the design suggestion was in 
terms of production costs and police response. The response is further clear 
evidence that offenders’ decision making processes fit with a rational choice 
perspective, and suggests that offenders would be ideal for evaluating product 
vulnerability and security in schemes such as Project MARC (Armitage and 
Pease, 2008b) and as suggested by Clarke and Newman (2005: Chapter 6).  
  
“I doubt they’d make them in the first place, they cost too much, plus the police 
wouldn't spend time tracking..... too many phones are taken.” 
 
Public watching 
Offenders were asked outright about the deterrent effect of a watching public, 
but this was also a factor mentioned spontaneously in many answers. Hence it 
is briefly considered again here. The majority of offenders not deterred by the 
public believed the public would not intervene. Several who were deterred 
believed that the public might intervene, or that they might be able to identify the 
offenders later. The hypothetical scenario describing the presence or absence 
of members of the public may be too simplistic: many of the offenders stated 
that the nature and density of the public crowd would affect their choices.  
 
“It depends- if I know the people, then yes it’d put me off, if I don't know the 
people, it doesn't put you off.” 
 
“I can be quick, and also busy places make [you] less obvious.” 
 
 224 
 
Research question 6. What level of knowledge do phone thieves have of 
fencing stolen phones, reprogramming IMEIs and making false insurance 
claims? 
Reprogramming IMEIs 
Reprogramming knowledge was measured by two means: firstly by asking 
offenders to describe what they meant by reprogramming, and secondly by 
assessing whether offenders spontaneously considered reprogramming when 
verbalising their reactions to the 23 designs 
 
Nearly two thirds (61%) of offenders claimed to know about reprogramming 
when asked directly. Just over half (51%) were categorised as knowledgeable 
about IMEI reprogramming according to analysis of responses to the 23 
deterrent designs. This is one of the few factors which could be assessed for 
exaggeration, and the scale of exaggeration is not particularly large  
 
Fencing stolen goods 
Offenders were asked directly whether, and how they sold on any phones they 
stole in Q91 and 92 of the questionnaire. Table 6.6 below displays who bought 
phones from the 20 offenders who reported regularly selling stolen phones. The 
majority of offenders sold to fences such as friends who knew local shops to sell 
to, or another distributor. The shops mentioned were always small, local shops 
and not large chains. Phones were sometimes swapped for goods but mostly 
sold for cash. Four offenders mentioned people or groups that they recognised 
as local fences, and commonly identified them by their ethnicity and not name, 
perhaps signifying the tenuous nature of their relationship with the fences. 
Several offenders knew what later happened to the phones: those sold to shops 
were sold in the shops, while those sold to friends were distributed to friends, 
relatives and other fences. Most offenders did not know whether the fences 
altered the phones before selling them on. One offender mentioned phones 
regularly being sold abroad. Only seven knew about the prices charged by 
 225 
 
fences for stolen phones, and five said that the price was only just below the 
price in a legal shop. The offenders were paid approximately half to three 
quarters of this resale value for the phones they provided, and the value was 
lower if the handsets were blocked.  
 
Table 6.6: Who bought phones from the offenders  
Sold to Count Notes 
Friend 6 Most friends were in fact local fences 
Shop 8 Mostly local small shops 
Market etc 4 
‘Chinese men on the market’; 'the DVD guy'; ‘the Bosnians who were 
always on the corner’. 
Other 2 Drug dealing brother; anyone in need of a phone. 
Total 20   
 
 
False insurance claims 
Twenty eight offenders responded to the question of whether or not they would 
consider filing a false insurance claim. Sixteen (57%) said that they would or 
had done so, and twelve said they would not. This proportion is higher than that 
estimated by Tilley et al., (2004), and may reflect either the higher likelihood of 
offenders defrauding the system than the general population, or that the sample 
in these interviews exaggerated their readiness to commit illegal acts in the 
absence of real consequences (Carroll and Weaver,1986). 
 
Research question 7. Do the responses of more experienced thieves differ 
from those of less experienced thieves?  
In order to identify any differences in offender responses resulting from 
experience, the offenders were categorised into two data-driven groups, named 
‘experts’ and ‘novices’. The groups were based on the three categories relating 
to the crime continuance model of the rational choice perspective (Clarke and 
Cornish, 1985). These are professionalism (skill sets and fencing contacts); life 
style changes (justification for offending behaviour, or the absence of 
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consideration for victims); and peer networks (knowledge of other offenders and 
people who could by-pass security technology). The two groups were defined as 
below. There were a total of 16 experts and 24 novices. 
 
 Experts: those who stated that they specialised in taking only mobile 
phones; had taken over 40 phones; had good or reasonable knowledge 
about IMEI reprogramming and SIM blocking; and had several contacts 
who they could sell to.  
 Novices: those who stated that they sometimes took other objects along 
with phones; had taken fewer than 40 phones; and had limited 
understanding of IMEI and SIM technology. They tended to have limited 
options for selling on, and some reported receiving less money for their 
stolen goods than experts reported. 
 
Variation in matched pair choices by experience 
The preference ratios of experts, novices and all offenders were compared. 
Table 6.7 below shows that experts and novices always preferred the same 
phone within a pair. Fisher’s exact test was used to assess whether there was 
significant difference in the choices made by novices compared to experts, 
because in most cases the expected cell count was less than five. None of the 
pairs resulted in a significant difference between novice and more expert 
thieves. Experts have stronger preference ratios for the pairs New vs. Old and 
Sliders. Only novices said they would ever leave both of a pair, suggesting they 
are slightly more easily deterred than experts. Novices expressed a slightly 
stronger preference ratio within the pair Candybar Upgrade, but this may be in 
part due to the low number of novices making that choice (nearly 20 precent 
either did not make a choice or said they would leave both). Not all offenders 
answered every question: all data shown below are of those who provided an 
answer.  
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Table 6.7: Comparing preference ratios between Experts and Novices 
 
    
 
Preference ratios 
 Pair Novices  Experts  P-value 
New vs. Old 24/24 14/14 NA 
Sliders 21/23 11/12 1.000 
Clamshells 21/24 13/14 1.000 
Candybars 17/24 10/14 1.000 
Concepts 18/24 10/14 1.000 
CandyBarUpgrade 14/20 7/12 0.703 
     
Analysis of the factors mentioned by experts and by novices when choosing 
between models revealed that experts mentioned value more frequently than 
did novices. The two groups mentioned other factors in similar proportions, 
although novices were slightly more likely to mention functionality and 
moderness. Figure 6.6 below displays the proportion of choices in which each 
factor or choice-structuring property was mentioned by both groups. The results 
fit well with an explanation that experts consider resale value more frequently 
than do novices. Experience appears to lead to established cognitive scripts, 
where increased familiarity with different models allows experts to more quickly 
judge the key variable of interest, resale value, while by-passing the need to 
specifically assess functionality and moderness.  
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Figure 6.6: The proportion of expert and novice decisions in which five choice-
structuring properties were mentioned 
 
 
Variation in the deterrent effect of 23 designs with experience 
Figure 6.7 below compares the percentage of novices and of experts deterred 
by each of the 23 designs solutions. The results show that in general, experts 
were less easily deterred than novices. However, Fischer’s exact tests revealed 
that none of the design solutions elicited significantly different responses 
between novices and experts. On average across the 23 designs, 37.1percent 
of novices were deterred and 33.3 percent of experts were deterred. The 
numbers in each category are relatively low (a maximum of 16 experts and 24 
novices for each design solution). The average difference in deterrent effect did 
not reach statistical significance (two sample t(37)= 0.63, p>0.5). However, the 
verbalised reasons for deterrence are worth exploration and are described 
below Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7: The percentage of novices and experts deterred by 23 design 
solutions 
 
Note: maximum (n) novices=24; maximum (n) experts=16 
Note: none of the results were significantly different (Fisher’s exact test) 
 231 
 
Experts were not as deterred as novices by difficult unblocking; an alarm on the 
handset; blacklisting after any amount of time; and by people watching. Experts 
were in part defined as experts because of their awareness of security 
circumvention techniques such as reprogramming to overcome blacklisting. It is 
therefore predictable that they were not deterred as much as novices by 
blacklisting. Their opinions about the watching public are, however, interesting. 
Experts were more likely to state that the likelihood of the general public 
intervening were very slim, and this was also why the alarm on a handset was 
not as worrying to them as it was to novices. 
 
For two of the designs, the ubiquitous phone and the phone with a name stamp, 
resale value was explicitly mentioned as the reason why experts were deterred 
more than novices. Experts were more likely to state that it was not worth their 
while to take these designs because of low resale values. This fits with the 
concept of increased skills and experience leading to more discerning decisions 
by experts, while novices might still be experimenting and ‘try anything once’. 
 
Research question 8. Do the responses of offenders differ from those of a 
non-offending control population? 
Comparing demographics of offenders and non-offenders 
Comparing differences between offender and non-offender samples was only 
meaningful if the socio-demographics of the samples did not vary significantly. 
Significant demographic variation between the two groups would mean that any 
differences in responses might be due to these factors rather than the offender/ 
non-offender categorisation. The socio-demographics collected for all 
participants were age range, ethnicity and geographic region of abode.  
 
Offenders and non-offenders were closely matched on age: 75 percent of 
students and 77 percent of offenders were aged between 16 to 20 years. A 
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Mann Whitney U test confirmed there was no significant difference in age 
groups between offenders and non-offenders (U=879; p=0.803). 
 
There was greater variation in the geographic area of abode in the student 
sample compared to offenders. Whereas 97.5 percent of offenders came from 
the East Midlands, only 60 percent of students resided in the area. However the 
difference in regions was not significant (U=824.5, p= 0.497).  
 
There was a significant difference between the ethnicity of the student and 
offender groups (U= 695, p=0.029). Specifically, the proportion of students who 
were white was larger than that of offenders. Table 6.8 below displays the 
ethnicity of students and offenders, aggregated to broad ethnicity categories.  
 
Table 6.8: Ethnicity of student and offender interview participants 
 
Student 
(%) 
Offender 
(%) 
White 88.6 67.5 
Mixed 9.1 12.5 
Asian 0.0 15.0 
Black 0.0 5.0 
Chinese 2.3 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Taken together, these results suggest there is merit in comparing the results of 
offenders with non-offenders. Any differences observed are not likely to be 
attributed to age, nor are they likely to be attributed to area of abode. Any 
differences between offender and non-offender responses may be attributable in 
part to ethnicity. Differences will never be conclusively attributable to the 
offender/ non-offender categories, because a wide range of other variables exist 
which might explain any differences observed. A key factor is the fact that the 
majority of students were design students, as opposed to students from a 
broader range of disciplines. Future research should investigate whether design 
students are more or less able to ‘think thief’ than students studying other 
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subjects. It is not possible to control for any of the recorded demographic 
variables, including ethnicity, in the analysis presented below. Larger sample 
sizes would allow multivariate analysis to control for between group similarities, 
as used by Bouffard (2008) to control for age differences between groups.  
 
Students and offender choices within six matched phone pairs 
On aggregate, students chose the same phone models within each of the six 
pairs as did offenders. However, the strength of the student and offender 
preference ratios differed. Table 6.9 below displays the preference ratios for 
students and offenders for each of the six pairs. The final column indicates the 
strength of the difference in the preferences expressed by students and by 
offenders by dividing the student preference ratio with the offender preference 
ratio. The word ‘all’ is used in place of the symbol for infinity when all individuals 
in a group chose one model in a phone pair.  
 
Table 6.9: Comparing student and offender preference ratios within 6 matched 
pairs of phones. 
 
Viewing 
order 
Pair Name (n) Offenders Students Significant? 
1  New vs. Old 39/39 43/43 NA 
4** Sliders  33/36 25/41 9.714 (p=0.002) 
5* Clamshells  34/39 33/34 NA    (p=0.363) 
3** Candybars  28/39 29/39 0.076 (p=0.799) 
6** Concepts  28/40 38/40 8.658 (p=0.003) 
2* Candybar 
Upgrade 
20/32 23/39 0.333 (p=0.566) 
*Fisher’s exact test 
** Chi-squared test 
 
The results indicate that the students are reasonable predictors of offenders’ 
choices, because the same model was always preferred regardless of offending 
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status, but there are important differences between offender and non-offender 
preferences. For the pairs Sliders and Candybar Upgrades, students expressed 
a weaker preference than did offenders. The students’ preference for the iconic 
Samsung D500 model in the pair sliders was almost ten times weaker (0.13) 
than that of the offenders’. Students’ preferences within the pairs Clamshells, 
Candybars and Concepts were stronger than offenders’ preferences. For the 
pair Clamshells, students preference was nearly four (3.77) times as strong as 
offenders’ preferences. For the pair Concepts, the students’ preferences were 
eight times stronger than offenders’.  
This result has important implications about the suitability of non-offenders as 
assessors of crime risk in new products despite the fact the for this sample, 
differences did not reach statistical significance. In the pair Concepts, student-
predicted theft numbers for the preferred phone, the Sony Ericsson Concept 
phone, would be much higher than real theft numbers if offender preferences 
are a reasonable predictor of real-world theft patterns. The section below 
describes an exploratory analysis to assess whether either offenders or 
students preferences were similar to the theft patterns observed in police-
recorded crime data. 
 
Comparing the hypothetical choices to real-world theft patterns 
The ideal way to assess how accurately student or offender choices reflected 
real-world theft choices was to compare offender and student preference ratios 
with the police-recorded theft risk for specific models of phone. Thus exploratory 
analysis was carried out to see if any validation of offender and student 
preference ratios was possible using the data available from the National Mobile 
Phone Crime Unit. For four of the models of phone chosen in the six matched 
pairs presented at interview, a real-world theft risk ratio has been calculated as 
part of the 2006 Mobile Phone Theft Index. The Index is described in Chapter 8 
of this thesis. A direct comparison between the preference ratios and the Index 
theft risk is not appropriate, because the two ratios do not assess comparable 
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choices. Preference ratios are a function of preference within a forced choice in 
a hypothetical scenario. The Index risk ratio is a function of preferences 
between many available phone models in real-world offences, and limited to 
NMPCU recorded crime data. What can be assessed is whether there is 
agreement between the relative risk of theft among the four models for which 
data are available. 
 
Table 6.10 below compares the relative risk of theft for four models of phone 
according to three sources: the offender preference ratio; the 2006 Index risk 
ratio and the student preference ratio. The relative risk is depicted in the final 
three columns of Table 6.10 and compares the theft risk of the four models of 
phone, indexed to the risk for the Nokia 7610 (on the first row)2.  
 
Table 6.10: Comparing student and offender preference ratios with risk of theft 
according to police recorded data 
     
Relative risk 
Pair 
Phone 
model 
Offender 
preference 
ratio 
Index 
risk 
ratio 
Student 
preference 
ratio Offender 
 Risk 
Index Student 
Candybars 
Nokia 
7610 2.5 1.2 2.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Clamshells 
Motorola 
Razr 9.0 1.5 33.0 3.6 1.2 11.4 
Sliders 
Samsung 
D500 11.5 4.2 1.5 4.6 3.5 0.5 
Candybar 
Upgrade 
Sony 
K700i 1.9 1.3 1.5 0.8 1.1 0.5 
 
The results show that offender preferences were more closely matched to the 
strength of preference displayed in police recorded theft data, than were the 
preferences of students. Thus the offender preference ratios implied that the 
                                                          
2
 The comparison of ‘predicted’ and police recorded theft risk is only possible for four models from the 
six matched pairs of phones. The pair Concepts were not available to buy and so were not reflected in 
police recorded data, and the older Nokia in the pair New vs Old was not present in the police recorded 
data.  
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Motorola Razr was 3.6 times more at risk of theft than the Nokia 7610, and the 
Samsung D500 was 4.6 times more at risk than the Nokia 7610. Student 
responses predicted a theft risk 11.4 times greater for the Motorola Razr than 
for the Nokia 7610. Police recorded data (in the column titled Risk Index) show 
that aggregate theft patterns in 2006 in the Greater London area reveal a theft 
risk 1.2 times greater for the Razr; 3.5 times greater for the D500; and 1.1 times 
greater for the K700i than the Nokia 7610. 
 
Students failed to predict the real-world strength of preference for the Samsung 
D500, but overestimated the strength of preference for the Motorola Razr. In 
contrast, the offender assessment of theft risk more closely matched the relative 
risk according to police data, implying that they are better placed to predict theft 
patterns than are non-offenders. Although the sample size is relatively small, 
these results suggest that those wishing to predict the vulnerability of electronic 
products to theft should consult the relative offending group for their opinions.  
 
The section below describes the main differences in student and offender 
deterrence from theft by the 23 designs. The section concludes with some 
qualitative differences in offender and non-offender responses in an attempt to 
identify some of the reasons for the differences between the preference ratios of 
the two groups, and why offenders were more accurate ‘predictors’ of relative 
theft risk than non-offenders.  
 
Differences in the deterrent effects of the 23 designs 
Figure 6.4 above visually displays the higher deterrent effect that most designs 
had on students compared to offenders. The average deterrence rate across the 
23 designs was 58 percent for students, compared to just 36 percent for 
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offenders. The difference in the percentage of students and offenders deterred 
by the 23 designs was significant (two-sample t (82)= 6.5, p<0.001)3.  
 
Table 6.11 below explores for which deterrent designs there was a significant 
difference between student and offender responses. The calculations are based 
on the percentage of offenders and student either put of a lot, or completely, by 
each design. For 2 by 2 tables where any expected cell count was less than 5, 
Fischer’s exact test has been used in place of Chi-squared. The key to Table 
6.11 shows which test was used for each design solution tested.  
 
                                                          
3
 Appendix 6.1 displays the histograms exploring the distribution of deterrence among offenders and 
students: both groups approximated to a normal distribution and so a parametric test for difference was 
used. 
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Table 6.11 Testing for significant differences between student and offender 
deterrence in response to the 23 design solutions 
 
 
Percent deterred 
   
Design solution Non-offender Offenders 
Chi-
squared p value Significant? 
Unblocking easy* 2.381 10.526 - 0.185 No 
Symbol unexplained* 9.091 10.256 - 1.000 No 
Blocked 48 hrs** 25.581 18.421 0.598 0.439 No 
Name written on** 27.273 7.692 5.354 0.021 No 
Keypad PIN** 29.545 2.703 10.130 0.001 No 
Alarm on owner** 31.818 13.158 3.988 0.046 No 
Alarm on handset** 45.455 57.895 1.263 0.261 No 
IMEI stamp** 51.163 13.158 13.112 <0.001 Yes 
Blocked 24 hrs** 51.163 18.421 8.251 0.004 No 
Camera, MP3** 61.364 29.412 7.853 0.005 No 
Headset** 63.636 45.455 2.528 0.112 No 
Chain** 66.667 34.211 8.411 0.004 No 
Face stamp** 68.182 38.462 7.357 0.007 No 
Unblocking difficult** 69.767 47.059 4.071 0.044 No 
Name stamp** 70.455 20.513 20.702 <0.001 Yes 
Wristband phone** 75.000 52.632 4.463 0.035 No 
Blocked 
immediately** 77.273 40.541 11.347 <0.001 Yes 
Ubiquitous phone* 79.070 62.857 2.505 0.114 No 
People watching** 79.545 25.000 22.436 <0.001 Yes 
Disposable phone** 79.545 78.947 0.004 0.947 No 
Symbol explained** 85.714 43.590 15.865 <0.001 Yes 
Tracker** 88.372 78.947 1.330 0.249 No 
Owner biometrics* 97.727 81.579 - 0.022 No 
Note: df for each calculation is (1) as only 2 by 2 tables were used. 
*= Fischer’s exact test 
**= Chi-squared test 
 
In all, five designs elicited significantly different theft deterrence in students 
compared to offenders. In all cases, students were more easily deterred than 
offenders. These were: IMEI stamp, people watching, name stamp, immediate 
blacklisting and the Eye of Horus symbol explained. The reasons for greater 
deterrence among students can be grouped into four themes: an increased 
tendency to report guilt compared to offenders; a lack of focus on the financial 
resale value of the phone; a lack of knowledge of ways to circumvent security 
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technology (such as reprogramming IMEIs); and finally evidence that a small 
number of students ‘got into character’ as they progressed through the task and 
did not produce consistent answers. Each of these four themes is explored 
further below.  
 
Observations on comments made by students and offenders: 
Students were not ready or experienced offenders (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). 
On aggregate they had not considered phone theft as a viable behavioural 
option. Thus when faced with the hypothetical scenarios of the questionnaire, 
they omitted some of the situational factors considered by offenders, and gave 
different weight to various factors when compared with offenders. Furthermore, 
they displayed the absence of knowledge or belief in the ability to work around 
proposed design solutions, and/or a stronger belief than offenders that society 
would work against the thief: i.e. that police would check IMEIs and that the 
public would intervene if they observed a theft occurring.  
 
Students spontaneously mentioned guilt as a deterrent factor relatively 
frequently, whereas this was never mentioned by offenders. This explains why 
students were more deterred than offenders by personalisation such as the 
name or face stamps. Offenders tended to be deterred only if they believed the 
personalisation detracted from the kudos or resale value of the phone. Thus 
more students were deterred by the name stamp than offenders, and the 
difference reached significance (p<0.001, Fischer’s exact test), presumably 
because of a combination of lack of knowledge about the possibility of removing 
the name stamp, and mention of guilt. Interestingly, the face stamp did not elicit 
a significantly different deterrent effect when comparing offenders with students, 
presumably because offenders were similarly deterred by the high level of 
personalisation communicated by a face. The IMEI stamp deterred significantly 
more students than offenders (see Table 6.11 above). The reasons mentioned 
by students for deterrence were that they believed the stamp could aid checking 
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by authorities and owners. In contrast, offenders mentioned more often than 
students that they did not believe police would actually check IMEIs. The 
presence of the public watching elicited a significantly stronger deterrent effect 
in students than in offenders. The key reason was that students believed the 
public might intervene, while more offenders did not. Similarly, experience 
gained by the offenders meant they were less deterred by the idea of immediate 
blacklisting than were students. The key reason was that offenders believed 
they might still sell the phone for parts, or find a work around to the blacklisting 
and still gain either personal usage or monetary value from the sale of the 
phone.  
 
Overall, financial motivations for theft were clearly lacking in the student 
responses: most of their considerations were about the implications that design 
solutions would have on personal use, not on resale or parts markets. This may 
reflect in part the focus of their studies at University on design issues. Thus an 
interesting comparison group would be students studying economics, business 
or another financially focused topic. Students were also more likely to specify 
being put off by ‘effort’ and ‘hassle’ than were offenders.  
 
The inexperience of students in phone theft was exemplified by their ignorance 
of the option to reprogramme IMEIs to circumvent blacklisting. This was despite 
the fact that the process had been explained at the start of the interview. In 
addition, most students were unaware that they could get a phone unblocked 
from a keypad lock at market stalls for minimal cost. Thus they were more easily 
deterred by the technological designs which deterred fewer novice offenders, 
and even fewer expert offenders. 
 
There is a risk that one or two of students ‘got into character’ as the paper and 
pen exercise of assessing the 23 design solutions progressed. Towards the end 
of the assessment of the designs, comments such as ‘it might be worth a go’ 
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appeared more often in the responses of two students. In contrast, at the start of 
the assessment many students explicitly expressed the absence of standing 
decisions to offend (‘its just not how I’ve been brought up’). It is unlikely that this 
shift dramatically affected the overall results, but it does demonstrate that future 
research should clarify and repeat throughout any testing process whether non-
offenders are answering as themselves, or imagining that they are a thief. If 
these results were repeated in larger samples, they might suggest that even 
imagined theft experience alters the balance of perceived effort, reward and risk 
in individuals. 
 
Last recalled offence 
There is a considerable amount of information available from the offender 
interviews and non-offender paper and pen exercises, and the results presented 
above have focused on those most pertinent to the rational choice event model. 
Offenders were also asked to describe the last offence they could remember 
committing, in order to assess some of the characteristics which have been 
assessed in previous research into decision-making (e.g. evidence of planning, 
factors affecting target selection, and motivations for theft). Many of these 
characteristics have been accounted for in the event-specific model (Figure 6.5) 
or discussed in relation to increased experience and continuance.  
  
Other characteristics assessed described the modus operandi and target choice 
for the last remembered offence. 25 offenders gave some details of their last 
offence. The largest proportion of phones were taken in robberies (48%), 16 
percent when the phone was unattended, and 12 percent in burglaries. The 
majority of last recalled phone thefts were committed against strangers (88.5%). 
The proportion of reported thefts involving robbery are considerably higher than 
Home Office recorded figures (Hoare, 2007), highlighting the tendency of more 
dramatic events to be remembered, and perhaps that more serious offences will 
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be prosecuted (the offender sample were, after all, incarcerated or under parole 
supervision). 
Twenty offenders gave reasons for taking the phone during their last recalled 
offence, and the majority of responses showed little evidence of planning. 
Phones were taken most frequently because they were available (especially if 
unattended), or part of the acquisitive trawl in burglaries. However, half of the 10 
robberies described could be viewed as prompted (Wortley, 1997) by the sight 
of the phone as exemplified by the reasons given for robbery below: 
 
 “The K750 was a good phone. Did it out of habit....bit stoned and drunk.” 
 
 “I knew it’d sell right away.....changed my mind from a till snatch to the 
 phone ‘cause it was easier” 
 
 “Because I liked it.” 
 
Although the sample size is small, these results lend support to the assertion 
that phone thefts are sometimes deliberately targeted at specific models which 
‘incite’ a theft, and others are taken as part of the acquisitive trawl. Even so, 
those taken in acquisitive trawls are likely to be taken only if they are valuable, 
an aspect which appears to be judged according to moderness and 
functionality.  
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The headline conclusion to be drawn from the interviews with 40 mobile phone 
thieves is that mobile phone thieves display rationality in target selection. 
Approximately half of the offenders interviewed state that they specialise in 
taking phones rather than other objects such as iPods. The choice-structuring 
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properties of phone models and some properties of the wider theft situation are 
summarised in Figure 6.5 above. 
 
The choice-structuring properties of mobile phones can be summarised as 
resale value and personal enjoyability, which are assessed via the visual cues 
of moderness and functionality. The choice-structuring properties of the wider 
theft situation include the likelihood of victim retaliation, personal injury and 
public interception.  
 
Familiarity with phone models elicits stronger and faster preferences when 
offenders choose between matched phone pairs. This implies that models with 
more aggressive marketing strategies and those seen in everyday use will be 
chosen preferentially by thieves. Furthermore, analysis of the motivations for 
offenders’ last recalled offence shows that the sight of a desirable phone can act 
as a prompt (Wortley, 1997) to initiate a theft act.  
 
The deterrent effects of 23 designs vary between offenders and non-offenders, 
and between novice and expert offenders. However, only five design solutions 
result in a significantly different proportion of students and offenders being 
deterred. The key reasons for the difference in deterrence appear to be that 
students are not as financially motivated as offenders; they are less persistent; 
they are less aware of alternative markets (for example the market for parts) 
and they are less aware of technological workarounds (for example 
reprogramming IMEIs). They also have more faith than do offenders in the 
effectiveness of the police and society in intervening in crime events. 
 
The designs which deter the largest proportion of offenders are those which 
reduce the resale value of the phone effectively (the ubiquitous phone and the 
disposable phone) and those which employ reasonably advanced technology 
(the biometrically protected phone and the tracked phone). Experts were less 
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likely to ‘bother’ with the disposable and ubiquitous phones than were novices, 
suggesting that experts might rely more on prior knowledge of model usability 
and disposability than do novices. 
 
Different handsets are at varying risk of theft, and theft risk varies over time. 
Hypothetical scenarios presented to offenders during interviews led to 
measurable group preferences within six matched pairs of phones. The 
strongest preference ratio within a pair was 100 percent, where all offenders 
chose the Nokia 6010 over the older and larger Nokia 5110. The pair which 
elicited a split opinion among the sample consisted of the Sony Ericsson K700i 
and its incremental upgrade, the Sony Ericsson T630. Offender preference 
ratios matched more closely the relative risk of theft according to police 
recorded data than did non-offender preference ratios.  
 
Expert phone thieves are more likely to recognise and name the models of 
phone presented at interview than are novices. Their preference ratios within 
the six matched pairs of phones are the same as or higher than the preference 
ratios of novices. However, the differences between preference ratios of novices 
and experts did not reach statistical significance. 
 
Expert offenders are more likely to mention resale value than are novices. 
Novices are slightly more likely to mention functionality and moderness than are 
experts. These results suggest that experienced thieves by-pass or carry out 
automatically an assessment of moderness and functionality, providing support 
for the hypothesis that experience leads to automatic progression along a 
familiar crime script (Cornish, 1994). 
 
Increased experience can be modelled as embedding more firmly the option of 
phone theft as a perceived solution in Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) involvement 
model. In contrast, the responses of non-offenders highlight that they are not in 
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the possession of the three characteristics which predict continuance in crime 
(professionalism, life-style changes and peer networks (Clarke and Cornish, 
1985)). This has implications for the use of non-offenders in decision-making 
research. 
 
Some offenders also represent Walsh’s (1986) ‘flaw hunters’. They 
spontaneously consider whether they can circumvent any deterrent designs, for 
example by reprogramming blacklisted phones; waiting to assess if a tracker 
device is active; or whether PIN codes can be circumnavigated.  
 
Armitage and Pease (2008b) considered whether product risk of theft should be 
communicated to consumers via a two tiered traffic light system. One light would 
reflect product vulnerability to theft, the other its level of security. Clarke and 
Newman (2005) suggest that product vulnerability be scored using an 
assessment of the presence or absence of CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) 
characteristics, and that security be assessed using a weighted checklist which 
assigns higher scores for security technology which specifically aims to negate 
CRAVED characteristics. So for example, technology which decreases the final 
value of the stolen product scores more highly than does customer education 
about ‘safe’ use of the product.  
 
The deterrent effects of the 23 designs reported here should be used to refine 
the weighting of Clarke and Newman’s (2005) checklist when assessing the 
security and vulnerability of new mobile phone designs. For example, Clarke 
and Newman (2005) advocate that a PIN code scores the maximum of three 
points on a product security checklist, whereas the deterrent effect of a PIN 
code was minimal according to offender responses. The security rating of a PIN 
code (and any technological security feature) should vary according to how 
easily the feature can be bypassed. Similarly, Clarke and Newman (2005) 
advocate that tracking technology scores three on the security checklist, but 
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offenders’ opinions about the efficacy of tracking devices vary. Many believe 
that they can sell a phone soon after theft to avoid detection. Offenders also 
raised the valid question of whether police have the resources to follow up a 
high number of tracking signals. The issue of speed of disposability may prove 
to be important in assessing theft risks of some security technologies.  
 
The results show that offenders consider security at the point of theft. Armitage 
and Pease (2008b) argue that this question had implications for any final 
‘product proofing’ labelling system. If thieves consider security at the point of 
theft then it makes less sense to inform consumers of both vulnerability and 
security, because vulnerability is partly reliant on security.  
 
The differences between offender and non-offender deterrence, and between 
more and less experienced offender deterrence suggest that involving criminals 
in product risk assessment is a necessary element of product design. As Walsh 
(1994) argues, it seems illogical to assess the thought processes of criminals 
without asking for their opinion. Offenders and students give different weight to 
some CRAVED characteristics, resulting in some statistically different 
responses to deterrent designs, and the presence or absence of standing 
decisions to offend appears to affect how easily they are deterred: Offenders 
frequently mention resale value and disposability, but students are not strongly 
motivated by these factors. Offenders make quicker and stronger aggregate 
decisions when faced with iconic (familiar) phones than newer models, and the 
preference ratios of experienced thieves are slightly higher in general than those 
of novices. The strength and speed of decision-making implies that experience 
and the familiarity it brings influence theft choices. It is difficult to see how non-
offenders could imagine this influence when ‘thinking thief’. Future research 
should explore whether the responses given by the design students used as a 
comparison group here differ from those given by other students (and in 
particular those focused on financial topics of study), and from other 
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demographic groups. This would help to inform who, if anybody, is best placed 
to ‘think thief’ when predicting the consequences of new design solutions. 
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Chapter 7: Background to and development of a count-based Theft 
Index. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the background to, and development of, the 
December 2005 count-based Theft Index. The count-based Theft Index laid 
the groundwork for the 2006 risk-based Theft Index described in Chapter 8. 
This chapter details the origins of the data and data collection, and an 
overview of the methodology underpinning both indices. A detailed 
description of data preparation and manipulation is provided for transparency 
and to allow replication in the future if an Index is adopted as a crime 
prevention instrument.  
 
Like the UK Car Theft Index described in Chapter 3, the final version of the 
Mobile Phone Theft Index ranked models of mobile phone according to their 
risk of theft: the models stolen were compared to the models available for 
theft. This chapter describes the process of producing the first iteration, 
which ranked models of mobile phone according to the number of models 
stolen and without a control for availability. Chapter 8 then describes the 
process and results of developing the risk-based Theft Index. Some of the 
work in this chapter and the next, particularly the main findings, were 
published as Mailley and Farrell (2006) and Mailley et al. (2006b, 2008). 
However, the present author was responsible for all the analytic ‘leg work’ 
detailed in these chapters and wrote all the present text.  
 
A brief description of the context of this chapter, in relation to Chapter 8 that 
follows, is warranted. The count-based Theft Index for mobile phones was an 
innovation, but it was not ideal. Popular makes of handsets would be sold 
more often and therefore expected to be stolen more often simply due to 
their availability for theft. This is why Chapter 8 details the subsequent 
development of an index that takes availability into account, while the 
present chapter details the development of a simpler precursor index where 
availability is not controlled for.  
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Furthermore, one practical limitation of the methodology described in this 
chapter was the significant length of time needed to clean the data. This was 
almost certainly too great to make regular production of the index by the 
NMPCU a realistic prospect. Even in the unlikely event that enough 
resources were available, the data would probably be out of date before the 
index was published. If a mobile phone theft index is ever to be adopted 
outside academia it must be both practical to produce and timely. A phone 
theft index must arguably be more timely than a car theft index to reflect the 
more rapidly changing and dynamic phone theft market.  
 
The previous paragraphs pre-empt three of the key conclusions of the 
present chapter – that an index must be (1) risk-based rather than count-
based, (2) practical in terms of resources, and (3) timely if it is to impact in a 
fast-changing market. These are lessons that are also likely to prove 
applicable to indices for electronic and other stolen products. However, in the 
present context they also set the scene because they are the issues that are 
addressed more directly in Chapter 8 after the main methodological steps 
are described in the present chapter.  
 
Acquiring NMPCU data 
Laycock (2004) described the difficulties of accessing and manipulating 
numerator and denominator data to produce the UK Car Theft Index. 
Similarly, development of a mobile phone theft index required access to data 
which described the model of phones taken. The National Mobile Phone 
Crime Unit (NMPCU) is the UK’s only police unit dedicated to lowering 
mobile phone theft. Based in the Metropolitan Police, NMPCU comprises 
dedicated officers, intelligence analysts and management. Reports of mobile 
phone thefts from the Greater London area are collated by the NMPCU on 
their computerised crime recording system. Incident records include 
descriptions of victim and suspect characteristics, the nature of the incident, 
and the make and model of phone(s) stolen.  
 
In order to facilitate access to NMPCU data, several meetings were held 
between the research team and NMPCU in late 2005 and throughout 2006 at 
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NMPCU’s base in London. The face to face meetings enabled an 
understanding to be gained of the organisational structure and work 
processes of NMPCU, and for rapport to be established. Perhaps most 
importantly they allowed NMPCU to appreciate the crime preventive 
orientation of the research team, which led to full support for the research 
presented in this and Chapter 8.  
 
NMPCU personnel advised on the procedures for gaining official clearance 
for access to NMPCU crime records. Firstly, approval from senior police 
management was needed and the advice was to write a formal letter of 
request to the Commander of the Metropolitan Police Territorial Policing 
Head Quarters, copying in the head of NMPCU, a Detective Superintendant. 
A copy of the letter to the Commander, as drafted by the present author and 
dated 28th October 2005, is attached as Appendix 7.1. Secondly, since 
NMPCU crime records are officially the property of the Home Office, support 
from the Home Office was needed. Therefore a letter of support was 
requested from the Street Crime Action Team (SCAT) of the Home Office. 
Face to face meetings were held with key personnel within the SCAT, to 
establish rapport, mutual understanding and to establish clear lines of 
communication. The SCAT proved a valuable ally in facilitating access to 
NMPCU data. Acting as the interface between NMPCU and government, 
they were keen to support applied research with a preventive focus. A letter 
of general support for exploratory analysis of NMPCU data was provided on 
10th October 2005 and is attached as Appendix 7.2. A more specific letter of 
support for access to NMPCU crime records was produced on 11th 
November 2005, and is attached as Appendix 7.3. The letters evidence the 
evolution of SCAT’s stance from tentative to more concrete support for the 
research. As the relationship with SCAT developed, trust was gained and 
specific goals of the research were clarified and communicated. 
 
As a result of the coordinated request to NMPCU and support from the Home 
Office, NMPCU contacted the author on 24th December 2006 advising that 
access to NMPCU data had been granted. The delay between the initial 
letters of request and support and the decision to grant access was in part 
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due to NMPCU staff changes, specifically, the replacement of the 
Commander, and the leave arrangements of other NMPCU staff involved. 
Such delays in gaining access to data are common in research across 
subject areas, in part due to the need to gain approval from various 
‘gatekeepers’ of data (Munro, 2008).  
 
The following section describes the data obtained from NMPCU and the 
processes involved in cleaning and preparing the data for analysis. The 
methodology and reasoning behind it are explained in detail to provide 
transparency and so that others might replicate the process using different or 
more recent data.  
 
The results of the count cased theft index are described after the 
methodology. Exploratory analysis resulting in the count-based Theft Index 
involved cleaning and analysing NMPCU data from 2004 thru 2005. An 
analytic component of the work that evolved from preliminary descriptive 
data analysis was the ‘theft careers’ of the most commonly stolen models. 
This analysis is also presented below.  
 
Data provided by NMPCU 
NMPCU record mobile phone theft incident details in a relational database. 
Each incident is assigned a unique crime number. At the time of this 
research the NMPCU database consisted of five main data tables, cross-
referenced by the unique crime number. The five main data tables were 
Property; Crimes; Victims and Witnesses (together); Suspects and; Accused 
persons.  
The table Property, containing information about the property stolen, detailed 
incidents at the item level and included information on the manufacturer 
(referred to as make) and models of phone reported as stolen. The table 
Crimes detailed incidents at the crime level and consisted of the Home Office 
classification of each incident. The table Victims and Witnesses was 
organised at the person level and recorded demographic and personal 
information relating to victims and witnesses. The two tables Suspects and 
Accused respectively recorded the demographic and personal attributes of 
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any individuals suspected or charged. While basic cross-referencing 
between tables such as Property and Suspects could be achieved using the 
unique crime reference number, each field also contained further reference 
numbers that could be linked to other record components. For example, each 
mobile phone listed within the Property table was assigned a unique code 
because a single incident could involve multiple handsets. This item code 
was unique within the incident but not within the entire database. Thus 
querying the database required the knowledge and skill of NMPCU analysts 
familiar with the database’s set up.  
 
Preliminary discussions involved the present author working at NMPCU to 
understand the nature of the data and its potential. Following this, an 
anonymised dataset including the information used in this thesis was 
provided by NMPCU. The university research team were obliged to provide 
written assurances regarding data protocols and the security of the data at 
the university.  
 
The NMPCU data provided to the author was in the form of text files (suffix 
.txt). There were five main data files corresponding to the tables detailed 
above. These were cross-referenced by the unique crime number of each 
incident, which is referred to hereafter as the Crime ID. 
 
The NMPCU provided a data file containing records from the table Property 
for incidents reported and recorded from 1st January 2004 to 31st December 
2005 inclusive. This Property file contained variables describing the make of 
the phone; the model of phone; whether the phone was stolen or damaged; 
the total number of items reported missing per crime; the value of property 
taken, and the unique crime reference number. This file formed the basis for 
the development of the 2005 count-based Theft Index described in this 
chapter. The final count-based Theft Index used only data from December 
2005 since this month represented the most recent and complete month of 
data available, but the exploratory analysis described below analysed 
records spanning April 2004 to December 2005. The risk-based Theft Index 
described in Chapter 8 uses NMPCU data spanning the calendar year 2006 
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(the change reflecting the fact that NMPCU subsequently provided a new 
data file for 2006 which contained the same variables as the 2004- 2005 data 
set as well as an added variable, the UK Home Office classification of each 
offence).  
 
Overview of methodology for producing the phone theft index 
The count-based and risk-based theft indices shared most components of 
their methodology, and these are described below. The analytical software 
used to analyse NMPCU data by the researcher was SPSS™. The SPSS™ 
software will only aggregate identical entries. The NMPCU data contained 
variables where information had been entered by hand (‘free text’ variables) 
resulting in considerable variation in entries which should have been 
identical. Specifically, the NMPCU Property table contained two free text 
variables, one to record the make of each phone (for example Nokia) and the 
other to record the specific model (for example 5210). In what follows, the 
capitalised M of Make and Model denotes these two SPSS™ variables, 
whereas lower case ‘make’ and ‘model’ are used in their usual sense as 
generic terms for manufacturer and type of handset respectively. Similarly, 
generic indices are referred to using lower case but the term Mobile Phone 
Theft Index is capitalised when referring to the specific 2005 count- based 
and the 2006 risk-based indices, in line with Laycock’s (2004) capitalisation 
of the UK Car Theft Index. As mentioned, the free text nature of the variables 
Make and Model allowed considerable data entry variation and errors. For 
example Nokia had been entered among other variations as Nokia, nokia, 
NOKIA, and Nookia. While the human brain can use reason to assume that 
these entries all refer to Nokia, SPSS™ cannot interpret data entries in this 
manner and these entries needed to be made uniform. Hence a large part of 
the data preparation for both theft indices involved extensive recoding of the 
variables Make and Model. The recoding was undertaken using many 
thousands of lines of SPSS™ syntax that were written by the present author.  
 
SPSS™ syntax consists of lines of code which instruct SPSS™ how to 
manipulate the data. It is an alternative to using the drop down menus 
available. Syntax files provide a permanent record of the analytical process, 
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making the process available to other researchers and therefore replicable 
and transparent, or available for scrutiny when retracing methodologies to 
identify errors. 
 
Figure 7.1 below presents an overview of the methodology common to both 
the count-based and risk-based theft indices. The syntax used for each stage 
is attached on the CD secured on the inside cover of the Appendix section of 
this thesis and labelled Appendices 7.4 thru 7.7. In the methodology below a 
‘case’ refers to one row of data in SPSS™, which in this instance represents 
a single stolen item, most usually a mobile phone. ‘Case’ does not equate to 
a crime, which is referred to here as an incident or crime.  
 
Figure 7.1: Overview of steps involved in generating the phone theft index 
 
1. The NMPCU text file was imported into SPSS™ using the SPSS™ 
import wizard. 
2. A unique identifier was assigned to each case (stolen item) to facilitate 
separation and re-merging of the data set during cleaning (recoding) 
(see step 7 below).  
3. The date of each case was recoded using the syntax ‘Recoding 
date.sps’ (Appendix 7.4) to facilitate later analysis by requisite time 
periods.  
4. The police variable PROPmake was recoded within the dataset using 
the syntax ‘Recoding Make.sps’ (Appendix 7.5) which is described in 
more detail below.  
5. Data relating to each of the four main makes of phone (Nokia, 
Samsung, Sony Ericsson and Motorola) were separated out and 
saved as separate SPSS files. 
6. The police variable PROPmodel was recoded within each of these 
four separated files using the syntax ‘Recode Model.sps’ (Appendix 
7.6) which is described further below. 
7. The four separate files containing the recoded data were added back 
into the initial dataset by merging on the unique case identifier. The 
data set then contained all original cases. Those from the main four 
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manufacturers were recoded to the model level. Other makes were 
recoded to the make level. 
8. Using the syntax ‘Merging Make and Model.sps’ (Appendix 7.7), the 
recoded Make and Model variables were combined to form one 
variable: MakeModel. This was necessary because otherwise the 
SPSS™ output would consist of separate variables for make and 
model.  
 
Further specifics of the methodology 
This section of the chapter provides further details on key aspects of the 
methodology. It follows the sequence of steps outlined above. Some of the 
tasks undertaken are described at length in order to convey the extent and 
variety of data cleaning, some of the innovative nature of this aspect of the 
research, and in order to emphasise the fact that the data preparation was 
recognised from the outset as a most critical aspect of the work to develop a 
theft index.  
 
1. Importing NMPCU data into SPSS 
The NMPCU generated file ‘Property.txt’ was imported into SPSS™ using 
the import wizard in order that quantitative analysis could be carried out. The 
resulting data file was ordered at the item level, with each row in SPSS™ 
representing a phone or item reported as stolen to NMPCU.  
 
2. Generating a unique identifier for each case 
NMPCU data within the file Property were differentiated at the incident level 
by the NMPCU variable ‘CrimeID’. Running frequencies of the variable Crime 
ID revealed that some incidents contained multiple items (phones). The 
NMPCU data did not contain an identifier unique to each phone: as 
described earlier the NMPCU database assigned identifiers unique to each 
item within incidents but not across timescales. Since analysis for the Indices 
was at the item level, a unique identifier was needed for each item (row of 
data). After sorting the data by descending Crime ID, the unique item 
identifier was computed using the syntax: 
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Compute CrimeNum=($casenum). 
Execute. 
 
With hindsight, a more logical name for this unique identifier would have 
been ItemNum since the identifier is unique to each item and not to each 
crime as the syntax name suggests. This provides a good example of where 
syntax acts as an important record: without referring back to the syntax it 
would be easy for another researcher to look at the data set and assume that 
the variable ‘CrimeNum’ was a unique identifier at the incident level.  
 
3. Recoding the date of each incident 
NMPCU data included the variable ‘SupvrRecDate’ which described the date 
on which the incident occurred. In order to facilitate later analysis by time 
periods of varying length, new variables were computed which described the 
month, year and quarter in which the incident occurred. A copy of the original 
police variable describing date was generated and its format altered to script 
format, to allow the syntax ‘Recoding date.sps’ to be run (see Appendix 7.4) 
This generated three numeric variables respectively describing the month, 
quarter and year in which each phone was stolen. Creating a numeric 
variable with text labels meant that SPSS™ output was ordered by 
successive time intervals. If the date had been left as a text variable SPSS™ 
output would have been ordered alphanumerically. For example when 
analysing the 2004-05 dataset by month the output would have been in the 
order April 2004, April 2005, August 2004, August 2005, December 2004, 
December 2005, and so on.  
 
4. Cleaning the variable ‘Make’ 
At this stage the data file consisted of item (phone handset) level data each 
with a unique identifying number and a new numeric variable defining the 
time period of the relative incident. Analysis to produce theft indices used 
data referring to the Make and Model of each item. As described above, the 
free text NMPCU variables Make and Model required standardising in order 
for SPSS™ to aggregate like Makes and Models of phones. The variety and 
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errors observed in Make and Model arose from several aspects of data input 
including: 
 
- Capitalisation (e.g. Nokia, nokia and NOKIA) 
- Misspelling (e.g. Nookia and Nokiia) 
- Extra spaces between words (e.g. Sony  Ericsson) 
- Abbreviation (e.g. Sony E or S Ericsson instead of Sony Ericsson) 
- Writing both make and model in the field meant for make alone, or 
writing both in the field meant for model (e.g. v3 motorola) 
 
Cleaning of both the 2004-05 and the 2006 data sets consisted of two key 
stages. First, the variable Make (manufacturer) was recoded, and then the 
data set was split into constituent makes and cleaned at the model level. The 
decision making process used to best interpret the various data entries is 
described below, following a description of the method used for efficient 
syntax development. 
 
4.1 Syntax development 
SPSS™ syntax was written with the aim of maximising the amount of 
useable information within the NMPCU datasets. Figure 7.2 below consists 
of a sample of the syntax used to clean the variable Make. The first four lines 
result in a new and empty variable which has the title ‘Make2’ and the label 
‘renamed make’. The IF commands then instruct the software to follow a 
logical sequence where the new variable ‘Make2’ is populated with the 
recoded version of the police entry ‘PROPMake’. The syntax ‘Recoding 
Make.sps’ recoded the variable Make in both the 2004-2005 and 2006 
NMPCU datasets. It consisted of 5052 IF commands and is attached as 
Appendix 7.5. 
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Figure 7.2: Sample from the syntax ‘Recoding Make.sps’ 
 
STRING Make2 (A20).    
COMPUTE Make2 = ' '.    
VARIABLE LABELS Make2 'renamed make'.   
EXECUTE.   
IF (PROPMake='T MOBILE')Make2='T-Mobile'.  
IF (PROPMake='motorola')Make2='Motorola'.  
IF (PROPMake='nokia')Make2='Nokia'. 
IF (PROPMake='NOKIA')Make2='Nokia'. 
IF (PROPMake='1 Samsung')Make2='Samsung'. 
IF (PROPMake='1 Sony')Make2='Sony Ericsson'. 
IF (PROPMake='02')Make2='O2'. 
IF (PROPMake='02 MOBILE PHONE')Make2='O2'. 
IF (PROPMake='02 x4')Make2='O2'. 
IF (PROPMake='07914417512')Make2='Missing'. 
 
 
The most efficient method of developing syntax of the sort above was to 
paste the output of the command ‘freq vars’ of the variable PROPMake into 
Microsoft Excel™. Once in Excel™ the single quote marks and IF commands 
could be added to one line and copied down an entire column (by clicking 
and dragging the mouse downwards). Similarly the closing single quote 
marks and full stop that is required at the end of each line of syntax could be 
added relatively quickly. Since each column typically consisted of hundreds 
of rows these efficiency measures were important.  
 
After importing the resultant text into Microsoft Word™ as unformatted text, 
extra spaces between brackets, between single quotes and at the starts of 
lines were removed and the text finally pasted back into SPSS™ syntax. 
Newer versions of SPSS™ software will discount spaces between certain 
commands, such as between the closed brackets and the name of the 
recoded variable (here, Make2). At the time of analysis the version in use 
(version 12) would malfunction if commands were not flush. The final syntax 
was developed using an iterative process of cleaning as many entries as 
possible, running the syntax and assessing the proportion of entries cleaned, 
and repeating the process until over 95 percent of Make entries were 
recoded as either validated makes of mobile phone or as missing. 
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Decisions made when cleaning data 
Many makes of mobile are well known and so interpretation of data entries 
was relatively simple and the results relatively certain. For example, while it 
was reasonable to assume that the entry ‘Nookia’ meant ‘Nokia’, other less 
recognisable entries such as ‘Z320i’ needed to be researched to gauge 
whether the make existed, or whether the entry referred to a specific model 
(as was often the case for alphanumeric numeric suffixes). Initially an 
unrecognised entry was entered into the search engine Google™ and the 
results used to determine whether the make was bona fide or a data entry 
error. It was reasonably common to encounter a model within the field meant 
for make, and in these cases the entry was recoded to the appropriate make. 
To continue the example above: the Z320i is a model specific to Samsung’s 
range of mobile phones and so this entry was recoded so that the variable 
Make read ‘Samsung’.  
 
Analysis of the frequencies of the recoded make revealed that a large 
proportion of phones within both the 2004-05 and the 2006 data sets were 
made by Nokia, Samsung, Sony Ericsson and Motorola (see Results section, 
below). Of these four most prevalent makes of phone, Nokia is arguably the 
most simple to type and spell correctly. In contrast to Sony Ericsson, it is a 
single word consisting of only five letters, with little potential for erroneous 
entry of spaces, or for abbreviation. Despite its simplicity, over 300 lines of 
syntax were needed to recode the many variations of Nokia in the 2004-05 
data set alone. Some of the more rare variations included Noka, Nockia, 
Nosia and Nkia as well as entries with variations in capitalisation, spaces and 
punctuation (for example Nokia? ‘Nokia’ and Nokia,). Common data entry 
errors in relation to Motorola involved permutations of the word spelt with 
double l and ending in ‘olla’ or ‘oller’, presumably because of association with 
the word roller. Issues common to Sony Ericsson were abbreviations of 
various permutations (for example Sony E, Sony Eric, S Ericsson) or 
incorrect spelling of the word Ericsson (for example Eriksson, ericson).  
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5. Separating out the main makes of phone 
The frequencies of recoded Make (Make2) were run to check which phones 
accounted for the largest proportion of stolen items. Each of the four most 
common Makes were selected out from the main data set and saved as 
separate data files. This process was carried out using the drop down menus 
from SPSS™, though syntax could be used equally successfully.   
 
6. Cleaning the variable ‘Model’  
Each make-specific file was cleaned (recoded) at the model level using a 
similar iterative cleaning process as for Make. Separating the files allowed 
attention to be focused on one phone manufacturer at a time, increasing the 
speed at which familiarity was gained with that manufacturer’s alphanumeric 
model naming system and minimising swapping between the websites of 
different manufacturers. The syntax used to clean models in both the 2004-
05 and 2006 datasets consisted of 7250 IF commands and is attached as 
Appendix 7.6. Figure 7.3 below consists of a sample of this syntax. The 
sample happens to be from a section focusing on models from the 
manufacturer Sony Ericsson. 
 
Figure 7.3: Sample from syntax to recode Model within the 2004-05 and 
2006 datasets 
 
IF (PROPModel='D700I')SonyModel='Missing'. 
IF (PROPModel='d705')SonyModel='D750i'. 
IF (PROPModel='d750')SonyModel='D750i'. 
IF (PROPModel='D750')SonyModel='D750i'. 
IF (PROPModel='D750 i')SonyModel='D750i'. 
IF (PROPModel='d750i')SonyModel='D750i'. 
IF (PROPModel='D750i')SonyModel='D750i'. 
IF (PROPModel='D750I')SonyModel='D750i'. 
IF (PROPModel='d759i')SonyModel='D750i'. 
IF (PROPModel='D7i')SonyModel='Missing'. 
IF (PROPModel='e3?')SonyModel='Missing'. 
 
 
Initially the command ‘freq vars’ was used to produce SPSS™ output of the 
frequencies of the police variable model (PROPModel) within each data file. 
This output was then exported into Microsoft Excel in order that IF 
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commands, single quotes and full stops could efficiently be added. Syntax 
was then developed using the iterative process of looking up each 
questioned entry on the internet, adjusting the syntax accordingly and 
rerunning the syntax until the majority of entries were recoded. The aim was 
to recode entries where a data entry error or model permutation could 
sensibly be resolved in to what was judged the ‘correct’ entry. Some 
subjective judgement was required and the attempts to avoid introducing 
systematic bias are described below. 
 
Models were checked in the first instance against the manufacturer’s 
websites. If the model was not found to be listed on current or archived lists 
of available models, a wider internet search was carried out to assess if the 
model was genuine. In many cases a model not listed on the manufacturer’s 
website or archive was recoded as missing.  
 
Exceptions to labelling unrecognised models as missing were made when a 
decision could be made as to what the ‘correct’ entry should have been. The 
overall aim was to minimise sources of error in the data, and to some extent 
this required a combination of art and science. Different models of phone had 
specific data entry errors associated with them. The suffix lower case ‘i’ was 
frequently observed as either capitalised i (I), or lower or upper case ‘L’. In 
these instances the entry was recoded to include a lower case ‘i’. In other 
instances it was possible to deduce the typing error which resulted in an 
entry needing recoding. For example it was reasonable to assume that the 
entry ‘66230’ within the Nokia dataset referred to the Nokia 6230: There is 
not a model 66230, nor a 6623, and so the most likely explanation for this 
data entry is that the individual entering the data has lingered on the 6 key a 
fraction too long resulting in a double 6 instead of a single.  
 
In some instances a reasoned decision could not be made. The entry ‘63300’ 
within the Nokia dataset was judged as likely to be the Nokia 6330 or the 
Nokia 6300, since both models exist. Thus this entry and others suffering the 
same ambiguity were recoded as missing. Similarly an incomplete entry such 
as ‘750’ within the make Sony Ericsson could refer to either the model K750i 
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or the D750i and so was recoded as missing. An example of a model where 
resolution was mostly unambiguous was the Motorola Razr, where it was 
apparent that any entry similar to Razr or permutations thereof (Razor, Raz, 
Rzr) was meant to be Razr. 
 
On occasion, reading the data entry aloud helped resolve the issue. Within 
the Sony Ericsson file there existed an NMPCU data entry ‘K8Ti’. There was 
not a model K8Ti but the model K800i was known to exist. Saying aloud ‘kay 
eight tea eye’ clarifies what probably happened: K80i is only one zero away 
from the recognised K800i. Perhaps the zero had been missed off and the 
entry inputted phonetically because someone was reading the information 
aloud to the person entering the data. From this entry ‘K8Ti’ it was not a giant 
leap to assume that the entry ‘kati’ within Sony Ericsson was probably also a 
phonetic entry referring to the K800i (again saying ‘kati’ aloud clarifies the 
likely error). However instances such as this were extremely rare and if they 
resulted in erroneous interpretation of the correct model the effects on the 
overall data set will be minute. The examples are included here to convey 
the essence of some of the adaptation and innovation that was needed as 
part of the effort to ensure that the data was as clean as possible.  
 
It was theoretically possible that focusing on only the four main 
manufacturers served to exclude models, from other manufacturers, which 
were stolen frequently. For example, the make ranking 5th might have been 
made up of only one or two models of phones, meaning that these models 
would have been stolen in similar numbers to models of the four most 
commonly stolen makes. Therefore the phone makes ranking fifth to eighth 
were checked for models which, with some recoding, might reach numbers 
comparable to models within the four most prevalent makes. Instances of 
cases where such models were identified were few, and are described in the 
results sections below. 
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7. Merging the four individual recoded datasets back with the original 
data set. 
The recoded files of the four most commonly stolen makes of phone were 
merged back into the original dataset by matching cases on their unique 
case identifier. The data set now contained all original cases. Those from the 
main four manufacturers were recoded to the model level. Key models within 
makes ranking fifth to eighth were also recoded. Remaining makes were 
recoded only to the make level. 
 
8. Merging the variables recoded Make and recoded Model 
In order to merge the recoded text variables Make and Model together, the 
syntax ‘Merging make and model.sps’ was run. This generated a report 
within which the two text variables were merged. This syntax is attached as 
Appendix 7.7. The output from the report was saved in the text editing 
software Windows Notepad and then re-imported into SPSS™ as a new 
variable, ‘Make & Model’. Cases were again matched using the unique 
identifier generated in step 2. The data file now consisted of all cases which 
could reasonably be cleaned within the eight most frequently stolen makes of 
mobile phone, each described by the month, quarter and year of offence and 
with a unique identifying number. 
 
Results 
The resulting size of the dataset for further analysis 
The original NMPCU ‘property’ data set for 2004 - 2005 consisted of 255353 
lines, each representing an individual item of stolen property. Over ninety 
percent of items (n= 229860) had a unique CrimeID, meaning that NMPCU 
records only contained a description of one item for that crime. However, 
analysis using the NMPCU variable ItemNum revealed that nearly fifty seven 
percent of items (n=145480) were stolen along with other items. It was 
NMPCU policy to not record the nature of items stolen along with phones. It 
would have been useful to analyse the nature of items which were taken 
along with phones, but this was not possible.   
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The prevalence of each manufacturer among stolen handsets 
Over 3400 individual lines of syntax were written to recode the makes of 
phone in the 2004-05 dataset. The syntax resulted in 98.7 percent 
(n=252064) of cases being recoded as either a recognised make or as 
missing. Just over 90 percent of cases (n= 230372) were recoded into 
recognisable makes. The frequencies of the recoded makes within the 2004-
05 dataset are presented below in Table 7.1 which shows that the majority 
(87%, n= 200337) of recoded makes were from the four manufacturers 
Nokia, Sony Ericsson, Samsung and Motorola.  
 
Table 7.1: Frequencies of recoded phone make within the 2004-05 dataset. 
 
Make Frequency Valid % 
Cumulative 
valid % 
Nokia 120315 52.2 52.2 
Sony Ericsson 29542 12.8 65.1 
Samsung 28874 12.5 77.6 
Motorola 21606 9.4 87.0 
Siemens 7450 3.2 90.2 
LG 5622 2.4 92.6 
Sharp 3273 1.4 94.1 
NEC 2804 1.2 95.3 
Sagem 2781 1.2 96.5 
Panasonic 2550 1.1 97.6 
O2 1027 0.4 98.0 
Hutchinson 997 0.4 98.5 
Vodafone 664 0.3 98.8 
Orange 593 0.3 99.0 
Phillips 521 0.2 99.2 
Blackberry 476 0.2 99.4 
T-Mobile 374 0.2 99.6 
Alcatel 339 0.1 99.8 
Virgin 262 0.1 99.9 
BT 97 0.0 99.9 
Sanyo 83 0.0 99.9 
Palm 67 0.0 100.0 
Toshiba 18 0.0 100.0 
i-mate 16 0.0 100.0 
Qtek 9 0.0 100.0 
Bosch 4 0.0 100.0 
Sendo 4 0.0 100.0 
Fujitsu 2 0.0 100.0 
Nikon 2 0.0 100.0 
Valid total 230372 100.0  
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The prevalence of handset models 
The 2004-05 data set to be recoded at the model level consisted of the 
200337 cases accounted for by manufacturers Nokia, Sony Ericsson, 
Samsung and Motorola. Over 10900 lines of syntax were written to recode 
models within this dataset, resulting in 71.4 percent (n= 143025) of cases 
being recoded into verified models. Analysis of the frequencies of models 
within the makes ranking fifth to eighth in Table 7.1 above revealed that only 
two models of phone, the LG U1820 and the Sharp GX10 were stolen in 
sufficient numbers to rank within the top 20 stolen models for any quarter. 
 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 below show the top 20 stolen phones for each quarter of 
years 2004 and 2005 respectively, within the eight most frequently stolen 
makes of phone. These eight makes are: Nokia, Sony Ericsson, Samsung, 
Motorola, Siemens, LG, Sharp and NEC. Analysis by quarter reveals the 
rapidly changing nature of phone thefts: models rise and fall through the 
ranks within a matter of months.  
 
For most quarters the majority of top 20 positions were occupied by models 
from makes ranking first to fourth. Exceptions to this were few: the LG U1820 
first appeared at rank 13 in the final quarter of 2004, rose to eighth at the 
start of 2005 and then dropped to twelfth the following quarter. By the third 
quarter of 2005 this model ranked 21st, with only 188 reported stolen in that 
quarter. In contrast the Nokia 7250 dominated for the majority of 2004 before 
dropping to tenth rank in the first quarter of 2005. It was immediately 
replaced by the Nokia 6230 which ranks first for the whole of 2005.  
 
The ‘theft careers’ of the most stolen handset models 
As the researcher conducted preliminary descriptive analysis of the trends in 
theft, it became apparent that there was significant monthly variation. That is, 
the prominence of certain handset models changed over time. Further 
investigation showed that there was often gradual change from month to 
month, producing distinct trends that varied from one handset to the next 
which the research team began to refer to as ‘theft careers’ of handsets, with 
reference to Felson and Clarke’s (1998) product life cycles.  
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Figure 7.4 charts the rise and fall of a selection of the most stolen models 
throughout 2004 and 2005. Each model has a clearly defined theft career or 
life cycle - that is, a gradual then almost exponential rise in the number 
stolen, followed by a plateau and finally a decrease. The stages parallel the 
stages of innovation, growth, mass marketing and saturation seen in the 
sales of products described by Felson and Clarke (1998). Wellsmith and 
Burrell (2005) showed that the decrease in theft numbers of both audio 
equipment and video recorders corresponded with decreases in purchase 
price, following saturation stage. It is likely that the demand for and rewards 
of stealing different models of mobile phone will also vary with purchase 
price. Further research could be carried out to track the price of different 
models on both pay-as-you-go and contract deals within the UK, and map 
the data back to NMPCU recorded crime numbers.  
 
The patterns displayed in Figure 7.4 are doubtless to some extent reflective 
of the numbers of each model in circulation, that is, the number available for 
theft. The ideal Theft Index would be based on risk of theft controlling for 
availability. The development of a risk-based Theft Index is described in the 
next chapter. The rapid pace of change of ranks and analysis of theft careers 
by month demonstrated that any Index produced should focus on short time 
periods of around a month. Aggregation of theft numbers over longer periods 
of time risks conflating different aspects of rapidly changing theft careers. 
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Table 7.2: Top 20 stolen phones by quarter in 2004 
 
*= N of ranks varied by Qr: 
Q1= 297 
Q2= 289 
Q3= 328 
Q4= 345 
 
 Q1 (n= 22131)  Q2 (n= 22237)  Q3 (n= 20538)  Q4 (n= 19090)  Total for 2004 (n= 83996) 
Rank Make & Model Cum % Make & Model Cum % Make & Model Cum %  Make & Model Cum % Make & Model Cum % 
1 Nokia 7250 9.1 Nokia 7250 7.7 Nokia 3310 5.3 Nokia 6230 9.7 Nokia 7250 6.6 
2 Nokia 3310 16.2 Nokia 3310 13.4 Nokia 7250 10.5 Nokia 3310 14.0 Nokia 3310 12.2 
3 Nokia 8310 22.8 Sony E T610 18.7 Samsung E700 15.7 Samsung E700 18.2 Sony E T610 16.9 
4 Sony E T610 28.1 Samsung E700 23.9 Nokia 6230 20.8 Nokia 7250 21.9 Samsung E700 21.3 
5 Nokia 6100 33.1 Nokia 8310 28.2 Sony E T610 25.2 Sony E T610 25.3 Nokia 8310 25.5 
6 Nokia 7210 37.9 Nokia 6100 32.4 Nokia 6100 29.0 Nokia 6100 28.2 Nokia 6100 29.5 
7 Samsung E700 41.1 Nokia 7210 36.1 Nokia 8310 32.3 Sony E K700i 30.9 Nokia 6230 33.2 
8 Nokia 3510 44.3 Nokia 6310 39.2 Nokia 6600 35.4 Nokia 6610 33.4 Nokia 7210 36.5 
9 Nokia 6310 47.4 Nokia 6600 42.2 Nokia 6310 38.2 Nokia 6600 35.9 Nokia 6310 39.4 
10 Nokia 3410 50.5 Nokia 3510 44.9 Nokia 7210 40.9 Nokia 6310 38.3 Nokia 6600 41.9 
11 Samsung V200 52.8 Nokia 3410 47.6 Nokia 3410 43.0 Nokia 8310 40.6 Nokia 3510 44.4 
12 Nokia 8210 54.9 Nokia 3200 49.3 Nokia 3510 45.1 Nokia 7610 42.6 Nokia 3410 46.7 
13 Nokia 3210 56.8 Samsung V200 51.0 Nokia 6610 46.9 LG U8120 44.5 Nokia 6610 48.6 
14 Nokia 6610 58.5 Nokia 3210 52.6 Sony E T630 48.7 Nokia 3510 46.3 Nokia 3210 50.3 
15 Sony E T68 60.0 Nokia 6610 54.1 Nokia 3210 50.4 Nokia 7210 48.0 Nokia 8210 51.8 
16 Samsung A800 61.5 Nokia 3100 55.6 Motorola V600 52.1 Nokia 3410 49.6 Samsung V200 53.2 
17 Nokia 3330 63.1 Nokia 7600 57.0 Nokia 3200 53.7 Motorola V600 51.2 Nokia 3200 54.6 
18 Nokia 5210 64.5 Nokia 8210 58.4 Motorola V300 55.0 Sony E T630 52.8 Nokia 6210 55.8 
19 Nokia 6600 65.9 Motorola V300 59.8 Sony E P900 56.4 Samsung E800 54.3 Nokia 3100 57.0 
20 Sharp GX10 67.3 Samsung A800 61.1 Nokia 6210 57.7 Nokia 7600 55.8 Sony E T630 58.2 
Other*  32.7  38.9  42.3  44.2  41.8 
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Table 7.3: Top 20 stolen phones by quarter in 2005 
 
  Q5 (n=18193)   Q6 (n= 20303)   Q7 (n= 20476)   Q8 (n= 20498)   Total for 2005 (n= 79470) 
Rank Make & Model 
Cum 
%  Make & Model Cum %  Make & Model Cum %  Make & Model Cum %  Make & Model Cum % 
1 Nokia 6230 12.8 Nokia 6230 13.9 Nokia 6230 13.9 Nokia 6230 13.3 Nokia 6230 13.5 
2 Sony E K700i 16.7 Samsung D500 21.5 Samsung D500 23.1 Samsung D500 22.1 Samsung D500 20.6 
3 Nokia 3310 20.1 Sony E K700i 25.3 Motorola Razr 28.5 Motorola Razr 29.9 Motorola Razr 25.4 
4 Sony E T610 22.7 Motorola Razr 28.7 Sony E K700i 31.8 Sony E K750i 33.5 Sony E K700i 28.8 
5 Nokia 6610 25.3 Nokia 3310 31.2 Nokia 6630 34.7 Nokia 6680 36.7 Nokia 3310 31.2 
6 Samsung E700 27.8 Nokia 6610 33.5 Nokia 6680 37.1 Sony E K700i 39.6 Nokia 6610 33.3 
7 
Samsung 
D500 30.3 Nokia 7610 35.5 Nokia 3310 39.4 Nokia 6630 42.2 Nokia 6630 35.3 
8 LG U8120 32.6 Sony E T610 37.5 Sony E K750i 41.4 Sony E W800i 43.9 Sony E T610 37.0 
9 Nokia 7610 34.9 Nokia 6630 39.4 Nokia 6610 43.4 Samsung D600 45.5 Nokia 7610 38.7 
10 Nokia 7250 37.1 Nokia 6310 41.2 Nokia 7610 45.0 Nokia 3310 47.2 Nokia 6310 40.3 
11 Nokia 6100 39.1 Nokia 6100 42.8 Nokia 6310 46.6 Nokia 6610 48.6 Nokia 6100 41.8 
12 Nokia 7600 41.0 LG U8120 44.4 Nokia 6100 48.0 Samsung E720 49.9 Nokia 6680 43.4 
13 Motorola Razr 42.9 Samsung E700 46.0 Sony E T610 49.3 Nokia 6310 51.1 Sony E K750i 44.8 
14 Nokia 6310 44.8 Nokia 7250 47.5 Nokia 6210 50.6 Nokia 6100 52.3 Samsung E700 46.2 
15 Nokia 6600 46.6 Nokia 7600 48.9 Samsung E720 51.9 Nokia 8800 53.4 Nokia 7250 47.6 
16 Sony E T630 48.1 Nokia 6600 50.2 Nokia 7250 53.0 Sony E K608i 54.4 LG U8120 48.9 
17 Samsung E800 49.5 Nokia 6210 51.6 Samsung E700 54.1 Nokia 6210 55.3 Nokia 6210 50.1 
18 Nokia 8310 51.0 Nokia 8310 52.8 Nokia 8310 55.1 Nokia 7610 56.2 Nokia 7600 51.3 
19 Nokia 7210 52.4 Sony E T630 54.0 Nokia 7600 56.0 Nokia 1100 57.1 Nokia 6600 52.5 
20 Nokia 3510 53.7 Samsung E800 55.1 Sony E T630 57.0 Sony E T610 58.0 Nokia 8310 53.6 
Other
*   46.3   44.9   43.0   42.0   46.3 
 
*= N of ranks varied by Qr: 
Q5= 317 
Q6= 332 
Q7= 344 
Q8= 347. 
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Figure 7.4: Theft careers of a selection of the most stolen phones throughout 2004 and 2005 
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The December 2005 Theft Index 
A count-based Theft Index was produced using NMPCU data for December 
2005, which at the time of analysis represented the latest complete month’s 
worth of data. The original month data set consisted of 10349 cases. After 
recoding, the valid sample size for analysis was 6172 cases. Table 7.4 below 
shows the twenty phone models most frequently stolen in December 2005.  
 
Table 7.4: Top 20 stolen phones in December 2005 
 
Rank 
Make and 
Model Frequency 
Valid 
percent 
(n=6172 ) 
Cum 
valid 
percent 
1 Nokia 6230 849 13.8 13.8 
2 Motorola Razr 647 10.5 24.2 
3 Samsung D500 519 8.4 32.6 
4 Sony E K750i 244 4.0 36.6 
5 Nokia 6680 202 3.3 39.9 
6 Sony E K700i 199 3.2 43.1 
7 Samsung D600 175 2.8 45.9 
8 Sony E W800i 163 2.6 48.6 
9 Nokia 6630 156 2.5 51.1 
10 Nokia N70 109 1.8 52.9 
11 Nokia 3310 88 1.4 54.3 
12 Nokia 6100 81 1.3 55.6 
13 Nokia 6310 81 1.3 56.9 
14 Sony E K608i 81 1.3 58.2 
15 Nokia 6610 79 1.3 59.5 
16 Samsung E720 77 1.2 60.8 
17 Nokia 8800 66 1.1 61.8 
18 Nokia 1100 65 1.1 62.9 
19 Motorola C975 63 1.0 63.9 
20 Sony E T610 62 1.0 64.9 
Other*   2166  35.1 
 
*Total N of ranks was 301 for December 2005 
 
 
Table 7.4 shows that together, the top 20 models accounted for nearly 65 
percent of phones stolen in December 2005. The remaining ranks (n=281) 
accounted for just 35 percent of stolen phones. The Nokia 6230 alone 
accounted for almost 14 percent of thefts. The Motorola Razr ranked second, 
but accounted for only three quarters as many thefts as the Nokia 6230. 
Together the top nine ranks accounted for just over half of all reported thefts 
in December 2005.  
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Cases which were ‘no crimed’ 
Exploratory analysis to develop a risk-base methodology began by using 
data from 2004 and 2005. The full methodology and results for the 2006 risk-
based Theft Index are presented in Chapter 8 but some initial results from 
the exploratory analysis affected the count-based Theft Index and so are 
described here. Initial analysis leading to the development of the risk-based 
methodology explored the relationships between the models of phone taken 
and the type of offence in which they were taken. Therefore the 2004-05 
NMPCU data files ‘Property.txt’ and ‘Crimes.txt’ were merged.  
 
Merging revealed that 6.07 percent (n=12177) of recoded phones within the 
2004-05 NMPCU data set ‘Property’ did not have crime types associated 
with them in the NMPCU file ‘Crimes’. A sample of these cases were emailed 
to NMPCU in order to determine why this was so. It transpired that the cases 
were those which had been originally recorded as offences on the NMPCU 
recording system but had subsequently been altered to ‘no crime’. Incidents 
were defined as ‘no crime’ if there was insufficient evidence that an offence 
had taken place or if there was evidence that a claim of theft was false. 
Neither NMPCU nor the researcher had realised that the data needed 
checking for cases which had been ‘no crimed’ before the 2005 count-based 
Theft Indices had been produced and published in Mailley et al. (2006b). The 
implication of this was that just over six percent of the cases used in the 
analysis and publication of results for the count-based Theft Index should 
have been omitted. Since six percent is a relatively small proportion, 
omission of these should not drastically alter the results. The key lesson 
learnt was that queries conducted by NMPCU in order to produce the 2006 
data set checked for and omitted cases where an incident had been ‘no 
crimed’. Furthermore, NMPCU added variables describing the offence type 
to the 2006 Property dataset, meaning all the variables required for analysis 
were present in one dataset, removing the need for the researcher to merge 
datasets before data cleaning could begin.  
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Discussion and conclusions 
 
Theft numbers 
Production of a count-based Theft Index for December 2005 demonstrated 
that the number of handsets stolen at any one time varied greatly between 
phone models. This was possibly in part due to differences in the availability 
and usage patterns of different models. It was likely that many more Nokia 
6230s were stolen because there were many more Nokia 6230s available for 
theft. Therefore a more meaningful measure of theft risk would control for 
what is available for theft. The methodology and results for developing a risk-
based Theft Index are described in the next chapter.  
 
Patterns of phone thefts 
Examination of the theft careers of various models demonstrated that stolen 
mobile phones follow a theft career similar to the life cycle of legitimate 
goods. For the most commonly stolen models such as the Nokia 6230, 
Motorola Razr, and the Samsung D500, distinct stages of a theft career 
(Felson and Clarke, 1998) were evident. The most commonly stolen models 
of phone exhibited relatively slow increases in theft during the equivalent of 
the legitimate innovation stage, when ownership is restricted to a specialist 
group of consumers and is probably not well known. Innovation is followed 
by rapid and then almost exponential increases in theft numbers during 
growth and mass marketing stages. During these stages more people are 
aware of the products and desire or own one, increasing theft demand and 
theft opportunities respectively. Finally the models reach a plateau, where 
theft numbers even out and then tail off. At this stage most people who 
desired that model presumably had one, or the price had reduced to the 
extent as to no longer outweigh the risks of theft. As evidenced by the Nokia 
6230 superseding the Nokia 7250, newer and more valuable or desirable 
models soon fill the niche of being the most demanded and available for 
theft.  
 
It is likely that purchase price has an effect on the theft risks of different 
models of phone, since price is interlinked with demand (Wellsmith and 
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Burrell, 2005). Further research into the relationship between mobile phone 
price and theft levels could be carried out by tracking the price of popular 
models throughout their legitimate life cycle and comparing the data with 
NMPCU generated theft career charts. 
 
Practicalities of producing a Theft Index 
When developing the count-based Theft Index, the greatest demand on time 
came from the need to recode each permutation of phone make and model 
one at a time. Syntax development took several months of full time work 
representing hundreds of hours of labour. Clearly the syntax for makes is 
more stable than for models - new models of phone are frequently introduced 
to the market - but the key manufacturers remain reasonably consistent (see 
Chapter 4). Therefore if a Mobile Phone Theft Index was ever to be routinely 
produced in an efficient manner, syntax development would need to be 
minimised. Syntax development for each Theft Index could be minimised by 
NMPCU incorporating drop down menus for at least phone make within their 
crime recording system, or by using ‘justified’ fields rather than free-text. The 
field justification could be monitored for repetition and error. This system is 
relatively simple and used in many such computing practices (such as road 
names which also used freetext fields at one time), and would reduce the 
need for data cleaning while also decreasing data lost due to unresolved 
data entries. Furthermore a drop down make menu would eliminate the 
possibility of the scenario where the make and model were entered together 
in the same field. In the absence of such technological progress in the 
database, an alternative option for efficient production of a Theft Index would 
be that uncleaned (raw) data is used if the representativeness of missing 
data can be understood. The feasibility of such an approach is explored in 
the next chapter following a description of the development of a risk-based 
Theft Index.   
 
Potential bias introduced when recoding the data 
It was possible that there was some inherent bias in the recoded data sets 
due to the varying propensity of different make and model names to be 
inputted correctly and recoded accurately. Entries which are longer, more 
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complex or less well known are predicted to be inputted inaccurately more 
frequently than shorter, less complex, or better known entries. The more 
complex and error prone entries might have been recoded as missing more 
frequently than more simple or recognisable entries. Similarly, those models 
such as the Nokia 6330 and 6300 which closely match each other might 
have been recoded as missing in higher proportions than unambiguous 
entries such as the Nokia 6230 or the Motorola Razr examples given above. 
This is because where two model names were judged to be equally likely as 
the ‘correct’ entry, the case was recoded as missing. However the instances 
of these unresolved cases were relatively low compared to the many 
thousands of entries which were resolved relatively easily. Furthermore, the 
count-based Theft Index focuses on only the 20 most stolen types of 
handsets. Handsets within these ranks numbered in the hundreds, and so 
the effect of any slight bias towards recoding longer make and model entries 
as missing would be minimal.  
 
Defining a suitable time period for Theft Indices 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 demonstrate how the numbers of handsets stolen in 
2004-2005 altered over a matter of months for many models, particularly for 
those ranking lower in the count-based Theft Index. Therefore any Theft 
Index should present data for relatively short time periods. Analysis covering 
theft in a one month period would be a reasonable possibility in the absence 
of a continual rolling or automated index that was updated on a daily basis. 
Aggregation over time masks underlying patterns and trends among quickly 
changing models. When a particular model dominates the count-based 
rankings for long periods of time it will still be represented if shorter time 
periods are analysed.  
 
Bulk thefts 
As described in Chapters 2 and 3, the rational choice perspective of 
Situational Crime Prevention necessitates the study of specific subtypes of 
crime. In parallel with car theft (Clarke and Harris, 1992), it is likely that 
mobile phone theft is a generic term that masks sub-types of theft which vary 
in modus operandi and in the motivation for the theft. The analysis presented 
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here has focused on personal thefts, while commercial robberies which 
typically involve ‘bulk thefts’ were omitted from all NMPCU data queries. If 
bulk thefts were included it is likely that the Index results would be altered, 
perhaps being dominated by a few models where many units had been taken 
in a small number of offences. Further research could explore whether a 
separate Theft Index focused on commercial thefts would be warranted by 
the data held by NMPCU, and whether it would prove useful if produced.  
 
In the case of car thefts, Clarke and Harris (1992) produced different indices 
to reflect the different motivations for theft: The Index which ranked cars 
according to risk of temporary theft differed from the Index which ranked cars 
according to risk of permanent theft. They argued that this differentiation 
between motivations allowed the ‘choice structuring properties’ of different 
types of cars to be identified. The models at most risk of permanent theft 
were the more powerful and luxurious models, presumably because these 
were stolen with a view to resale and so likely profit was an important 
consideration for thieves. Further analysis of NMPCU data might reveal 
whether there is any gain in producing mobile phone Theft Indices according 
to crime type. The first step would be to include bulk thefts and repeat the 
analysis presented here. Pearson’s correlation analysis would test whether 
there were significant differences in the Indices produced by grouping 
different crime types together.  
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Chapter 8: Development of a risk-based and practical Theft Index 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of a risk-based Theft Index that was 
practical for the UK police to produce on a regular basis. The risk-based 
Theft Index aimed to address the shortcomings of the count-based Theft 
Index described in Chapter 7. It was possible that the count-based Theft 
Index simply reflected varying theft opportunities, rather than offenders’ 
preferences for certain handsets over others. Furthermore, the time taken to 
produce the count-based Theft Index meant that routine production by the 
NMPCU remained unfeasible. The chapter begins with a short section on an 
analysis of risk at the manufacturer level which preceded the risk-based 
Index production. After this, the methodology and results of the risk-based 
Theft Index are described, followed by a concluding section describing the 
publications resulting from this work, and industry reaction to those 
publications. 
 
Exploring risk at the manufacture level  
Before the risk-based Theft Index was produced, an analysis was carried out 
to explore whether different phone manufacturers conveyed different levels 
of risk to their customers. This aggregate level analysis suggests that theft 
risk might vary at the model level.  
 
Sales information was available for the UK’s major manufacturers, from the 
market research company Mintel, and this acted as the denominator for 
calculating risk. Sales data were not absolutely ideal as a measure of 
availability, but they provided a solid starting point for exploring risk at the 
manufacturer level. The numerator for calculating theft risk at the 
manufacturer level was NMPCU data. The risk of theft for each of the main 
manufacturers was calculated for two years, 2004 and 2006.  
 
Table 8.1 below shows the Theft Ratio for 2004 and 2006 at manufacture 
level. The Theft Ratio is the percentage theft share divided by the 
percentage sales share for the appropriate year, for each manufacturer. A 
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ratio greater than one means the make is represented in greater proportions 
in the theft data than in the sales data, i.e. it confers increased risk to 
consumers. A ratio less than one means that the proportion of thefts is less 
than the proportion of sales.  
 
Table 8.1: Theft Ratio by manufacturer, 2004 and 2006. 
 
Make 
% Stolen 
2004 
% Stolen 
2006 
% Sold 
2004 
% Sold 
2006 
Theft 
Ratio 
2004 
Theft 
Ratio 
2006 
Nokia 55.3 42.4 41 30 1.3 1.4 
Samsung 11.4 14.8 10 23 1.1 0.6 
Sony Ericsson 12.4 19.9 12 28 1.0 0.7 
Motorola 7.4 13.2 9 8 0.8 1.7 
LG 1.6 2.8 4 5 0.4 0.6 
 
Source for sales data: Mintel (2007a, figure 22). 
 Source for theft data: analysis of NMPCU data. 
 
Comparing the Theft Ratios reveals variance in theft risk according to phone 
manufacturer. Ratios ranged from 0.4 for LG in 2004 to 1.7 for Motorola in 
2006. In 2004 Nokia handsets were at higher risk of theft per phone bought 
than all other makes. Nokias had a risk of theft 1.2 times higher than the next 
riskiest manufacturer, Samsung, and a risk more than three times higher 
than the risk for LG (1.3 divided by 0.4 is 3.25). Theft Ratios also changed 
over time within manufacturer: Samsung’s ratio decreased from 1.1 in 2004 
to 0.6 in 2006.  
 
The variation over time is almost certainly caused by the rise and fall of 
different models in their theft careers. It is likely that the models responsible 
for Nokia’s Theft Ratio of greater than one include the frequently stolen 
models 7250 and 6230 evidenced in Figure 7.4 of the previous chapter, 
which describes the theft careers of these models. One reason for the 
popularity of Nokias with mobile phone thieves was the familiarity of their 
software menus and subsequent ease of use (see Chapter 6). This might 
explain why they were targeted more frequently in both years than every 
make except Motorolas in 2006. 
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The Theft Ratio for Motorola increased considerably from 0.8 in 2004 to 1.7 
in 2006, meaning that the relative risk of theft of Motorolas doubled in this 
time (1.7/0.8= 2.1). The Motorola Razr was arguably responsible for the 
majority of this increase, if not all of it. Razrs began being stolen in the latter 
quarter of 2004 and theft numbers were still on the rise by the end of 2005 
(see Figure 7.4 describing theft careers). 
 
Clearly sales data do not give a full picture of what was available for theft. 
Phones sold outside the sales data recording period were not represented in 
the sales data, but were still available for theft. Conversely, some phones 
sold would be thrown away and not be available for theft. Phones available 
for theft would constitute all phones either in use within the UK, and therefore 
exposed to risk of theft while in use, and those stored away as spares and 
therefore exposed to risk of theft in offences such as burglary. 
 
Nevertheless, the strong patterns seen in both Nokia and Motorola models, 
and the fact that these can be sensibly (if not categorically) attributed to 
certain models lends support to the hypothesis that certain types of phone 
are preferred by thieves over other types. Differential risk by model is the 
premise upon which a risk-based Index is based, and so it is important that 
this aggregate analysis did nothing to counter the prediction that differential 
risk would be displayed at the model level. 
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Calculating Risk at the model level 
Development of a risk-based Theft Index consisted of establishing a 
measure of phone availability within the UK population, and minimising the 
resources needed to produce a risk-based Theft Index. The development 
and results of each stage are presented in this chapter in the same order that 
the research progressed, as depicted in Figure 8.1 below.  
 
Figure 8.1: Stages of developing a risk-based Theft Index 
1. Phone availability was controlled for and a measure of ‘theft risk’ devised. 
2. A preliminary risk based theft index was produced. 
3. The robustness of the methodology was tested by comparing the Indices 
produced by different permutations of offence types.  
4. A more efficient way of producing the risk-based Theft Index was tested by 
comparing the Index produced using recoded data with the Index produced 
using the NMPCU data in its original and non-recoded state, as received 
from NMPCU. 
 
The methodology for each of these four stages is described below, followed 
by a results section. The chapter concludes with a section describing the 
publications resulting from the theft index work, and the industry reaction to 
these publications.  
 
Methodology 
1. Controlling for phone availability 
The aim of a risk-based Theft Index was to compare the relative risk of theft 
between different models of phone. In the Car Theft Index, car availability is 
controlled for by referring to the DVLA’s records of registered vehicles 
(Laycock, 2004). Put simply, the Car Theft Index compares what is stolen to 
what is available for theft. The measure is not perfect, since registration with 
the DVLA is not the only factor affecting car availability for theft. Availability 
and suitability for theft will vary according to situational factors such as car 
usage and storage, as well as by factors describing the car itself, such as its 
age, and the effectiveness of any security measures present. Suitability for 
theft will also vary according to the motivation for the theft (Clarke and Harris, 
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1992). Nevertheless the Car Theft Index is accepted as a sound measure of 
car theft risk. The key to developing a risk based methodology was therefore 
to decide on an available and suitable denominator for risk calculations. The 
numerator for risk calculations (the number of handsets stolen) was 
restricted to the data already available from the NMPCU, which meant that 
there was a geographical restriction to the Greater London area. 
 
Three options presented themselves as contenders for the denominator in 
controlling for phone availability. These options were sales data, usage data 
based on the records of phones active according to the UK CEIR, and thirdly 
the phones contained within the NMPCU data set and therefore available to 
thieves. Table 8.2 below summarises these three options and the population 
of phones each one describes, together with its limitations. Ultimately, the 
only data available to the team were those contained within the NMPCU data 
set, but the process of deciding on a denominator for risk calculations 
warrants a brief description, since sales or usage data might be believed to 
be suitable denominators, until the reasons why this is so are fully explained.  
 
Table 8.2: Three options for controlling for phone availability 
Data 
source 
Describes Limitations 
Sales data Phones sold in a 
given 
time period 
Omits phones sold outside the time 
period,  
Is not restricted to Greater London area. 
Data are not available. 
Usage 
(CEIR) 
Phones in use in 
the UK 
Omits phones inactive but available for 
theft (e.g. a spare kept in a drawer at 
home), 
Might be skewed by reprogrammed 
IMEIs, 
Is not restricted to Greater London area. 
Data are not available 
Stolen by 
chance 
Phones available to 
phone thieves 
Crimes not reported to or recorded by 
NMPCU. 
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Sales data 
Sales data would have identified the proportions of sales accounted for by 
various models, within the time period that the sales data were collected. 
They would have allowed comparison of the number of models sold with the 
numbers stolen, in order to assess the risk of theft per phone sold, for 
different models of phone. However, given that the numerator for risk 
calculations (the number of each handset stolen) was based on NMPCU 
data, and NMPCU data recorded thefts within the Greater London area only, 
any sales data provided would had to have been restricted to the same 
geographical area as the NMPCU data. Since many people commute to 
London for work and leisure, and London is visited by many tourists, there is 
no sensible way to restrict the sales data to the same geographical area as 
that covered by NMPCU records.  
 
Usage data 
In order to ascertain which models of phone were in use by the UK public, it 
was theoretically possible to deduce the model type from the IMEI numbers 
of all phones active on the UK SEIR, which is the IMEI database of the UK 
network providers. In theory, the database could provide for phones the 
same data that the DVLA register provides for vehicles. Two practical issues 
would need to be overcome but are not insurmountable:  
Firstly, IMEI records on the SEIR would allow identification of the population 
of phones in use within the UK, but not those stored away as spares. 
Secondly, inaccurate IMEIs might be present on the SEIR due to the illegal 
activity of reprogramming. If an IMEI had been altered to enable a blacklisted 
phone to be used on the UK networks, the make and model associated with 
that IMEI might not accurately reflect the actual make and model of the 
handset in question. The extent of IMEI reprogramming in the UK is not well 
understood but thought to be considerable in terms of total numbers. 
Kaplankiran et al. (2008) estimate that a minimum of 5 percent of the UK 
mobile population might have had their IMEI tampered with.  
Finally, the issue of geographic restriction of the data would again be an 
issue: it would take a great deal of analysis to determine which phones had 
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ever been available for theft in the Greater London area and within the time 
period covered by the latest Index.  
Industry non-cooperation 
Attempts to access sales data at the model level from manufacturers through 
contacts within the Carphone Warehouse, the GSM Association and the 
Mobile Industry Crime Action Forum were unsuccessful despite Home Office 
support for this research. It was claimed that sales data were commercially 
sensitive. When the GSM Association was approached for usage data based 
on UK CEIR records, their response was that these data effectively reflected 
sales and so were also commercially sensitive. It is worth noting that the 
GSMA was aware that the research involved the analysis of police crime 
records, arguably as sensitive as sales data. Furthermore the GSMA claimed 
that a good deal of work was needed in order to identify make and model 
from IMEI numbers. For an ICT based company this is a poor excuse. The 
final ‘excuse’ for not providing CEIR data was that the issue of 
reprogramming was so great that it would skew results. In reality, if 
reprogramming was such a common event, then this implied that IMEIs were 
not secure and that the GSMA’s attempts to decrease thefts by securing 
IMEIs were failing. Arguing that reprogramming was a large scale issue was 
not consistent with earlier claims that the GSMA and manufacturers were 
doing everything possible to decrease phone theft levels. It also contrasted 
with England’s (2005) conclusions that duplicate IMEIs were not a significant 
problem on the UK SEIR. 
 
While it is not possible to state categorically the motives of the GSMA, 
whether it was fully supportive of the research is questionable. As soon as it 
was apparent that the research was heading in the direction of producing 
empirical evidence of the nature of phone theft, cooperation stalled. This and 
other issues concerning industry (non)cooperation are discussed further in 
the concluding section of this chapter.  
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NMPCU data: phones stolen by chance 
The third and most practical option for assessing model availability was to 
use data already contained within the NMPCU dataset. The measure of 
availability used for the denominator of the risk-based Theft Index was the 
proportion of each model taken in offences where the phone was taken with 
other items. When phones were taken with other items, they were arguably 
taken by chance rather than being consciously chosen. For example a phone 
within a handbag which is snatched will be taken because it was within the 
bag; a phone taken during a burglary will be taken because it was in the 
house and available for theft. Therefore these crimes acted as a sampling 
procedure of phones available to phone thieves. As recorded in Table 8.1 
above, the limitations of the NMPCU data were that all the NMPCU records 
were restricted to those offences both reported to the NMPCU and recorded 
by them as offences. The proportion of phone thefts not reported to the 
police could be around half: According to the British Crime Survey 46 percent 
of mobile phone thefts suffered in the year prior to the 2002/03 BCS were not 
reported to the police (Allen et al. 2005: 24). 
 
Numerator for theft risk calculations 
The numerator used in the final theft risk calculation was the proportion of 
each model taken in incidents where only the phone was taken (phone-only 
thefts). The logic of using this numerator was that when the phone is the only 
item taken, it is likely that the intention of that offence was to take that 
specific model of phone and nothing else.  
 
These measures will not be perfect: some offences where a phone was the 
only item taken might have been interrupted before other items were taken. 
Examples might include hypothetical scenarios in which a victim was less 
compliant than the offender assumed, or when a larger theft was interrupted. 
Conversely if other items were taken along with the phone, they might have 
been taken despite the fact that the phone was the main target of the theft. A 
hypothetical scenario would include a victim who was particularly compliant 
and offered up an entire bag or their wallet in fear when asked for his or her 
phone.  
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However, on aggregate, those offences where the phone was the only item 
taken will represent offences where offenders have had the opportunity to 
make a choice to take that specific phone. Offences where other items were 
also taken (not phone-only thefts) will sample phone availability within the 
victimised population. This measure does not provide any information about 
the availability of phones within the non-victimised population.  
 
The measure of risk decided upon 
For each model of phone within the NMPCU 2006 data set, a Risk Ratio was 
calculated. The Risk Ratio compares the proportion of each model 
specifically targeted in thefts with the proportion available for thefts and is 
summarised below. The SPSS™ based methodology to calculate the Risk 
Ratio is then described.  
 
 Risk Ratio= Proportion taken in targeted crimes (phone-only) 
           Proportion taken in acquisitive crimes (not phone-only). 
 
2. Producing a risk-based Theft Index using 2006 data 
At the time of analysis leading to the risk-based Theft Index, the most recent 
and complete year of NMPCU data was 2006. Development of a risk-based 
Theft Index therefore began with the acquisition and recoding of NMPCU 
crime records from 1st January 2006 to December 31st 2006 inclusive. Data 
acquisition was much easier compared to gaining access to the original 
2004-2005 data set because a relationship with NMPCU was already 
established. NMPCU repeated the Property query as they had for 2004-05 
with the slight revision of adding variables describing the offence type, and 
removing ‘no crimed’ cases. Including the offence type, a variable based on 
Home Office Counting Rules for crime, saved the need for merging Property 
and Crimes files by the researcher. Removal of the ‘no crimed’ cases 
reflected the lesson learnt from the production of the count-based Theft 
Index, where it was discovered that some cases initially recorded as crimes 
by the NMPCU were later deemed to be false reports and labelled as not 
crimes, as described in Chapter 7.  
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Recoding the data consisted of running the syntax developed for the 2004-
2005 data set and then updating this syntax to include new makes and 
models of phone, following the iterative process already described in Figure 
7.1 of Chapter 7. As with the count-based Theft Index, the resulting SPSS™ 
data set consisted of rows of cases. Each row represented a mobile phone, 
with variables describing the nature of the incident and the make and model 
of phone taken. The steps necessary to calculate the Risk Ratio for each 
model of handset are described below: 
 
Counting the number of phones per offence 
It was necessary to ascertain the number of phones taken in each crime 
within the data set in order to define those cases where only the phone was 
taken. The number of phones per offence was counted by using the SPSS™ 
command ‘aggregate’ and defining the NMPCU crime number (CrimeID) as 
the break variable. The break variable defines the sets of cases within which 
addition occurs. The resultant new variable was named PhoneCount. This 
count relied on each line of NMPCU data representing an individual stolen 
phone. 
 
Identifying offences where only the phone was taken 
The next stage of calculating a Risk Ratio required labelling those cases 
where the phone was the only item which had been stolen. This involved 
comparing the count of phones stolen per crime, as calculated in the 
previous section, with the total amount of property recorded as stolen by the 
NMPCU. The 2006 dataset contained the NMPCU variable 
GENTotalProperty which recorded the total number of items reported stolen. 
Therefore, identifying which offences had involved the theft of only a mobile 
phone consisted of labelling those cases where the number of phones 
(PhoneCount computed as above) equalled the NMPCU variable 
GENTotalProperty. The syntax to achieve this is presented below in Figure 
8.2. 
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Figure 8.2 Syntax to identify ‘phone-only’ offences. 
 
Compute PhoneOnly = 0 . 
Execute. 
IF(GENTotalProperty=PhoneCount)PhoneOnly=1. 
Value labels PhoneCount 1 ‘Phone only’. 
Execute. 
 
 
Calculating Risk Ratios for each model of phone 
Once cases were labelled as being taken in targeted (phone-only) or in not 
phone-only offences, calculation of the Risk Ratio was relatively simple. A 
cross tabulation of the variables PhoneOnly and recoded MakeModel 
produced SPSS™ output which was exported to Microsoft Excel™. The 
counts of each model were then summed and the proportion of each model 
stolen in phone only offences calculated. The Risk Ratio was then calculated 
by dividing the proportion of each model taken in phone-only offences by the 
proportion taken in not phone-only offences. Note that analysis was 
conducted at the item level because the risk-based Theft Index ranks 
different models of phones according to their risk of theft. The SPSS™ 
syntax to produce the initial cross tabulation is presented in Figure 8.3 below. 
 
Figure 8.3 Syntax to produce Risk Ratio output for import to Microsoft Excel. 
 
Crosstabs tables= MakeModel by PhoneOnly. 
Execute. 
 
4. Comparing the risk-based Theft Indices produced by different 
permutations of offence types. 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, the robustness of the 
methodology used was tested by assessing if there were any significant 
differences in the risk-based Indices produced if various permutations of 
offence type were used. The original risk-based Theft Index for phones 
stolen in 2006 included all types of crime. The advantage of including all 
offence types was that the number of cases was maximised, and that all theft 
opportunities were controlled for. However, if variation had been found 
between the Indices using various offence permutations, this would have 
implied that the proportions of phone-only thefts differed between crime 
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types, and that the methodology might have needed refinement to take this 
into account. If a large majority of the offences which were assumed to be 
due to specific choices (phone-only offences) were in fact simply due to 
availability, then altering the composition of offence types included in the 
analysis should have altered the final Risk Ratios and resultant rankings of 
different phone models. 
 
Two potential alternative Indices were compared to the original risk-based 
Theft Index. The first alternative Index considered the Risk Ratios of phones 
stolen in ‘street crimes’. Street crimes were defined as those where offenders 
were thought to have had the best chance of seeing the phone and therefore 
to have made a choice about whether to take it. The offence types within the 
category street crimes were: robbery of personal property, snatch theft and 
other theft.  
 
The second alternative Index considered the four crime types which were 
most common within the 2006 data set. These were: robbery of personal 
property, burglary dwelling, snatch theft and other theft.  
 
In total, the robustness of the risk-based Theft Index was tested by 
comparing the Indices produced by using three combinations of crime type: 
all crimes types, street crimes, and the four most prevalent offence types. 
Because the Indices consisted of ranked order data, a two-tailed Spearman’s 
rank correlation was carried out to assess whether there was significant 
difference in the rank order of models between the three Indices. The test 
was two-tailed since there was no assumption about which, if either, of the 
Indices would result in higher or lower ranking of models compared to the 
others.  
 
5. Addressing the efficiency of Index production.  
As discussed in Chapter 7 the ideal Theft Index should be easy for NMPCU 
to produce without committing to the many hours of data recoding and 
analysis that were required to develop the initial Theft Indices. In order to 
assess the minimum recoding required to produce a meaningful Theft Index, 
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the correlation was measured between Indices resulting from the raw data as 
it was received from NMPCU, and the same data after it was recoded using 
the methodology described in Chapter 7. Again the overall aim of the 
analysis was to use Spearman’s rank correlation to assess the degree of 
similarity between the model ranking order produced by the recoded and the 
original data set. In order to assess this correlation it was necessary to 
merge together the raw 2006 data as it was received from NMPCU, with the 
recoded data.  
 
Merging raw and recoded data 
Producing Theft Indices using raw data required retracing the methodology 
described in Chapter 7 to create a data set which included both the raw and 
recoded versions of the variables Make and Model. By matching each case 
on its unique identifier, it was relatively simple to extract raw Make and raw 
Model from previous working data files, and to merge them using a slightly 
altered Modelmerge syntax. The final data file for comparison of the raw and 
recoded Theft Indices consisted of the raw and the recoded variable Make, 
and the raw and the recoded variable Model. Risk Ratios were then 
calculated for each model using raw Make and raw Model (the Raw Theft 
Index), and the recoded Make and recoded Model (the Recoded Theft 
Index).  
 
Results 
1. Recoding the 2006 NMPCU data set 
The 2006 data set was recoded using the same iterative development of 
syntax to recode phone Make and Model as described in Chapter 7. The 
syntax developed using the 2004-05 data provided a solid starting point for 
recoding the 2006 data, meaning less work was needed than when starting 
from scratch with the 2004-05 data. However the syntax to recode the 
variable Model still required several weeks of development because of the 
rapidly changing pool of models available for theft.   
 
The original 2006 Property data set consisted of 111877 cases. Further 
development of the 2004-05 SPSS™ syntax to recode Make resulted in 91.8 
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percent of the 2006 dataset (n= 102786) being recoded into a valid Make. 
The remaining 9091 cases were recoded as Missing. Table 8.3 below shows 
the frequencies and proportions of recoded Make within the 2006 dataset. 
 
Table 8.3: Recoded Make within the 2006 dataset 
Make Frequency Valid % 
Cum 
valid % 
Nokia 43762 42.58 42.58 
Sony Ericsson 20534 19.98 62.55 
Samsung 15107 14.70 77.25 
Motorola 13534 13.17 90.42 
LG 2886 2.81 93.23 
Siemens 1625 1.58 94.81 
Sagem 821 0.80 95.61 
Blackberry 816 0.79 96.40 
O2 546 0.53 96.93 
Sharp 526 0.51 97.44 
Orange 479 0.47 97.91 
NEC 462 0.45 98.36 
T-Mobile 383 0.37 98.73 
Panasonic 280 0.27 99.00 
Vodafone 272 0.26 99.27 
Hutchinson 255 0.25 99.52 
Virgin 107 0.10 99.62 
Alcatel 103 0.10 99.72 
Phillips 79 0.08 99.80 
Palm 61 0.06 99.86 
i-mate 33 0.03 99.89 
Sanyo 33 0.03 99.92 
Toshiba 24 0.02 99.94 
BT 18 0.02 99.96 
Amoi 14 0.01 99.97 
Qtek 7 0.01 99.98 
Bang & Olufsen 5 0.00 99.99 
Mitsubishi 4 0.00 99.99 
Other 10 0.01 100.00 
Valid total 102786 100.00  
 
In 2006 the proportion of cases accounted for by the top four makes Nokia, 
Sony Ericsson, Samsung and Motorola was comparable to the proportion 
they accounted for in 2004-05. In 2006 these four makes (n=92937) 
accounted for just over 90 percent of valid makes; in 2004- 05 they 
accounted for 87 percent.  
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2. The 2006 count-based Theft Index 
Model recoding was then carried out on the four most prevalent makes of 
phone, as it had been for the 2004- 05 data set to produce the count-based 
Theft Index. Again, models were validated against manufacturers’ websites 
and using wider internet searches. The four data sets were then re-merged 
with all other makes from the 2006 data. The resulting set contained all 2006 
cases, with the four most commonly stolen makes recoded to the model 
level, and all other makes recoded to the make level. The makes ranking fifth 
to eighth were also checked for models which, with some recoding, might 
rank within the top 20 most stolen models in any quarter. The makes ranking 
fifth to eighth were LG, Siemens, Sagem and Blackberry. The model LG 
Chocolate, a new and reasonably iconic model, was the only model identified 
as likely to rank within the top 20 stolen models in any given quarter. 
 
The final 2006 recoded data set consisted of 65926 cases containing 
validated model data (excluding models recoded as missing). Thus validated 
and recoded models were present for 58.9 percent of the original 2006 
NMPCU property data set; 64.1 percent of recoded makes, and 66.5 percent 
of cases within the eight most stolen makes in 2006. The syntax 
ModelMerge.sps was then run to enable the production of a count-based 
Theft Index for 2006. Table 8.4 below shows the top 20 models of the 2006 
count-based Theft Index. 
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Table 8.4: The top 20 models in the 2006 count-based Theft Index 
 
Rank Recoded Make and Model Frequency 
 
 Valid % 
(n=65926) 
Cum 
valid % 
1  Nokia 6230 7525 11.4 11.4 
2  Motorola Razr 6191 9.4 20.8 
3  Samsung D600 3425 5.2 26.0 
4  Samsung D500 3335 5.1 31.1 
5  Sony Ericsson W800i 2781 4.2 35.3 
6  Sony Ericsson K750i 2573 3.9 39.2 
7  Nokia N70 2154 3.3 42.4 
8  Nokia 6280 2114 3.2 45.7 
9  Sony Ericsson W810i 1641 2.5 48.1 
10  Sony Ericsson K700i 1534 2.3 50.5 
11  Sony Ericsson K800i 1310 2.0 52.5 
12  Nokia 8800 1304 2.0 54.4 
13  Nokia 6680 1264 1.9 56.4 
14  Nokia 6630 900 1.4 57.7 
15  Nokia 6111 867 1.3 59.0 
16  Nokia 3310 773 1.2 60.2 
17  Samsung E900 738 1.1 61.3 
18  Nokia 6310 723 1.1 62.4 
19  LG Chocolate 706 1.1 63.5 
20  Nokia 6210 608 0.9 64.4 
Other*   23460 35.6 100 
 *N of validated models in 2006 was 522. 
 
 
3. The 2006 risk-based Theft Index 
Table 8.5 below shows the twenty models of phone with the highest Risk 
Ratios in 2006. The results presented below are for those models of mobile 
phone where over 100 phones were taken during 2006. Inclusion of models 
with numbers less than 100 produced large variations in Risk Ratios which 
were presumed to be due to low numbers of cases rather than reflecting a 
genuine measure of theft risk. Further research would ideally identify the cut-
off number of cases where Risk Ratios become highly sensitive to variation 
due to small numbers. The LG Chocolate, at rank number 14, demonstrates 
the relevance of checking for models within lower ranking makes which were 
stolen in sufficient numbers to rank alongside those models from the four 
most commonly stolen makes, as described in Chapter 7 stage 5. 
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Table 8.5 The 20 most theft-prone phone models in 2006. 
 
Rank Phone Make and Model 
Total 
Stolen 
in 2006 
Risk 
Ratio 
2006 
1  Sony Ericsson W850i 196 2.70 
2  Sony Ericsson W810i 1641 2.27 
3  Samsung E900 738 2.11 
4  Sony Ericsson W550i 379 1.98 
5  Sony Ericsson W800i 2781 1.94 
6  Nokia 8800 1304 1.90 
7  Samsung E370 113 1.83 
8  Samsung D900 551 1.81 
9  Sony Ericsson K800i 1310 1.81 
10  Samsung D600 3425 1.79 
11  Sony Ericsson D750i 520 1.77 
12  Nokia N80 448 1.68 
13  Sony Ericsson K610i 112 1.60 
14  LG Chocolate 706 1.57 
15  Nokia 3250 128 1.56 
16  Samsung D800 176 1.51 
17  Nokia N91 252 1.50 
18  Nokia N73 335 1.48 
19  Motorola L6 419 1.45 
20  Nokia  6280 2114 1.42 
Other*   44623  
 
*N of ranks with over 100 phones stolen in 2006 was 90. 
 
4. Testing the robustness of the methodology 
Offence types within the 2006 dataset 
As described above, the rationale for testing whether using different crime 
types resulted in different Indices was that the level of targeting of specific 
handsets might vary across crime types. If this were the case, the inclusion 
of different crime types would result in different Indices. The first step in 
assessing the robustness of the methodology was to assess the distribution 
of crime types within the 2006 dataset. Table 8.6 below shows the 
proportions of each offence type within the 2006 data set. In line with earlier 
Home Office research described in Chapter 4, the majority of cases (nearly 
60 percent) were due to robbery and other theft.  
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Table 8.6 Offence types within the 2006 data set 
Offence type 
Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Valid 
Percent 
Other Theft 39826 38.7 38.7 
Robbery Personal Property 21176 20.6 59.3 
Burglary Dwelling 9937 9.7 69.0 
Snatch Theft 9629 9.4 78.4 
Theft from M/V 8230 8.0 86.4 
Picking Pockets etc 8128 7.9 94.3 
Burglary Other Buildings 2122 2.1 96.4 
ABH 1063 1.0 97.4 
Theft Shops 666 .6 98.0 
Theft/Taking of M/V 418 .4 98.5 
Robbery Business Property 379 .4 98.8 
Common Assault 323 .3 99.1 
Handling Stolen Goods 201 .2 99.3 
Fraud/Forgery Counted per 
person 165 .2 99.5 
GBH 101 .1 99.6 
Other Notifiable Other 82 .1 99.7 
Rape 56 .1 99.7 
Other Sexual 49 .0 99.8 
Other Accepted Crime- 
Other 45 .0 99.8 
Theft/Taking Pedal Cycles 28 .0 99.8 
Criminal Damage Motor 
vehicle 
28 .0 99.9 
Criminal Damage Dwelling 24 .0 99.9 
Violence vs person 
Harassment 23 .0 99.9 
Criminal Damage Other 22 .0 99.9 
Violence vs person Other 18 .0 100.0 
Drug Possession 14 .0 100.0 
Violence vs person 
Offensive Weapon 8 .0 100.0 
Murder 7 .0 100.0 
Criminal Damage Other 
Building 6 .0 100.0 
Fraud/Forgery Other 4 .0 100.0 
Other Notifiable Going 
Equipped 4 .0 100.0 
Drug Trafficking 2 .0 100.0 
Motor vehicle Interference 
Tampering 
1 .0 100.0 
Missing 1   
Total 102786   
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Spearman’s Rank correlation between the risk-based, Street Crime and 
Top 4 Crimes Indices. 
Two-tailed tests were carried out to assess if there was any significant 
difference between the Indices produced using the three permutations of 
offence type:  
 - All crimes (the usual risk-based methodology) 
- Street crimes (robbery of personal property, snatch theft and other theft) 
- Top four crime types (robbery of personal property, burglary dwelling, 
snatch theft and other theft) 
Spearman’s rank correlation showed that there was strong agreement 
between the Indices produced using these three combinations of offence 
type. The full results of the SPSS™ based test are depicted in Table 8.7 
below.   
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Table 8.7: SPSS™ output from Spearman’s Rank Correlation of three 
alternative risk-based Theft Indices. 
 
Risk Ratio 
Type   
All 
Crimes 
Top Four 
Crime Types 
Street 
Crimes 
All Crimes 
Correlation 
Coefficient 1 0.913647665 
0.91739798
4 
  Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.000001 0.000001 
  N 560 479 479 
Top 4 Crime 
Types 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.913647
7 1 
0.99231221
3 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000001 . 0.000001 
  N 479 479 479 
Street Crimes 
Correlation 
Coefficient 0.917398 0.992312213 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000001 0.000001 . 
  N 479 479 479 
 
 
The results show significant correlation between the three Indices when 
compared to each other: the correlation coefficient (in bold) is higher than 0.9 
for all comparisons. 
 
Specifically, the correlation between the Theft Index using all types of 
offence and the Theft Index using the four most common crime types is 
significant (r=0.91, n=479, p<0.000001, two tailed). Similarly the correlation 
between the Theft Index using all type of offence and using just ‘street 
crimes’ was significant (r=9.17, n=479, p<0.000001, two tailed). The 
correlation between the Top Four Theft Index and the Street Crimes Theft 
Index was significant (r=99, n=479, p<0.000001, two tailed).  
 
In some senses the results are not particularly surprising: all the Indices 
tested included both Other theft and Robbery of personal property, which 
together accounted for nearly 60 percent of cases. If in the future other 
Indices are produced where the distribution of crime types is not as skewed, 
it would be prudent to check for between-crime-type differences in targeting 
in order to check that the Index is robust. 
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5. Increasing the efficiency of Index production 
Two tailed Spearman’s rank correlations were carried out to assess whether 
or not there were significant differences between the Indices produced when 
recoded and when raw police data were used. The rationale was that if there 
were no significant differences, then NMPCU could empirically justify using 
their raw data to produce risk-based Indices and therefore save considerable 
resources when producing an Index. Spearman’s Rank correlation showed 
significant correlation between the Raw Theft Index and the Recoded Theft 
Index (r=0.99, n=89, p<0.01, two tailed).  
 
The results showed that NMPCU could justify production of a risk-based 
Theft Index using their raw data. However this is only justifiable if the relative 
ranking of each model in comparison to other models is the statistic of 
interest. If the Risk Ratio per se were the statistic of interest, other tests 
would need to be performed to assess the correlation between the Risk 
Ratios produced using recoded and raw data.   
 
Publications and the reaction of the mobile phone industry 
The count-based Theft Index was published in Mailley et al. (2006a) in the 
practitioner journal Justice of the Peace. The report was picked up widely by 
the media and was reported in, among other newspapers, the London 
Evening Standard (Prigg, 2006), The Daily Telegraph (Steele, 2006), The 
Mirror (Thornton, 2006) and The Western Mail (Livingstone and Carey, 
2006).  
 
The results of the risk-based Theft Index were first published in the 
practitioner journal Police Review (Farrell and Mailley, 2007) and this elicited 
a response from the mobile industry. Jack Wraith, the head of MICAF, 
personally responded. The following is a direct quote from Farrell and Mailley 
(2007): 
 
“There has been a dramatic rise in the ownership of mobile phones but this 
has not been matched by the theft of mobile phones,’ says Jack Wraith, 
chairman of the mobile phone crime action forum. The body represents 
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members of the industry, including the phone networks and high street 
retailers, and the Home Office. He says he would question ‘the usefulness 
and the viability’ of the phone theft index, which he compared to a vehicle 
crime index, adding: ‘A thief, in the main, steals a phone because the 
opportunity is there or the phone is a by-product of a robbery. I do not 
believe a thief stands on a street corner thinking: ‘I am going to steal that 
because it is a Samsung and not that one because it is a Nokia’.’ Mr Wraith 
says the industry has encouraged mobile phone users to register their 
phones at www.immobilise.com and ensures all stolen phones are blocked 
from use on all UK networks within 48 hours of being reported.” 
 
Jack Wraith further demonstrated a lack of awareness of criminological 
thinking in the response below, which was a comment made by email on a 
draft of the 2008 Security Journal publication (Mailley et al., 2008):  
 
“Mobile phone theft will NEVER go away. This shows a lack of understanding 
of the underlying problems of mobile phone theft. The authorities including 
Government, Police and industry can only put in place measures to impact 
on the post theft environment – phones will always be the subject of theft – 
FACT” (Jack Wraith, 2007 via personal correspondence to the author). 
 
Several points are worth iterating regarding Mr Wraith’s comments. Firstly, 
the comparison with the UK Car Theft Index was made originally by the 
research team, and Mr Wraith argued in person that cars and phones are so 
different that there is no common ground on which to make comparisons. 
This ignores the methodological similarities of the Indices (comparing what is 
stolen to what is available), and the overarching purpose of increasing 
consumer awareness in order to stimulate demand for safer products. The 
similarities are at the macro level and are most clearly seen in terms of 
routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979: Sampson et al., 2010). The 
micro level differences which he refers to (for example in target type, length 
of product life cycle and value of products) are real, but apply to the rational 
choice perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986).  
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Secondly, the comment that thieves do not discern between different models 
of mobile phone is in direct contrast to both rational choice theory (Cornish 
and Clarke, 1986), and to the evidence obtained during this research and 
reported in Chapter 6. Mobile phone thieves themselves reported that they 
often discerned between handsets when they could, and some had even 
given phones back to victims because the phones were so undesirable. To 
state publicly that rational choices are not made shows at the least a lack of 
awareness of current criminological literature and evidence, which is 
worrying when displayed by such an influential figure as the chair of MICAF. 
At worst this statement could be interpreted as turning a blind eye to the 
evidence which builds a case for compelling industry to take steps to secure 
mobile phones.  
 
Finally and critically, the claim that ‘all mobiles are blocked within 48 hours’ is 
itself untrue. A full rebuttal of this claim has been given in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter has described how the count-based Theft Index methodology 
was developed to produce a risk-based Theft Index that was practical for 
NMPCU to produce on a regular basis. An initial analysis at the manufacturer 
level had revealed that the risk of theft, based on sales data, differed 
between manufacturers and over time. This justified a more detailed 
exploration of risk at the model level. 
 
In the absence of sales data, phone availability was approximated using data 
available within the NMPCU data set. This removed the need for NMPCU to 
rely on any external organisation to provide data for the risk-based Theft 
Index. Furthermore, the use of NMPCU data removed the complications 
associated with using either sales or usage data. 
Phone availability was approximated by relying on the sampling effect of 
offences where phones were taken as a by-product of the offence. This 
measure had the advantage over sales data of representing phones 
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regardless of their age (i.e. when they were sold), and removed the need to 
interrogate the SEIR to assess usage patterns based on IMEI records. 
 
The risk-based Theft Index was restricted to models of phone where over 
100 had been taken according to NMPCU data, since numbers below 100 
were predicted to produce unreliable results.  
 
Spearman’s rank correlation showed that the theft risk rankings did not 
significantly alter when the types of offences considered were altered. 
Therefore all crime types were included to maximise the number in the 
sample.  
 
Spearman’s rank correlation showed that the rankings produced by the 
recoded data were significantly similar to the rankings produced by raw data. 
Therefore NMPCU could justify the production of risk-based Indices using 
their raw data. 
 
A key recommendation from this research for NMPCU was the adoption of 
drop down menus within their crime recording system for at least the variable 
phone make. This would minimise data entry errors. Gratifyingly, NMPCU 
have since adopted drop down menus for at least the key mobile 
manufacturers in the UK. It would also be possible for models to be 
organised into drop down menus if phone manufacturers would provide 
NMPCU with regularly updated lists of current models. However, the 
implementation of drop down menus for the variable Make means that, in 
effect, the data now produced by NMPCU are half recoded. The potential 
bias of underrepresentation of long or difficult make names will be removed 
by using drop down menus. This reduces even further any objections that 
might be raised if NMPCU produced risk-based Theft Indices using their raw 
data, since it is now in effect semi recoded.  
 
In conclusion, there seems to be no practical reason why NMPCU can not 
regularly produce a risk-based Theft Index using their raw data, including all 
types of crime, for models where 100 or more phones were stolen.  
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Future research could focus on honing the methodology as required. The 
remaining issues, albeit minor ones, are those of whether a separate Theft 
Index for bulk thefts of phones is justified and useful, and an analysis to 
estimate the minimum number of cases needed to produce a reliable Risk 
Ratio if time intervals between Indices are varied. 
 
The reactions of key personnel within the GSMA and MICAF to the academic 
publications resulting from this work suggest that the industry is against 
investing in more efficient IMEI blacklisting. The fact that the methodology for 
testing the efficacy of the SEIR is questionable to say the least, supports the 
hypothesis that industry is resisting the internalisation of crime costs, while 
publicly claiming that it is doing everything possible to protect customers 
from the risk of victimisation. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions, recommendations and predictions. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter summarises the outcomes of the research presented in this 
thesis. Headline observations and recommendations are highlighted in bold. 
Normal text is used to expand upon and give evidence for the conclusions 
and recommendations. The results are presented in the order of a summary 
of progress in mobile phone theft prevention to date; an analysis of mobile 
phone theft in the UK through the lens of routine activity theory (Cohen and 
Felson, 1979; Sampson et al, 2010) and applying the notion of crime as 
pollution (Roman and Farrell, 2002). Evidence for the rationality of mobile 
phone thieves is then summarised and the implications for the rational choice 
perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) are clarified. The chapter concludes 
by specifying the implications of this research for macro level policy, and for 
designing-out crime from mobile phone handsets. The final table presents 
some predictions of how theft patterns for various motivations of mobile 
phone theft will alter in the future if the two key practical recommendations of 
this thesis are implemented. These are: 
1) A Mobile Phone Theft Index is published which stimulates market demand 
for increased security features in phones, resulting in incremental 
improvements in phone security.  
2) Blacklisting efficiency is independently reviewed and subsequently 
increased. 
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A SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM OF MOBILE PHONE THEFT AND ITS 
PREVENTION IN THE UK  
Mobile phone theft has been a chronic problem in the UK since the early 
1990s (POST, 1995) and is estimated to cost the UK in excess of £1.2 billion 
each year (Mailley and Farrell, 2006). It can be viewed as a form of pollution 
(Roman and Farrell, 2002) where industry profits and society bears the costs 
of crime consequences. 
Future research should aim to triangulate sources such as the British 
Crime Survey and NMPCU data to provide a more up to date estimate of 
annual theft levels for England and Wales. A thorough analysis of a 
variety of sources led to an estimate of 710 000 mobile phone thefts in 
England and Wales during 2000 (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). The 
majority of these thefts occurred while the phones were unattended, such as 
when left on tables or in vehicles. Females were at slightly higher risk of 
victimisation than were males. Offenders were almost all male, and there 
was evidence of groups acting together and accounting for an increase in 
‘street crimes’ (Harrington and Mayhew, 2001). Data from NMPCU (Higgins, 
2007) suggest that theft levels decreased in 2007 following a peak in 2004 
and 2005.  
The mobile phone industry has acted as a monopoly when responding to 
government and media demands for increased phone security. Industry has 
resisted government calls to effectively design-out crime from its products, by 
blaming offenders and phone users, and by claiming that phone thieves take 
any phone available to them. The implication is that any prevented crime will 
be displaced. 
The UK government has been successful in coercing the mobile phone 
industry to take some action. Home Office minister Hazel Blears’ meeting in 
2004 resulted in security standards for IMEIs (via the GSMA’s 9 Principles 
for IMEI Security), and a target for UK blacklisting efficiency (via the 2006 
Mobile Phone Industry Crime Reduction Charter). In addition, the UK 
government invested considerable resources by establishing the NMPCU, 
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initiating the Mobile Phones (Reprogramming) Act 2002, and addressing 
street crime via the Street Crime Initiative.  
A status quo exists where the UK government is being told that all possible 
prevention measures have been taken by industry, and that blacklisting 
targets are being met. The government therefore has little leverage with 
which to reasonably demand further action from industry. The critique of 
industry’s self-funded and self-directed research (see Cooper et al., 2007) in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis shows how the government has been misled. 
Blacklisting is not likely to be as efficient as claimed by industry, and 
furthermore it would not decrease phone thefts where the phone is sold 
abroad, sold for parts, for recycling, or when they have taken place as part of 
a bullying act. Therefore an alternative fresh initiative is needed to break the 
unfavourable stalemate in which industry continues to pollute. 
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A MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF MOBILE PHONE THEFT: ROUTINE 
ACTIVITY THEORY AND CRIME AS POLLUTION 
1. Mobile phones are the crime target in mobile phone theft. The role of 
guardian (of the phone) can be filled by the phone owner, members of 
the public, and by technological or physical security features of the 
phone. Manufacturers are the supercontrollers who define the supply 
of suitable technological or physical security features, and therefore 
they define the supply of suitable targets.  
2. The government, police and the public can be seen as 
supercontrollers who interact with phone manufacturers to create 
demand for increased security. The current status quo of industry pollution 
exists because the goals of government and the police (to decrease phone 
thefts) do not align with the goals of industry (to maximise profit). The public 
have little power to create demand for increased security because they are 
currently unaware of the variation in, or perhaps the presence of, theft risk 
conferred according to model choice. 
3. One means of aligning the incentives of all supercontrollers is to 
create public demand for increased security. Security would become a 
marketable commodity and therefore of interest to phone manufacturers. The 
role of government as supercontroller would be minimised as a market for 
security evolved, thereby minimising demand on government resources. An 
acceptable level of pollution (phone theft) should emerge, once a threshold is 
reached above which consumers are not prepared to pay for further 
increased security.  
4. One method for creating a market for phone security is to inform 
consumers of the variance in theft risk across handsets. This would 
achieve market barrier reduction (Stavins, 2000). The UK Car Theft Index 
(Laycock, 2004) provides an example of a previously successful market 
barrier reduction initiative.  
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A MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF MOBILE PHONE THEFT: THE 
RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE  
Mobile phone thieves display rationality in their choice of victim and 
their choice of phone target. This headline conclusion is based on the sub-
conclusions and evidence listed below. The choice-structuring properties of 
mobile phones and some of the wider situational factors considered by 
phone thieves are depicted in a novel rational choice event model for mobile 
phone theft, reproduced below as Figure 9.1. This is a copy of Figure 6.5 of 
this thesis. 
Figure 9.1: A rational choice event model for mobile phone theft 
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1. Mobile phone thieves prefer to take some models of phone rather 
than others. Thieves are not, on aggregate, opportunists who take any 
phone available.  
a) There exists a population of offenders who specialise in taking only 
phones rather than other objects such as iPods. Approximately half (46%) of 
the offenders interviewed take only phones. One third (34%) of the 
interviewed offenders are generalists and vary their choice of theft object 
depending on the situation.  
b) Mobile phone thieves make choices about which phones they wish to 
take. Some mobile phone thieves even give back phones which they 
perceive to have little or no value. Three quarters of offenders interviewed 
stated that they make active choices at the point of theft.  
c) The choice-structuring properties of the wider phone theft situation include 
the likelihood of retaliation by victims; the likelihood of public intervention; 
and the modus operandi necessary to remove a phone from the victim. 
These properties inform assessments of the likelihood of theft events being 
successful; of personal injury; and of the likelihood and severity of 
punishment by the police.  
 
2. Different handsets are at varying risk of theft, and theft risk varies 
over time. 
a) Hypothetical scenarios presented to offenders during interviews led to 
measurable group preferences within six matched pairs of phones. The 
strongest preference ratio within a pair was 100 percent, where all offenders 
chose the Nokia 6010 over the older and larger Nokia 5110. The pair which 
elicited a split opinion among the sample consisted of the Sony Ericsson 
K700i and its very similar upgrade, the Sony Ericsson T630. 
b) These stated preferences are backed by empirical analysis of crime 
records held at the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit. Handset models 
 307 
 
display ‘theft careers’ mirroring the four stage product life-cycle of legitimate 
products (Felson and Clarke, 1998). Controlling for phone availability allows 
the most theft-prone models to be identified. In 2006 the four most theft-
prone phone models were the Nokia 6230, the Motorola Razr, the Samsung 
D600 and the Samsung D500 (Mailley et al., 2008). 
c) The variance in theft risk of certain models confers variance in theft risk to 
the manufacturer level. For example the theft ratio (percent stolen over 
percent sold) for Motorola phones doubled from 0.8 in 2004 to 1.7 in 2006. 
The iconic ‘Motorola Razr’ was arguably responsible for the majority of this 
increase, if not all of it. 
 
3. The main factor which increases risk of theft is resale value, which is 
assessed using the properties of handset moderness and functionality. 
a) The choice-structuring properties of mobile phones include how modern 
the phone looks and its functionality, as well as how familiar the model is to 
the offender. These properties inform assessments of the likely resale value 
and personal enjoyment of the phones.  
 
4. Increased experience of mobile phone theft leads to faster decision-
making, because elements of the decision-making process are 
automatic.  
a) Expert phone thieves are more likely to recognise and name the models of 
phone presented at interview than are novices. Their preference ratios within 
the six matched pairs of phones are the same as or higher than the 
preference ratios of novices.  
b) Expert offenders are more likely to mention resale value than are novices. 
Novices are slightly more likely to mention functionality and moderness than 
are experts. These results suggest that experienced thieves by-pass or carry 
out automatically an assessment of moderness and functionality, providing 
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support for the hypothesis that experience leads to automatic progression 
along a familiar crime script (Cornish, 1994). 
c) Increased experience can be modelled as embedding more firmly the 
option of phone theft as a perceived solution in Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) 
involvement model. In contrast, the responses of non-offenders highlight that 
they are not in the possession of the three characteristics which predict 
continuance in crime (professionalism, life-style changes and peer networks). 
This has implications for the use of non-offenders in decision-making 
research. 
 
5. Experienced thieves are less easily deterred than are novices, and 
are more resourceful in finding methods to overcome security 
measures. 
a) The average percentage of experts deterred across the 23 design 
solutions was 33.3 percent compared to 37.1 percent of novices. The 
significance of this variation did not reach statistical significance (two sample 
t(37)= 0.63, p>0.5). 
b) Experienced offenders are more likely than novices to report that they can 
overcome security measures or that they can find someone who can; and 
that they will find an alternative use for a stolen phone even if it cannot work 
in the UK. Alternative uses include sale abroad, personal use and sale of 
parts. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY 
1. A Mobile Phone Theft Index should be produced using NMPCU data 
on a quarterly basis.  
Newman (2004) concluded that publicity which increased consumer demand 
for safety and security was the most influential mechanism resulting in 
vehicle re-designs in the US. The example of the UK Car Theft Index (2004) 
shows how effective Indices can be in stimulating market demand for 
security. Consumers do not routinely consider theft risk when purchasing 
electronic items (Learmount, 2005), and this is probably because crime is an 
orthogonal (unrecognised) externality (Farrell and Roman, 2006).  
a) The routine production of a Mobile Phone Theft Index which 
assesses risk of theft for different models of phones is feasible and 
methodologically justifiable using data which already exist within the 
crime records held by the UK’s National Mobile Phone Crime Unit.  
b) The equation for assessing theft risk for each phone model is: 
 
Risk Ratio =   Proportion taken in targeted crimes (phone-only) 
Proportion taken in acquisitive crimes (not phone-only). 
 
The denominator for the Index should be offences where a phone is taken 
along with other items, which controls for phone availability and negates the 
need for industry cooperation in supplying phone pool data. The numerator is 
the number of phones taken in offences where the phone is the only item 
taken.  
c) The Index can use non-cleaned NMPCU data, saving on the 
resources necessary for routine production.  
The model ranking orders produced using raw and recoded police data were 
significantly similar (rho=0.99, n=89, p<0.01, two tailed). This implies that raw 
police data can be used in Index production. This is justifiable only if the 
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relative ranking of each model in comparison to other models is the statistic 
of interest.  
 
d) The Index should include all offence types apart from bulk thefts. 
Commercial and bulk thefts were omitted from the analysis of NMPCU data. 
Bulk thefts would disproportionately increase the representation of stolen 
models in theft data, assuming that large volumes of a single model are 
taken. They are arguably not of interest to the general public who are 
concerned with personal victimisation, rather than commercial victimisation.  
Correlation between the Theft Index using all types of offence and the Theft 
Index using the four most common crime types was significant (rho=0.91, 
n=479, p<0.000001, two tailed). Future research should assess whether bulk 
thefts occur in sufficient quantities to warrant a separate Index.  
 
e) The Index should include only models of phone where at least 100 
handsets have been taken, but further analysis should reassess this 
threshold over time.  
It is likely that the risk ratios of handsets where fewer than 100 phones are 
taken will be overly sensitive to changes in small numbers. However, an 
element of common sense is needed. If, for example, a new model is 
released which is predicted to be at high risk of theft, this should be included 
in in-house horizon-scanning for signs of the product progressing along a 
theft career. 
 
f) The Index should initially be produced on a three-monthly (quarterly) 
basis, but this time period should be reassessed depending on the 
theft trajectories or ‘theft careers’ of the most frequently stolen phones. 
The appropriate time period for Index production will rely partly on the 
distribution of theft risk among models. If, for example, a large proportion of 
 311 
 
thefts are of one particular model, then the numbers of other models stolen 
will be low, meaning that it might make sense to produce an Index only every 
six months. The appropriate time period will also rely on the time span of 
theft careers of different models. If in the future the rate of model turnover in 
the stolen population increases and theft careers shorten, it will make sense 
to decrease the time intervals between Indices.  
2. The effectiveness of the Index should be assessed by NMPCU. 
The effectiveness of the proposed Index should be assessed at the macro 
level by measuring aggregate phone theft levels, and at the micro level by 
assessing the product life-cycles or theft careers of different models of 
phone. The effectiveness of new security measures can be assessed by 
comparing the theft risk of models incorporating the new technologies with 
those which do not. Very effective security measures would result in no 
discernable theft career. 
 
3. It is imperative that an independent review of blacklisting efficiency 
is carried out. 
a) The claim by industry that they are meeting blacklisting targets 
agreed under the Mobile Phone Industry Crime Reduction Charter 
(2006) is doubtful.  
The UK government is currently ill-informed about how efficiently stolen 
phones are cut off (blacklisted), and this lack of information allows the status 
quo of crime pollution to continue. The methodology for testing the UK SEIR 
used by Cooper et al. (2007) is questionable. Issues include the possibility 
that time-slippage occurred, meaning that handsets were tested at minimum 
time intervals as opposed to absolute intervals; the absence of internal 
controls for validity; and the involvement of MICAF in the testing process.  
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b) Previous research has shown that industry tends to act in its own 
interests unless severe pressure is applied (Laycock, 2004; Newman, 
2004; Clarke and Newman, 2005).  
To date, the phone industry has shown reluctance to fully engage in crime- 
proofing phones against physical theft, and has instead done the minimum 
required to avoid legislation by government. If the issue of blacklisting 
efficiency is not investigated fully, it is likely that the status quo will not alter.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNING-OUT CRIME FROM MOBILE PHONES 
1. Blacklisting should not be the sole focus of future crime prevention 
efforts. More efficient blacklisting of stolen phones would decrease 
aggregate phone theft levels in the UK but there are three further 
considerations: 
a) Blacklisting within 24 and 48 hours deterred fewer than a fifth of offenders. 
Even immediate blacklisting deterred only forty percent. Alternative 
deterrents should be sought. 
b) Blacklisting would not remove the incentives for stealing phones and 
selling their parts; nor for stealing phones to sell abroad; nor for stealing 
phones for the data which they hold. Furthermore, blacklisting would be 
unlikely to deter any thefts which result from bullying in schools.  
c) Blacklisting is only effective while IMEIs (the phone’s identity number) 
remain secure against hacking. Insecure IMEIs would reintroduce the 
incentive to steal phones for resale in the UK. Thus an ongoing arms race 
between IMEI hackers and security experts should be anticipated and paid 
for by industry. 
 
2. Future designs which aim to deter thieves should greatly reduce the 
resale value of handsets, perhaps by using advanced technology. It is 
imperative that technological solutions cannot be easily bypassed; and 
that tracking devices result in a swift and negative consequence. 
a) The four designs which had the strongest deterrent effect on offenders in 
interviewed can be grouped in to two design types: those which use 
reasonably advanced technology (the biometrically activated phone, and a 
tracking device) and those which greatly decrease the financial value of the 
handset (the disposable and the ubiquitous phone).  
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b) In interview some offenders immediately considered if and how they could 
circumvent the technological deterrents, and were certain that somebody 
somewhere will soon invent a solution.  
c) Some offenders believed that the police did not have the resources to 
follow up on a large volume of tracking devices. Others believed they could 
sell the phone on quickly before being detected. These offenders were not 
deterred by the tracking device.  
 
3. Non-offenders are not necessarily suitable substitutes for offenders 
when predicting the crime consequences of new products.  
a) The preferences of non-offenders for phones within the six matched pairs 
did not reflect real-world relative theft risk as accurately as did offender 
preferences. Non-offenders underestimated the preference of thieves for 
certain handsets, and underestimated the strength of preference for other 
handsets. However these differences did not reach statistical significance. 
For example the offender preference ratios ‘predicted’ that the risk of theft for 
the Samsung D500 was 4.6 times that of the Nokia 7610. The non-offender 
preference ratios predicted the D500 would be at a risk of theft 0.5 times that 
of the Nokia 7610. Analysis of NMPCU records of thefts in 2006 revealed 
that the D500 was at 3.5 times the risk of thefts as the Nokia 7610. 
b) Non-offenders were on average more easily deterred than offenders. For 
5 of the 23 design solutions, this difference reached significance. The 
average deterrence rate across the 23 designs was 58 percent for students, 
and 36 percent for offenders. The difference in the percentage of students 
and offenders deterred by the 23 designs was significant (two-sample t (82)= 
6.5, p<0.001). 
c) Non-offenders were less ‘ready’ to offend (Clarke and Cornish, 1985) than 
were offenders, and when imagining the crime event they gave different 
weight to target characteristics than did offenders. The differential deterrence 
of offenders and non-offenders was due to four elements: an increased 
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tendency in students to report guilt compared to offenders; a lack of student 
focus on the financial resale value of the phone; a lack of knowledge among 
students of ways to circumvent security technology (such as reprogramming 
IMEIs); and the possibility that some students ‘got into character’ as they 
progressed through the hypothetical scenarios and so did not produce 
consistent answers.  
4. The deterrent effects of the 23 designs which were assessed in the 
offender interviews reported here should be used to refine the 
weighting of Clarke and Newman’s (2005) checklist of product security 
when considering mobile phones. For example, Clarke and Newman 
(2005) advocate that a PIN code scores the maximum on the product 
security checklist, whereas the deterrent effect of a PIN code was minimal 
according to offenders’ responses 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. The efficiency of blacklisting phones needs to be assessed, via an 
independent and blind test. The results should be compared to those 
reported by System Concepts who carried out previous tests of blacklisting 
efficiency (see Pimm et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2007). 
2. Further assessments of the different responses given by offenders and 
non-offenders to questions concerning deterrence are warranted. The 
majority of the non-offender population used in this research were design 
students, and a wider variety of non-offenders should be assessed to 
develop a more representative model of non-offender responses.  
3. Further assessments of a wider variety and greater number of mobile 
phone thieves are needed, in order to verify the validity of the initial rational 
choice event model proposed here.  
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4. Future research should consider whether the questions asked in the 
interview schedules used here could be randomised in order to minimise any 
order effects created by the interview design.  
5. The research presented here has focused on stated preferences between 
phone models, and used police crime data to explore ‘real world’ 
preferences. Future research should utilise mock-up theft scenes, and 
technology such as eye-scanning tools, to assess offender and non-offender 
responses to potential theft targets in the context of more complex 
environments. Observing the eye movements of offenders and non-
offenders, as well as novice and more experienced thieves, would be an 
ideal way to assess how accurate are hypotheses that aspects of target 
recognition becoming more swiftly recognised with increased theft 
experience.  
6. Since the empirical work for this thesis was undertaken, a key 
development is that the UK Home Office is considering regular production of 
the Mobile Phone Theft Index. Future independent research should measure 
theft rates, theft MO, and geographic patterns of thefts before and after Index 
publication, to test for preventive and possible displacement effects of the 
Index on phone thefts. There remains the question of how swiftly any 
decrease in theft rates would translate from Index, through to manufacturers, 
and onto the ground where consumers experience decreased risk of theft. 
This will in part depend upon manufacturer responses to the Index. It will 
also depend in part on whether the publicity alone from the Index has a 
positive effect and prevents some phone thefts before any newly designed 
models are released. Further desk-based research is needed to assess the 
probable timescales of the initial and longer term effects of the Index.  
7. If an Index is to be produced regularly, the methodology used to produce it 
should be refined according to the recommendations made under the section 
‘Implications for government policy’. 
8. Further research should explore the nature of the phones which were 
discarded in the lost property sections of Loughborough Police and 
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University, and could be expanded to a wider variety of lost property depots. 
Industry data describing the profile (market share) of handsets sold around 
the dates that the lost handsets were handed in, should be compared to the 
profile of the handsets handed to lost property departments. This would allow 
an assessment of whether or not the discarded phones were the older and 
less valuable models of their day, which is the result predicted by the 
research presented in this thesis.  
9. Data held by the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit should be mined 
further in order to assess the nature of several aspects of the ‘theft careers’ 
of different handsets. It appears from the initial analyses presented here that 
different models display theft careers of varying length and scale; and 
quantification of these factors would help to predict future theft patterns if 
those factors could be linked to some measurable aspect of the handset. It is 
likely that those measurable aspects will reflect the characteristics of 
CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) but operationalising (quantifying) these 
characteristics requires further research.  
   
TENTATIVELY PREDICTING THE FUTURE 
Ken Pease (1997) has rightly lamented the absence of predictions within 
criminological literature in general. A sound theory should arguably be able 
to predict with some accuracy as well as to explain with hindsight. The final 
section of this thesis considers how increased blacklisting efficiency and 
increased in-built security technology would, in the future, affect various 
motivations for mobile phone theft. These predictions are presented in Table 
9.1 below. 
.  
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Table 9.1: Some predictions about future patterns of phone theft if blacklisting is increased, and if security is designed-in to 
handsets. 
Predicted aspect of theft patterns: Increased blacklisting  Better security in specific models 
Aggregate phone theft levels 
 
Theft levels of specific models 
 
 
 
Displacement  
 
 
 
Diffusion of benefits  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decrease 
 
Smaller decrease in theft rates of models stolen 
for sale abroad; for sale of parts; recycling; and 
due to bullying. 
 
Target displacement to other goods (e.g. iPods; 
iPads). Tactical displacement to sale abroad 
(low risk); or sale for parts (low risk) 
 
More casual robbers stop all together, therefore 
thefts in general decrease. Ditto for muggings.  
 
 
 
 
 
Decrease 
 
Greatest decrease in the newly secured 
models. Specifically, crime-proof models will 
not have a theft cycle. 
 
Possible target displacement to non-secured 
models of phones. Displacement is highly 
unlikely to be absolute. 
 
High probability that all phones are perceived 
as more secure, therefore thefts of all models 
decrease. As with blacklisting, this may then 
diffuse to decreases in thefts in general. Some 
less secure models may then suffer a second 
crime wave as knowledge about these more 
vulnerable models spreads. 
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Emerging and future crime forms? 
 
Theft for data: blacklisting will have little effect 
on crimes where data, to inform identity theft or 
to sell on the black market, is the target. 
 
Recycling: blacklisting will have no effect on 
whole-phone-recycling-driven thefts unless 
checks are carried out on authenticity of 
ownership by recycling companies. Blacklisting 
would not decrease recycling of phone 
components, to the extent that increased 
recycling opportunities could drive an increase 
in recycling-of-parts-driven thefts. 
Security aimed specifically at protecting stored 
data (e.g. biometrics) would probably decrease 
risk of theft for data.  
 
Recycling: new security technologies may 
increase recycling-of-parts-driven thefts if the 
technology uses precious materials. Different 
technologies will have different or no effect on 
whole-phone-recycling driven thefts, according 
to their security mechanisms. 
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The different motivations for mobile phone theft are treated separately, in line with 
Clarke and Harris’ (1992) observations that differential motivations for car theft 
warranted separate analyses. Changes in theft patterns are predicted for aggregate 
phone theft; theft for resale abroad; theft for sale of parts; thefts as part of bullying; 
and thefts where recyclable components are the main target. The likely effects of 
increased blacklisting and increased security features in handsets are considered for 
each motivation. In addition, the likelihood of displacement and diffusion of benefits 
are considered.  
In general, increased blacklisting will decrease aggregate theft levels, but not deter 
thefts motivated by anything other than use in the UK. Blacklisting might produce 
some target displacement, to iPods or other valuable consumer items, but previous 
research (e.g. Guerette and Bowers, 2009) suggests displacement will not be 
complete. There is the potential that removing the rewards of phone theft will 
decrease the numbers of offenders recruited into a criminal career, if phone theft is a 
debut crime.  
Incremental improvements in phone security would confer varying levels of 
protection depending on the nature of the security feature and the motivation for 
theft. The greatest decreases in theft risk would be seen in models incorporating new 
security measures, but there may be initial diffusion of benefits to all models of 
phone if security implementation is ubiquitous. A second mini-crime harvest may 
occur as knowledge of how to circumvent specific security measures spreads 
through the offending population (Ekblom, 2007).  
It would be a useful exercise to review, perhaps in a few years, the accuracy of these 
predictions. If they prove to be inaccurate, this might signify that a crucial choice-
structuring property has not been identified in this research. A major caveat of any 
future assessment has to be that other factors which may affect crime patterns 
should be controlled for. Such factors include changing economic conditions, or an 
as yet unimagined revolution in the way that mobile services are delivered and 
charged for. Clarke and Newman (2005) describe how predictions about a crime 
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harvest of television set-top boxes were incorrect because the boxes were given 
away for free instead of being sold as originally planned. Financial revenue was 
generated from the services they provided rather than from sales.  
If the Index proposed herein is produced, and the knowledge gained from interviews 
about the choice structuring properties of phones is used by designers, the resultant 
innovation race by industry to produce more secure phones should produce 
incremental security improvements. It is commonly said about predictions that ‘the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating’. It is hoped that in the case of a Mobile Phone 
Theft Index, that the proof of the Index will be in the prevention. 
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Appendix 3.1: FOI response 
 
 
Direct Communications Unit 
  2 Marsham Street, London  SW1P 4DF 
Switchboard 020 7035 4848    Fax: 020 7035 4745 Textphone: 020 7035 4742 
E-mail: xxxxxx.xxxxxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxx.xxx.xxx.xx   Website: www.homeoffice.gov.uk 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx 
Mr Gareth Oakley 
 
Reference:  T23587/8 
 
Dear Mr Oakley, 
Thank you for your e-mail of 04/11/2008 23:01:09 about the Car Theft Index.  
 
I can confirm that the 2006 Car Theft Index is the most up-to-date version of the 
document available.  
 
There is a possibility that a 2008 version of the document will be produced during 
2009 however the plans to do so are not confirmed.  
 
DEBBIE MOON 
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Appendix 4.1 People met during the research 
These included in-person visits to: Panasonic; Three (3);Vodafone headquarters at 
Newbury, Vodafone Callcentre at Addelsbury; 02 (2 meetings); Virgin Mobile; the 
Mobile Industry Crime Action Forum (MICAF, 2 meetings); National Mobile Phone 
Crime Unit (NMPCU, 8 meetings); Global System Mobile Association (GSMA, 2 
meetings); the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI); the Home Office Acquisitive Crime 
Team (3 meetings); Home Office Street Crime Action Team; Home Office Robbery 
Team; Derbyshire Police Intelligence Unit (2 meetings); Leicestershire Police 
Intelligence Unit; Loughborough Police Station Lost Property (4 meetings); Applied 
Forensic Solutions (AFS); and Argos retailers. In addition, we communicated by 
phone and email with Phonesec (a French company who monitor phone software 
hacking), and Recipero (the company who run the CheckMEND website to trace 
stolen phones).   
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Appendix 5.1: Application to HMPS to interview 
 
APPLICATION TO UNDERTAKE RESEARCH IN HER MAJESTY'S 
PRISON SERVICE 
 
 
Researcher Details 
 
Surname: Mailley      Title: Miss. 
 
Forename(s): Jennifer Clare 
 
Contact Address: 
Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, 
Department of Social Sciences, 
Brockington Building, 
Loughborough University. 
Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU 
 
Contact Telephone Number: 01509 223616/ 07956 459 156 
Contact Email Address: J.C.Mailley@lboro.ac.uk 
 
 
Name, Status and Address of Research Supervisor (if appropriate): 
Professor Graham Farrell, 
Director, Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice,  
Department of Social Sciences, 
Brockington Building, 
Loughborough University, 
Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU 
 
Name and Address of Sponsoring Body (if appropriate): 
 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) 
Crime and Technology Programme, 
Polaris House 
North Star Avenue 
Swindon 
Wiltshire 
SN2 1ET  
England 
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If more than one researcher will be engaged on the project, please copy this page and 
provide details on all.  
 
Please attach a CV for all researchers: 
1. Please find attached CVs for Jennifer Mailley, Graham Farrell, and Shaun Whitehead. 
2.  
 
3.  
4.  
Researcher Details 
 
Surname: Whitehead     Title: Mr 
 
Forename: Shaun  
 
Contact Address: 
Department of Design and Technology, 
Loughborough University, 
Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU 
 
Contact Telephone Number: 01664 810009/ 07729 410561 
Contact Email Address: shaun@creationeer.co.uk 
 
 
Name, Status and Address of Research Supervisor (if appropriate): 
Professor Graham Farrell, 
Director, Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice,  
Department of Social Sciences, 
Brockington Building, 
Loughborough University, 
Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU 
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Name and Address of Sponsoring Body (if appropriate): 
 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) 
Crime and Technology Programme, 
Polaris House 
North Star Avenue 
Swindon 
Wiltshire 
SN2 1ET  
England 
 
 
 
5. ADDITIONAL OBSERVER: 
6. In addition to the 2 researchers named above, Peter Hamerton from the Home Office 
Acquisitive Crime Team plans to attend a selection of the interviews as an observer. Please 
see attached letter of support also. He is contactable on his mobile: 07984 493077  
 
All research is to be overseen by Professor Graham Farrell, who has previous experience of 
interviewing offenders, and will be heavily involved in the analysis and dissemination of the 
work, and will attend at least the initial interviews.  
 
7. Proposed Research – Aims and Objectives 
 
8. Research title:  
Iconography and Semantics of Technological Deterrence within Mobile Telephones: 
A Crime Feasibility Study 
 
 
9. Reason for undertaking research project: 
Academic research as part of the Midlands Centre for Criminology’s normal academic 
activities. We have an EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council) grant 
to look into the problem of mobile phone theft, and interviewing offenders is part of that 
EPSRC funded project. Goals of the project include publications in relevant journals, such as 
the British Journal of Criminology, and more importantly tangible, practical solutions 
actionable by the Home Office, mobile phone industry and Criminal Justice System to lower 
mobile phone theft. 
Mobile phone theft remains high, due to continued demand on the black market for the 
newer models released. Understanding exactly how such thefts occur, where the phones go, 
who fences them, who buys them and how offenders might be deterred or more easily 
detected will aid the development of crime prevention policy and of  policing strategies, 
ultimately lowering the crime rate. 
The reason for interviewing offenders is twofold: 
Firstly, to gain in depth knowledge of the ‘Who What When Where and Why’ of the thefts 
committed. Previous research in this area is scarce, and the main text, Harrington and 
Mayhew 2001, is out of date, since new technologies and methods of selling phones 
(abroad, and over the internet) have emerged since this research was undertaken. 
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Secondly, to ask offenders if they would be deterred from repeat offending by the new phone 
designs we will present to them. These designs range from simply warning the thief that the 
phone can and will be blocked (and so be worthless) if it is stolen, to incorporating 
biotechnology making it much more difficult for the phone to be used by anyone apart from 
the rightful owner. Thus we will be able to assess which, if any, of these solutions are worth 
considering further in working groups consisting of the Home Office, National Mobile Phone 
Crime Unit, handset manufacturers (e.g. Nokia) and network operators (e.g O2). 
 
The Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team agrees that the problem of mobile theft is an 
ongoing and expensive issue, and welcome out independent and academic but practically 
based input- see letter of support from Peter Hamerton attached. 
 
 
Furthermore, the U.K has already put in place a system (where stolen phones are cut off), to 
tackle the issue of mobile phone theft, but there is no documentation of the good practice 
used and the lessons learned during the process of setting up this system, nor of any issues 
remaining. Our initial research suggests there are implementation issues which if resolved 
could greatly improve the efficacy of the system at cutting off stolen phones, and therefore 
deterring theft for resale within the U.K. Thus another aim of this research is to bring 
together this previous work and communicate it to the relevant parties- other criminologists, 
the Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team, the network operators and handset manufacturers, 
and working groups concerned with security such as MICAF (Mobile Industry Crime Action 
Forum) and the GSMA (Global Systems Mobile Association).  
This aspect of the research (which is separate from but intertwined with the interviews 
sought here) presents an opportunity to document good practice, in order to spread the 
lessons learnt,  while identifying implementation issues, and building on this to make 
recommendations to increase the efficacy of the system and ultimately lower the rate of 
mobile phone thefts in the U.K. 
 
Finally, this research has implications for other ‘crime waves’: if a solution to drive down the 
thefts of mobile phones can be found, then the same ideas can be applied to the emerging 
wave of thefts of PDAs, SatNav, MP3 players and other new portable technologies (‘Hot 
Products’). 
 
 
What is (are) the research question(s)? 
 
Overall project questions: 
1) What is the nature and extent of mobile phone theft in the U.K now, in 2006? 
2) What happens once a phone is reported stolen- is it cut off? How? If not, why not? 
3) What would act as a deterrent to potential thieves, to lower the incidents of mobile phone 
theft? 
4) Is there evidence that by cutting off phones stolen within the U.K, the criminal market has 
changed to selling more phones abroad (where the phones still function)? 
 
Questions to be addressed by interviewing offenders: 
A list of specific proposed interview questions is attached, which we are happy to revise 
based on any guidance from you, but in general the interviews aim to find out: 
1) The detail of an offenders last incidence of taking a phone- how, where, when, why that 
phone/ that person. 
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2) Whether they are aware that phones can be cut off in the U.K once they’re reported as 
stolen. 
3) If so, whether this put them off stealing phones at all. 
4) Whether they think any of our proposed design changes would lower the crime rate- we 
aim  to show them two or three proposed design solutions and ask their opinion about 
effectiveness in terms of deterrence. 
5) Whether our proposed design solutions therefore have the potential to decrease repeat 
offending- if a thief steals 3 phones upon release and they are all useless within 24 hours, 
would this deter them from stealing again or would they continue on the off chance that 
some may still work? 
 
 
Will the research address any of the following issues, including when analysing data? 
 
Gender   X  Ethnicity     
 
Religion     Sexuality     
 
Young/ elderly prisoners X  Other diversity issues   
(please state)    
         
In order to capture the appropriate offender population, it will be necessary to interview 
offenders under 21, including juveniles. 
Gender and age would ideally be recorded as part of the data set. However, neither names 
nor date of birth are needed, ensuring anonymity.       
 
What are the potential benefits of the research: 
 
 to the Prison Service? 
 
Put simply, effective Crime Prevention techniques will lower the future inmate population. 
Our research seeks to maximise the effectiveness of both current and new Crime Prevention 
techniques. Our research to date suggests that the cost of mobile phone theft to the U.K as 
a whole is in the region of a billion pounds per year- some of this cost is borne by the prison 
service.  
The knowledge gained from the prisoners will inform us (Criminologists, Home Office, 
Police)  how best to lower the rate of mobile phone theft. The prevention techniques 
analysed would deter many currently active thieves and inmates from re-offending, and also 
prevent novices from committing initial offences, since it would be known that stolen phones 
were worthless in terms of resale value. 
 
In addition, the interviews themselves will show current offenders that action is being taken, 
and so may deter them from offending upon release, thus immediately decreasing repeat 
offending on release. 
 
Furthermore, the work would inform Home Office future research and policy (see attached 
letter of support from Peter Hamerton of the Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team.) 
 
 to academic knowledge in the field of study? 
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Over all the research will further our knowledge of the specific and ongoing issue of mobile 
phone theft within the U.K, which has been high and remained high since the inception of 
the Street Crime Initiative in 2001. 
The interviews in particular will add the level of detail necessary to unpick the different types 
of mobile theft, and therefore allow us to identify tailored crime prevention measures. As 
stated before, the seminal text on the subject is now outdated and other research is scarce. 
The opinions of the interviewees about the potential deterrence effect of the proposed 
designs will increase knowledge of offenders perceptions and thought processes. 
 
 
10. Research Plan and Methodology 
 
Briefly describe the research methodology: 
 
1. Identifying suitable offender population: 
With the help of prison personnel, it is anticipated that a screening procedure will be 
necessary to identify offenders who have stolen mobiles, unless some institutions  have 
records at this level of detail, in which case these records could be used. 
 
2. Approach offenders and obtain consent. 
Please see attached Consent Form and Participant Information Sheet, both based on HMP 
templates. 
 
3. Interview offenders: 
a) 60 - 70% of interview time on gaining rapport, asking about the details of one offence, and 
discussing the deterrent effect of cutting off stolen mobiles within the U.K. 
b) 30- 40% of interview time on asking offenders’ opinions about deterrent effect of our novel 
designs. 
 
Anonymity: there appear to be 2 options: 
a) Once identified by the screening procedure, offenders will be anonymised by 
allocating a unique reference number to each named individual. The records of the 
names and reference numbers will be stored securely at Loughborough, separately 
from the interview results, so that any person accessing the interview results can not 
identify individuals from the interview results. 
b) The list of names and reference numbers are kept by HMP and so do not leave the 
institutions, making it impossible for researchers to identify who gave which interview 
results. HMP staff have access to the list. 
Either option is acceptable to us, as is whatever suits each establishment that we work with. 
 
4. Data analysis: 
Analysis will be both qualitative and quantitative, as appropriate. 
 
5. Dissemination of results: 
a) Findings: Via reports to EPSRC, to Home Office, to HMP, to mobile phone operators and 
manufacturers, and papers published in peer reviewed journals (e.g. British Journal of 
Criminology). 
b) Applications of the research: via working groups with H.O, GSMA, MICAF, CJS and other 
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appropriate bodies. 
 
11. What data will be collected during the research? 
Please include with this application any research tools that will be used in the research 
 
1. Offender age and gender. 
2. Answers to interview questions- please see attached questions. 
3. Opinions on deterrent effect of design solutions- please see attached mock up of one 
proposed solution. Ideally we would show the offenders models of mobile phones with the 
design solutions on them; failing this we would want to show them 3D computer images on a 
laptop. If a laptop is not acceptable, we can use large posters/ cutouts. 
 
 
Which (if any) measurement tools will be used? 
 
None. 
 
 
Please list any equipment, which you are intending to bring into the prison 
establishment.  
E.g. tape recorders etc… 
 
Dictaphone, stationary to take notes during interviews, laptop to display proposed design 
solutions. 
 
 
What is the proposed timetable for the research? 
 
Interviews conducted: May to mid-June. 
Results analysis: mid-June to mid-July. 
Report writing and further analysis: mid-July to end of August. 
 
When will the research be completed? 
 
Fieldwork: end of June 2006. 
 
Report: 31 August 2006. 
 
 
12. Research Analysis and Dissemination 
 
How will the research results be analysed? 
 
Results from the rating of the deterrent effect of the proposed design solutions will be 
analysed quantitatively using SPSS.  
Results from conversations describing the nature of offences and choices of phone will be 
summarised qualitatively, and quantitative analysis carried out if the data are suitable. It is 
envisaged that if a suitable number of interviews are conducted, the results could be 
analysed  using the same methodology employed by Allen et al. 2005 (Fraud and 
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Technology Crimes: findings from the British Crime Survey and 2003 Offending, Crime and 
Justice Survey, pg22) Here, victims of mobile phone theft were asked about the 
circumstances of the incident, and the results presented both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 
 
Will the research include a reconviction study? If yes, please state how this will be 
conducted 
 
NO. 
 
NB. Governors/ Area Psychologists reviewing an application, which includes a 
reconviction element should forward it to the Reconviction Analysis Team in RDS-
NOMS. 
 
How long will the research materials be retained? 
1 year after interview. 
 
 
How will the results of the research be disseminated? e.g. thesis, article, book etc... 
1) Initial report to the EPSRC (funding body) of the project outcomes. 
2) To HMP, CJS and Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team via meetings and report. 
3) As paper(s) in academic peer reviewed journals, such as The British Journal of 
Criminology. 
4) To the mobile phone security industry through reports to and meetings with key contacts 
within relevant institutions/ bodies. E.g The GSMA, MICAF. 
 
 
 
Please state how the results will be made available to the Prison Service.  
 
The final report for the EPSRC would be made available to the Prison Service. Also, 
outcomes from the research will filter down via Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team, in 
terms of recommendations, further research etc. 
13.  
 
14. Access to Prison Establishments, Prisoners and Staff 
 
What establishment(s) is access being sought for? Please state name(s) or type(s) of 
establishment? 
 
Birmingham, 
Brockhill, 
Swinfen Hall, 
Stoke Heath. 
 
NOTE: this list is not exhaustive- we would interview anyone suitable regardless of which 
establishment they were in. In part our choice of establishment is to be guided by your 
knowledge of how we might identify people who have been involved in mobile phone theft. 
 
Please state your reasons for choosing this establishment(s)?  
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Previous research shows that the perpetrators of mobile phone theft tend to be young: 
Smith (2003; pg 22) described the majority of robbery offenders as under 21yrs. 
Harrington and Mayhew (2001; pg 37) ) described the majority of mobile phone thieves 
offenders as between 15 and 18. 
Thus it is important that we interview a cross-section of juveniles under 18, and young 
offenders under 21.  
The institutions listed are those geographically based in the Midlands area, purely for ease 
of access/ travel etc by the research team. Again this is an ideal scenario, and not set in 
stone. 
 
References: 
Allen et al (2005) Fraud and Technology Crimes: findings from the 2002/03 British Crime 
Survey  and the 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey. Home Office Online Report 
34/05. 
 
Harrington, V. & Mayhew, P. (2001) Mobile Phone Theft. Home Office Research Study 235. 
 
Smith, J. (2003). The Nature of Personal Robbery. Home Office Research Study 254.  
 
 
If you wish to conduct your research in more than four prisons, please provide further 
details on why this number of prisons is required? 
As before, the exact number of establishments will depend on how easy it is to identify 
offenders involved in mobile phone theft. Ideally, the number of establishments will be kept 
at a minimum to save both HMP and Loughborough resources. 
The research aims to conduct 40 offender interviews. 
 
Have any establishments been approached separately about this research? If so, 
please provide details: 
Initially we were unaware of this central form to request permission at the regional level, and 
so have sent individual letters to the Governors of the following institutions: 
Ashwell, Foston Hall, Glen Parva, Leicester, Norwich, Onley, Brinsford, Brockhill, Shanley, 
Stoke Heath, Swinfen Hall, Werrington. 
 
The response has been mixed and we will communicate to each one that we are now 
following the central NRC approval route. 
 
How long will the researcher(s) need to be inside each prison establishment)? Number 
of days and numbers of hours per day. 
 
15 hours total per institution, spread over 2.5 days. 
 
Rationale: 
Ideally we would interview 40 prisoners, averaging ten at each of four establishments. 
 
Each interview will last approximately one hour, with an allowance of 30 minutes between 
interviews for overspill, breaks and for offenders to be found and escorted to the interview 
room. 
40 x 1.5 hrs = 60 hours total, between the 4 institutions. 
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How many prisoners would be involved? Please state if any types of prisoner, sampling 
of prisoners is required  
40 in total. 
Sample: those involved in mobile phone theft from the person/ robbery, and theft from 
warehouses/shops. We are not focusing on those who committed burglary and took a 
phone as a by product of that burglary. 
 
How will you identify the prisoners to be involved in the research? 
If possible, prisoners responsible for mobile phone theft will be identified by Area Psychology 
or other HMP personnel with knowledge of offender’s crimes, or access to records of such. 
If this is not possible, we will conduct a screening visit to each institution to discuss how best 
to identify offenders.  
 
How long will the researcher(s) need to be in contact with prisoners?   
One hour per offender. 
 
How many staff would be involved? Please state if any types of staff, sampling of staff is 
required  
As many as necessary to follow internal procedures to identify relevant offenders, for sitting 
in on interviews/ escorting both us and offenders around the establishments. Estimate 3 or 4 
at each institution?. 
 
Will the researcher(s) need to be in contact with prison staff?  
Planning: one x 2 hour meeting to identify suitable offenders. 
Ongoing: one hour on phone calls/ miscellaneous communications. (e.g. to arrange 
interview dates). 
Interviews: 10 interviews per institution, each taking 1.5 hours average, giving 15 hours of 
staff time per staff member present for escorting offenders/ us at any one time during 
interviews.  
 
Are there any resource implications for Prison Service Headquarters? e.g. anticipated 
demands on staff time, office requirements, information etc… 
 
As above, the resource demands would be initially to identify a suitable offender population, 
and then during interview for escorting/ access to buildings etc. 
 
 
 
15. Research Ethics 
 
Please state how informed consent will be obtained? If a consent form will be used, 
please include this with your application. 
See attached form- we are happy to revise this as advised by you. 
 
 
 Has a relevant Ethics Committee approved the research? If so, please attach a copy of 
the submission to the Ethics Committee and its response: 
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Attached is a copy of the ethics approval form sent to Loughborough University Ethics 
Committee, concerning specifically the interview stage of this research. We are currently 
waiting for their response. 
 
 
Please confirm that: 
 the research will comply with the Prison Service’s Statement of Professional 
principles, and provide any relevant consent forms that will be used in the 
research 
 only one copy of this application has been sent to the Prison Service 
 
 
Signature:      Date: 
 
 
 
 
Please return this form, together with 
 
 Copies of the CVs of all researchers 
 Copies of any submission to an Ethics Committee and its response 
 Copies of any questionnaires, topic schedules, and consent forms etc… 
 
 To ONE of the following: 
 
 Prison Governor/ Research Contact 
 Area Psychologist 
 Prison Service Headquarters – Psychology Group 
 
Please refer to PSO 7035 at: http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/resourcecentre 
For details of who application forms should be sent to. 
 
If you have any questions about this form, please contact: 
AppliedPsychologyGroup@hmps.gsi.gov.uk 
 
 
 355 
 
Appendix 5.2 Interview questionnaire 
Interview Schedule - Mobile Phones 
Loughborough University 
 
I’m a researcher from Loughborough University. We’re doing research into mobile phones and 
mobile phone theft. I’m going to ask you some questions about different issues relating to mobile 
phones. This will cover your use of mobile phones, different phone designs, and different things that 
are done to stop mobile phone theft.  
 
The interview will probably take about 40 minutes or so - the time it takes varies from one person to 
the next.    
 
Let me reassure you I am not writing down you your name. Everything you say is confidential. Any 
reports we write about the research will not identify you or any individual person.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
SECTION I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. If in prison: ‘We know you’re not allowed mobiles in here, but before you were here, did 
you own a mobile phone?’ 
Not prison: ‘Do you have a mobile phone?’ 
 
No……………………………….0 Go to Q7 
Yes, 1……………………………1 Go to Q2 
Yes, 2..…………………………..2 Go to Note 1a 
Yes, more than 2………………..3 Go to Note 1a 
 
Note 1a: If phone user: From now on we’d like to talk about the phone you use the most. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2. What make is/was it? 
 
Alcatel……... 1  Orange……… 18 
BlackBerry… 2    Panasonic....... 19 
BlueBerry…. 3   Philips……… 20         
Bosch……… 4  Qtek………… 21 
BT…………. 5  Sagem………. 22   
BT Cellnet… 6  Samsung……. 23 
EG………… 7   Sanyo………. 24 
Fujitsu…….. 8    Seconda……. 25 
Hutchinson.. 9       Sendo………. 26 
Hutchinson 3. 10       Sharp………. 27 
i-mate…….. 11       Siemens......... 28 
LG………… 12       Sony Ericsson 29 
Motorola…. 13       T-mobile....... 30 
NEC……… 14   Toshiba ……. 31 
Nikon…….. 15        Virgin……… 32 
Nokia…….. 16        Vodafone….. 33 
O2………... 17       Any other….. 34 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
3. What model is/was it? (If outside: If you are unsure would you mind if we checked it now?) 
 
(specify)______________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4. How long have/did you /have it? 
 
0-6 months…………... 1          13-18 months……….. 3  
7-12 months………… 2         19-24 months………. 4 
      >24 months………… 5 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5. Do/did you mainly use it for texting or for voice calls? 
 
Text… …….. 1 
Voice………. 2 
Mixture…….. 3 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Do you feel it is important to have all the bells and whistles like camera, video or music for 
example? 
 
No (calls text only)….. 0 
Yes…………………... 1 
[If yes] please explain……..……………………………………………………………. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
7. Did you know that phones can be blocked, so they can’t make calls?  
 
No……………………………………………………..0 (If no go to note 2, and Q9) 
Yes……………………………………………………1 (If yes go to Q 8) 
Note 2: basically, if you called up say O2 or Vodafone, and told them that your phone had been 
stolen, they can block it so that it can’t be used by the thief to make any calls.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
8. [If yes] Can you tell me what you know? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
(If confused between SIM lock and blocking/blacklisting, explain difference- SIM lock makes sure 
you’re phone will only work on a particular network, whereas blacklisting means the whole phone 
doesn’t work.) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
9. Have you ever heard of the IMEI, the phone’s serial number? 
 
No……………………………………… 0 (Go to note 3) 
Yes……………………………………. 1 (Go to Q10) 
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10. [If yes] Can you tell me what you know? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
Note 3: You remember we just talked about phone companies could block your phone so it can’t 
make calls? The IMEI is the number they use so they know it’s your phone they’re blocking. It’s a bit 
like a car number plate- there’s usually only one number so its easy to tell which phones are which. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Are you familiar with the idea of mobile phone reprogramming? 
 
No……………………………………………………….0 (Go to note 4) 
Yes………………………………………………………1 
 
12. [If yes] Can you tell me what you know?………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Note 4: Reprogramming is another word for changing the serial number, or IMEI. So it changes the 
phone’s identity. If your phone is blocked, for example because it’s reported as stolen, one way to get 
it working again is to reprogram or change the serial number. It’s illegal but it happens! 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
SUMMARY: in summary then, are you O.K with the idea that phones can be blocked so they don’t 
work, and that the way the phone company knows which phone to block is to use its serial number, 
the IMEI? One way that people can get round a blocked phone is to change that IMEI, so that the 
phone works again. This is called reprogramming the IMEI. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
SECTION II: COMPARING PAIRS OF PHONES 
 
I’m going to show you some pictures of mobile phones, two at a time. Each time I’m going to ask you 
which of the two phones you would steal if they were both available (easy to steal, no risk) but you 
could only take one of them. There’s only 6 pairs in total.  
 
13. Given that an easy opportunity arose to steal one of these phones, with no risk, which would you 
choose?  Which is more attractive to take? [SHOW PAIR 1 – OLD/NEW] 
 
Phone on Left …… 1 
Phone on Right…… 2  
Neither……………. 3 
Don’t know……….. 4 
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IF LEFT OR RIGHT CHOSEN: Why did you chose that one rather than the other? (prompt for 
specifics as necessary if first response is just ‘because it looks better’ etc. E.g. ‘In what way does it 
look better?’)  
14. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
15. Given that an easy opportunity arose to steal one of these phones, with no risk, which would you 
choose?  Which is more attractive to take? [SHOW PAIR 2 – Sony Ericcsons - older and 
newer] 
 
Phone on Left …… 1 
Phone on Right…… 2  
Neither……………. 3 
Don’t know……….. 4 
 
IF LEFT OR RIGHT CHOSEN: Why did you chose that one rather than the other? (prompt for 
specifics as necessary if first response is just ‘because it looks better’ etc.)  
16. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
17. Given that an easy opportunity arose to steal one of these phones, with no risk, which would you 
choose?  Which is more attractive to take? [SHOW PAIR 3 – silver Nokias, square and 
curved] 
 
Phone on Left …… 1 
Phone on Right…… 2  
Neither……………. 3 
Don’t know……….. 4 
 
IF LEFT OR RIGHT CHOSEN: Why did you chose that one rather than the other? (prompt for 
specifics as necessary if first response is just ‘because it looks better’ etc.)  
18. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
19. Given that an easy opportunity arose to steal one of these phones, with no risk, which would you 
choose?  Which is more attractive to take? [SHOW PAIR 4 – black sliders -Nokia and 
Samsung] 
 
Phone on Left …… 1 
Phone on Right…… 2  
Neither……………. 3 
Don’t know……….. 4 
 
IF LEFT OR RIGHT CHOSEN: Why did you chose that one rather than the other? (prompt for 
specifics as necessary if first response is just ‘because it looks better’ etc.)  
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20. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
21. Given that an easy opportunity arose to steal one of these phones, with no risk, which would you 
choose?  Which is more attractive to take? [SHOW PAIR 5 – silver clamshells] 
 
Phone on Left …… 1 
Phone on Right…… 2  
Neither……………. 3 
Don’t know……….. 4 
 
IF LEFT OR RIGHT CHOSEN: Why did you chose that one rather than the other? (prompt for 
specifics as necessary if first response is just ‘because it looks better’ etc.)  
22. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
23. Given that an easy opportunity arose to steal one of these phones, with no risk, which would you 
choose?  Which is more attractive to take? [SHOW PAIR 6 – Fortress/concept] 
 
Phone on Left …… 1 
Phone on Right…… 2  
Neither……………. 3 
Don’t know……….. 4 
 
IF LEFT OR RIGHT CHOSEN: Why did you chose that one rather than the other? (prompt for 
specifics as necessary if first response is just ‘because it looks better’ etc.)  
24. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION III: DESIGN SOLUTIONS 
 
Now I'd like to ask your opinion about different ways that people try to stop having their mobile 
phones taken. Some of them are just ideas so they might seem new, but it’s all part of our work.  
 
I’d like you to pretend you were thinking of taking a mobile phone. Then, for each question I ask, can 
you tell me if there is anything about the idea that would put you off taking the phone.  
 
For each question I will ask: ‘Is this a good idea-would it put you off?’ and I would like you to chose 
one of these four answers:  
 
Show SHOWCARD A  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
[‘Identifiable’ solutions] 
25. The phone has someone's name written on it with a marker pen? Would that put you off? 
 
Not at all………. 1 
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A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
26. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
27. The phone has someone's name stamped on the cover, but it is not one of those covers you can 
replace easily, so you can’t get rid of the name? Would that put you off? 
 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
28. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
29. The phone has someone's face stamped on the cover, and again its not one of those covers you can 
replace easily, so you can’t get rid of the picture? Would that put you off? 
 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
 
30. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
[‘Seen’ solutions] 
31. Now I’m going to show you a picture, and I’d like you to tell me what you’d think if you saw that 
on a phone- what’s your gut reaction? Would it put you off?  [SHOW PICTURE OF EYE?] 
 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
32. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
33. If I told you that the eye, this symbol, means the phone won’t work if it’s reported stolen. Would 
that put you off ? 
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Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
 
34. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
35. Now imagine that the phone’s serial number, the IMEI, is stamped on the outside of phone so that 
people such as the police or a potential buyer can check to see if it’s been changed. Would that 
put you off? 
 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
36. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
[‘Attached’ solutions] 
37. This phone is attached by a chain to someone's trousers (SHOW PICTURE OF LANYARD 
CHAIN) Would that put you off? 
 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
 
38. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
39. This picture shows a phone which is worn on the wrist like a bracelet  (SHOW WRIST BAND 
PHONE). Would that put you off? 
 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
40. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 362 
 
41. Imagine a phone where the handset communicates with another part on the wristband of the 
owner. When the handset is taken more than a few feet away from the user, a loud alarm goes of 
on the handset. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
42. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
43. Imagine the same phone where the handset and wristwatch communicate. What if, when the 
handset is taken away, the alarm goes off on the wristwatch of the owner? Would that put you 
off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
44. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
('Findable' solutions) 
45. Imagine that the mobile phone is fitted with a tracking device -  like a tracker on a car - so it can 
be located when it’s stolen. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
46. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(‘Executable' solutions) 
47. Imagine that the mobile phone handset will definitely be blocked in the UK within 48 hours of 
being reported stolen, so it cannot be used. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
48. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
49. What if it would be blocked even quicker, say within 24 hours? Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
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A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
50. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
51. What if you knew that the phone would be blocked immediately in the UK? Would that put you 
off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
52. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
 
Notes: do they mention abroad? Aware of selling abroad? If so, probe further………………. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
('Necessary' solutions) 
53. Imagine that the mobile phone will definitely be cut off when stolen, but it will still work as a 
camera and MP3 player. Would that put you off?  
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
54. Why is that?……………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(‘Secure’ solutions) 
55. Imagine that the phone was likely to be cut off, but that your friend had the equipment to unblock 
it by changing its identity [if necessary: its serial number, the IMEI number], so that it worked 
again. Would the blocking (still) put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
56. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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57. What if the phone would be cut off and the only way to reactivate it was to get inside and change 
some of the chips inside it, which is quite difficult to do. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
58. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(Back to ‘necessary’ solutions) 
59. Imagine that the mobile phone can only be activated with something unique to the owner, like a 
fingerprint, an eye scan, or face recognition. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
60. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
61. Imagine that the handset  is locked by a PIN code, so you need to take it to someone who can 
unlock it before it works. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
62. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
('Detectable' solutions) 
63. Imagine you're in a public place and you see an unguarded mobile phone but there’s some other 
people watching. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
64. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
('Hidden' solutions) 
65. Imagine that you know somebody is carrying a mobile phone because you can see the headset  
they’re wearing, so you know the phone is in their pocket. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
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A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
 
66. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
('Reduced Value' solutions) 
67. Imagine that people only carry very cheap 'disposable’ mobile phones. They can only be used for 
voice calls and text. They don’t have a screen. They can't be reprogrammed. They can have up to 
£5 worth of call credit on them. Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
68. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
69. Let's say that handsets in the future are all free, and are just left lying around in bars, restaurants 
etc.  They don't hold any personal information on them, they are just used to connect to say the 
internet, so there’s no money or personal details on them.  Would that put you off? 
Not at all………. 1 
A little………… 2 
Quite a lot……... 3 
Completely……. 4 
 
70. Why is that?..……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………….……………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
71. Right, and finally on the subject of ideas to stop people taking phones- let's say that you were 
employed by the mobile phone industry to come up with an idea for a mobile phone that wouldn’t 
get stolen. Do you have any ideas?  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION IV: EXPERIENCE OF TAKING PHONES 
 
Next I’m going to ask you a few questions about your experiences of taking mobile phones. This is 
the last set of questions.  
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72. Now as you know, the reason we’re asking your opinion on these ideas is because you know a bit 
about taking phones. That’s fine. It’s actually very useful for us, because you’re the expert. Can 
you tell us, from your experience, do you prefer to steal phones rather than other things?   
 
Yes (mobile phones)……….. 1 
No (other things)……………. 2 
Don’t know/ no opinion…….. 3 
Depends on situation……….. 4 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
73. Can you tell us why you say that? [Probe as necessary if only a general response given: - ‘Is 
there something in particular about mobiles that makes them good to take?’ Or: ‘Is anything better 
than a mobile?’) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
74. Would you say, in general, that some types of mobile phone are more attractive to steal than 
others? In your experience did you make a choice about which ones to steal, or take any type that 
was available? 
 
Choice made yes…………….. 1 
Anything that was available…. 2 
Depends……………………… 3 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
75. What choices did you make, and why? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
[‘Who what when where and why’ of last offence] 
The next set of questions relate to the last time you took a mobile phone. The last time you took a 
mobile phone,  
 
76. What make of phone was it? 
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Alcatel……... 1  Orange……… 18 
BlackBerry… 2    Panasonic....... 19 
BlueBerry…. 3   Philips……… 20         
Bosch……… 4  Qtek………… 21 
BT…………. 5  Sagem………. 22   
BT Cellnet… 6  Samsung……. 23 
EG………… 7   Sanyo………. 24 
Fujitsu…….. 8    Seconda……. 25 
Hutchinson.. 9       Sendo………. 26 
Hutchinson 3. 10       Sharp………. 27 
i-mate…….. 11       Siemens......... 28 
LG………… 12       Sony Ericsson 29 
Motorola…. 13       T-mobile....... 30 
NEC……… 14   Toshiba ……. 31 
Nikon…….. 15        Virgin……… 32 
Nokia…….. 16        Vodafone….. 33 
O2………... 17       Any other….. 34 
 
 
77. What model of mobile phone was it?………………………………….. 
 
78. Who did it belong to?  
 
Stranger………………………………... 1 
Don’t know……………………………. 2 
Relative (specify)……………………… 3 
Friend…………………………………. 4 
Partner………………………………..... 5 
Work colleague……………………….. 6 
Other (specify)..……………………...... 7 
 
79. How did you steal it?… 
Robbery street…………………………………… 1 
Robbery public space not street………………….. 2 
Snatch theft……………………………………… 3 
Burglary…………………………………………. 4 
Part of a fight……………………………………. 5 
Left unattended in a bar…………………………. 6 
Left unattended public transport……………….... 7 
Left unattended other (specify)…………………. 8 
Pickpocket……………………………………….. 9 
Other (specify)………………………………….. 10 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
80. What year and month was it: YR ……….    MON ….……..  
 
Jan ………….. 1 Jul…………….. 7 
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Feb…………. 2 Aug…………… 8 
Mar………….. 3 Sep…………… 9 
Apr…………. 4 Oct……………. 10 
May…………. 5 Nov…………… 11 
Jun……….. …. 6 Dec……………. 12 
 
 
81. What time of day was it? (to nearest hour) …………… 
 
82. Where was it?  ……………………………………………… 
 
83. Why did you take that particular mobile phone? …………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
84. How many mobile phones would you say you have taken, in total? (prompt as necessary: If it is a 
lot, can you give me a rough estimate?)  
 
Total number taken ………….(If 1 go to 80) 
 
85. Over what time period were these taken?:  …………YRS …………… MONTHS 
 
 
86. If you took mobile phones more than once, did you ever take them from the same person, 
business, property?  
 
Yes … 1 (Go to 80 below) 
No….. 2 (Go to 81) 
 
87. IF YES: Can you tell me a bit more about why you took them from the same person/place:  
 
 ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
88. Did you look for a certain type of phone? Was the type of phone important to you? Would you 
steal one model but leave another? 
 
Choice made yes……………. 1 
Anything that was available… 2 
Depends…………………….. 3 
Not applicable………………. 4 
 
 
89. Why was that? ………………………………………………………………………. 
 
…..……………………………………………………………………………… 
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……..……………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
90. What happened to make you decide to take a phone that day? (If needed prompt for specifics - but 
do not lead) E.g. When did you make the decision to take that phone? Can you tell me in words 
what you were thinking? ->What sort of day was it? What were you doing before you took  it? 
Then what happened… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
[Selling on ] 
91. And can I ask about you- when you took a phone, did you sell it on to anyone else? 
Yes……..1 (Go to Q85) 
No……….2(Go to Q90) 
 
 
 
92. Who did you sell it on to? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
93. How did you find out they wanted a phone? (Prompt: What happened to end up with you selling it 
to them?) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
94. Did you do anything to the phone before you passed it on?  Probe: When you took the phone, was 
it the same when you sold it on? 
 
Change cover……………………….. 1 
Reprogramme IMEI………………… 2 
Disable SIM lock…………………… 3 
New SIM in…………………………. 4 
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Other (specify)……………………… 5 
 
 
95. Do you know what they (the buyer) was planning to do with the ‘phone? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
96. (If bought to sell on again-) Was the buyer planning to alter the phone in any way before passing 
it on? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
[Fence knowledge] 
 
Thank you, and we’re nearly done now. 
 
97. Are you aware of anyone who regularly buys phones from thieves to sell them on, a fence? 
Yes…………………………………… 1 (go to 90 ) 
No…………………………………… 0 (go to 96) 
 
98. Where do they sell them on? …………………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
99. Who buys the handsets?....................................................................................................... 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
100. How much do they charge for a handset?....................................................................... 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
101. How much do they pay for a handset? …………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
102. Do they ask for specific types of handset? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 371 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
[False claims] 
 
103. Right, a slight change of subject here- would you ever consider making a false claim to the 
insurance company to upgrade your model of mobile phone? 
 
Yes………………………    1 
No…………………………. 2 
 
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
[Snowballing to identify other interviewees] 
 
104. We are interested in speaking to other people about mobile phones. Is there anyone you know 
of (in here or outside) who we might talk to? We’re interested in speaking to people who have 
specialised in stealing phones, reprogramming, or selling or fencing stolen phones. 
 
(Person a)………………………………………………………………… 
 
(Person b) ………………………………………………………………… 
 
(Person C) ………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
105. Have you got any questions for us? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Demographics 
106. Respondent is:  
 
  Male……….. 1 
Female ……. 2 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
107. Can I ask you your age?:  
 
Age:   15 and under……….1   36-40……………….6 
   16-20………………2   41-45…………….…7 
   21-25………………3   46-50……………….8 
   26-30………………4   51 and over…………9 
   31-35………………5 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
108. Let me remind you that this is all confidential and anonymous.  Can I ask you which of these 
categories you would put yourself into?:  (Show SHOWCARD B). 
 
Ethnic Origin:  White/British……………………….1    
White/Irish………………………….2 
   White other……….………………...3 
 
   Mixed- White/Black Caribbean…….4 
   Mixed- White/Black African………..5 
   Mixed- White/Asian………………...6 
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   Mixed- Other………………………..7 
 
   Asian/Asian British- Indian…………8 
   Asian/Asian British- Pakistani………9 
   Asian/Asian British- Bangladeshi…...10 
   Asian/Asian British- Other…………..11 
 
   Black/Black British- Caribbean……...12 
   Black/Black British- African………...13 
   Black/Black British- Other…………..14 
 
   Chinese……………………………….15 
   Other (specify)………………………..16 
 
Region you live in: Anglia………………1     Scotland………………….7 
Home Counties……..2       South East/ Southern….…8 
London ……………..3     South West………………9 
   Midlands……………4     Tyne-Tees……………….10 
North West………….5     Yorkshire………………...11 
Northern Ireland…….6     Wales…………………….12 
    
Other (please specify) ………………………13 
 
 
 
109. Where interviewed (list the YOT, prison, or Uni)………………………………… 
 
110. Student, prisoner or young offender/ other (specify)…..................... 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
*NOTE DATE AND QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ON FRONT OF QUESTIONNAIRE.* 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you very much for your time. If you’ve got any questions about any of this once we’ve gone 
you can contact who ever it was that arranged this interview.  
Do you have any questions for me?  
Is there anything else you’d like to tell me about mobile phones that you think I’ve missed?  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 5.3 Loughborough University’s internal Ethical Advisory Committee 
form. 
 
1. ETHICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
 
 
 
RESEARCH PROPOSAL FOR HUMAN BIOLOGICAL OR 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
This application should be completed after reading the University Code of Practice 
on Investigations Involving Human Participants  (found at 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/ind-cophp.htm).   
2. 1. Project Title 
Iconography and Semantics of Technological Deterrence within Mobile 
Telephones: A Crime Feasibility Study 
3. 2. Brief lay summary of the proposal for the benefit of non-expert 
members of the Committee 
Mobile phone theft is an ongoing crime problem in both the U.K and abroad. 
This project aims to review the progress to date, to recommend how to improve 
on current systems designed to cut off mobiles if they are reported as stolen, 
and to suggest novel design solutions which might further lower the crime rate. 
The Ethics Committee approval requested here is specifically for interviewing 
Young Offenders who have been involved in mobile phone theft, in order to find 
out how they committed such thefts, and to ask their opinion about the potential 
deterrent effect of several novel designs supplied by the Design and Technology 
arm of this research team. 
For example, if there were a symbol on the phone warning that the phone would 
be cut off if stolen, would offenders be deterred by this or indifferent to it? 
40 offenders will be interviewed in the various HMP Institutions where they are 
held, with each interview lasting 1 hour. In addition to this Loughborough Ethical 
approval, the HMP Central Research Office also require a separate Ethics 
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submission from the team, which must be approved before arrangements to 
interview can be made. Both forms are to be submitted in parallel to minimise 
delays. 
4. 3. Details of responsible investigator (supervisor in case of student 
projects) 
Titl
e 
Profes
sor 
Surnam
e 
Farrell Forena
me 
Graham 
Department Director, Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, 
Dept Social Sciences, Loughborough University. 
Email 
address 
G.Farrell@lboro.ac.uk 
Personal experience of proposed procedures and/or methodologies. 
Professor of Criminology, with lecturing including crime prevention.  Previous 
experience includes many research projects and publications, including a range 
of experience in survey/interview research. 
5. 4. Names, experience, department and email addresses of additional 
investigators 
Jennifer Mailley, Research Associate, Midlands Centre for Criminology and 
Criminal Justice, Dept Social Sciences. 
Email: J.C.Mailley@Lboro.ac.uk 
Jen worked as a Forensic Scientist in the Forensic Science Service for 5 years 
before completing an MSc in Crime Science. Research at Loughborough has 
involved interviewing many people about mobile phone crime, ranging from 
Fraud and Security specialists to Home Office personnel. While volunteering for 
Tamworth Volunteer Bureau interviewed a wide range of people about their 
experiences of volunteering.  
Shaun Whitehead, Research Associate, Dept of Design and Technology. 
Email: Shaun@creationeer.co.uk 
Shaun has interviewed many types of people in the course of his work as an 
Engineer and Project Manager, ranging from TV Executives to NASA scientists 
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. 
6. 5. Proposed start and finish date and duration of project  
Start 
date 
1 Sep 2005 Finish 
date 
31 Aug 2006 Durati
on 
12 months 
7. 6. Location(s) of project 
Interviews of offenders: various Young Offenders Institutes in the Midlands area. 
Data analysis/ write up: Midlands Centre for Criminology, Dept of Social 
Sciences, Loughborough University. 
8. 7. Reasons for undertaking the study (eg contract, student research) 
EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council) Grant funded 
research. 
9. 8. Do any of the investigators stand to gain from a particular 
conclusion of the research project? 
 
No 
 
9a. Is the project being sponsored? Yes  No  
If yes, please state source of funds including contact name and address. 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) 
Crime and Technology Programme, 
Polaris House 
North Star Avenue 
Swindon 
Wiltshire 
SN2 1ET  
England 
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9b. Is the project covered by the sponsors 
insurance? 
Yes  No  
If no, please confirm details of alternative cover (eg University cover). 
University standard cover 
10. 10. Aims and objectives of project 
Specifically, for the approval sought here, to interview offenders in Young 
Offender Institutes to ascertain details of past crimes they committed where a 
mobile phone was stolen, and to seek their opinions about the efficacy of 
proposed design based solutions. 
11. 11. Brief outline of project 
Interview 40 offenders who have stolen mobile phones either in ‘Street Crime’ 
style offences (robbery or theft from person), or from more organised bulk thefts 
from warehouses, lorries etc. We are not interested in phones taken as a by 
product of burglary, i.e. where the phone was not the primary target.  
The details of the ‘Who What When Where and Why’ of the crimes committed 
will add to current understanding of offender behaviour and choices made. 
Gaining their views of the proposed solutions will inform whether any proposed 
solutions warrant further research. 
12. A) STUDY DESIGN 
Structured interview, with qualitative and quantitative analysis, as appropriate. 
13. B) MEASUREMENTS TO BE TAKEN 
Some measurements will be quantitative and some qualitative, depending on 
the specific question and to some extent the offenders’ responses. 
For example, ‘Describe how you chose which person to approach’ requires 
qualitative analysis, and ‘Please rate the deterrent potential of this design on 
a scale of 1 to 10’ requires quantitative. 
 
14. 12. Please indicate whether the proposed study: 
Involves taking bodily samples Ye  No  
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s 
Involves procedures which are physically invasive (including 
the collection of body secretions by physically invasive 
methods) 
Ye
s 
 No  
Is designed to be challenging (physically or psychologically 
in any way), or involves procedures which are likely to cause 
physical, psychological, social or emotional distress to 
participants 
Ye
s 
 No  
Involves intake of compounds additional to daily diet, or 
other dietary manipulation / supplementation 
Ye
s 
 No  
Involves pharmaceutical drugs (please refer to published 
guidelines)  
Ye
s 
 No  
Involves testing new equipment Ye
s 
 No  
Involves procedures which may cause embarrassment to 
participants 
Ye
s 
 No  
Involves collection of personal and/or potentially sensitive 
data 
Ye
s 
 No  
Involves use of radiation (Please refer to published 
guidelines. Investigators should contact the University’s 
Radiological Protection Officer before commencing any 
research which exposes participants to ionising radiation – 
e.g. x-rays) 
Ye
s 
 No  
Involves use of hazardous materials (please refer to 
published guidelines) 
Ye
s 
 No  
Assists/alters the process of conception in any way Ye
s 
 No  
Involves methods of contraception Ye
s 
 No  
Involves genetic engineering Ye
s 
 No  
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If Yes - please give specific details of the procedures to be used and arrangements 
to deal with adverse effects. 
Details of offenders past offences are inherently sensitive data. However, the 
names of offenders will not be recorded, nor will their date of birth, ensuring 
anonymity.  
Data will be stored securely at Loughborough and accessed only by the relevant 
named researchers. 
15. 13. Participant Information 
Details of participants (gender, age, special interests etc) 
40 offenders aged between 15 and 21. This age group is necessary because 
past Home Office research shows the majority of offences are committed by 
people in this age range. 
Number of participants to be recruited: 40 
How will participants be selected?  Please outline inclusion/exclusion criteria to be 
used. 
Following advice from HMP personnel, suitable interviewees will be identified 
and approached according to the various HMP Institutions’ internal procedures. 
If HMP personnel can not identify suitable offenders, it will be necessary for the 
Loughborough University research team to screen potential interviewees with a 
brief questionnaire. 
How will participants be recruited and approached?  
As above- by HMP Personnel according to internal procedures. No incentives 
are offered for participation. Experience from previous interviews suggests that 
many will participate simply for a break in their every day routine. 
Please state demand on participants' time. 
One hour per interviewee.  
16. 14. Control Participants 
Will control participants be used? Ye
s 
 No  
If Yes, please answer the following: 
 379 
 
Number of control participants to be recruited:  
How will control participants be selected?  Please outline inclusion/exclusion criteria 
to be used. 
N/A 
How will control participants be recruited and approached?  
N/A 
Please state demand on control participants' time. 
N/A 
17. 15. Procedures for chaperoning and supervision of participants 
during the investigation 
HMP personnel will chaperone interviewees to and from the interviews, and will 
be present either at each interview or just outside the room, depending on the 
requirement of each HMP Institution. 
18. 16. Possible risks, discomforts and/or distress to participants 
Possible embarrassment/ shame at recounting past illegal activities, but 
participation is voluntary. 
19. 17. Details of any payments to be made to the participants 
None 
 
18. Is written consent to be obtained from 
participants? 
Yes  No  
If yes, please attach a copy of the consent form to be used. 
If no, please justify. 
N/A 
20. 19. Will any of the participants be from one of the following 
vulnerable groups? 
Children under 18 years of age 21. Y No  
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e
s 
People over 65 years of age Ye
s 
 No  
People with mental illness  Ye
s 
 No  
Prisoners/other detained persons Ye
s 
 No  
Other vulnerable groups Ye
s 
 No  
If you have selected yes to any of the above, please answer the following 
questions: 
a) what special arrangements have been made to deal with the issues of 
consent? 
We are in the process of submitting a full Ethics Approval form to HMP Central 
Research Office, and as part of this procedure we are seeking advice from them 
as to the suitability of our consent form.  
The absence of any incentive to participate should ensure that participation is 
truly voluntary. 
b) have investigators obtained necessary police registration/clearance? 
(please provide details or indicate the reasons why this is not applicable to 
your study) 
If HMP indicate that clearance of any form is needed we will of course obtain it, 
and inform Loughborough Ethics Committee of this. 
22. 20. How will participants be informed of their right to withdraw from 
the study? 
Verbally at the stage of selection, in the Participants Information sheet, and by 
us at the start of each interview. 
23. 21. Will the investigation include the use of any of the following? 
Audio recording  Ye  No  
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s 
Video recording Ye
s 
 No  
Observation of participants Ye
s 
 No  
If yes to any, please provide detail of how the recording will be stored, when the 
recordings will be destroyed and how confidentiality of data will be ensured? 
N/A 
24. 22. What steps will be taken to safeguard anonymity of 
participants/confidentiality of personal data? 
The names of participants are not needed- we will assign a unique reference 
number to each interviewee and the cross reference of this to named individuals 
could be kept by HMP personnel. Similarly, date of birth is not needed by the 
research team and so will not be part of the data set taken away from the 
interviews and stored at Loughborough. 
Data will be stored securely on password protected computer systems in locked 
offices, in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
25. 23. What steps have been taken to ensure that the collection and 
storage of data complies with the Data Protection Act 1998?   Please see 
University guidance on Data Collection and Storage and Compliance with 
the Data Protection Act. 
As above, secure storage of anonymised data, and archiving of the data after 
the maximum period of 6 years. 
26. 24. INSURANCE COVER: 
It is the responsibility of investigators to ensure that there is appropriate 
insurance cover for the procedure/technique. 
 
The University maintains in force a Public Liability Policy, which indemnifies it 
against its legal liability for accidental injury to persons (other than its employees) 
and for accidental damage to the property of others. Any unavoidable injury or 
damage therefore falls outside the scope of the policy. 
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Will any part of the investigation result in unavoidable 
injury or damage to participants or property? 
Ye
s 
 No  
If yes, please detail the alternative insurance cover arrangements and attach 
supporting documentation to this form. 
 
N/A 
 
The University Insurance relates to claims arising out of all normal activities of the 
University, but Insurers require to be notified of anything of an unusual nature  
 
Is the investigation classed as normal activity? Ye
s 
 No  
If no, please check with the University Insurers that the policy will cover the activity.  
If the activity falls outside the scope of the policy, please detail alternative insurance 
cover arrangements and attach supporting documentation to this form. 
 
N/A 
27. 25. Declaration 
I have read the University's Code of Practice on Investigations on Human 
Participants and have completed this application.  I confirm that the above named 
investigation complies with published codes of conduct, ethical principles and 
guidelines of professional bodies associated with my research discipline. 
I agree to provide the Ethical Advisory Committee with appropriate feedback upon 
completion of my investigation. 
Signature of applicant:   
Signature of Head of Department:   
Date   
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PLEASE ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE ATTACHED COPIES OF THE FOLLOWING 
DOCUMENTS TO YOUR SUBMISSION. 
 Participant Information Sheet 
 Informed Consent Form 
 Health Screen Questionnaire* 
 Advertisement/Recruitment material* 
 Evidence of consent from other Committees* 
 
*where relevant 
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Appendix 5.4 Application form for undertaking interviews within HM Prison 
Service. 
APPLICATION TO UNDERTAKE RESEARCH IN HER MAJESTY'S 
PRISON SERVICE 
Researcher Details 
Surname: Mailley      Title: Miss. 
Forename(s): Jennifer Clare 
Contact Address: 
Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, 
Department of Social Sciences, 
Brockington Building, 
Loughborough University. 
Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU 
 
Contact Telephone Number: 01509 223616/ 07956 459 156 
Contact Email Address: J.C.Mailley@lboro.ac.uk 
 
Name, Status and Address of Research Supervisor (if appropriate): 
Professor Graham Farrell, 
Director, Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice,  
Department of Social Sciences, 
Brockington Building, 
Loughborough University, 
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Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU 
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Name and Address of Sponsoring Body (if appropriate): 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) 
Crime and Technology Programme, 
Polaris House 
North Star Avenue 
Swindon 
Wiltshire 
SN2 1ET  
England 
 
If more than one researcher will be engaged on the project, please copy this page and 
provide details on all.  
Please attach a CV for all researchers: 
15.1.1. Please find attached CVs for Jennifer Mailley, Graham Farrell, and Shaun Whitehead. 
15.1.2.  
 
15.1.3.  
15.1.4.  
Researcher Details 
Surname: Whitehead     Title: Mr 
Forename: Shaun  
Contact Address: 
Department of Design and Technology, 
Loughborough University, 
Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU 
 
Contact Telephone Number: 01664 810009/ 07729 410561 
Contact Email Address: shaun@creationeer.co.uk 
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Name, Status and Address of Research Supervisor (if appropriate): 
Professor Graham Farrell, 
Director, Midlands Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice,  
Department of Social Sciences, 
Brockington Building, 
Loughborough University, 
Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU 
Name and Address of Sponsoring Body (if appropriate): 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) 
Crime and Technology Programme, 
Polaris House 
North Star Avenue 
Swindon 
Wiltshire 
SN2 1ET  
England 
 
 
15.1.5. ADDITIONAL OBSERVER: 
15.1.6. In addition to the 2 researchers named above, Peter Hamerton from the Home Office 
Acquisitive Crime Team plans to attend a selection of the interviews as an observer. 
Please see attached letter of support also. He is contactable on his mobile: 07984 
493077  
 
All research is to be overseen by Professor Graham Farrell, who has previous experience of 
interviewing offenders, and will be heavily involved in the analysis and dissemination of the work, 
and will attend at least the initial interviews.  
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Proposed Research – Aims and Objectives 
15.2. Research title:  
Iconography and Semantics of Technological Deterrence within Mobile 
Telephones: A Crime Feasibility Study 
15.3. Reason for undertaking research project: 
Academic research as part of the Midlands Centre for Criminology’s normal academic activities. 
We have an EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council) grant to look into 
the problem of mobile phone theft, and interviewing offenders is part of that EPSRC funded 
project. Goals of the project include publications in relevant journals, such as the British Journal 
of Criminology, and more importantly tangible, practical solutions actionable by the Home Office, 
mobile phone industry and Criminal Justice System to lower mobile phone theft. 
Mobile phone theft remains high, due to continued demand on the black market for the newer 
models released. Understanding exactly how such thefts occur, where the phones go, who 
fences them, who buys them and how offenders might be deterred or more easily detected will 
aid the development of crime prevention policy and of  policing strategies, ultimately lowering the 
crime rate. 
The reason for interviewing offenders is twofold: 
Firstly, to gain in depth knowledge of the ‘Who What When Where and Why’ of the thefts 
committed. Previous research in this area is scarce, and the main text, Harrington and Mayhew 
2001, is out of date, since new technologies and methods of selling phones (abroad, and over 
the internet) have emerged since this research was undertaken. 
Secondly, to ask offenders if they would be deterred from repeat offending by the new phone 
designs we will present to them. These designs range from simply warning the thief that the 
phone can and will be blocked (and so be worthless) if it is stolen, to incorporating biotechnology 
making it much more difficult for the phone to be used by anyone apart from the rightful owner. 
Thus we will be able to assess which, if any, of these solutions are worth considering further in 
working groups consisting of the Home Office, National Mobile Phone Crime Unit, handset 
manufacturers (e.g. Nokia) and network operators (e.g O2). 
The Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team agrees that the problem of mobile theft is an ongoing 
and expensive issue, and welcome out independent and academic but practically based input- 
see letter of support from Peter Hamerton attached. 
 
Furthermore, the U.K has already put in place a system (where stolen phones are cut off), to 
tackle the issue of mobile phone theft, but there is no documentation of the good practice used 
and the lessons learned during the process of setting up this system, nor of any issues 
remaining. Our initial research suggests there are implementation issues which if resolved could 
greatly improve the efficacy of the system at cutting off stolen phones, and therefore deterring 
theft for resale within the U.K. Thus another aim of this research is to bring together this previous 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
389 
 
work and communicate it to the relevant parties- other criminologists, the Home Office 
Acquisitive Crime Team, the network operators and handset manufacturers, and working groups 
concerned with security such as MICAF (Mobile Industry Crime Action Forum) and the GSMA 
(Global Systems Mobile Association).  
This aspect of the research (which is separate from but intertwined with the interviews sought 
here) presents an opportunity to document good practice, in order to spread the lessons learnt,  
while identifying implementation issues, and building on this to make recommendations to 
increase the efficacy of the system and ultimately lower the rate of mobile phone thefts in the 
U.K. 
Finally, this research has implications for other ‘crime waves’: if a solution to drive down the 
thefts of mobile phones can be found, then the same ideas can be applied to the emerging wave 
of thefts of PDAs, SatNav, MP3 players and other new portable technologies (‘Hot Products’). 
What is (are) the research question(s)? 
Overall project questions: 
1) What is the nature and extent of mobile phone theft in the U.K now, in 2006? 
2) What happens once a phone is reported stolen- is it cut off? How? If not, why not? 
3) What would act as a deterrent to potential thieves, to lower the incidents of mobile phone 
theft? 
4) Is there evidence that by cutting off phones stolen within the U.K, the criminal market has 
changed to selling more phones abroad (where the phones still function)? 
Questions to be addressed by interviewing offenders: 
A list of specific proposed interview questions is attached, which we are happy to revise based 
on any guidance from you, but in general the interviews aim to find out: 
1) The detail of an offenders last incidence of taking a phone- how, where, when, why that 
phone/ that person. 
2) Whether they are aware that phones can be cut off in the U.K once they’re reported as stolen. 
3) If so, whether this put them off stealing phones at all. 
4) Whether they think any of our proposed design changes would lower the crime rate- we aim  
to show them two or three proposed design solutions and ask their opinion about effectiveness 
in terms of deterrence. 
5) Whether our proposed design solutions therefore have the potential to decrease repeat 
offending- if a thief steals 3 phones upon release and they are all useless within 24 hours, would 
this deter them from stealing again or would they continue on the off chance that some may still 
work? 
Will the research address any of the following issues, including when analysing data? 
Gender   X  Ethnicity     
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Religion     Sexuality     
Young/ elderly prisoners X  Other diversity issues   
(please state)    
         
In order to capture the appropriate offender population, it will be necessary to interview offenders 
under 21, including juveniles. 
Gender and age would ideally be recorded as part of the data set. However, neither names nor 
date of birth are needed, ensuring anonymity.       
 
What are the potential benefits of the research: 
 to the Prison Service? 
Put simply, effective Crime Prevention techniques will lower the future inmate population. Our 
research seeks to maximise the effectiveness of both current and new Crime Prevention 
techniques. Our research to date suggests that the cost of mobile phone theft to the U.K as a 
whole is in the region of a billion pounds per year- some of this cost is borne by the prison 
service.  
The knowledge gained from the prisoners will inform us (Criminologists, Home Office, Police)  
how best to lower the rate of mobile phone theft. The prevention techniques analysed would 
deter many currently active thieves and inmates from re-offending, and also prevent novices 
from committing initial offences, since it would be known that stolen phones were worthless in 
terms of resale value. 
In addition, the interviews themselves will show current offenders that action is being taken, and 
so may deter them from offending upon release, thus immediately decreasing repeat offending 
on release. 
Furthermore, the work would inform Home Office future research and policy (see attached letter 
of support from Peter Hamerton of the Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team.) 
 to academic knowledge in the field of study? 
Over all the research will further our knowledge of the specific and ongoing issue of mobile 
phone theft within the U.K, which has been high and remained high since the inception of the 
Street Crime Initiative in 2001. 
The interviews in particular will add the level of detail necessary to unpick the different types of 
mobile theft, and therefore allow us to identify tailored crime prevention measures. As stated 
before, the seminal text on the subject is now outdated and other research is scarce. 
The opinions of the interviewees about the potential deterrence effect of the proposed designs 
will increase knowledge of offenders perceptions and thought processes. 
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15.3.1.1. Research Plan and Methodology 
Briefly describe the research methodology: 
1. Identifying suitable offender population: 
With the help of prison personnel, it is anticipated that a screening procedure will be necessary 
to identify offenders who have stolen mobiles, unless some institutions  have records at this level 
of detail, in which case these records could be used. 
2. Approach offenders and obtain consent. 
Please see attached Consent Form and Participant Information Sheet, both based on HMP 
templates. 
3. Interview offenders: 
a) 60 - 70% of interview time on gaining rapport, asking about the details of one offence, and 
discussing the deterrent effect of cutting off stolen mobiles within the U.K. 
b) 30- 40% of interview time on asking offenders’ opinions about deterrent effect of our novel 
designs. 
Anonymity: there appear to be 2 options: 
b) Once identified by the screening procedure, offenders will be anonymised by allocating a 
unique reference number to each named individual. The records of the names and 
reference numbers will be stored securely at Loughborough, separately from the 
interview results, so that any person accessing the interview results can not identify 
individuals from the interview results. 
c) The list of names and reference numbers are kept by HMP and so do not leave the 
institutions, making it impossible for researchers to identify who gave which interview 
results. HMP staff have access to the list. 
Either option is acceptable to us, as is whatever suits each establishment that we work with. 
4. Data analysis: 
Analysis will be both qualitative and quantitative, as appropriate. 
5. Dissemination of results: 
a) Findings: Via reports to EPSRC, to Home Office, to HMP, to mobile phone operators and 
manufacturers, and papers published in peer reviewed journals (e.g. British Journal of 
Criminology). 
b) Applications of the research: via working groups with H.O, GSMA, MICAF, CJS and other 
appropriate bodies. 
15.4. What data will be collected during the research? 
Please include with this application any research tools that will be used in the research 
1. Offender age and gender. 
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2. Answers to interview questions- please see attached questions. 
3. Opinions on deterrent effect of design solutions- please see attached mock up of one 
proposed solution. Ideally we would show the offenders models of mobile phones with the 
design solutions on them; failing this we would want to show them 3D computer images on a 
laptop. If a laptop is not acceptable, we can use large posters/ cutouts. 
Which (if any) measurement tools will be used? 
None. 
Please list any equipment, which you are intending to bring into the prison establishment.  
E.g. tape recorders etc… 
Dictaphone, stationary to take notes during interviews, laptop to display proposed design 
solutions. 
What is the proposed timetable for the research? 
Interviews conducted: May to mid-June. 
Results analysis: mid-June to mid-July. 
Report writing and further analysis: mid-July to end of August. 
When will the research be completed? 
Fieldwork: end of June 2006. 
Report: 31 August 2006. 
 
15.4.1.1. Research Analysis and Dissemination 
How will the research results be analysed? 
Results from the rating of the deterrent effect of the proposed design solutions will be analysed 
quantitatively using SPSS.  
Results from conversations describing the nature of offences and choices of phone will be 
summarised qualitatively, and quantitative analysis carried out if the data are suitable. It is 
envisaged that if a suitable number of interviews are conducted, the results could be analysed  
using the same methodology employed by Allen et al. 2005 (Fraud and Technology Crimes: 
findings from the British Crime Survey and 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey, pg22) 
Here, victims of mobile phone theft were asked about the circumstances of the incident, and the 
results presented both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 
Will the research include a reconviction study? If yes, please state how this will be 
conducted 
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NO. 
NB. Governors/ Area Psychologists reviewing an application, which includes a reconviction element 
should forward it to the Reconviction Analysis Team in RDS-NOMS. 
How long will the research materials be retained? 
1 year after interview. 
How will the results of the research be disseminated? e.g. thesis, article, book etc... 
1) Initial report to the EPSRC (funding body) of the project outcomes. 
2) To HMP, CJS and Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team via meetings and report. 
3) As paper(s) in academic peer reviewed journals, such as The British Journal of Criminology. 
4) To the mobile phone security industry through reports to and meetings with key contacts 
within relevant institutions/ bodies. E.g The GSMA, MICAF. 
Please state how the results will be made available to the Prison Service.  
The final report for the EPSRC would be made available to the Prison Service. Also, outcomes 
from the research will filter down via Home Office Acquisitive Crime Team, in terms of 
recommendations, further research etc. 
15.4.1.2.  
 
15.4.1.3. Access to Prison Establishments, Prisoners and Staff 
What establishment(s) is access being sought for? Please state name(s) or type(s) of 
establishment? 
Birmingham, 
Brockhill, 
Swinfen Hall, 
Stoke Heath. 
 
NOTE: this list is not exhaustive- we would interview anyone suitable regardless of which 
establishment they were in. In part our choice of establishment is to be guided by your 
knowledge of how we might identify people who have been involved in mobile phone theft. 
Please state your reasons for choosing this establishment(s)?  
Previous research shows that the perpetrators of mobile phone theft tend to be young: 
Smith (2003; pg 22) described the majority of robbery offenders as under 21yrs. 
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Harrington and Mayhew (2001; pg 37) ) described the majority of mobile phone thieves 
offenders as between 15 and 18. 
Thus it is important that we interview a cross-section of juveniles under 18, and young offenders 
under 21.  
The institutions listed are those geographically based in the Midlands area, purely for ease of 
access/ travel etc by the research team. Again this is an ideal scenario, and not set in stone. 
References: 
Allen et al (2005) Fraud and Technology Crimes: findings from the 2002/03 British Crime Survey  
and the 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey. Home Office Online Report 34/05. 
Harrington, V. & Mayhew, P. (2001) Mobile Phone Theft. Home Office Research Study 235. 
Smith, J. (2003). The Nature of Personal Robbery. Home Office Research Study 254.  
If you wish to conduct your research in more than four prisons, please provide further 
details on why this number of prisons is required? 
As before, the exact number of establishments will depend on how easy it is to identify offenders 
involved in mobile phone theft. Ideally, the number of establishments will be kept at a minimum 
to save both HMP and Loughborough resources. 
The research aims to conduct 40 offender interviews. 
Have any establishments been approached separately about this research? If so, please 
provide details: 
Initially we were unaware of this central form to request permission at the regional level, and so 
have sent individual letters to the Governors of the following institutions: 
Ashwell, Foston Hall, Glen Parva, Leicester, Norwich, Onley, Brinsford, Brockhill, Shanley, Stoke 
Heath, Swinfen Hall, Werrington. 
The response has been mixed and we will communicate to each one that we are now following 
the central NRC approval route. 
How long will the researcher(s) need to be inside each prison establishment)? Number of 
days and numbers of hours per day. 
15 hours total per institution, spread over 2.5 days. 
Rationale: 
Ideally we would interview 40 prisoners, averaging ten at each of four establishments. 
Each interview will last approximately one hour, with an allowance of 30 minutes between 
interviews for overspill, breaks and for offenders to be found and escorted to the interview room. 
40 x 1.5 hrs = 60 hours total, between the 4 institutions. 
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How many prisoners would be involved? Please state if any types of prisoner, sampling of 
prisoners is required  
40 in total. 
Sample: those involved in mobile phone theft from the person/ robbery, and theft from 
warehouses/shops. We are not focusing on those who committed burglary and took a 
phone as a by product of that burglary. 
How will you identify the prisoners to be involved in the research? 
If possible, prisoners responsible for mobile phone theft will be identified by Area Psychology or 
other HMP personnel with knowledge of offender’s crimes, or access to records of such. 
If this is not possible, we will conduct a screening visit to each institution to discuss how best to 
identify offenders.  
How long will the researcher(s) need to be in contact with prisoners?   
One hour per offender. 
How many staff would be involved? Please state if any types of staff, sampling of staff is 
required  
As many as necessary to follow internal procedures to identify relevant offenders, for sitting in on 
interviews/ escorting both us and offenders around the establishments. Estimate 3 or 4 at each 
institution?. 
Will the researcher(s) need to be in contact with prison staff?  
Planning: one x 2 hour meeting to identify suitable offenders. 
Ongoing: one hour on phone calls/ miscellaneous communications. (e.g. to arrange interview 
dates). 
Interviews: 10 interviews per institution, each taking 1.5 hours average, giving 15 hours of staff 
time per staff member present for escorting offenders/ us at any one time during interviews.  
Are there any resource implications for Prison Service Headquarters? e.g. anticipated 
demands on staff time, office requirements, information etc… 
As above, the resource demands would be initially to identify a suitable offender population, and 
then during interview for escorting/ access to buildings etc. 
 
15.4.1.4. Research Ethics 
Please state how informed consent will be obtained? If a consent form will be used, please 
include this with your application. 
See attached form- we are happy to revise this as advised by you. 
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 Has a relevant Ethics Committee approved the research? If so, please attach a copy of the 
submission to the Ethics Committee and its response: 
Attached is a copy of the ethics approval form sent to Loughborough University Ethics 
Committee, concerning specifically the interview stage of this research. We are currently waiting 
for their response. 
Please confirm that: 
 the research will comply with the Prison Service’s Statement of Professional principles, and 
provide any relevant consent forms that will be used in the research 
 only one copy of this application has been sent to the Prison Service 
 
Signature:      Date: 
Please return this form, together with 
 Copies of the CVs of all researchers 
 Copies of any submission to an Ethics Committee and its response 
 Copies of any questionnaires, topic schedules, and consent forms etc… 
 To ONE of the following: 
 Prison Governor/ Research Contact 
 Area Psychologist 
 Prison Service Headquarters – Psychology Group 
Please refer to PSO 7035 at: http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/resourcecentre 
For details of who application forms should be sent to. 
 
If you have any questions about this form, please contact: 
AppliedPsychologyGroup@hmps.gsi.gov.uk 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
397 
 
Appendix 5.6 Interviewee consent form 
 
Participant Information Number for Study: 
 
  
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: Mobile Phone Theft 
    
Name of Researcher: Jen Mailley 
               Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet, dated ___________ for 
the above study, and have had an opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, without my care or rights being affected.     
      
 
 
3. I understand that notes taken during this interview may be looked at by appropriate members of 
the University of Loughborough research team, where it is relevant to my taking part in research.  
I give permission for these individuals to have access to my records.    
       
 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study.       
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________________________        _________________       _______________________ 
Name of Participant          Date   Signature  
 
 
________________________        _________________       _______________________ 
Name of Person taking consent      Date   Signature   
(if different from researcher) 
 
 
__Jen Mailley____________       __________________     _______________________ 
Researcher          Date   Signature   
 
 
One for participant, one for researcher;  one to be kept with HMP files 
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Appendix 7.1. Formal request for access to NMPCU data, October 2005. 
Note: the real letter was printed on official University headed note paper 
 
Commander Delbar 
Metropolitan Police TPHQ, 
Victoria Embankment, 
London, 
SW1A 2JL. 
 
cc.  Det Supt. Eddie Thomson, NMPCU 
 Emma-Louise Avery, Home Office (Acquisitive Crime Team) 
28 October 2005 
 
Re: Research into Mobile Phone Crime 
 
Dear Commander Delbar, 
Further to my letter of 29th September 2005, and following more recent discussions and meeting with 
Roni Garcia of NMPCU,  I am writing to request access to NMPCU data on mobile phone crime. With 
sponsorship from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, I am working with a team at 
Loughborough University that is seeking to address the issue of mobile phone crime. I attach a brief 
outline of the research project and a copy of my curriculum vitae for information.  
The attached overview of the research outlines why an analysis of recorded mobile crime data will be an 
integral part of the research. It will allow us, we hope, to identify patterns and trends in mobile phone 
theft and robbery (changes in the nature of offences, changes in the characteristics of victims, possible 
shift to thefts for the international rather than domestic re-sale market, etc.). Access to individual-level 
crime record data would allow us to conduct this type of analysis.  
I am also writing to clarify any data confidentiality issues. The standard procedure we undertake at the 
university with respect to any confidential data and information is:  
 
o To keep all confidential information on secure password-protected systems, and any hard copies are 
kept under lock-and-key.  
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o Any reports produced do not use any individual identifiers. The bulk of the analysis will be aggregate-
level information. Any case studies or illustrations will be appropriately changed to ensure individual 
anonymity.  
o We would be happy for any of our analysis that uses NMPCU records to be approved by you prior to 
any publications that may result from the research.  
 
It is my hope that our research evolves to become a two-way street and that we are able to produce 
work that is of use to NMPCU. With your permission, I would like to arrange to meet Mr Garcia of 
NMPCU in the near future to discuss any technical issues that might relate to the data.  
 
I would be very happy to answer any questions you may have about our research, or to meet you to 
discuss them.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
Professor Graham Farrell 
Director, Midlands Centre for Criminology and Crime Prevention 
 
bStreet Crime Action Team 
Fourth Floor, Peel, 2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P  4DF 
0207-035-4560  
peter.hamerton@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk  
 www.homeoffice.gov.uk 
 
Appendix 7.2 Letter of general support from Home Office to NMPCU 
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Appendix 7.3: Letter of support for research from HO SCAT 
 
 
10th October, 2005 
 
 
 
Dear Roni, 
 
Further to our earlier conversation I would like to confirm that we have been in discussions 
with 2 researchers from Loughborough University, Jennifer Mailley and Professor Graham 
Farrell about the possibility of undertaking a pre-funded research project on mobile phone 
theft. 
 
As far as I am aware, the precise nature of the project is unclear at this stage however 
numerous possibilities have been discussed.  
 
Again, depending on the precise nature of the project, I believe that it would be helpful for 
them to have access to data held by the NMPCU on this issue although this will be 
dependent on what types of data, the nature of the research project and operational/other 
concerns within the unit that you would be best placed to decide.  
 
However, broad expectations should include that data is treated in confidence and that the 
research would not be published without prior approval.   
 
If you have any further questions please feel free to contact me. 
 
 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Peter Hamerton 
Street Crime Action Team 
 
 
 
 
 
 
